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Fix some SSL_export_keying_material() issues
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
26
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
29
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
33 WPACKET *pkt);
34
35 /*
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
37 *
38 * Return values are:
39 * 1: Yes
40 * 0: No
41 */
42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
43 {
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
48 return 0;
49
50 return 1;
51 }
52
53 /*
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
55 *
56 * Return values are:
57 * 1: Yes
58 * 0: No
59 */
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
61 {
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63
64 /*
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
67 */
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
69 | SSL_kSRP)) {
70 return 1;
71 }
72
73 return 0;
74 }
75
76 /*
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
81 *
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
84 */
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
86 {
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88
89 /*
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 */
94
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
96 default:
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
100 /*
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
103 */
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
106 return 1;
107 }
108 break;
109
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
113 return 1;
114 }
115 break;
116
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
118 if (s->hit) {
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 } else {
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 return 1;
127 }
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 }
133 break;
134
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141
142 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
145 return 1;
146 }
147 break;
148
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
152 return 1;
153 }
154 break;
155
156 case TLS_ST_OK:
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 return 1;
160 }
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
168 #endif
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
171 /*
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
176 */
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
179 return 0;
180 }
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
182 return 1;
183 }
184 }
185 break;
186 }
187
188 /* No valid transition found */
189 return 0;
190 }
191
192 /*
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
197 *
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
200 */
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
202 {
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
204 int ske_expected;
205
206 /*
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
209 */
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
212 goto err;
213 return 1;
214 }
215
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
217 default:
218 break;
219
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
223 return 1;
224 }
225
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 }
232 break;
233
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
235 /*
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
238 * HelloRetryRequest.
239 */
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 break;
245
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
247 if (s->hit) {
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
251 return 1;
252 }
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
255 return 1;
256 }
257 } else {
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
260 return 1;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 /*
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
270 */
271 s->hit = 1;
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 return 1;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
278 return 1;
279 }
280 } else {
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
283 if (ske_expected
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
288 return 1;
289 }
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
293 return 1;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
296 return 1;
297 }
298 }
299 }
300 break;
301
302 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
303 /*
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
306 */
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
309 return 1;
310 }
311 /* Fall through */
312
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
320 return 1;
321 }
322 goto err;
323 }
324 /* Fall through */
325
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
330 return 1;
331 }
332 goto err;
333 }
334 /* Fall through */
335
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
339 return 1;
340 }
341 break;
342
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
351 return 1;
352 }
353 break;
354
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
358 return 1;
359 }
360 break;
361
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
365 return 1;
366 }
367 break;
368
369 case TLS_ST_OK:
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
372 return 1;
373 }
374 break;
375 }
376
377 err:
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 BIO *rbio;
381
382 /*
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
385 */
386 s->init_num = 0;
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
391 return 0;
392 }
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 /*
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
402 * server.
403 */
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
405 {
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
407
408 /*
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
412 */
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
414 default:
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
420
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 }
426 /*
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
429 */
430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 }
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
441 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
442 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
444 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
445 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
447 else
448 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451
452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
453 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 }
457 /* Fall through */
458
459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
461 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464
465 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
467 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470
471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
476 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 }
480 /* Fall through */
481
482 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
483 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
484 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487
488 case TLS_ST_OK:
489 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 }
493
494 /* Try to read from the server instead */
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
496 }
497 }
498
499 /*
500 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
501 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
502 */
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
504 {
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
506
507 /*
508 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
509 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
510 * later
511 */
512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
513 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
514
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
516 default:
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
519 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
522
523 case TLS_ST_OK:
524 if (!s->renegotiate) {
525 /*
526 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
527 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
528 */
529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
530 }
531 /* Renegotiation */
532 /* fall thru */
533 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
538 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
539 /*
540 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
541 * actually selected a version yet.
542 */
543 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
545 else
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 }
549 /*
550 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
551 * we will be sent
552 */
553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
554
555 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
556 /*
557 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
558 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
559 * because we did early data.
560 */
561 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
562 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
564 else
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567
568 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570
571 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574
575 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
576 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
578 else
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581
582 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585
586 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
587 /*
588 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
589 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
590 */
591 /*
592 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
593 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
594 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
595 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
596 */
597 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
599 } else {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
601 }
602 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 }
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606
607 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610
611 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
612 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
614 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
616 } else {
617 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
619 #else
620 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
622 else
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
624 #endif
625 }
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627
628 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
629 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 #endif
633
634 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
635 if (s->hit) {
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 } else {
639 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
640 }
641
642 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
643 if (s->hit) {
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 } else {
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649 }
650
651 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
652 /*
653 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
654 * convenient time.
655 */
656 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
657 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
659 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
660 }
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
663 }
664 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
666 }
667 }
668
669 /*
670 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
671 * the client to the server.
672 */
673 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 {
675 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676
677 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 default:
679 /* No pre work to be done */
680 break;
681
682 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
683 s->shutdown = 0;
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
686 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 return WORK_ERROR;
689 }
690 }
691 break;
692
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
695 if (s->hit) {
696 /*
697 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
698 * messages unless we need to.
699 */
700 st->use_timer = 0;
701 }
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
706 }
707 #endif
708 }
709 break;
710
711 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
712 /*
713 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
714 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
715 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
716 */
717 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
718 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
720 /* Fall through */
721
722 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
723 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
724
725 case TLS_ST_OK:
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
728 }
729
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
731 }
732
733 /*
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * client to the server.
736 */
737 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
738 {
739 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
740
741 s->init_num = 0;
742
743 switch (st->hand_state) {
744 default:
745 /* No post work to be done */
746 break;
747
748 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
749 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
750 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
751 /*
752 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
753 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
754 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
755 */
756 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
757 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 return WORK_ERROR;
761 }
762 }
763 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
764 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
765 return WORK_MORE_A;
766 }
767
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
769 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
770 s->first_packet = 1;
771 }
772 break;
773
774 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
775 /*
776 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
777 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
778 */
779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
780 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
781 break;
782
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
784 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
785 /* SSLfatal() already called */
786 return WORK_ERROR;
787 }
788 break;
789
790 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
791 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
792 break;
793 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
794 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
795 /*
796 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
797 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
798 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
799 */
800 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
802 return WORK_ERROR;
803 break;
804 }
805 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
806 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
807 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
808 #else
809 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
810 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
811 else
812 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
813 #endif
814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 return WORK_ERROR;
817 }
818
819 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
820 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 return WORK_ERROR;
823 }
824
825 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
827 if (s->hit) {
828 /*
829 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
830 * no SCTP used.
831 */
832 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
833 0, NULL);
834 }
835 #endif
836
837 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
838 }
839 break;
840
841 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
843 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
844 /*
845 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 * no SCTP used.
847 */
848 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
849 0, NULL);
850 }
851 #endif
852 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
853 return WORK_MORE_B;
854
855 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
856 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 return WORK_ERROR;
859 }
860 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
861 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
862 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
864 return WORK_ERROR;
865 }
866 }
867 }
868 break;
869
870 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
871 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
872 return WORK_MORE_A;
873 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return WORK_ERROR;
876 }
877 break;
878 }
879
880 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
881 }
882
883 /*
884 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
885 * client
886 *
887 * Valid return values are:
888 * 1: Success
889 * 0: Error
890 */
891 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
892 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
893 {
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
895
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
897 default:
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
900 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
901 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
902 return 0;
903
904 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
905 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
906 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
907 else
908 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
910 break;
911
912 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
913 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
914 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
918 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
919 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
920 break;
921
922 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
923 *confunc = NULL;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
925 break;
926
927 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
928 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
930 break;
931
932 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
935 break;
936
937 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
940 break;
941
942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
943 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
944 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
945 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
946 break;
947 #endif
948 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
949 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
950 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
951 break;
952
953 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
954 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
955 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
956 break;
957 }
958
959 return 1;
960 }
961
962 /*
963 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
964 * reading. Excludes the message header.
965 */
966 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
967 {
968 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
969
970 switch (st->hand_state) {
971 default:
972 /* Shouldn't happen */
973 return 0;
974
975 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
976 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
977
978 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
979 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
982 return s->max_cert_list;
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
985 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
986
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
988 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
989
990 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
991 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
992
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
994 /*
995 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
996 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
997 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
998 */
999 return s->max_cert_list;
1000
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1002 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1003
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1005 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1006 return 3;
1007 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1008
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1010 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1011
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1013 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1014
1015 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1016 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1017
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1019 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1020 }
1021 }
1022
1023 /*
1024 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1025 */
1026 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1027 {
1028 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1029
1030 switch (st->hand_state) {
1031 default:
1032 /* Shouldn't happen */
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1034 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1036 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1037
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1039 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1040
1041 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1042 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1045 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1048 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1051 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1054 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1057 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1060 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1063 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1064
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1066 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1069 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1070
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1072 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1073
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1075 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1078 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1079 }
1080 }
1081
1082 /*
1083 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1084 * from the server
1085 */
1086 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1087 {
1088 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1089
1090 switch (st->hand_state) {
1091 default:
1092 /* Shouldn't happen */
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1094 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1095 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1096 return WORK_ERROR;
1097
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1100 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1101 }
1102 }
1103
1104 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1105 {
1106 unsigned char *p;
1107 size_t sess_id_len;
1108 int i, protverr;
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1110 SSL_COMP *comp;
1111 #endif
1112 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1113 unsigned char *session_id;
1114
1115 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1116 /* Should not happen */
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1118 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 return 0;
1120 }
1121
1122 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1123 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1124 if (protverr != 0) {
1125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1126 protverr);
1127 return 0;
1128 }
1129
1130 if (sess == NULL
1131 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1133 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1134 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1136 return 0;
1137 }
1138 }
1139 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1140
1141 p = s->s3->client_random;
1142
1143 /*
1144 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1145 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1146 */
1147 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1148 size_t idx;
1149 i = 1;
1150 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1151 if (p[idx]) {
1152 i = 0;
1153 break;
1154 }
1155 }
1156 } else {
1157 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1158 }
1159
1160 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1161 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 return 0;
1165 }
1166
1167 /*-
1168 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1169 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1170 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1171 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1172 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1173 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1174 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1175 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1176 * 1.0.
1177 *
1178 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1179 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1180 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1181 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1182 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1183 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1184 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1185 * know that is maximum server supports.
1186 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1187 * containing version 1.0.
1188 *
1189 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1190 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1191 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1192 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1193 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1194 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1195 * the negotiated version.
1196 *
1197 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1198 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1199 */
1200 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1201 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 return 0;
1205 }
1206
1207 /* Session ID */
1208 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1209 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1210 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1211 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1212 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1213 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1214 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1215 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1216 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1218 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 return 0;
1221 }
1222 } else {
1223 sess_id_len = 0;
1224 }
1225 } else {
1226 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1227 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1228 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1229 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1230 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1231 }
1232 }
1233 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1234 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1235 sess_id_len))
1236 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 return 0;
1240 }
1241
1242 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1244 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1245 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1246 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 return 0;
1250 }
1251 }
1252
1253 /* Ciphers supported */
1254 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return 0;
1268 }
1269
1270 /* COMPRESSION */
1271 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1274 return 0;
1275 }
1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1277 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1278 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1279 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1280 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1281 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1282 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1283 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1285 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1287 return 0;
1288 }
1289 }
1290 }
1291 #endif
1292 /* Add the NULL method */
1293 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1295 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298
1299 /* TLS extensions */
1300 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1302 return 0;
1303 }
1304
1305 return 1;
1306 }
1307
1308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1309 {
1310 size_t cookie_len;
1311 PACKET cookiepkt;
1312
1313 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1314 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1316 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1318 }
1319
1320 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1321 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1323 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1325 }
1326
1327 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1329 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1331 }
1332 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1333
1334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1335 }
1336
1337 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1338 {
1339 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1340 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1341 int i;
1342
1343 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1344 if (c == NULL) {
1345 /* unknown cipher */
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1347 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1348 return 0;
1349 }
1350 /*
1351 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1352 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1353 */
1354 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1356 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1357 return 0;
1358 }
1359
1360 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1361 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1362 if (i < 0) {
1363 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1365 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1366 return 0;
1367 }
1368
1369 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1370 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1371 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1373 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1374 return 0;
1375 }
1376
1377 /*
1378 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1379 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1380 * set and use it for comparison.
1381 */
1382 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1383 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1384 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1385 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1386 /*
1387 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1388 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1389 */
1390 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1391 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1393 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1394 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1395 return 0;
1396 }
1397 } else {
1398 /*
1399 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1400 * ciphersuite.
1401 */
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1403 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1404 return 0;
1405 }
1406 }
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1408
1409 return 1;
1410 }
1411
1412 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1413 {
1414 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1415 size_t session_id_len;
1416 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1417 int hrr = 0;
1418 unsigned int compression;
1419 unsigned int sversion;
1420 unsigned int context;
1421 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1423 SSL_COMP *comp;
1424 #endif
1425
1426 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1428 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1429 goto err;
1430 }
1431
1432 /* load the server random */
1433 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1434 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1435 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1436 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1437 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1438 hrr = 1;
1439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1442 goto err;
1443 }
1444 } else {
1445 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1448 goto err;
1449 }
1450 }
1451
1452 /* Get the session-id. */
1453 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1456 goto err;
1457 }
1458 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1459 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1460 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1463 goto err;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1469 goto err;
1470 }
1471
1472 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1475 goto err;
1476 }
1477
1478 /* TLS extensions */
1479 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1480 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1481 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1482 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1484 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1485 goto err;
1486 }
1487
1488 if (!hrr) {
1489 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1490 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1491 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1492 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1493 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1494 goto err;
1495 }
1496
1497 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1498 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1499 goto err;
1500 }
1501 }
1502
1503 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1504 if (compression != 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1507 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1508 goto err;
1509 }
1510
1511 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1512 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1513 session_id_len) != 0) {
1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1515 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1516 goto err;
1517 }
1518 }
1519
1520 if (hrr) {
1521 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1523 goto err;
1524 }
1525
1526 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1527 }
1528
1529 /*
1530 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1531 * are appropriate for this version.
1532 */
1533 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1534 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1535 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1538 goto err;
1539 }
1540
1541 s->hit = 0;
1542
1543 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1544 /*
1545 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1546 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1547 */
1548 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1550 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1551 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1552 goto err;
1553 }
1554
1555 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1556 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1557 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1558 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1559 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1560 goto err;
1561 }
1562 } else {
1563 /*
1564 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1565 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1566 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1567 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1568 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1569 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1570 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1571 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1572 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1573 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1574 */
1575 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1576 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1577 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1578 /*
1579 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1580 * backwards compat reasons
1581 */
1582 int master_key_length;
1583 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1584 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1585 &master_key_length,
1586 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1587 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1588 && master_key_length > 0) {
1589 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1590 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1591 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1592 } else {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1594 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 goto err;
1596 }
1597 }
1598
1599 if (session_id_len != 0
1600 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1601 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1602 session_id_len) == 0)
1603 s->hit = 1;
1604 }
1605
1606 if (s->hit) {
1607 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1608 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1609 /* actually a client application bug */
1610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1611 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1612 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1613 goto err;
1614 }
1615 } else {
1616 /*
1617 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1618 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1619 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1620 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1621 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1622 */
1623 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1624 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1625 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1626 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1627 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1628 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1629 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1630 goto err;
1631 }
1632 }
1633
1634 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1635 /*
1636 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1637 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1638 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1639 * used for resumption.
1640 */
1641 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1642 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1643 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1644 if (session_id_len > 0)
1645 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1646 session_id_len);
1647 }
1648 }
1649
1650 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1651 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1653 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1654 goto err;
1655 }
1656 /*
1657 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1658 * version.
1659 */
1660 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1661 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1662
1663 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1665 goto err;
1666 }
1667
1668 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1669 if (compression != 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 /*
1675 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1676 * using compression.
1677 */
1678 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1680 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1681 goto err;
1682 }
1683 #else
1684 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1687 goto err;
1688 }
1689 if (compression == 0)
1690 comp = NULL;
1691 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1693 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1694 goto err;
1695 } else {
1696 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1697 }
1698
1699 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1701 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1702 goto err;
1703 } else {
1704 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1705 }
1706 #endif
1707
1708 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1710 goto err;
1711 }
1712
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1714 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1715 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1716 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1717
1718 /*
1719 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1720 * no SCTP used.
1721 */
1722 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1723 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1724
1725 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1726 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1727 labelbuffer,
1728 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 goto err;
1732 }
1733
1734 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1735 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1736 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1737 }
1738 #endif
1739
1740 /*
1741 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1742 * we're done with this message
1743 */
1744 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1745 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1746 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1747 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 goto err;
1750 }
1751
1752 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1753 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1754 err:
1755 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1756 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1757 }
1758
1759 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1760 PACKET *extpkt)
1761 {
1762 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1763
1764 /*
1765 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1766 * should not be used.
1767 */
1768 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1769 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1770
1771 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1772 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1773 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1774 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1776 goto err;
1777 }
1778
1779 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1780 extensions = NULL;
1781
1782 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1783 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1784 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1785 #endif
1786 ) {
1787 /*
1788 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1789 * ClientHello will not change
1790 */
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1792 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1793 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1794 goto err;
1795 }
1796
1797 /*
1798 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1799 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1800 */
1801 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1803 goto err;
1804 }
1805
1806 /*
1807 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1808 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1809 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1810 * for HRR messages.
1811 */
1812 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1813 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1815 goto err;
1816 }
1817
1818 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1819 err:
1820 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1821 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1822 }
1823
1824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1825 {
1826 int i;
1827 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1828 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1829 X509 *x = NULL;
1830 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1831 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1832 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1833 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1834 unsigned int context = 0;
1835 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1836
1837 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1839 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1840 goto err;
1841 }
1842
1843 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1844 || context != 0
1845 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1847 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1850 goto err;
1851 }
1852 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1853 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1854 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1857 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1858 goto err;
1859 }
1860
1861 certstart = certbytes;
1862 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1863 if (x == NULL) {
1864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1865 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1866 goto err;
1867 }
1868 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1870 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1871 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1872 goto err;
1873 }
1874
1875 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1876 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1877 PACKET extensions;
1878
1879 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1881 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1882 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1886 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1887 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1888 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1889 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1890 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1891 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1892 /* SSLfatal already called */
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1896 }
1897
1898 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1900 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1901 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1902 goto err;
1903 }
1904 x = NULL;
1905 }
1906
1907 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1908 /*
1909 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1910 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1911 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1912 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1913 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1914 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1915 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1916 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1917 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1918 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1919 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1920 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1921 */
1922 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1923 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1924 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1925 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1926 goto err;
1927 }
1928 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1929 if (i > 1) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1931 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934
1935 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1936 /*
1937 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1938 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1939 */
1940 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1941 sk = NULL;
1942
1943 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1944
1945 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1946 x = NULL;
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1948 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951
1952 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1953 x = NULL;
1954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1955 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1956 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1957 goto err;
1958 }
1959 /*
1960 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1961 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1962 * type.
1963 */
1964 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1965 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1966 x = NULL;
1967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1968 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1969 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1970 goto err;
1971 }
1972 }
1973 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1974
1975 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1976 X509_up_ref(x);
1977 s->session->peer = x;
1978 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1979 x = NULL;
1980
1981 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1982 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1983 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1984 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1985 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1986 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1987 goto err;
1988 }
1989
1990 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1991
1992 err:
1993 X509_free(x);
1994 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1995 return ret;
1996 }
1997
1998 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1999 {
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2001 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2002
2003 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2004
2005 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2007 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2008 return 0;
2009 }
2010
2011 /*
2012 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2013 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2014 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2015 * identity.
2016 */
2017 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2019 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2020 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2021 return 0;
2022 }
2023
2024 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2025 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2026 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2027 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2028 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2031 return 0;
2032 }
2033
2034 return 1;
2035 #else
2036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 return 0;
2039 #endif
2040 }
2041
2042 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2043 {
2044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2045 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2046
2047 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2048 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2049 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2050 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2052 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055
2056 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2057 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2060 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2061 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2062 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2063 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2064 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2066 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2067 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2068 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2070 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073
2074 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2075 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2076 return 0;
2077 }
2078
2079 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2080 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2081 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2082
2083 return 1;
2084 #else
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2087 return 0;
2088 #endif
2089 }
2090
2091 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2092 {
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2094 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2095 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2096
2097 DH *dh = NULL;
2098 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2099
2100 int check_bits = 0;
2101
2102 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2103 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2104 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2106 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2107 return 0;
2108 }
2109
2110 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2111 dh = DH_new();
2112
2113 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2115 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2116 goto err;
2117 }
2118
2119 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2120 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2121 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2122 NULL);
2123 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2124 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2125 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2127 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2128 goto err;
2129 }
2130
2131 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2132 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2134 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2135 goto err;
2136 }
2137
2138 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2140 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2141 goto err;
2142 }
2143 p = g = NULL;
2144
2145 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2147 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2148 goto err;
2149 }
2150
2151 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2153 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2154 goto err;
2155 }
2156 bnpub_key = NULL;
2157
2158 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2160 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2161 goto err;
2162 }
2163
2164 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2166 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2167 goto err;
2168 }
2169
2170 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2171
2172 /*
2173 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2174 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2175 */
2176 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2177 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2178 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2179
2180 return 1;
2181
2182 err:
2183 BN_free(p);
2184 BN_free(g);
2185 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2186 DH_free(dh);
2187 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2188
2189 return 0;
2190 #else
2191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2193 return 0;
2194 #endif
2195 }
2196
2197 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2198 {
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2200 PACKET encoded_pt;
2201 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2202
2203 /*
2204 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2205 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2206 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2207 */
2208 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2210 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2211 return 0;
2212 }
2213 /*
2214 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2215 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2216 */
2217 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2218 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2220 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2221 return 0;
2222 }
2223
2224 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2226 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2227 return 0;
2228 }
2229
2230 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2232 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235
2236 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2237 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2238 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2240 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2241 return 0;
2242 }
2243
2244 /*
2245 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2246 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2247 * and ECDSA.
2248 */
2249 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2250 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2251 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2252 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2253 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2254
2255 return 1;
2256 #else
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 return 0;
2260 #endif
2261 }
2262
2263 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2264 {
2265 long alg_k;
2266 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2267 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2268 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2269 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2270
2271 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2272
2273 save_param_start = *pkt;
2274
2275 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2276 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2277 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2278 #endif
2279
2280 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2283 goto err;
2284 }
2285 }
2286
2287 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2288 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2289 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2290 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2292 goto err;
2293 }
2294 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2295 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2296 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2297 goto err;
2298 }
2299 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2300 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2302 goto err;
2303 }
2304 } else if (alg_k) {
2305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2306 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2307 goto err;
2308 }
2309
2310 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2311 if (pkey != NULL) {
2312 PACKET params;
2313 int maxsig;
2314 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2315 unsigned char *tbs;
2316 size_t tbslen;
2317 int rv;
2318
2319 /*
2320 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2321 * equals the length of the parameters.
2322 */
2323 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2324 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2325 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 goto err;
2329 }
2330
2331 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2332 unsigned int sigalg;
2333
2334 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2337 goto err;
2338 }
2339 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2341 goto err;
2342 }
2343 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2345 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 goto err;
2347 }
2348
2349 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2352 goto err;
2353 }
2354 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2355 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2356 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2357 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2358 #endif
2359
2360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2361 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2364 goto err;
2365 }
2366 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2367 if (maxsig < 0) {
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 goto err;
2371 }
2372
2373 /*
2374 * Check signature length
2375 */
2376 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2377 /* wrong packet length */
2378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2380 goto err;
2381 }
2382
2383 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2384 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2387 goto err;
2388 }
2389
2390 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2396 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2397 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2398 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2400 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2401 goto err;
2402 }
2403 }
2404 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2405 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2406 if (tbslen == 0) {
2407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2408 goto err;
2409 }
2410
2411 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2412 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2413 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2414 if (rv <= 0) {
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2417 goto err;
2418 }
2419 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2420 md_ctx = NULL;
2421 } else {
2422 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2423 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2424 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2425 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2426 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2429 }
2430 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2431 goto err;
2432 }
2433 /* still data left over */
2434 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2437 goto err;
2438 }
2439 }
2440
2441 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2442 err:
2443 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2445 }
2446
2447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2448 {
2449 size_t i;
2450
2451 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2452 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2453 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2454
2455 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2456 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2457 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2458
2459 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2460 /*
2461 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2462 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2463 * we just ignore it
2464 */
2465 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2466 }
2467
2468 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2469 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2470 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2471 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2472 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2473 s->pha_context = NULL;
2474
2475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2476 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2479 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2481 }
2482
2483 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2488 }
2489 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2490 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2491 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2492 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2493 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2495 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2497 }
2498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2499 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2502 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2504 }
2505 } else {
2506 PACKET ctypes;
2507
2508 /* get the certificate types */
2509 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2514 }
2515
2516 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2519 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2521 }
2522
2523 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2524 PACKET sigalgs;
2525
2526 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2529 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2531 }
2532
2533 /*
2534 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2535 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2536 */
2537 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2539 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2540 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2541 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2542 }
2543 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2546 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2548 }
2549 }
2550
2551 /* get the CA RDNs */
2552 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2555 }
2556 }
2557
2558 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2560 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2561 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2562 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2563 }
2564
2565 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2566 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2567
2568 /*
2569 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2570 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2571 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2572 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2573 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2574 * client_cert_cb.
2575 */
2576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2578
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2580 }
2581
2582 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2583 {
2584 unsigned int ticklen;
2585 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2586 unsigned int sess_len;
2587 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2588 PACKET nonce;
2589
2590 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2591
2592 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2593 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2594 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2595 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2596 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2597 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2598 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2600 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2601 goto err;
2602 }
2603
2604 /*
2605 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2606 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2607 * be 0 here in that instance
2608 */
2609 if (ticklen == 0)
2610 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2611
2612 /*
2613 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2614 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2615 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2616 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2617 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2618 * cache.
2619 */
2620 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2621 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2622
2623 /*
2624 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2625 * one
2626 */
2627 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2629 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2630 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2631 goto err;
2632 }
2633
2634 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2635 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2636 /*
2637 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2638 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2639 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2640 */
2641 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2642 }
2643
2644 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2645 s->session = new_sess;
2646 }
2647
2648 /*
2649 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2650 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2651 */
2652 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2653
2654 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2655 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2656 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2657
2658 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2659 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2662 goto err;
2663 }
2664 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2666 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2667 goto err;
2668 }
2669
2670 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2671 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2672 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2673
2674 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2675 PACKET extpkt;
2676
2677 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2678 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2680 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2681 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2682 goto err;
2683 }
2684
2685 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2686 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2687 NULL, 1)
2688 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2689 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2690 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2691 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2692 goto err;
2693 }
2694 }
2695
2696 /*
2697 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2698 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2699 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2700 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2701 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2702 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2703 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2704 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2705 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2706 */
2707 /*
2708 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2709 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2710 */
2711 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2712 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2713 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2715 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2716 goto err;
2717 }
2718 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2719 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2720
2721 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2722 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2723 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2724 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2725 size_t hashlen;
2726 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2727
2728 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2729 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2731 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2732 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2733 goto err;
2734 }
2735 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2736
2737 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2738 nonce_label,
2739 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2740 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2741 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2742 s->session->master_key,
2743 hashlen, 1)) {
2744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2745 goto err;
2746 }
2747 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2748
2749 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2750 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2751 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2752 }
2753
2754 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2755 err:
2756 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2757 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2758 }
2759
2760 /*
2761 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2762 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2763 */
2764 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2765 {
2766 size_t resplen;
2767 unsigned int type;
2768
2769 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2770 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2772 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2773 return 0;
2774 }
2775 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2776 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2779 return 0;
2780 }
2781 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2782 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2784 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2785 return 0;
2786 }
2787 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2789 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2790 return 0;
2791 }
2792 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2793
2794 return 1;
2795 }
2796
2797
2798 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2799 {
2800 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2802 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2803 }
2804
2805 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2806 }
2807
2808 /*
2809 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2810 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2811 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2812 * on failure.
2813 */
2814 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2815 {
2816 /*
2817 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2818 * the server
2819 */
2820 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2822 return 0;
2823 }
2824
2825 /*
2826 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2827 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2828 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2829 */
2830 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2831 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2832 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2833
2834 if (ret == 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2836 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2837 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2838 return 0;
2839 }
2840 if (ret < 0) {
2841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2842 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2844 return 0;
2845 }
2846 }
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2848 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2849 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2850 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2852 return 0;
2853 }
2854 }
2855 #endif
2856
2857 return 1;
2858 }
2859
2860 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2861 {
2862 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2863 /* should contain no data */
2864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2865 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2867 }
2868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2869 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2870 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2872 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2874 }
2875 }
2876 #endif
2877
2878 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2881 }
2882
2883 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2884 }
2885
2886 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2887 {
2888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2889 int ret = 0;
2890 /*
2891 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2892 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2893 * strnlen.
2894 */
2895 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2896 size_t identitylen = 0;
2897 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2898 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2899 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2900 size_t psklen = 0;
2901
2902 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2904 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2905 goto err;
2906 }
2907
2908 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2909
2910 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2911 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2912 psk, sizeof(psk));
2913
2914 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2916 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 goto err;
2918 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2920 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2921 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2922 goto err;
2923 }
2924
2925 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2926 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2929 goto err;
2930 }
2931
2932 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2933 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2934 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2936 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2937 goto err;
2938 }
2939
2940 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2941 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2942 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2943 tmppsk = NULL;
2944 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2945 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2946 tmpidentity = NULL;
2947
2948 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2950 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 goto err;
2952 }
2953
2954 ret = 1;
2955
2956 err:
2957 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2958 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2959 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2960 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2961
2962 return ret;
2963 #else
2964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 return 0;
2967 #endif
2968 }
2969
2970 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2971 {
2972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2973 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2974 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2975 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2976 size_t enclen;
2977 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2978 size_t pmslen = 0;
2979
2980 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2981 /*
2982 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2983 */
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2986 return 0;
2987 }
2988
2989 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2990 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 return 0;
2994 }
2995
2996 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2997 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2998 if (pms == NULL) {
2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3000 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3001 return 0;
3002 }
3003
3004 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3005 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3006 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3007 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3010 goto err;
3011 }
3012
3013 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3014 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3016 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 goto err;
3018 }
3019 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3020 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3021 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3023 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3024 goto err;
3025 }
3026 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3027 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3029 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3030 goto err;
3031 }
3032 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3033 pctx = NULL;
3034
3035 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3036 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 goto err;
3040 }
3041
3042 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3043 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3044 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3045 goto err;
3046 }
3047
3048 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3049 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3050
3051 return 1;
3052 err:
3053 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3054 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3055
3056 return 0;
3057 #else
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3060 return 0;
3061 #endif
3062 }
3063
3064 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3065 {
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3067 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3068 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3069 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3070 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3071
3072 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3073 if (skey == NULL) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3076 goto err;
3077 }
3078
3079 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3080 if (ckey == NULL) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 goto err;
3084 }
3085
3086 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3087
3088 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 goto err;
3092 }
3093
3094 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3096 goto err;
3097 }
3098
3099 /* send off the data */
3100 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3101 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3102 &keybytes)) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 goto err;
3106 }
3107
3108 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3109 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3110
3111 return 1;
3112 err:
3113 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3114 return 0;
3115 #else
3116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 return 0;
3119 #endif
3120 }
3121
3122 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3123 {
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3125 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3126 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3127 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3128 int ret = 0;
3129
3130 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3131 if (skey == NULL) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3134 return 0;
3135 }
3136
3137 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3138 if (ckey == NULL) {
3139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3140 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3141 goto err;
3142 }
3143
3144 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3146 goto err;
3147 }
3148
3149 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3150 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3151
3152 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3154 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3155 goto err;
3156 }
3157
3158 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3161 goto err;
3162 }
3163
3164 ret = 1;
3165 err:
3166 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3168 return ret;
3169 #else
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 return 0;
3173 #endif
3174 }
3175
3176 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3177 {
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3179 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3180 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3181 X509 *peer_cert;
3182 size_t msglen;
3183 unsigned int md_len;
3184 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3185 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3186 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3187 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3188 size_t pmslen = 0;
3189
3190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3191 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3192
3193 /*
3194 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3195 */
3196 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3197 if (!peer_cert) {
3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3199 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3200 return 0;
3201 }
3202
3203 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3204 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3206 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 return 0;
3208 }
3209 /*
3210 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3211 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3212 * certificate key for key exchange
3213 */
3214
3215 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3216 pmslen = 32;
3217 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3218 if (pms == NULL) {
3219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3221 goto err;
3222 }
3223
3224 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3225 /* Generate session key
3226 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3227 */
3228 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3231 goto err;
3232 };
3233 /*
3234 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3235 * data
3236 */
3237 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3238 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3239 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3240 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3241 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3242 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3243 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3244 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 goto err;
3248 }
3249 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3250 ukm_hash = NULL;
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3252 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3254 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3255 goto err;
3256 }
3257 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3258 /*
3259 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3260 */
3261 msglen = 255;
3262 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3264 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3265 goto err;
3266 }
3267
3268 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3269 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3270 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3273 goto err;
3274 }
3275
3276 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3277 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3278 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3279
3280 return 1;
3281 err:
3282 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3283 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3284 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3285 return 0;
3286 #else
3287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 return 0;
3290 #endif
3291 }
3292
3293 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3294 {
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3296 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3297
3298 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3299 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3300 &abytes)) {
3301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3303 return 0;
3304 }
3305 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3306
3307 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3308 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3309 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3311 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3312 return 0;
3313 }
3314
3315 return 1;
3316 #else
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3319 return 0;
3320 #endif
3321 }
3322
3323 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3324 {
3325 unsigned long alg_k;
3326
3327 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3328
3329 /*
3330 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3331 * no need to do so here.
3332 */
3333 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3334 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3335 goto err;
3336
3337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3338 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3339 goto err;
3340 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3341 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3342 goto err;
3343 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3344 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3345 goto err;
3346 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3347 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3348 goto err;
3349 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3350 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3351 goto err;
3352 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3355 goto err;
3356 }
3357
3358 return 1;
3359 err:
3360 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3361 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3363 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3364 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3365 #endif
3366 return 0;
3367 }
3368
3369 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3370 {
3371 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3372 size_t pmslen = 0;
3373
3374 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3375 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3376
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3378 /* Check for SRP */
3379 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3380 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3382 goto err;
3383 }
3384 return 1;
3385 }
3386 #endif
3387
3388 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3391 goto err;
3392 }
3393 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3394 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3395 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3396 pms = NULL;
3397 pmslen = 0;
3398 goto err;
3399 }
3400 pms = NULL;
3401 pmslen = 0;
3402
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3404 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3405 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3406 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3407
3408 /*
3409 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3410 * used.
3411 */
3412 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3413 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3414
3415 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3416 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3417 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3421 goto err;
3422 }
3423
3424 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3425 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3426 }
3427 #endif
3428
3429 return 1;
3430 err:
3431 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3432 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3433 return 0;
3434 }
3435
3436 /*
3437 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3438 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3439 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3440 */
3441 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3442 {
3443 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3444 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3445 return 0;
3446 /*
3447 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3448 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3449 */
3450 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3451 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3452 return 0;
3453 return 1;
3454 }
3455
3456 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3457 {
3458 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3459 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3460 int i;
3461
3462 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3463 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3464 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3465 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3466 if (i < 0) {
3467 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3468 return WORK_MORE_A;
3469 }
3470 if (i == 0) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3473 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3474 return WORK_ERROR;
3475 }
3476 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3477 }
3478 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3479 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3480 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3481 }
3482 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3483 }
3484
3485 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3486 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3487 }
3488
3489 /* We need to get a client cert */
3490 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3491 /*
3492 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3493 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3494 */
3495 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3496 if (i < 0) {
3497 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3498 return WORK_MORE_B;
3499 }
3500 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3501 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3502 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3503 i = 0;
3504 } else if (i == 1) {
3505 i = 0;
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3507 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3508 }
3509
3510 X509_free(x509);
3511 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3512 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3513 i = 0;
3514 if (i == 0) {
3515 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3516 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3517 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3518 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3519 } else {
3520 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3521 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3523 return WORK_ERROR;
3524 }
3525 }
3526 }
3527
3528 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3529 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3530 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3531 }
3532
3533 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3536 return WORK_ERROR;
3537 }
3538
3539 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3540 {
3541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3542 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3543 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3544 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3547 return 0;
3548 }
3549 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3551 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 return 0;
3553 }
3554 }
3555 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3556 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3557 : s->cert->key)) {
3558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3559 return 0;
3560 }
3561
3562 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3563 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3564 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3565 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3566 /*
3567 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3568 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3569 */
3570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3571 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3572 return 0;
3573 }
3574
3575 return 1;
3576 }
3577
3578 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3579 {
3580 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3581 size_t idx;
3582 long alg_k, alg_a;
3583
3584 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3585 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3586
3587 /* we don't have a certificate */
3588 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3589 return 1;
3590
3591 /* This is the passed certificate */
3592 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3593
3594 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3595 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3597 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3598 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3599 return 0;
3600 }
3601
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3603 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3604 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3605 return 1;
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3607 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3608 return 0;
3609 }
3610 #endif
3611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3612 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3614 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3615 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3616 return 0;
3617 }
3618 #endif
3619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3620 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3623 return 0;
3624 }
3625 #endif
3626
3627 return 1;
3628 }
3629
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3631 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3632 {
3633 size_t len, padding_len;
3634 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3635
3636 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3637 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3638
3639 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3640 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3643 return 0;
3644 }
3645
3646 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3647
3648 return 1;
3649 }
3650 #endif
3651
3652 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3653 {
3654 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3655 /* should contain no data */
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3657 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3658 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3659 }
3660
3661 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3663 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3664 }
3665
3666 /*
3667 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3668 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3669 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3670 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3671 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3672 */
3673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3674 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3675 else
3676 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3677
3678 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3679 }
3680
3681 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3682 {
3683 PACKET extensions;
3684 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3685
3686 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3687 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3689 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3690 goto err;
3691 }
3692
3693 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3694 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3695 NULL, 1)
3696 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3697 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3699 goto err;
3700 }
3701
3702 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3703 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3704
3705 err:
3706 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3707 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3708 }
3709
3710 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3711 {
3712 int i = 0;
3713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3714 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3715 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3716 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3717 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3718 if (i != 0)
3719 return i;
3720 }
3721 #endif
3722 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3723 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3724 return i;
3725 }
3726
3727 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3728 {
3729 int i;
3730 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3731 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3732
3733 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3734 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3736 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3737 return 0;
3738 }
3739
3740 if (sk == NULL) {
3741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3742 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3743 return 0;
3744 }
3745
3746 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3747 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3748 # error Max cipher length too short
3749 # endif
3750 /*
3751 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3752 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3753 * use TLS v1.2
3754 */
3755 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3756 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3757 else
3758 #endif
3759 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3760 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3761
3762 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3763 maxlen -= 2;
3764 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3765 maxlen -= 2;
3766
3767 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3768 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3769
3770 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3771 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3772 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3773 continue;
3774
3775 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3778 return 0;
3779 }
3780
3781 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3782 if (!maxverok) {
3783 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3784 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3785 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3786 maxverok = 1;
3787 } else {
3788 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3789 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3790 maxverok = 1;
3791 }
3792 }
3793
3794 totlen += len;
3795 }
3796
3797 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3799 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3800
3801 if (!maxverok)
3802 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3803 "SSL/TLS version");
3804
3805 return 0;
3806 }
3807
3808 if (totlen != 0) {
3809 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3810 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3811 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3812 };
3813 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3815 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3816 return 0;
3817 }
3818 }
3819 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3820 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3821 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3822 };
3823 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3825 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3826 return 0;
3827 }
3828 }
3829 }
3830
3831 return 1;
3832 }
3833
3834 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3835 {
3836 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3837 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3839 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3840 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3841 return 0;
3842 }
3843
3844 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3845 return 1;
3846 }
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