2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
46 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
47 s
->init_num
, &written
);
50 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
60 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
63 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
65 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
66 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
70 s
->init_off
+= written
;
71 s
->init_num
-= written
;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
79 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
83 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
101 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
113 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
120 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
140 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
144 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
146 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
152 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
155 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
169 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
171 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
194 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
195 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
208 retlen
= retlen_l
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
220 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
222 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
223 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
224 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
226 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
228 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
229 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
232 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
239 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
245 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
248 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
252 /* Get the data to be signed */
253 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
258 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
259 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
263 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
264 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
267 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
271 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
277 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
278 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
279 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
280 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
286 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
287 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
288 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
289 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
290 s
->session
->master_key
)
291 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
297 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
305 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
307 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
308 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
309 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
310 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
314 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
321 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
337 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
338 const unsigned char *data
;
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
340 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
342 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
346 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
349 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
350 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
351 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
359 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
360 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
367 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
369 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
381 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
385 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
391 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
398 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
399 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
400 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
403 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
405 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
406 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
409 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
410 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
411 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
412 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
413 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
414 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
415 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
418 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
424 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
425 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
426 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
428 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
431 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
437 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
443 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
444 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
446 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
453 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
454 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
455 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
456 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
457 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
458 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
459 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
462 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
468 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
469 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
470 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
471 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
477 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
478 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
479 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
480 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
481 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
486 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
488 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
492 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
495 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
501 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
502 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
503 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
504 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
505 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
506 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
508 if (!s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1)
509 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
511 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
513 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
514 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
515 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
517 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
522 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
524 size_t finish_md_len
;
528 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
529 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
530 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
533 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
538 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
539 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
540 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
546 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
547 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
549 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
550 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
553 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
555 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
556 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
561 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
563 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
564 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
570 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
571 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
573 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
574 s
->session
->master_key
,
575 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
576 /* SSLfatal() already called */
581 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
583 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
589 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
591 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
593 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
595 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
601 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
603 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
609 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
613 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
615 unsigned int updatetype
;
617 s
->key_update_count
++;
618 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
620 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
625 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
626 * be on a record boundary.
628 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
630 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
631 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
634 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
637 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
638 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
642 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
645 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
646 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
648 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
653 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
654 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
655 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We
656 * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already
659 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
660 && (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) == 0)
661 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
663 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
672 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
675 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
681 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
682 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
684 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
685 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
688 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
689 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
690 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
692 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
704 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
706 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
707 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
708 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
711 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
712 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
713 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
714 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
717 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
724 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
729 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
730 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
736 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
737 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
738 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
746 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
747 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
751 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
752 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
767 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
770 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
771 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
774 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
775 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
776 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
784 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
785 * message must be on a record boundary.
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
789 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
793 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
795 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
796 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
799 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
801 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
803 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
805 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
809 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
812 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
817 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
819 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
820 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
825 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
827 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
829 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
831 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
835 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
836 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
840 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
841 !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
842 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
847 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
848 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
849 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
853 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
858 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
865 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
868 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
872 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
879 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
880 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
883 unsigned char *outbytes
;
885 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
887 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
891 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
892 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
899 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
909 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
913 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
914 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
915 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
917 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
923 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
925 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
926 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
928 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
930 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
932 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
933 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
935 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
937 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
938 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
940 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
941 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
945 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
946 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
952 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
953 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
954 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
955 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
957 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
958 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
960 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
961 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
964 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
969 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
973 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
974 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
975 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
983 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
985 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
987 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
990 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
991 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
995 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
996 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1005 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
1007 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
1008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
1016 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
1018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1026 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1027 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1030 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1032 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1033 int cleanuphand
= s
->statem
.cleanuphand
;
1036 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1038 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1039 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1041 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1044 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1052 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1053 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1054 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1057 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1058 * post handshake exchange
1061 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1064 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1065 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1067 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1071 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1074 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1075 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1077 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1078 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1079 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1081 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1083 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1084 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1086 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1087 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1088 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1091 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1094 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1097 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1099 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1100 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1103 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1104 /* done with handshaking */
1105 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1106 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1107 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1108 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1112 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1113 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1114 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1115 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1117 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1118 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1123 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1124 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1128 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1129 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1130 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1133 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1136 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1138 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1139 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1141 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1143 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1146 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1147 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1152 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1155 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1157 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1158 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1160 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1161 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1162 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1163 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1166 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1167 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1169 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1170 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1171 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1172 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1173 * with a valid cookie.
1177 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1178 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1179 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1180 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1182 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1184 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1185 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1188 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1193 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1194 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1196 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1197 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1198 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1201 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1205 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1206 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1207 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1208 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1210 } while (skip_message
);
1211 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1214 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1216 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1218 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1221 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1222 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1224 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1225 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1226 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1228 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1229 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1232 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1233 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1235 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1238 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1240 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1247 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1249 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1253 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1254 /* We've already read everything in */
1255 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1260 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1262 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1263 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1265 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1269 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1274 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1275 * Finished verification.
1277 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1283 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1284 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1285 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1291 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1292 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1293 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1296 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1297 * processing the message
1298 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1301 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1302 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1303 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1304 && s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1305 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1306 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1307 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1308 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1309 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1310 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1311 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1318 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1319 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1320 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1321 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1328 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1329 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1364 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1365 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1366 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1367 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1369 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1370 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1373 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1375 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1377 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1378 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1383 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1385 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1387 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1390 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1392 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1397 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1398 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1403 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1404 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1407 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1408 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1411 /* Must be in order high to low */
1412 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1414 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1416 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1419 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1421 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1424 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1426 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1429 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1431 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1434 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1436 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1441 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1442 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1445 /* Must be in order high to low */
1446 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1448 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1450 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1453 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1454 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1456 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1457 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1463 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1465 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1466 * @method: the intended method.
1468 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1470 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1472 int version
= method
->version
;
1474 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1475 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1476 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1477 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1479 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1480 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1481 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1483 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1484 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1485 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1486 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1492 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1493 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1496 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL
*s
)
1499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1505 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1509 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
|| s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
)
1512 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1513 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1515 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1516 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1517 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1518 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1523 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 if (i
!= SSL_PKEY_ECC
)
1529 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1530 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1531 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1533 eckey
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
1536 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey
));
1537 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s
, curve
))
1548 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1551 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1552 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1554 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1556 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
, const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1558 const version_info
*vent
;
1559 const version_info
*table
;
1561 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1563 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1564 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1565 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1566 table
= tls_version_table
;
1568 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1569 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1574 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1576 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1577 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1578 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1580 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1581 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1583 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1591 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1592 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1593 * supported protocol version.
1595 * @s server SSL handle.
1597 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1599 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1601 const version_info
*vent
;
1602 const version_info
*table
;
1605 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1606 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1609 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1613 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1614 * highest protocol version).
1616 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1617 table
= tls_version_table
;
1618 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1619 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1621 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1625 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1626 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1627 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1633 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1634 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1635 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1636 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1638 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1639 * @version: the intended limit.
1640 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1642 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1644 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1652 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1653 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1654 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1656 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1657 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1658 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1659 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1660 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1662 switch (method_version
) {
1665 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1666 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1667 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1668 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1673 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1674 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
)
1678 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1679 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
) ||
1680 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1689 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1691 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1692 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1693 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1694 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1695 && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1697 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1698 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1699 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1700 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1701 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1703 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1704 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1706 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1711 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1712 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1713 * the version specific method.
1715 * @s: server SSL handle.
1717 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1719 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1722 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1724 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1725 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1727 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1730 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1731 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1732 const version_info
*vent
;
1733 const version_info
*table
;
1735 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1737 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1739 switch (server_version
) {
1741 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1742 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1743 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1744 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1746 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1747 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1748 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1749 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1750 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1755 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1756 * a HelloRetryRequest
1759 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1760 table
= tls_version_table
;
1762 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1763 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1767 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1769 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1770 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1771 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1773 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1774 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1775 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1776 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1777 PACKET versionslist
;
1779 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1781 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1782 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1783 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1787 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1788 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1789 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1790 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1791 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1792 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1793 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1795 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
1796 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
1798 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1799 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1801 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
1802 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1804 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1805 /* Trailing data? */
1806 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1809 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1810 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1812 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1813 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1815 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1816 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1819 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1820 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1821 s
->method
= best_method
;
1824 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1828 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1829 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1831 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1832 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1835 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1838 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1839 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1841 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1842 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1844 method
= vent
->smeth();
1845 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1846 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1847 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1853 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1857 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1858 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1859 * the version specific method.
1861 * @s: client SSL handle.
1862 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1863 * @extensions: The extensions received
1865 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1867 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1869 const version_info
*vent
;
1870 const version_info
*table
;
1871 int ret
, ver_min
, ver_max
, real_max
, origv
;
1874 s
->version
= version
;
1876 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1877 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1879 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
1885 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
1886 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1888 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1889 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1893 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1895 if (s
->version
!= s
->method
->version
) {
1897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1898 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1899 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1903 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1904 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1905 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1906 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1907 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1910 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1911 table
= tls_version_table
;
1913 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1914 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1918 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, &real_max
);
1921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1922 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, ret
);
1925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->version
, ver_min
)
1926 : s
->version
< ver_min
) {
1928 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1929 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1931 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s
->version
, ver_max
)
1932 : s
->version
> ver_max
) {
1934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1935 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1939 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) == 0)
1942 /* Check for downgrades */
1943 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& real_max
> s
->version
) {
1944 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1945 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1946 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1947 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1950 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1951 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1954 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1955 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1956 && real_max
> s
->version
) {
1957 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1958 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1959 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1960 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1962 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1963 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1964 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1969 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1970 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
|| s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1973 s
->method
= vent
->cmeth();
1978 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1979 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1984 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1985 * @s: The SSL connection
1986 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1987 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1988 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
1989 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
1992 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1993 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1994 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1995 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1996 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1998 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1999 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2000 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2002 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2003 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2005 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
,
2008 int version
, tmp_real_max
;
2010 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
2011 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
2012 const version_info
*table
;
2013 const version_info
*vent
;
2015 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
2018 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2019 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2020 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2021 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2022 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2024 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
2026 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2029 if (!ossl_assert(real_max
== NULL
))
2030 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2032 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2033 table
= tls_version_table
;
2035 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2036 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2041 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2042 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2043 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2044 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2046 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2047 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2048 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2050 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2051 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2052 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2054 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2055 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2056 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2057 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2058 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2059 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2061 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2063 if (real_max
!= NULL
)
2066 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2068 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2069 * "version capability" vector.
2071 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2076 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2078 if (hole
== 1 && tmp_real_max
== 0)
2079 tmp_real_max
= vent
->version
;
2081 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2085 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2087 if (real_max
!= NULL
&& tmp_real_max
!= 0)
2088 *real_max
= tmp_real_max
;
2089 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2090 *min_version
= version
;
2095 *max_version
= version
;
2097 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2099 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2105 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2106 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2108 * @s: client SSL handle.
2110 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2112 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
2114 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2117 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2118 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2120 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2123 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
);
2128 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2130 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2131 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2132 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2134 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2139 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2140 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2141 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2142 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2145 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2146 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2150 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2153 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2154 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2156 if (group_id
== group
2158 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2167 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2168 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *hashval
,
2169 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2172 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2173 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2175 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2177 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2178 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2180 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2181 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2182 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2189 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2190 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2196 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2197 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2198 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2199 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2205 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2206 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2207 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2210 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2211 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2212 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
2213 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2221 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2223 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2226 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2228 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2229 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2232 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2234 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2237 /* get the CA RDNs */
2238 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2240 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2244 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2245 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2246 unsigned int name_len
;
2248 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2249 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2251 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2255 namestart
= namebytes
;
2256 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2261 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2263 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2267 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2269 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2275 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2276 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2281 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2286 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *get_ca_names(SSL
*s
)
2288 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;;
2291 ca_sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2292 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
&& sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
) == 0)
2297 ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2302 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2304 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2311 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2314 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2315 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2316 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2320 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2321 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2323 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2331 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2340 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2341 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2342 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2344 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2345 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2349 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2352 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2353 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2355 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2362 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2363 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2365 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2367 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2368 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2372 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2375 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2379 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2380 s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
)) {
2381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2382 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2391 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2392 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2394 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2396 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2397 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2398 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2402 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
,
2404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2405 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2406 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);