2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
36 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
53 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
68 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
93 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
130 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
139 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
140 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
148 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
149 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
154 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
155 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
163 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
165 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
170 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
172 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
178 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
179 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
182 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
183 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
186 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
187 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
188 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
189 # error Internal DTLS version error
191 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
192 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
193 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
195 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
196 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
197 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
198 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
200 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
201 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
211 /* No valid transition found */
216 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
217 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
218 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
219 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
221 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
222 * (transition not allowed)
224 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
226 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
230 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
231 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
233 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
234 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
239 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
243 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
244 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
249 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
250 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
257 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
259 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
260 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
269 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
271 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
272 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
276 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
277 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
281 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
282 && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
283 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
285 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
286 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
287 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
288 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
290 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
291 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
292 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
293 * the server is resuming.
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
298 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
299 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
300 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
305 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
308 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
309 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
310 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
311 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
314 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
315 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
318 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
319 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
339 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
342 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
352 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
362 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
369 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
374 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
375 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
381 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
382 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
388 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
389 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
395 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
408 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
409 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
413 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
414 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
415 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
423 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
424 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
427 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
429 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
432 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
433 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
434 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
436 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
438 /* Shouldn't happen */
439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
440 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
442 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
443 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
444 if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
451 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
452 * we already sent close_notify
454 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
455 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
457 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
463 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
464 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
465 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
466 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
467 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
469 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
471 else if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
474 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
477 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
478 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
485 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
486 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
487 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
488 else if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
494 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
496 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
497 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
498 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
499 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
501 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
506 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
507 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
508 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
513 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 /* Try to read from the server instead */
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
524 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
525 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
527 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
529 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
532 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
533 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
536 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
537 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
539 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
541 /* Shouldn't happen */
542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
546 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
548 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
549 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
560 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
562 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
563 * actually selected a version yet.
565 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
572 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
575 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
579 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
580 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
581 * because we did early data.
583 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
584 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
585 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
587 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
590 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
591 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
593 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
598 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
599 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
608 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
610 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
611 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
614 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
615 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
616 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
617 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
619 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
620 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
624 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
625 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
630 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
633 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
634 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
635 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
636 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
637 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
642 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
643 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
645 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
650 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
651 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
656 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
658 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
664 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
666 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
673 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
675 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
678 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), 1)) {
679 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
681 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
683 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
686 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
692 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
693 * the client to the server.
695 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
697 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
699 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
701 /* No pre work to be done */
704 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
706 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
707 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
708 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
712 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
) {
714 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
715 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
716 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
717 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
719 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s
,
721 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
,
722 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
,
723 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0,
724 NULL
, 0, NID_undef
, NULL
, NULL
,
726 /* SSLfatal already called */
732 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
733 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
736 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
737 * messages unless we need to.
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
742 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)))) {
743 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
744 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
750 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
752 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
753 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
754 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
756 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
757 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
758 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
761 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
762 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
765 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
766 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
769 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
773 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
774 * client to the server.
776 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
778 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
779 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
783 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
785 /* No post work to be done */
788 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
789 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
790 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
792 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
793 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
794 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
796 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
797 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
798 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
803 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
804 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
808 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
809 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
814 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
815 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
822 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
823 || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
825 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
826 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
828 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
829 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
830 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
832 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
833 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
837 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
839 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
841 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
842 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
844 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
846 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
852 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
857 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
861 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
864 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
869 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
873 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
875 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
877 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
880 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
884 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
887 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
888 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
892 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
893 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
894 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
895 /* SSLfatal() already called */
902 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
903 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
905 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
912 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
916 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
919 * Valid return values are:
923 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
924 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
926 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
928 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
934 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
935 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
936 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
938 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
939 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
942 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
943 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
944 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
947 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
948 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
949 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
952 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
958 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
959 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
963 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
964 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate
;
965 *mt
= SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
;
969 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
970 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
971 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
974 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
975 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
976 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
979 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
980 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
981 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
982 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
985 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
986 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
987 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
990 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
991 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
992 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1000 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1001 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1003 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1005 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1007 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1009 /* Shouldn't happen */
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1013 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1015 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1016 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1019 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1020 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1022 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1023 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1025 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1026 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1028 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1029 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1031 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1033 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1034 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1035 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1037 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1040 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1043 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1045 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1048 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1049 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12
;
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1052 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1055 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1058 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1063 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1065 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1068 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1070 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1072 /* Shouldn't happen */
1073 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1074 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1077 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1079 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1080 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1082 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1083 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1086 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1087 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1090 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1091 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1094 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1096 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1097 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1100 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1102 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1103 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1105 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1106 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1108 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1109 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1111 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1112 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1114 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1115 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1118 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1120 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1121 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1126 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1129 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1132 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1134 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1136 /* Shouldn't happen */
1137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1140 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1141 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1142 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s
, wst
);
1144 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1145 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1146 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1150 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1158 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1159 unsigned char *session_id
;
1160 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1162 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1163 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1164 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, protverr
);
1166 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1170 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1171 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1172 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1173 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1174 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1175 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1178 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1180 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1183 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1184 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1186 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1189 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1196 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1199 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1200 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1206 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1207 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1208 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1209 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1210 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1211 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1212 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1213 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1216 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1217 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1218 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1219 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1220 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1221 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1222 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1223 * know that is maximum server supports.
1224 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1225 * containing version 1.0.
1227 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1228 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1229 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1230 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1231 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1232 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1233 * the negotiated version.
1235 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1236 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1238 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1239 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1241 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1245 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1246 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1247 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1248 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1249 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1250 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1251 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1252 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1253 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1254 sess_id_len
, 0) <= 0) {
1255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1256 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1262 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1263 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1264 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1265 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1266 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1269 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1270 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1272 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1274 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1277 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1278 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1279 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1280 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1281 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1283 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1287 /* Ciphers supported */
1288 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1290 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1293 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
1295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1298 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1300 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1304 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1306 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1309 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1310 && sctx
->comp_methods
1311 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1312 || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1313 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
);
1314 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1315 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1316 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1318 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1323 /* Add the NULL method */
1324 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1325 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1326 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1329 /* TLS extensions */
1330 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1332 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1335 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
1338 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1343 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1344 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1345 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1346 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1349 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1350 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1352 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1355 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1357 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1359 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1361 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1364 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1365 const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1367 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1368 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1370 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1372 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1374 /* unknown cipher */
1375 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1379 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1380 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1382 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1387 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1388 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1390 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1395 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1396 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1397 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1403 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1404 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1405 * set and use it for comparison.
1407 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1408 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1409 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1410 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1411 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(sctx
, c
->algorithm2
);
1414 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1415 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1418 || md
!= ssl_md(sctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1420 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1425 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1429 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1433 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1438 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1440 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1441 size_t session_id_len
;
1442 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1444 unsigned int compression
;
1445 unsigned int sversion
;
1446 unsigned int context
;
1447 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1448 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1453 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1458 /* load the server random */
1459 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1460 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1461 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1462 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1463 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1467 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1468 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1469 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
1470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1474 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1475 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1479 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1485 /* Get the session-id. */
1486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1490 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1491 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1492 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1493 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1497 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1502 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1507 /* TLS extensions */
1508 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1509 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1510 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1511 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1517 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1518 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1519 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1520 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1521 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1525 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1531 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1532 if (compression
!= 0) {
1533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1534 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1538 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1539 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1540 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1547 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1552 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1556 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1557 * are appropriate for this version.
1559 context
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1560 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1561 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1568 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1570 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1571 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1573 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1575 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1579 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1580 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1581 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1582 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1588 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1589 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1590 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1591 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1592 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1593 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1594 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1595 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1596 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1597 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1599 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1600 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1601 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1603 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1604 * backwards compat reasons
1606 int master_key_length
;
1608 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1609 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(ssl
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1612 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1613 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1614 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1615 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1616 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1618 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1623 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1624 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1625 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1626 session_id_len
) == 0)
1631 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1632 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1633 /* actually a client application bug */
1634 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1635 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1640 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1641 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1642 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1643 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1644 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1646 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1647 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1648 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1654 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1656 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1657 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1658 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1659 * used for resumption.
1661 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1662 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1663 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1664 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1665 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1670 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1671 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1673 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1677 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1680 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1681 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1683 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1688 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1689 if (compression
!= 0) {
1690 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1691 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1695 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1696 * using compression.
1698 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1703 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1705 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1708 if (compression
== 0)
1710 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1711 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1714 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->comp_methods
,
1718 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1720 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1723 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1727 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1733 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1734 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1735 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1739 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1742 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1743 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1745 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1746 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1747 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1750 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
1751 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1753 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1754 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1758 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
),
1759 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1760 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1765 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1766 * we're done with this message
1768 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1769 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1770 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1771 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1776 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1777 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1779 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1780 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1783 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1786 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1789 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1790 * the old wrlmethod.
1792 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1793 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s
,
1795 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
,
1796 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
,
1797 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0,
1798 NULL
, 0, NID_undef
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal already called */
1802 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1803 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, TLS1_3_VERSION
);
1805 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1806 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1807 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1808 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1813 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1816 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1818 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1819 * ClientHello will not change
1821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1826 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1827 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1829 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1830 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1835 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1836 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1837 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1840 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1841 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1846 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1848 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1849 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1852 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1853 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1856 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1858 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1860 unsigned int context
= 0;
1861 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1863 if ((s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1868 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1870 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1871 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1872 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1873 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1876 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1877 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1878 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1879 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1883 certstart
= certbytes
;
1884 x
= X509_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
1886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1889 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
,
1890 cert_len
) == NULL
) {
1891 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1895 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1900 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1901 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1904 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1908 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1909 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1910 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1911 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1912 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1913 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1914 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1915 /* SSLfatal already called */
1918 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1921 if (!sk_X509_push(s
->session
->peer_chain
, x
)) {
1922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1927 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1931 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1932 s
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
1933 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1937 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1938 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1939 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1941 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1945 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1946 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1950 if (s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
1951 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1952 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1953 if (i
> 0 && s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
) {
1957 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1958 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1959 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1960 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1961 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1962 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1963 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1964 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1965 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1966 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1967 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1968 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1970 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1971 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1972 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1975 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1978 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1979 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1981 x
= sk_X509_value(s
->session
->peer_chain
, 0);
1983 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1985 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1987 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1991 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
,
1992 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
))) == NULL
) {
1993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1997 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1998 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2001 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2002 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
2003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2008 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2010 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
2011 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2013 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2014 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2015 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
2016 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
2017 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
2018 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2021 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2025 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2027 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2029 BUF_MEM
*buf
= BUF_MEM_new();
2031 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc
, pkt
, &tmppkt
, buf
) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
)
2032 ret
= tls_process_server_certificate(sc
, &tmppkt
);
2039 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2042 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
2044 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2046 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
2047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2052 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2053 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2054 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2057 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2062 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2063 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2064 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2065 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2066 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2073 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2078 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2081 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2083 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2084 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2085 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2086 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2092 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2093 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2095 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2096 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2098 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2099 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2101 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2102 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2103 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2107 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2108 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2112 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2113 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2114 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2123 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2125 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2126 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2127 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2128 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2129 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2130 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2131 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2134 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2135 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2136 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2141 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2142 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2144 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2145 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2146 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2151 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2153 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2154 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, g
)
2155 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
,
2157 || (params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
)) == NULL
) {
2158 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2162 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
2164 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2167 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) <= 0
2168 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &peer_tmp
, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR
, params
) <= 0) {
2169 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2173 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2174 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, peer_tmp
, sctx
->propq
);
2177 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2178 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2179 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2180 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2182 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx
) != 1
2183 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx
) != 1) {
2184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2188 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2189 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp
),
2191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2195 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2199 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2200 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2202 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2203 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2204 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2209 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2210 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2211 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2212 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2220 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2223 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2226 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2227 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2228 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2230 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2235 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2236 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2238 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2239 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2244 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(s
, curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2246 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2250 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2255 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2256 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2257 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
)) <= 0) {
2258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2263 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2264 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2267 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2268 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2269 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2270 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2271 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2273 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2274 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2278 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2281 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2282 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2283 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2284 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2285 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2287 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2289 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2291 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2292 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2294 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2295 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2296 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2301 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2302 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2303 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2304 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2308 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2309 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2313 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2314 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2315 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2323 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2326 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2332 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2333 * equals the length of the parameters.
2335 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2336 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2337 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2338 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2342 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2343 unsigned int sigalg
;
2345 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2349 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2350 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2353 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2355 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED
);
2359 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2361 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
);
2364 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2365 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2366 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
2368 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2369 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2370 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2374 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2375 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2381 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2382 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2387 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2388 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2389 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2390 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2395 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2396 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2402 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2403 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2406 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2409 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2412 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2413 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2414 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2415 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2416 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA
);
2419 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2422 /* still data left over */
2423 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2429 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2431 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2438 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2439 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
!= NULL
)
2440 memset(s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
, 0, s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2442 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
= OPENSSL_zalloc(s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2444 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2445 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
== NULL
)
2448 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2449 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2450 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2452 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2454 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2455 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2458 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2461 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2462 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2463 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2464 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2465 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2466 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2467 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2469 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2470 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2472 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2479 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2480 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2482 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2483 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2485 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2486 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2488 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2489 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2491 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2496 /* get the certificate types */
2497 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2498 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2499 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2502 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2504 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2507 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2510 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2516 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2517 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2519 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2521 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2524 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2526 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2530 /* get the CA RDNs */
2531 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2532 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2533 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2537 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2542 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2543 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2546 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2547 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2548 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2549 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2550 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2553 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2554 && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2555 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2557 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2560 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2563 unsigned int ticklen
;
2564 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2565 unsigned int sess_len
;
2566 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2568 EVP_MD
*sha256
= NULL
;
2569 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2571 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2573 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2574 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2575 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2576 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2577 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2578 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0
2579 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2580 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2581 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2586 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2587 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2588 * be 0 here in that instance
2591 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2594 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2595 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2596 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2597 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2598 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2601 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2602 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2605 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2608 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2613 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2614 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2616 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2617 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2618 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2620 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2623 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2624 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2627 s
->session
->time
= ossl_time_now();
2628 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
2630 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2631 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2632 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2634 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2635 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2639 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2640 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2644 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2645 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2646 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2648 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2651 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2652 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2653 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2657 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2658 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2660 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2661 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2662 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2669 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2670 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2671 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2672 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2673 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2674 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2675 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2676 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2679 sha256
= EVP_MD_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "SHA2-256", sctx
->propq
);
2680 if (sha256
== NULL
) {
2681 /* Error is already recorded */
2682 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2686 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2687 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2689 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2690 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2695 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2697 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2698 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2700 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2701 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2702 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2703 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
2705 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2707 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2708 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2712 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2714 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2716 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2717 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2718 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2719 s
->session
->master_key
,
2721 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2724 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2727 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2728 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2731 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2733 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2739 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2740 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2742 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2747 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2748 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2749 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2752 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2753 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2754 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2757 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2758 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2759 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= 0;
2760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2763 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2764 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2765 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2773 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2775 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2777 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2780 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2784 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2785 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2786 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2789 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2791 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2794 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2797 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2803 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2804 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2805 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2807 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2808 && sctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2809 int ret
= sctx
->ext
.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2810 sctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2814 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2819 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2824 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2825 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2826 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2836 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2838 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2839 /* should contain no data */
2840 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2844 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2845 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s
) <= 0) {
2846 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2847 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2852 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2854 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2857 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2860 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2865 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2866 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2869 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2870 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2871 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2872 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2873 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2876 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2881 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2883 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2884 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2885 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2888 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2890 psklen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2892 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2897 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2898 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2903 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2904 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2905 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2910 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2911 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2912 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2914 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2915 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2918 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2926 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2927 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2928 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2929 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2933 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2938 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2940 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2941 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2942 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2944 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2946 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2948 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2950 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2956 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2957 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "RSA")) {
2958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2962 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2963 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2965 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2969 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2970 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2971 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2, 0) <= 0) {
2972 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_RAND_LIB
);
2976 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2977 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2978 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2982 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pkey
, sctx
->propq
);
2983 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2984 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2985 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2988 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2989 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2990 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2993 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2996 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2997 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3002 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3003 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3004 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3008 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3009 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3013 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3014 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3019 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3021 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3022 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3024 unsigned char *encoded_pub
= NULL
;
3025 size_t encoded_pub_len
, pad_len
;
3028 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3034 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3036 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3041 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3045 /* send off the data */
3047 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3048 encoded_pub_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encoded_pub
);
3049 if (encoded_pub_len
== 0) {
3050 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3051 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3052 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
3056 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3057 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3060 prime_len
= EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey
);
3061 pad_len
= prime_len
- encoded_pub_len
;
3063 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, pad_len
, &keybytes
)) {
3064 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3067 memset(keybytes
, 0, pad_len
);
3070 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_pub
, encoded_pub_len
)) {
3071 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3077 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub
);
3078 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3082 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3084 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3085 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3086 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3089 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3091 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3095 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3101 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3102 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3106 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3107 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3109 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3110 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3114 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3121 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3122 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3126 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3129 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3130 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3133 unsigned int md_len
;
3134 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3135 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3136 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3137 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3139 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3141 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3142 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3145 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3147 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3148 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3149 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3150 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3154 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3155 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3157 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3158 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3162 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3163 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3164 * certificate key for key exchange
3167 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3169 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3171 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3175 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3176 /* Generate session key
3178 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3183 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3186 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3187 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3188 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3189 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3190 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3191 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3192 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3193 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3194 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3197 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3199 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3200 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) <= 0) {
3201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3204 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3206 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3209 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3214 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3215 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3216 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3222 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3223 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3227 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3228 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3229 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3238 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3240 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_MAGMA
) != 0)
3241 return NID_magma_ctr
;
3242 else if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_KUZNYECHIK
) != 0)
3243 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr
;
3248 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *dgst_buf
)
3250 EVP_MD_CTX
* hash
= NULL
;
3251 unsigned int md_len
;
3252 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3253 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
,
3259 if ((hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3260 || EVP_DigestInit(hash
, md
) <= 0
3261 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3262 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3263 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash
, dgst_buf
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3264 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3265 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3269 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3270 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3275 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3278 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3279 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3280 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
3281 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3283 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3286 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3287 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3289 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3294 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3295 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3299 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3301 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3307 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3308 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3312 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3313 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3314 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3316 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3320 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3321 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3323 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3328 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3333 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3334 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3335 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3340 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3341 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3346 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, NULL
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3347 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3351 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, msglen
, &encdata
)
3352 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, encdata
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3357 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3359 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3360 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3364 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3365 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3373 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3376 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3378 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3379 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3384 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3386 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3387 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3388 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3395 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3400 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3403 unsigned long alg_k
;
3405 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3408 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3409 * no need to do so here.
3411 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3412 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3415 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3416 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3418 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3419 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3421 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3422 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3424 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3425 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3427 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3428 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
))
3430 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3431 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3433 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3438 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3440 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3441 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3442 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3444 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3445 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3446 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3448 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3451 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3453 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3456 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3457 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3461 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3462 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3463 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
3474 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3476 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3485 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3486 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3487 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3489 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3492 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3495 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3496 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3498 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3499 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3500 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3503 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
3504 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3505 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3510 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3511 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3517 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3518 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3519 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3524 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3525 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3526 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3528 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3530 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3531 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3534 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3535 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3537 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3538 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3543 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3546 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3548 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3550 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3551 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3552 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3553 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(ssl
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3555 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3559 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3562 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3564 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3565 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3566 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3568 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3571 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3575 /* We need to get a client cert */
3576 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3578 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3579 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3581 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3583 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3586 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3587 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3588 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl
, x509
)
3589 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl
, pkey
))
3591 } else if (i
== 1) {
3593 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3597 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3598 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3601 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3602 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3603 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3604 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3606 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3607 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3608 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3609 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3615 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3616 || (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
) != 0)
3617 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3619 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3620 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3624 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3625 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3629 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3632 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3634 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3635 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3636 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3637 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3639 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3641 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3642 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3643 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3646 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3647 (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3648 : s
->cert
->key
, 0)) {
3649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3650 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3653 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3654 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3655 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3656 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3658 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3659 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3662 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3665 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3669 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
3672 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc
);
3674 BUF_MEM
*buf
= NULL
;
3677 COMP_METHOD
*method
;
3678 COMP_CTX
*comp
= NULL
;
3681 int alg
= sc
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0];
3683 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3685 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
|| !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt
, buf
))
3688 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3689 if (sc
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3690 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3691 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt
, 0))
3693 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt
, sc
->pha_context
, sc
->pha_context_len
))
3696 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc
, &tmppkt
, sc
->cert
->key
, 0)) {
3697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3701 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3702 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, alg
)
3703 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt
, &length
)
3704 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt
, length
))
3708 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib
:
3709 method
= COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3711 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli
:
3712 method
= COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3714 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd
:
3715 method
= COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3720 max_length
= ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg
, length
);
3722 if ((comp
= COMP_CTX_new(method
)) == NULL
3723 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
3724 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, max_length
, NULL
))
3727 comp_len
= COMP_compress_block(comp
, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
), max_length
,
3728 (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, length
);
3732 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, comp_len
, NULL
)
3733 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
3736 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc
)
3737 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(sc
,
3738 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3740 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3741 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3743 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3750 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3753 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3754 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt
);
3757 COMP_CTX_free(comp
);
3762 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3764 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3768 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3769 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3771 /* we don't have a certificate */
3772 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3775 /* This is the passed certificate */
3776 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
,
3777 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
3779 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3780 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3785 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3786 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3792 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3794 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3798 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3807 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3809 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3810 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3812 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3813 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3815 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3816 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3818 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3821 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3823 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3827 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3829 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3831 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3832 /* should contain no data */
3833 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3834 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3837 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3838 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3839 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3843 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3844 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3845 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3846 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3847 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3849 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
3850 SSL_renegotiate(ssl
);
3852 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl
);
3854 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3857 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3861 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3863 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3864 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3865 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3869 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3870 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3872 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3873 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3878 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3879 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3882 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3883 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3886 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3889 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3892 if (sctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3893 i
= tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3898 if (sctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3899 i
= sctx
->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), px509
, ppkey
);
3903 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3907 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3908 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3909 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3911 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3912 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3918 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3922 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3923 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3924 # error Max cipher length too short
3927 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3928 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3931 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3932 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3935 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3938 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3940 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3943 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3944 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3946 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3947 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3948 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3951 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3956 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3958 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3959 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3960 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
3963 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
3964 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3972 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3973 const char *maxvertext
=
3975 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3978 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
3984 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3985 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3986 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3988 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3993 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3994 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3995 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3997 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4007 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4009 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4010 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
4011 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
4012 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
4015 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;
4016 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;