2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
23 #include <openssl/encoder.h>
26 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
28 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
33 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
34 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
35 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
36 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
37 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL
*s
,
41 ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb
,
42 ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb
,
45 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
50 sc
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb
= mutate_handshake_cb
;
51 sc
->statem
.mutatearg
= mutatearg
;
52 sc
->statem
.finish_mutate_handshake_cb
= finish_mutate_handshake_cb
;
58 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
59 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
61 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
)
65 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
68 * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message
69 * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation.
71 if (s
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb
!= NULL
72 && !s
->statem
.write_in_progress
73 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
74 && s
->init_num
>= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
78 if (!s
->statem
.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
83 if (msglen
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
84 || !BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, msglen
))
86 memcpy(s
->init_buf
->data
, msg
, msglen
);
88 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
89 s
->statem
.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s
->statem
.mutatearg
);
90 s
->statem
.write_in_progress
= 1;
93 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(ssl
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
94 s
->init_num
, &written
);
97 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
99 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
100 * ignore the result anyway
101 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
103 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
104 || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
105 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
106 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
107 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
108 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
111 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
112 s
->statem
.write_in_progress
= 0;
114 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
115 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), ssl
,
116 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
119 s
->init_off
+= written
;
120 s
->init_num
-= written
;
124 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
128 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
129 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
132 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
138 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
140 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
;
141 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
142 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
144 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
149 /* Reset any extension flags */
150 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
152 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
) != 0) {
153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
157 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
158 if (sctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
] == NULL
) {
159 int md5sha1_needed
= 0;
161 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
162 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
163 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, DTLS1_VERSION
))
166 if (ver_max
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
169 if (md5sha1_needed
) {
170 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
171 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
,
172 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
173 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
174 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
175 " above, or load different providers");
180 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
181 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
182 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min
, DTLS1_2_VERSION
))
183 ok
= SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl
, DTLS1_2_VERSION
);
185 if (ver_min
< TLS1_2_VERSION
)
186 ok
= SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl
, TLS1_2_VERSION
);
189 /* Shouldn't happen */
190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
197 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(ssl
);
201 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
202 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
205 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
206 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
208 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
209 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
210 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
212 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
219 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
220 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
221 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
225 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
226 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
227 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
229 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
230 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx
, &sctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
232 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
235 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
236 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
238 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
239 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
241 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
242 memset(s
->s3
.client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
));
245 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
247 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
248 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
255 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
256 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
258 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
259 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
261 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
262 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
264 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
265 static const char servercontext
[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
266 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
267 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
268 static const char clientcontext
[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
269 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
271 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
274 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
275 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
276 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
277 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
278 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
279 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
281 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
284 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
285 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
286 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
288 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
289 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
290 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
291 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
292 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
293 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
294 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
300 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
305 retlen
= retlen_l
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
316 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
318 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
319 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
320 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
321 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
322 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
324 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
325 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
326 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
327 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
329 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
333 pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
335 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
340 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
346 /* Get the data to be signed */
347 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
352 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
357 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx
, &pctx
,
358 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
359 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
365 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
366 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
367 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
368 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
373 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
375 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
376 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
378 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
379 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
380 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
381 s
->session
->master_key
) <= 0
382 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, NULL
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
387 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
389 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
395 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
396 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
398 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
402 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
404 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
405 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
412 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
414 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
415 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
416 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
417 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
421 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
422 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
426 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
427 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
433 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
434 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
437 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
438 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
441 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
443 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
444 const unsigned char *data
;
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
446 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
448 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
451 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
454 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
455 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
456 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
457 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
464 pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
470 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
, sctx
) == NULL
) {
471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
472 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
476 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
479 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET
);
483 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
487 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
489 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED
);
493 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
498 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
499 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
500 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
502 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
504 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
505 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
508 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
509 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
510 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
511 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
512 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
513 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
514 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
518 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
522 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
527 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
532 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
533 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
535 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx
, &pctx
,
536 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
537 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
544 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
545 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
546 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
547 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
548 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
)
550 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
556 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
557 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
558 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
559 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
560 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
564 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
565 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
566 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
567 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
568 s
->session
->master_key
) <= 0) {
569 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
572 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
577 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
579 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
585 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
586 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
587 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
588 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
589 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
590 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
592 if (!s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1)
593 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
595 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
597 BIO_free(s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
);
598 s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
599 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
601 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
606 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
608 size_t finish_md_len
;
611 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
613 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
614 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
615 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
618 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
621 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
623 && s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0
624 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
625 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
626 /* SSLfatal() already called */
627 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
631 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
632 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
634 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
635 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
638 finish_md_len
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
640 s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
);
641 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
643 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
646 s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
648 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
649 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
650 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
654 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
655 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
657 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
658 && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
, s
->session
->master_key
,
659 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
661 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
665 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
667 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
668 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
669 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
672 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
,
674 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
676 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.finish_md
,
678 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
681 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
684 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
686 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
688 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
691 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
692 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
695 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
697 unsigned int updatetype
;
700 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
701 * be on a record boundary.
703 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
705 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
708 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
709 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
710 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
711 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
715 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
718 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
719 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
720 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
721 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
725 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
726 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
727 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
729 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
730 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
732 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
734 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
737 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
741 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
744 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
748 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
751 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
752 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
754 sender
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
755 slen
= ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
758 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
759 ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
760 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
762 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
763 /* SSLfatal() already called */
770 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
775 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
777 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
778 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
779 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
781 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
782 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
783 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
784 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
785 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
786 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
792 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
796 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
797 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
799 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
802 s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
= 1;
803 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
805 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
808 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
809 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
811 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
812 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
816 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
817 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
820 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
821 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
825 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
828 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
831 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
832 int was_first
= SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
);
836 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
839 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
840 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
843 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts
!= NULL
)
844 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 0);
845 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
846 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
847 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
848 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
850 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
855 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
856 * message must be on a record boundary.
858 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
859 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
861 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
864 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
865 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
) {
866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
869 s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
= 0;
871 md_len
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
873 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
878 ok
= CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
880 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
882 if ((PACKET_data(pkt
)[0] ^ s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
[0]) != 0xFF) {
888 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
889 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
893 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
895 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
897 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
900 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
902 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
904 memcpy(s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
906 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
910 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
911 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
913 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
915 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
916 !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
917 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
918 /* SSLfatal() already called */
919 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
922 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
924 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
925 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
928 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
930 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
931 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
933 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
935 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
943 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
944 && s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
945 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_first_handshake(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 0);
947 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
950 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
952 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
953 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
954 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
957 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
960 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
961 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
962 X509
*x
, int chain
, int for_comp
)
965 unsigned char *outbytes
;
966 int context
= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
;
969 context
|= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
;
971 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
974 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
977 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
978 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
984 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || for_comp
)
985 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, context
, x
, chain
)) {
986 /* SSLfatal() already called */
993 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
994 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int for_comp
)
998 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
999 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
1000 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
1001 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1003 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
1009 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
1011 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
1012 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
1014 extra_certs
= sctx
->extra_certs
;
1016 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
1018 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
1019 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
1021 chain_store
= sctx
->cert_store
;
1023 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
1024 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
,
1027 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
1029 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
1032 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
1033 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1035 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
1039 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
1040 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
1041 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
1042 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
1044 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
1045 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1047 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
1048 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
1051 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
1052 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1053 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1054 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
1056 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
);
1061 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
1062 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
1063 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
1065 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, for_comp
)) {
1066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1067 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1071 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
1073 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
1076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
);
1079 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, for_comp
)) {
1080 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1083 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
1084 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
1085 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, for_comp
)) {
1086 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1094 EVP_PKEY
* tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
1096 if (sc
->session
->peer_rpk
!= NULL
)
1097 return sc
->session
->peer_rpk
;
1098 if (sc
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1099 return X509_get0_pubkey(sc
->session
->peer
);
1103 int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**peer_rpk
)
1105 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1107 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1110 unsigned long cert_len
= 0, spki_len
= 0;
1111 const unsigned char *spki
, *spkistart
;
1112 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc
);
1115 * ----------------------------
1116 * TLS 1.3 Certificate message:
1117 * ----------------------------
1118 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2
1124 * } CertificateType;
1127 * select (certificate_type) {
1128 * case RawPublicKey:
1129 * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
1130 * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1133 * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
1135 * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
1136 * } CertificateEntry;
1139 * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
1140 * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1143 * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server
1144 * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message
1145 * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no
1146 * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate
1147 * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list"
1148 * field having length 0).
1150 * ----------------------------
1151 * TLS 1.2 Certificate message:
1152 * ----------------------------
1153 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3
1155 * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
1158 * select(certificate_type){
1160 * // certificate type defined in this document.
1161 * case RawPublicKey:
1162 * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
1164 * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
1166 * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
1168 * // Additional certificate type based on
1169 * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry
1176 * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the
1177 * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to
1178 * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there
1179 * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the
1180 * [CertificateEntry] list is empty.
1182 * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send,
1183 * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions,
1184 * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string).
1186 * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and
1187 * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client
1188 * to server direction.
1190 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1191 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)) {
1192 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
1196 if (sc
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
1197 if (PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0) {
1198 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
1202 if (!PACKET_equal(&context
, sc
->pha_context
, sc
->pha_context_len
)) {
1203 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
1208 if (PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0) {
1209 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
1215 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1216 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_len
) {
1217 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1222 * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS
1223 * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified,
1224 * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We
1225 * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is
1226 * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported
1227 * by the verbatim RFC7250 text.
1232 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1234 * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed
1235 * by a possibly empty extension block.
1237 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &spki_len
)) {
1238 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1241 if (spki_len
== 0) {
1243 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1247 spki_len
= cert_len
;
1250 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &spki
, spki_len
)) {
1251 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1255 if ((pkey
= d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL
, &spki
, spki_len
, sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
)) == NULL
1256 || spki
!= (spkistart
+ spki_len
)) {
1257 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1260 if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1261 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1262 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1266 /* Process the Extensions block */
1267 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1268 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != (cert_len
- 3 - spki_len
)) {
1269 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1272 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
1273 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1274 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1277 if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY
,
1278 &rawexts
, NULL
, 1)) {
1279 /* SSLfatal already called */
1282 /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */
1283 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY
,
1284 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1285 /* SSLfatal already called */
1290 if (peer_rpk
!= NULL
) {
1296 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1297 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1301 unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
1304 unsigned char *pdata
= NULL
;
1305 X509_PUBKEY
*xpk
= NULL
;
1306 unsigned long ret
= 0;
1309 if (cpk
!= NULL
&& cpk
->x509
!= NULL
) {
1311 /* Get the RPK from the certificate */
1312 xpk
= X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk
->x509
);
1314 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1317 pdata_len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk
, &pdata
);
1318 } else if (cpk
!= NULL
&& cpk
->privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1319 /* Get the RPK from the private key */
1320 pdata_len
= i2d_PUBKEY(cpk
->privatekey
, &pdata
);
1322 /* The server RPK is not optional */
1324 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1327 /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */
1328 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, pdata
, pdata_len
)) {
1329 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1335 if (pdata_len
<= 0) {
1336 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1341 * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key
1342 * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper
1344 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1345 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
1346 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1351 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, pdata
, pdata_len
)) {
1352 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1356 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1358 * Only send extensions relevent to raw public keys. Until such
1359 * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions.
1360 * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle.
1362 if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY
,
1364 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1367 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1368 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1375 OPENSSL_free(pdata
);
1379 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1380 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int for_comp
)
1382 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
1384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1388 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, for_comp
))
1391 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1401 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1402 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1405 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst
,
1406 int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1408 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1409 int cleanuphand
= s
->statem
.cleanuphand
;
1410 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1411 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1414 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1417 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1418 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1420 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1422 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
))
1426 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1427 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1429 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1433 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1440 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1441 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1442 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1445 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1446 * post handshake exchange
1449 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1452 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1453 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1455 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1459 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1462 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
1463 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1465 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1466 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx
, &sctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1467 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1469 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1471 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1472 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1474 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1475 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1476 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1479 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1482 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1485 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
1486 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1488 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1489 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
,
1490 &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1493 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1494 /* done with handshaking */
1495 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1496 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1497 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1498 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1502 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1503 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1504 else if (sctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1505 cb
= sctx
->info_callback
;
1507 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1512 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1513 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1514 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1518 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1519 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1520 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1523 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1526 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int *mt
)
1528 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1529 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1531 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1532 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1534 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1537 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1538 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(ssl
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1540 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1543 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1546 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1548 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1549 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1551 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1552 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1553 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1556 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1557 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1559 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1560 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1561 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1562 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1563 * with a valid cookie.
1567 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1568 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1569 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1570 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1572 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1574 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1577 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1582 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1583 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1585 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1586 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1587 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1590 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1594 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1595 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1596 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, ssl
,
1597 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1599 } while (skip_message
);
1600 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1603 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1605 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1607 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1610 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1611 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1613 l
= s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[0].length
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1614 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1616 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1617 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1620 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1621 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1623 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1626 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1628 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1635 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t *len
)
1637 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1640 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1642 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1643 /* We've already read everything in */
1644 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1649 n
= s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1651 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(ssl
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1652 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1654 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1658 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1663 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1664 * Finished verification.
1666 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1672 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1673 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1674 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1680 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1681 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1682 (size_t)s
->init_num
, ssl
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1685 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1686 * processing the message
1687 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1690 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1691 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1692 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1693 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1694 && s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1695 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1696 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1697 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1698 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1699 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1700 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1701 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1708 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1709 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1710 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, ssl
,
1711 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1718 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1719 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1720 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1721 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1722 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1723 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1724 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1725 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1726 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1727 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1728 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1729 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1730 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1731 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1732 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1733 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1734 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1735 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1736 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1737 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1738 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1739 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1740 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1741 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1742 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1743 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1744 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1745 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1746 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1747 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1748 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1749 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1750 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1751 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1752 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1753 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1754 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1755 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1756 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1757 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1758 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1760 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1761 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1764 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1766 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1768 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1769 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1774 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1776 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1778 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1781 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1783 int dtls
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
);
1788 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1789 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1794 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1795 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1798 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1799 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1802 /* Must be in order high to low */
1803 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1805 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1807 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1810 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1812 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1815 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1817 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1820 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1822 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1825 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1827 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1832 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1833 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1836 /* Must be in order high to low */
1837 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1839 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1841 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1844 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1845 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1847 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1848 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1854 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1856 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1857 * @method: the intended method.
1859 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1861 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1863 int version
= method
->version
;
1865 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1866 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1867 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1868 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1870 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1871 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1872 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1874 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1875 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1876 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1877 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1883 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1884 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1885 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1887 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1891 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1893 if (!ossl_assert(sctx
!= NULL
) || !ossl_assert(s
->session_ctx
!= NULL
))
1897 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1898 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1900 if (sctx
->ext
.servername_cb
!= NULL
1901 || s
->session_ctx
->ext
.servername_cb
!= NULL
)
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1905 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1909 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
|| s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
)
1912 /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */
1913 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
1914 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1916 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1917 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1918 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1919 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1924 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1926 if (i
!= SSL_PKEY_ECC
)
1929 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1930 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1931 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1933 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
1934 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s
, curve
))
1942 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1945 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1946 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1948 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1950 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1951 const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1953 const version_info
*vent
;
1954 const version_info
*table
;
1956 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
) {
1958 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1959 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1960 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1961 table
= tls_version_table
;
1963 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1964 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1969 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1971 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1972 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1973 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1975 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1976 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1978 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1986 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1987 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1988 * supported protocol version.
1990 * @s server SSL handle.
1992 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1994 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1996 const version_info
*vent
;
1997 const version_info
*table
;
1998 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2001 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
2002 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed
2005 if (s
->version
== ssl
->defltmeth
->version
)
2009 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
2010 * highest protocol version).
2012 if (ssl
->defltmeth
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
2013 table
= tls_version_table
;
2014 else if (ssl
->defltmeth
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
2015 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2017 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
2021 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2022 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
2023 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
2029 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
2030 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
2031 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
2032 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
2034 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
2035 * @version: the intended limit.
2036 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
2038 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
2040 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
2050 valid_tls
= version
>= SSL3_VERSION
&& version
<= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
2052 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
) &&
2053 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
);
2055 if (!valid_tls
&& !valid_dtls
)
2059 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
2060 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
2061 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
2063 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
2064 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
2065 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
2066 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
2067 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
2069 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
2070 * returning success.
2072 switch (method_version
) {
2076 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2081 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2089 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
2091 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
2092 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
2093 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
2094 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2095 && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
2097 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
2098 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
2099 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
2100 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
2101 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
2103 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
2104 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
2106 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
2111 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
2112 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
2113 * the version specific method.
2115 * @s: server SSL handle.
2117 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2119 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
2123 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
2125 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
2126 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
2128 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
2131 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2132 int server_version
= ssl
->method
->version
;
2133 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
2134 const version_info
*vent
;
2135 const version_info
*table
;
2137 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
2139 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
2141 switch (server_version
) {
2143 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2144 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
2145 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
2146 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
2148 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2149 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2150 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2151 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2152 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2157 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
2158 * a HelloRetryRequest
2161 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2162 table
= tls_version_table
;
2164 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2165 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2169 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
2171 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
2172 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
2173 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
2175 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2176 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
2177 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
2178 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
2179 PACKET versionslist
;
2181 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
2183 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
2184 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
2185 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
2189 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
2190 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
2191 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
2192 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
2193 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
2194 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
2195 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
2197 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
2198 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
2200 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
2201 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
2203 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
2204 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
2206 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
2207 /* Trailing data? */
2208 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
2211 if (best_vers
> 0) {
2212 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
2214 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
2215 * negotiated TLSv1.3
2217 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2218 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
2221 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
2222 s
->version
= best_vers
;
2223 ssl
->method
= best_method
;
2224 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, best_vers
))
2225 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2229 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
2233 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
2234 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
2236 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
2237 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2240 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
2243 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2244 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
2246 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
2247 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
2249 method
= vent
->smeth();
2250 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
2251 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
2252 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
2253 ssl
->method
= method
;
2254 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
))
2255 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2261 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
2265 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
2266 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
2267 * the version specific method.
2269 * @s: client SSL handle.
2270 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
2271 * @extensions: The extensions received
2273 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
2275 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
2276 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
2278 const version_info
*vent
;
2279 const version_info
*table
;
2280 int ret
, ver_min
, ver_max
, real_max
, origv
;
2281 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2284 s
->version
= version
;
2286 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
2287 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
2288 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
2289 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
2295 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
2296 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
2302 switch (ssl
->method
->version
) {
2304 if (s
->version
!= ssl
->method
->version
) {
2306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
2310 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2311 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2312 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2313 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2314 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2316 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
2317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2321 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2322 table
= tls_version_table
;
2324 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2325 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2329 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, &real_max
);
2332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, ret
);
2335 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->version
, ver_min
)
2336 : s
->version
< ver_min
) {
2338 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2340 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s
->version
, ver_max
)
2341 : s
->version
> ver_max
) {
2343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2347 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) == 0)
2350 /* Check for downgrades */
2351 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& real_max
> s
->version
) {
2352 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
2353 s
->s3
.server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2354 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
2355 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2358 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
2361 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2362 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
2363 && real_max
> s
->version
) {
2364 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
2365 s
->s3
.server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2366 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
2367 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
2369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2370 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
2375 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2376 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
|| s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
2379 ssl
->method
= vent
->cmeth();
2380 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
2381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
2393 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2394 * @s: The SSL connection
2395 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2396 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2397 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2398 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2401 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2402 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2403 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2404 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2405 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2407 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2408 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2409 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2411 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2412 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2414 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int *min_version
,
2415 int *max_version
, int *real_max
)
2417 int version
, tmp_real_max
;
2419 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
2420 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
2421 const version_info
*table
;
2422 const version_info
*vent
;
2423 const SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2425 switch (ssl
->method
->version
) {
2428 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2429 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2430 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2431 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2432 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2434 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
2436 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2439 if (!ossl_assert(real_max
== NULL
))
2440 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2442 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2443 table
= tls_version_table
;
2445 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2446 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2451 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2452 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2453 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2454 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2456 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2457 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2458 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2460 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2461 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2462 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2464 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2465 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2466 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2467 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2468 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2469 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2471 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2473 if (real_max
!= NULL
)
2476 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2478 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2479 * "version capability" vector.
2481 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2486 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2488 if (hole
== 1 && tmp_real_max
== 0)
2489 tmp_real_max
= vent
->version
;
2491 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2495 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2497 if (real_max
!= NULL
&& tmp_real_max
!= 0)
2498 *real_max
= tmp_real_max
;
2499 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2500 *min_version
= version
;
2505 *max_version
= version
;
2507 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2509 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2515 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2516 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2518 * @s: client SSL handle.
2520 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2522 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2524 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2527 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2528 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2530 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2533 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
);
2538 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2540 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2541 if (ver_max
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2543 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2544 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2545 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2546 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2547 * about this immediately.
2549 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, ver_max
))
2552 } else if (ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2553 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2554 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2557 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2562 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2563 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2564 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2565 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2567 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2568 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2572 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2575 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2576 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2578 if (group_id
== group
2580 || tls_group_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2588 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2589 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2590 const unsigned char *hashval
,
2591 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2594 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2595 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2597 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2599 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2600 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2602 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2603 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2604 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2606 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2611 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2612 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2617 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2618 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2619 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2620 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2621 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2627 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2628 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2629 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2632 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2633 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2634 s
->s3
.tmp
.message_size
2635 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2636 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2643 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2645 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2648 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2650 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2651 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2654 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2658 /* get the CA RDNs */
2659 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2664 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2665 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2666 unsigned int name_len
;
2668 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2669 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2674 namestart
= namebytes
;
2675 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2679 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2680 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2684 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2691 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2692 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2697 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2702 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2704 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2705 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2708 ca_sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl
);
2709 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
&& sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
) == 0)
2714 ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl
);
2719 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
,
2722 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2723 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2728 if ((ca_sk
!= NULL
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES
)) {
2731 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2732 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2733 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2737 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2738 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2740 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2741 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2747 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2755 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2756 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2757 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2759 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2760 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2766 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2767 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2769 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2776 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2777 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2779 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2781 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2782 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2786 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2787 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2792 s
->s3
.handshake_dgst
)) {
2793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2794 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s
->pha_dgst
);
2803 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2804 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2806 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2808 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2809 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2812 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
.handshake_dgst
,
2814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2821 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
2826 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2828 COMP_METHOD
*method
= NULL
;
2829 COMP_CTX
*comp
= NULL
;
2830 size_t expected_length
;
2836 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2839 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg
)) {
2840 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2843 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2844 if (sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
) {
2845 for (i
= 0; sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[i
] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
; i
++) {
2846 if (sc
->cert_comp_prefs
[i
] == comp_alg
) {
2852 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2856 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg
)) {
2857 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2861 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib
:
2862 method
= COMP_zlib_oneshot();
2864 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli
:
2865 method
= COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2867 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd
:
2868 method
= COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2871 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2875 if ((comp
= COMP_CTX_new(method
)) == NULL
2876 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &expected_length
)
2877 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &comp_length
)
2878 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != comp_length
2879 || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, expected_length
)
2880 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt
, (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, expected_length
)
2881 || COMP_expand_block(comp
, (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, expected_length
,
2882 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt
), comp_length
) != (int)expected_length
) {
2883 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
2886 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2888 COMP_CTX_free(comp
);