2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
39 int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL
*s
,
40 ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb
,
41 ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb
,
44 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
49 sc
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb
= mutate_handshake_cb
;
50 sc
->statem
.mutatearg
= mutatearg
;
51 sc
->statem
.finish_mutate_handshake_cb
= finish_mutate_handshake_cb
;
57 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
58 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
60 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
)
64 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
67 * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message
68 * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation.
70 if (s
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb
!= NULL
71 && !s
->statem
.write_in_progress
72 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
73 && s
->init_num
>= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
77 if (!s
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
82 if (msglen
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
83 || !BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, msglen
))
85 memcpy(s
->init_buf
->data
, msg
, msglen
);
87 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
88 s
->statem
.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s
->statem
.mutatearg
);
89 s
->statem
.write_in_progress
= 1;
92 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(ssl
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
93 s
->init_num
, &written
);
96 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
98 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
99 * ignore the result anyway
100 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
102 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
103 || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
104 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
105 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
106 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
107 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
110 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
111 s
->statem
.write_in_progress
= 0;
113 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
114 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), ssl
,
115 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
118 s
->init_off
+= written
;
119 s
->init_num
-= written
;
123 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
127 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
128 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
131 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
137 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
139 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
;
140 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
141 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
143 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
144 /* SSLfatal() already called */
148 /* Reset any extension flags */
149 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
151 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
) != 0) {
152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
156 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
157 if (sctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
] == NULL
) {
158 int md5sha1_needed
= 0;
160 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
161 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
162 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, DTLS1_VERSION
))
165 if (ver_max
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
168 if (md5sha1_needed
) {
169 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
170 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
,
171 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
172 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
173 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
174 " above, or load different providers");
179 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
180 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
181 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min
, DTLS1_2_VERSION
))
182 ok
= SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl
, DTLS1_2_VERSION
);
184 if (ver_min
< TLS1_2_VERSION
)
185 ok
= SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl
, TLS1_2_VERSION
);
188 /* Shouldn't happen */
189 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
196 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(ssl
);
200 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
201 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
204 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
205 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
207 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
208 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
209 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
211 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
218 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
219 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
220 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
224 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
225 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
226 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
228 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
229 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx
, &sctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
231 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
234 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
235 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
237 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
238 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
240 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
241 memset(s
->s3
.client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
));
244 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
246 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
247 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
254 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
255 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
257 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
258 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
260 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
261 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
263 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
264 static const char servercontext
[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
265 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
266 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
267 static const char clientcontext
[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
268 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
270 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
273 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
274 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
275 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
276 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
277 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
278 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
280 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
283 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
284 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
285 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
287 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
288 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
289 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
290 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
291 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
292 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
293 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
299 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
304 retlen
= retlen_l
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
315 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
317 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
318 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
319 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
320 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
321 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
323 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
324 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
325 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
326 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
328 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
332 pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
334 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
339 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
345 /* Get the data to be signed */
346 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
351 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
356 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx
, &pctx
,
357 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
358 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
364 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
365 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
366 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
367 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
372 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
374 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
375 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
377 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
378 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
379 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
380 s
->session
->master_key
) <= 0
381 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, NULL
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
386 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
388 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
394 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
395 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
397 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
401 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
403 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
411 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
413 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
414 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
415 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
416 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
420 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
421 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
425 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
426 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
433 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
436 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
437 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
440 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
442 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
443 const unsigned char *data
;
444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
445 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
451 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
454 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
455 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
456 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
457 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
464 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
465 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
471 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
, sctx
) == NULL
) {
472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
473 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
477 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
480 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET
);
484 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
488 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
490 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED
);
494 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
499 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
500 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
501 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
503 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
505 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
506 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
509 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
510 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
511 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
512 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
513 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
514 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
515 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
518 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
523 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
528 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
529 /* SSLfatal() already called */
533 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
534 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
536 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx
, &pctx
,
537 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
538 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
545 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
546 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
547 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
548 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
549 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
)
551 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
557 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
558 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
559 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
560 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
565 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
566 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
567 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
568 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
569 s
->session
->master_key
) <= 0) {
570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
573 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
578 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
586 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
587 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
588 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
589 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
590 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
591 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
593 if (!s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1)
594 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
596 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
598 BIO_free(s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
);
599 s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
600 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
602 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
607 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
609 size_t finish_md_len
;
612 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
614 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
615 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
616 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
619 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
622 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
624 && s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0
625 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
626 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
627 /* SSLfatal() already called */
628 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
632 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
633 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
635 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
636 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
639 finish_md_len
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
641 s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
);
642 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
643 /* SSLfatal() already called */
644 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
647 s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
649 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
650 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
651 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
655 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
656 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
658 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
659 && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
, s
->session
->master_key
,
660 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
661 /* SSLfatal() already called */
662 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
666 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
668 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
669 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
670 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
673 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
,
675 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
677 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
,
679 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
682 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
685 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
687 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
689 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
692 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
693 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
696 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
698 unsigned int updatetype
;
701 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
702 * be on a record boundary.
704 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
709 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
710 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
711 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
712 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
716 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
719 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
720 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
722 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
726 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
727 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
728 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
730 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
731 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
733 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
738 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
742 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
745 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
749 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
752 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
753 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
755 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
756 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
759 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
760 ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
761 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
763 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
771 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
776 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
778 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
779 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
780 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
782 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
783 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
784 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
785 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
786 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
788 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
793 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
797 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
798 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
800 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
803 s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
= 1;
804 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
809 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
810 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
812 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
813 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
817 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
818 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
821 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
822 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
826 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
829 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
832 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
833 int was_first
= SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
);
837 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
840 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
841 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
844 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts
!= NULL
)
845 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 0);
846 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
847 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
848 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
849 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
856 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
857 * message must be on a record boundary.
859 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
860 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
862 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
865 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
866 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
) {
867 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
868 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
870 s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
= 0;
872 md_len
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
874 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
875 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
876 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
879 ok
= CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
881 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
883 if ((PACKET_data(pkt
)[0] ^ s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
[0]) != 0xFF) {
889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
890 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
894 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
896 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
898 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
901 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
903 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
905 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
907 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
911 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
912 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
914 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
916 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
917 !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
918 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
920 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
923 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
925 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
926 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
928 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
931 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
932 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
934 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
936 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
937 /* SSLfatal() already called */
938 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
944 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
945 && s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
946 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_first_handshake(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 0);
948 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
951 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
953 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
955 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
958 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
961 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
962 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
963 X509
*x
, int chain
, int for_comp
)
966 unsigned char *outbytes
;
967 int context
= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
;
970 context
|= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
;
972 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
978 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
979 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
985 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || for_comp
)
986 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, context
, x
, chain
)) {
987 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
995 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int for_comp
)
999 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
1000 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
1001 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
1002 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1004 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
1010 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
1012 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
1013 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
1015 extra_certs
= sctx
->extra_certs
;
1017 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
1019 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
1020 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
1022 chain_store
= sctx
->cert_store
;
1024 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
1025 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
,
1028 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
1030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
1033 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
1034 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1036 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
1040 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
1041 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
1042 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
1043 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
1045 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
1046 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1048 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
1049 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
1052 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1053 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1054 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1055 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
1057 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1059 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
);
1062 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
1063 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
1064 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
1066 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, for_comp
)) {
1067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1068 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1072 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1074 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
1077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
);
1080 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, for_comp
)) {
1081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1084 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
1085 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
1086 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, for_comp
)) {
1087 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1095 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1096 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int for_comp
)
1098 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
1100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1104 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, for_comp
))
1107 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1117 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1118 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1121 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst
,
1122 int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1124 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1125 int cleanuphand
= s
->statem
.cleanuphand
;
1126 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1127 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1130 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1133 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1134 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1136 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1138 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
))
1142 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1143 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1145 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1149 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1156 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1157 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1158 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1161 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1162 * post handshake exchange
1165 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1168 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1169 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1171 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1175 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1178 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
1179 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1181 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1182 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx
, &sctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1183 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1185 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1187 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1188 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1190 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1191 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1192 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1195 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1198 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1201 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
1202 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1204 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1205 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
1206 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1209 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1210 /* done with handshaking */
1211 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1212 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1213 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1214 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1218 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1219 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1220 else if (sctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1221 cb
= sctx
->info_callback
;
1223 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1224 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1228 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1229 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1230 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1234 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1235 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1236 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1239 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1242 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int *mt
)
1244 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1245 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1247 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1248 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1250 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1253 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1254 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(ssl
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1256 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1259 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1262 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1264 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1265 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1267 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1269 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1272 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1273 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1275 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1276 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1277 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1278 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1279 * with a valid cookie.
1283 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1284 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1285 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1286 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1288 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1290 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1293 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1298 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1299 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1301 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1302 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1303 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1306 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1310 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1311 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1312 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, ssl
,
1313 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1315 } while (skip_message
);
1316 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1319 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1321 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1323 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1326 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1327 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1329 l
= s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[0].length
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1330 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1332 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1333 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1336 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1337 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1338 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1339 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1342 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1344 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1351 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t *len
)
1353 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1356 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1358 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1359 /* We've already read everything in */
1360 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1365 n
= s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1367 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(ssl
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1368 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1370 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1374 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1379 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1380 * Finished verification.
1382 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1388 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1389 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1390 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1396 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1397 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1398 (size_t)s
->init_num
, ssl
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1401 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1402 * processing the message
1403 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1406 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1407 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1408 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1409 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1410 && s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1411 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1412 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1414 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1415 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1416 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1417 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1424 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1425 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1426 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, ssl
,
1427 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1434 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1435 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1436 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1437 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1438 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1439 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1440 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1441 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1442 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1443 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1444 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1445 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1446 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1447 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1448 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1449 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1450 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1451 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1452 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1453 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1454 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1455 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1456 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1457 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1458 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1459 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1460 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1461 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1462 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1463 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1464 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1465 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1466 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1467 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1468 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1469 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1470 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1471 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1472 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1473 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1474 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1476 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1477 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1480 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1482 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1484 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1485 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1490 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1492 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1494 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1497 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1499 int dtls
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
);
1504 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1505 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1510 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1511 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1514 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1515 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1518 /* Must be in order high to low */
1519 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1521 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1523 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1526 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1528 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1531 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1533 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1536 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1538 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1541 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1543 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1548 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1549 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1552 /* Must be in order high to low */
1553 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1555 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1557 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1560 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1561 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1563 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1564 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1570 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1572 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1573 * @method: the intended method.
1575 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1577 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1579 int version
= method
->version
;
1581 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1582 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1583 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1584 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1586 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1587 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1588 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1590 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1591 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1592 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1593 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1599 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1600 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1601 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1603 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1607 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1609 if (!ossl_assert(sctx
!= NULL
) || !ossl_assert(s
->session_ctx
!= NULL
))
1613 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1614 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1616 if (sctx
->ext
.servername_cb
!= NULL
1617 || s
->session_ctx
->ext
.servername_cb
!= NULL
)
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1621 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1625 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
|| s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
)
1628 /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */
1629 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
1630 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1632 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1633 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1634 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1635 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1640 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1642 if (i
!= SSL_PKEY_ECC
)
1645 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1646 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1647 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1649 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
1650 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s
, curve
))
1658 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1661 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1662 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1664 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1666 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1667 const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1669 const version_info
*vent
;
1670 const version_info
*table
;
1672 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
) {
1674 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1675 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1676 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1677 table
= tls_version_table
;
1679 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1680 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1685 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1687 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1688 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1689 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1691 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1692 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1694 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1702 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1703 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1704 * supported protocol version.
1706 * @s server SSL handle.
1708 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1710 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1712 const version_info
*vent
;
1713 const version_info
*table
;
1714 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1717 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1718 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed
1721 if (s
->version
== ssl
->defltmeth
->version
)
1725 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1726 * highest protocol version).
1728 if (ssl
->defltmeth
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1729 table
= tls_version_table
;
1730 else if (ssl
->defltmeth
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1731 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1733 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1737 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1738 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1739 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1745 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1746 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1747 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1748 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1750 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1751 * @version: the intended limit.
1752 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1754 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1756 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1766 valid_tls
= version
>= SSL3_VERSION
&& version
<= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
1768 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
) &&
1769 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
);
1771 if (!valid_tls
&& !valid_dtls
)
1775 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1776 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1777 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1779 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1780 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1781 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1782 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1783 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1785 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1786 * returning success.
1788 switch (method_version
) {
1792 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1797 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1805 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1807 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1808 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1809 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1810 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1811 && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1813 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1814 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1815 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1816 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1817 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1819 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1820 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1822 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1827 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1828 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1829 * the version specific method.
1831 * @s: server SSL handle.
1833 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1835 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1839 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1841 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1842 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1844 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1847 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1848 int server_version
= ssl
->method
->version
;
1849 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1850 const version_info
*vent
;
1851 const version_info
*table
;
1853 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1855 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1857 switch (server_version
) {
1859 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1860 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1861 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1862 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1864 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1865 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1866 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1867 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1868 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1873 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1874 * a HelloRetryRequest
1877 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1878 table
= tls_version_table
;
1880 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1881 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1885 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1887 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1888 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1889 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1891 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1892 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1893 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1894 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1895 PACKET versionslist
;
1897 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1899 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1900 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1901 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1905 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1906 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1907 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1908 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1909 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1910 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1911 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1913 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
1914 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
1916 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1917 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1919 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
1920 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1922 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1923 /* Trailing data? */
1924 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1927 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1928 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1930 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1931 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1933 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1934 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1937 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1938 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1939 ssl
->method
= best_method
;
1940 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, best_vers
))
1941 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1945 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1949 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1950 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1952 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1953 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1956 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1959 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1960 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1962 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1963 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1965 method
= vent
->smeth();
1966 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1967 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1968 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1969 ssl
->method
= method
;
1970 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
))
1971 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1977 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1981 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1982 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1983 * the version specific method.
1985 * @s: client SSL handle.
1986 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1987 * @extensions: The extensions received
1989 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1991 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1992 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1994 const version_info
*vent
;
1995 const version_info
*table
;
1996 int ret
, ver_min
, ver_max
, real_max
, origv
;
1997 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2000 s
->version
= version
;
2002 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
2003 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
2004 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
2005 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
2011 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
2012 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
2018 switch (ssl
->method
->version
) {
2020 if (s
->version
!= ssl
->method
->version
) {
2022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
2026 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2027 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2028 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2029 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2030 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2032 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
2033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2037 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2038 table
= tls_version_table
;
2040 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2041 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2045 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, &real_max
);
2048 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, ret
);
2051 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->version
, ver_min
)
2052 : s
->version
< ver_min
) {
2054 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2056 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s
->version
, ver_max
)
2057 : s
->version
> ver_max
) {
2059 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2063 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) == 0)
2066 /* Check for downgrades */
2067 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& real_max
> s
->version
) {
2068 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
2069 s
->s3
.server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2070 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
2071 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
2073 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2074 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
2077 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2078 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
2079 && real_max
> s
->version
) {
2080 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
2081 s
->s3
.server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2082 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
2083 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
2085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2086 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
2091 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2092 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
|| s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
2095 ssl
->method
= vent
->cmeth();
2096 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
2097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2104 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2109 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2110 * @s: The SSL connection
2111 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2112 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2113 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2114 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2117 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2118 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2119 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2120 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2121 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2123 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2124 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2125 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2127 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2128 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2130 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int *min_version
,
2131 int *max_version
, int *real_max
)
2133 int version
, tmp_real_max
;
2135 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
2136 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
2137 const version_info
*table
;
2138 const version_info
*vent
;
2139 const SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2141 switch (ssl
->method
->version
) {
2144 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2145 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2146 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2147 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2148 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2150 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
2152 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2155 if (!ossl_assert(real_max
== NULL
))
2156 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2158 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2159 table
= tls_version_table
;
2161 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2162 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2167 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2168 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2169 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2170 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2172 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2173 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2174 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2176 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2177 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2178 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2180 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2181 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2182 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2183 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2184 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2185 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2187 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2189 if (real_max
!= NULL
)
2192 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2194 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2195 * "version capability" vector.
2197 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2202 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2204 if (hole
== 1 && tmp_real_max
== 0)
2205 tmp_real_max
= vent
->version
;
2207 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2211 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2213 if (real_max
!= NULL
&& tmp_real_max
!= 0)
2214 *real_max
= tmp_real_max
;
2215 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2216 *min_version
= version
;
2221 *max_version
= version
;
2223 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2225 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2231 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2232 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2234 * @s: client SSL handle.
2236 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2238 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2240 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2243 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2244 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2246 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2249 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
);
2254 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2256 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2257 if (ver_max
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2259 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2260 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2261 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2262 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2263 * about this immediately.
2265 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, ver_max
))
2268 } else if (ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2269 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2270 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2273 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2278 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2279 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2280 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2281 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2283 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2284 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2288 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2291 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2292 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2294 if (group_id
== group
2296 || tls_group_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2304 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2305 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2306 const unsigned char *hashval
,
2307 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2310 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2311 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2313 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2315 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2316 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2318 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2319 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2320 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2327 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2328 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2333 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2334 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2335 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2336 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2337 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2338 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2343 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2344 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2345 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2348 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2349 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2350 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
2351 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2352 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2359 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2361 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2364 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2366 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2367 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2370 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2371 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2374 /* get the CA RDNs */
2375 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2380 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2381 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2382 unsigned int name_len
;
2384 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2385 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2390 namestart
= namebytes
;
2391 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2395 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2400 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2407 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2408 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2413 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2418 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2420 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2421 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2424 ca_sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl
);
2425 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
&& sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
) == 0)
2430 ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl
);
2435 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
,
2438 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2439 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2444 if ((ca_sk
!= NULL
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES
)) {
2447 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2448 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2449 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2453 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2454 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2456 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2457 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2463 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2471 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2472 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2473 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2475 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2476 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2482 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2483 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2485 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2492 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2493 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2495 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2497 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2498 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2502 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2503 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2507 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2508 s
->s3
.handshake_dgst
)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2510 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s
->pha_dgst
);
2519 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2520 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2522 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2524 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2528 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
.handshake_dgst
,
2530 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2537 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
2542 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2544 COMP_METHOD
*method
= NULL
;
2545 COMP_CTX
*comp
= NULL
;
2546 size_t expected_length
;
2552 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2555 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg
)) {
2556 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2559 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2560 if (sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
) {
2561 for (i
= 0; sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[i
] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
; i
++) {
2562 if (sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[i
] == comp_alg
) {
2568 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2572 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg
)) {
2573 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2577 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib
:
2578 method
= COMP_zlib_oneshot();
2580 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli
:
2581 method
= COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2583 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd
:
2584 method
= COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2587 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2591 if ((comp
= COMP_CTX_new(method
)) == NULL
2592 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &expected_length
)
2593 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &comp_length
)
2594 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != comp_length
2595 || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, expected_length
)
2596 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt
, (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, expected_length
)
2597 || COMP_expand_block(comp
, (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, expected_length
,
2598 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt
), comp_length
) != (int)expected_length
) {
2599 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
2602 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2604 COMP_CTX_free(comp
);