2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
29 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
31 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
32 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
33 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
37 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
43 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
45 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
46 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
47 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
48 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
55 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
61 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
63 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
66 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
67 * ciphersuite or for SRP
69 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
78 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
79 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
80 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
81 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
83 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
84 * (transition not allowed)
86 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
88 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
91 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
92 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
93 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
96 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
100 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
102 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
103 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
111 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
112 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
113 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
118 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
120 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
121 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
130 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
136 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
137 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
138 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
144 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
145 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
151 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
152 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
158 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
159 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
162 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
163 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
167 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
168 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
170 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
171 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
173 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
174 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
175 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
176 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
178 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
182 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
189 /* No valid transition found */
194 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
195 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
196 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
197 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
199 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
200 * (transition not allowed)
202 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
204 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
208 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
209 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
211 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
212 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
217 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
221 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
228 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
229 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
235 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
237 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
238 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
241 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
249 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
254 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
262 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
264 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
265 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
275 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
282 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
283 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
285 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
286 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
287 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
288 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
291 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
292 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
293 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
295 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
305 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
306 * |ext.status_expected| is set
308 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
315 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
316 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
317 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
318 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
319 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
328 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
329 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
330 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
338 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
339 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
344 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
345 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
346 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
347 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
350 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
364 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
371 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
372 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
379 /* No valid transition found */
380 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
384 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
385 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
388 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
389 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
391 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
396 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
407 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
414 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
418 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
423 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
431 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
434 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
436 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
442 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
443 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
445 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
446 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
449 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
450 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
454 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
461 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
462 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
463 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
468 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
469 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
472 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
473 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
476 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
478 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
489 /* Try to read from the server instead */
490 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
495 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
496 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
498 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
500 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
503 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
504 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
508 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
510 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
519 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
529 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
533 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
538 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
556 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
557 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
558 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
571 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
592 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
597 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
607 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
608 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
609 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
610 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
615 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
623 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
625 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
639 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
659 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
668 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
670 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
672 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
674 /* No pre work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
679 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
692 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
693 * messages unless we need to.
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
699 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
700 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
706 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
708 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
709 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
710 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
712 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
713 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
714 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
717 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
729 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
730 * client to the server.
732 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
734 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
738 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
740 /* No post work to be done */
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
744 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
745 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
747 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
748 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
749 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
751 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
752 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
753 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
758 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
759 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
764 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
769 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
771 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
772 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
774 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
775 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
778 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
779 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
785 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
786 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
788 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
789 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
791 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
792 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
793 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
795 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
796 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
800 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
801 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
802 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
804 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
805 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
807 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
809 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
815 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
824 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
827 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
832 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
838 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
840 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
843 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
847 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
851 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
856 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
857 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
866 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
868 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
869 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
879 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
882 * Valid return values are:
886 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
887 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
889 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
891 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
893 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
895 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
896 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
901 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
903 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
904 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
907 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
908 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
909 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
912 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
913 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
914 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
917 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
923 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
924 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
928 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
929 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
932 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
933 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
934 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
937 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
938 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
939 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
940 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
943 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
944 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
945 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
948 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
949 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
950 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
958 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
959 * reading. Excludes the message header.
961 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
963 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
965 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
967 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
971 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
973 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
974 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
977 return s
->max_cert_list
;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
983 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
986 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
990 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
991 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
992 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
994 return s
->max_cert_list
;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
997 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
999 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1000 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1002 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1005 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1008 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1011 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1014 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1019 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1021 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1023 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1025 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1027 /* Shouldn't happen */
1028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1029 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1081 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1083 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1085 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1087 /* Shouldn't happen */
1088 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1089 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1094 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1095 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1099 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1107 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1108 unsigned char *session_id
;
1110 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1111 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1112 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1113 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1119 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1120 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1121 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1122 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1123 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1127 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1129 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1132 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1133 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1135 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1138 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1145 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1148 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1149 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1156 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1157 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1158 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1159 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1160 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1161 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1162 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1163 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1166 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1167 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1168 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1169 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1170 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1171 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1172 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1173 * know that is maximum server supports.
1174 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1175 * containing version 1.0.
1177 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1178 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1179 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1180 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1181 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1182 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1183 * the negotiated version.
1185 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1186 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1189 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1196 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1197 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1198 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1201 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1202 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1203 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1205 sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1207 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1215 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1216 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1217 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1218 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1219 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1222 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1223 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1225 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1226 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1227 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1231 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1233 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1234 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1235 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1242 /* Ciphers supported */
1243 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1244 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1249 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1253 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1260 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1266 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1267 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1268 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1269 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1270 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1271 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1274 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1281 /* Add the NULL method */
1282 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1288 /* TLS extensions */
1289 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1297 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1302 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1303 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1306 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1309 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1310 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1312 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1313 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1316 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1318 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1319 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1321 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1323 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1326 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1328 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1329 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1332 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1334 /* unknown cipher */
1335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1336 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1340 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1341 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1343 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1345 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1349 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1350 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1352 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1354 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1358 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1359 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1360 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1362 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1367 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1368 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1369 * set and use it for comparison.
1371 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1372 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1373 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1374 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1376 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1377 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1379 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1380 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1382 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1383 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1388 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1392 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1396 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1401 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1403 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1404 size_t session_id_len
;
1405 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1407 unsigned int compression
;
1408 unsigned int sversion
;
1409 unsigned int context
;
1410 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1415 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1417 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1421 /* load the server random */
1422 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1423 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1424 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1425 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1426 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1428 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1430 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1434 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1435 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1436 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1441 /* Get the session-id. */
1442 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1443 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1444 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1447 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1448 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1449 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1451 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1455 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1457 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1461 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1463 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1467 /* TLS extensions */
1468 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1469 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1470 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1471 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1478 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1479 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1480 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1481 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1482 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1486 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1493 if (compression
!= 0) {
1494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1495 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1496 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1500 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1501 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1502 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1504 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1510 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1511 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1515 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1519 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1520 * are appropriate for this version.
1522 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1523 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1524 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1526 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1534 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1535 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1537 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1539 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1540 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1544 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1545 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1546 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1547 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1553 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1554 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1555 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1556 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1557 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1558 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1559 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1560 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1561 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1562 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1564 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1565 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1566 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1568 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1569 * backwards compat reasons
1571 int master_key_length
;
1572 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1573 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1576 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1577 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1578 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1579 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1580 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1582 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1583 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1588 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1589 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1590 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1591 session_id_len
) == 0)
1596 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1597 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1598 /* actually a client application bug */
1599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1600 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1601 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1606 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1607 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1608 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1609 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1610 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1612 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1613 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1614 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1620 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1622 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1623 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1624 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1625 * used for resumption.
1627 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1628 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1629 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1630 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1631 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1636 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1637 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1639 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1643 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1646 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1647 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1649 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1654 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1655 if (compression
!= 0) {
1656 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1657 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1661 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1662 * using compression.
1664 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1666 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1670 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1671 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1672 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1675 if (compression
== 0)
1677 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1679 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1682 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1685 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1687 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1690 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1694 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1695 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1700 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1701 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1702 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1706 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1709 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1710 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1712 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1713 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1714 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1717 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1718 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1720 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1726 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1727 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1728 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1733 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1734 * we're done with this message
1737 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1738 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1739 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1745 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1747 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1751 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1754 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1757 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1758 * should not be used.
1760 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1761 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1763 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1764 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1765 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1766 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1771 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1774 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1775 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1776 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1780 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1781 * ClientHello will not change
1783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1785 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1790 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1791 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1793 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1799 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1800 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1801 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1804 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1805 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1810 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1812 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1816 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1819 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1820 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1822 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1823 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1824 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1825 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1826 unsigned int context
= 0;
1827 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1829 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1835 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1837 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1839 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1840 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1841 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1844 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1845 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1846 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1847 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1848 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1849 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1853 certstart
= certbytes
;
1854 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1860 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1863 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1867 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1868 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1871 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1877 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1879 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1880 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1881 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1882 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1883 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1884 /* SSLfatal already called */
1887 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1890 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1891 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1892 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1893 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1899 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1901 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1902 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1903 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1904 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1905 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1906 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1907 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1908 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1909 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1910 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1911 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1912 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1914 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1916 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1917 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1920 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1923 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1927 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1929 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1930 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1932 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1935 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1937 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1940 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1944 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1947 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1948 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1952 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1953 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1956 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1957 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1961 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1965 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1967 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1969 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1970 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1973 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1975 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1976 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1977 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1978 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1982 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1986 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1990 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1993 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1995 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1997 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1999 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2004 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2005 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2006 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2009 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2011 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2012 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2017 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2018 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2019 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2020 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2034 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2037 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2039 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2042 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2044 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2048 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2050 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2051 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2053 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2054 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2056 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2059 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2060 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2066 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2071 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2072 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2073 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2083 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2086 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2087 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2090 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2094 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2098 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2102 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2105 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2107 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2111 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2112 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2113 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2115 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2116 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2117 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2123 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2124 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2126 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2130 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2137 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2138 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2139 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2143 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2144 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2150 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2152 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2156 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2162 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2165 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2166 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2168 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2169 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2170 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2179 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2189 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2193 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2196 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2197 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2198 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2202 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2206 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2207 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2209 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2210 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2216 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2218 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2222 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2229 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2230 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2237 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2238 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2241 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2242 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2243 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2244 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2245 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2249 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2255 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2258 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2259 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2260 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2261 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2263 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2265 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2267 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2268 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2269 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2272 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2273 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2280 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2281 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2282 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2286 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2291 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2302 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2305 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2311 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2312 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2315 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2316 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2323 unsigned int sigalg
;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2327 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2330 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2340 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2345 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2346 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2347 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2350 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2352 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2356 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2357 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2359 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2363 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2369 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2370 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2371 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2373 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2377 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2378 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2384 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2385 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2389 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2392 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2395 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2396 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2397 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2398 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2399 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2400 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2403 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2406 /* still data left over */
2407 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2409 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2414 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2416 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2420 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2424 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2425 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2426 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2428 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2429 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2430 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2432 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2434 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2435 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2438 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2441 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2442 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2443 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2444 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2445 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2446 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2448 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2449 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2451 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2452 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2453 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2456 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2457 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2458 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2462 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2463 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2465 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2466 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2468 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2471 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2472 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2481 /* get the certificate types */
2482 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2484 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2485 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2486 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2489 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2491 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2492 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2496 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2499 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2502 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2507 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2508 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2510 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2512 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2513 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2514 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2516 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2517 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2519 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2524 /* get the CA RDNs */
2525 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2527 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2531 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2534 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2538 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2539 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2542 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2543 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2544 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2545 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2546 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2549 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2550 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2552 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2555 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2557 unsigned int ticklen
;
2558 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2559 unsigned int sess_len
;
2560 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2563 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2565 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2567 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2568 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2569 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2570 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2571 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2572 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2573 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2578 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2579 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2580 * be 0 here in that instance
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2586 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2587 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2588 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2589 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2590 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2593 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2594 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2597 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2600 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2603 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2607 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2608 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2610 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2611 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2612 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2614 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2617 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2618 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2622 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2623 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2625 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2627 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2628 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2629 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2631 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2632 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2634 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2637 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2639 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2643 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2644 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2645 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2650 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2651 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2653 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2654 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2658 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2659 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2661 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2662 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2663 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2670 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2671 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2672 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2673 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2674 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2675 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2676 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2677 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2678 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2681 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2682 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2684 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2685 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2686 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2691 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2692 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2694 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2695 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2696 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2697 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
2699 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2701 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2702 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2704 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2708 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2710 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2712 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2713 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2714 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2715 s
->session
->master_key
,
2717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2720 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2723 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2724 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2727 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2734 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2735 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2737 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2742 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2743 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2744 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2745 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2748 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2749 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2750 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2751 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2754 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2755 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2757 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2760 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2761 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2762 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2765 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2771 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2773 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2778 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2782 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2783 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2784 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2787 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2790 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2793 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2799 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2800 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2801 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2803 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2804 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2805 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2808 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2809 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2810 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2815 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2816 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2821 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2822 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2823 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2833 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2835 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2836 /* should contain no data */
2837 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2839 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2842 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2843 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2844 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2846 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2851 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2853 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2856 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2859 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2864 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2865 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2868 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2869 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2870 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2871 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2872 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2875 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2877 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2881 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2883 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2884 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2887 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2888 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2889 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2891 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2893 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2894 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2898 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2899 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2901 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2905 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2906 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2907 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2908 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2909 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2913 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2914 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2915 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2917 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2918 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2921 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2930 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2931 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2932 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2933 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2943 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2946 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2947 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2950 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2953 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2955 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2958 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2962 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2963 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2969 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2970 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2972 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2973 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2977 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2978 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2979 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2980 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2982 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2986 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2987 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2988 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2992 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2993 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2994 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2995 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2999 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
3000 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3001 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3002 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
3005 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3008 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3009 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3015 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3016 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3017 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3021 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3022 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3026 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3027 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3031 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3037 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3041 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
3042 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3043 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3045 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3052 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3054 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3055 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3059 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3061 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
3062 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3063 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3067 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3068 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3072 /* send off the data */
3073 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
3074 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
3076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3081 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
3082 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3086 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3095 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3098 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3099 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3100 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3103 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3105 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3110 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3112 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3113 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3117 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3118 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3122 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3123 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3125 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3131 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3139 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3140 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3149 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3152 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3153 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3156 unsigned int md_len
;
3157 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3158 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3159 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3160 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3163 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3164 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3167 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3169 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3170 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3171 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3172 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3176 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3177 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3178 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3179 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3183 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3184 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3185 * certificate key for key exchange
3188 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3190 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3193 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3197 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3198 /* Generate session key
3199 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3201 || RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3207 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3210 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3211 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3212 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3213 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3214 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3215 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3216 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3217 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3222 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3224 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3225 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3226 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3230 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3232 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3235 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3241 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3242 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3243 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3244 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3249 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3250 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3251 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3255 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3256 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3257 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3266 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3269 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3271 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3272 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3278 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3280 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3281 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3282 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3284 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3296 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3298 unsigned long alg_k
;
3300 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3303 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3304 * no need to do so here.
3306 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3307 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3310 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3311 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3313 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3314 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3316 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3317 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3319 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3320 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3322 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3323 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3325 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3327 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3333 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3334 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3336 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3337 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3342 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3344 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3347 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3348 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3352 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3353 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3354 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3361 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3363 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3366 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3367 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3368 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3377 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3378 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3379 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3383 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3386 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3387 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3389 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3390 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3391 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3394 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3395 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3396 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3397 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3398 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3403 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3404 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3410 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3411 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3416 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3417 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3418 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3420 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3422 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3423 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3426 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3427 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3429 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3430 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3435 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3438 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3441 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3442 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3443 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3444 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3446 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3451 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3452 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3455 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3457 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3458 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3459 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3461 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3464 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3468 /* We need to get a client cert */
3469 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3471 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3472 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3474 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3476 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3479 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3480 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3481 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3483 } else if (i
== 1) {
3485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3486 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3490 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3491 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3494 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3495 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3497 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3499 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3500 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3501 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3507 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3508 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3509 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3512 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3518 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3520 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3521 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3522 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3523 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3525 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3528 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3529 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3530 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3534 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3535 (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3537 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3542 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3543 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3544 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3546 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3547 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3550 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3557 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3559 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3563 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3564 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3566 /* we don't have a certificate */
3567 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3570 /* This is the passed certificate */
3571 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3573 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3574 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3575 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3576 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3577 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3582 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3583 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3586 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3591 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3593 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3594 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3599 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3601 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3610 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3612 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3613 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3615 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3616 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3618 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3619 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3625 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3631 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3633 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3634 /* should contain no data */
3635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3636 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3637 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3640 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3641 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3642 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3646 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3647 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3648 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3649 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3650 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3655 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3657 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3660 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3663 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3665 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3666 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3668 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3672 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3673 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3675 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3676 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3677 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3681 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3682 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3685 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3686 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3689 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3693 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3694 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3695 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3696 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3701 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3702 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3706 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3709 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3710 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3712 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3713 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3714 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3715 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3720 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3725 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3726 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3727 # error Max cipher length too short
3730 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3731 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3734 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3735 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3738 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3741 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3743 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3746 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3747 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3749 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3750 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3751 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3754 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3760 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3762 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3763 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3764 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
3767 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
3768 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3776 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3778 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3781 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3788 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3789 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3790 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3792 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3794 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3798 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3799 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3800 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3802 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3803 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3804 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3813 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3815 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3816 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3818 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3819 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3823 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;