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Fix a race condition in ciphers handling
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27
28 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29
30 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
31
32 /*
33 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
34 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
35 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
36 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 *
38 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
39 * (transition not allowed)
40 */
41 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 {
43 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
44
45 /*
46 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
47 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
48 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 */
50 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 default:
52 break;
53
54 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
55 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
56 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
57 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 return 1;
59 }
60 break;
61 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
62 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
63 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
64 return 1;
65 }
66 break;
67 }
68 /* Fall through */
69
70 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
71 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
72 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
73 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
74 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 return 1;
76 }
77 } else {
78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
80 return 1;
81 }
82 }
83 break;
84
85 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
86 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 return 1;
90 }
91 } else {
92 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
93 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
94 return 1;
95 }
96 }
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
102 return 1;
103 }
104 break;
105
106 case TLS_ST_OK:
107 /*
108 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
109 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 */
111 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
112 break;
113
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
115 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 return 1;
118 }
119
120 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
121 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 break;
125 }
126
127 /* No valid transition found */
128 return 0;
129 }
130
131 /*
132 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
133 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
134 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
135 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 *
137 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
138 * (transition not allowed)
139 */
140 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 {
142 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143
144 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
145 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
146 goto err;
147 return 1;
148 }
149
150 switch (st->hand_state) {
151 default:
152 break;
153
154 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
155 case TLS_ST_OK:
156 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
159 return 1;
160 }
161 break;
162
163 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 /*
165 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
166 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * OR
168 * 2) If we did request one then
169 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * AND
171 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
172 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 */
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
175 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
176 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
177 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
178 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 /*
180 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
181 * not going to accept it because we require a client
182 * cert.
183 */
184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
185 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
186 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
187 return 0;
188 }
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 } else {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
194 return 1;
195 }
196 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
199 return 1;
200 }
201 }
202 break;
203
204 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
205 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
206 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 return 1;
208 }
209 break;
210
211 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 /*
213 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
214 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
215 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
216 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
217 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
218 * set.
219 */
220 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 /*
223 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
224 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
225 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
226 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 */
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 } else {
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
233 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
234 return 1;
235 }
236 }
237 break;
238
239 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 break;
245
246 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
248 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
251 return 1;
252 }
253 } else {
254 #endif
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
257 return 1;
258 }
259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
260 }
261 #endif
262 break;
263
264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
265 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
268 return 1;
269 }
270 break;
271 #endif
272
273 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 return 1;
277 }
278 break;
279 }
280
281 err:
282 /* No valid transition found */
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
284 BIO *rbio;
285
286 /*
287 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
288 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
289 */
290 s->init_num = 0;
291 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
292 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
293 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
294 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
295 return 0;
296 }
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
298 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
299 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 return 0;
301 }
302
303 /*
304 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 *
306 * Valid return values are:
307 * 1: Yes
308 * 0: No
309 */
310 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 {
312 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
313
314 /*
315 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
316 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
317 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
318 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
319 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
320 * key exchange.
321 */
322 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 /*
324 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
325 * provided
326 */
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
328 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
329 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
330 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
331 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
332 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #endif
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
335 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
336 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
337 #endif
338 ) {
339 return 1;
340 }
341
342 return 0;
343 }
344
345 /*
346 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 *
348 * Valid return values are:
349 * 1: Yes
350 * 0: No
351 */
352 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
353 {
354 if (
355 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
356 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 /*
358 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
359 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 */
361 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
362 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 /*
364 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
365 * a second time:
366 */
367 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
368 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 /*
370 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
371 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
372 * RFC 2246):
373 */
374 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 /*
376 * ... except when the application insists on
377 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
378 * this for SSL 3)
379 */
380 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
381 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
382 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 /*
384 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
385 * are omitted
386 */
387 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
388 return 1;
389 }
390
391 return 0;
392 }
393
394 /*
395 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
396 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
397 * client.
398 */
399 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 {
401 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
402
403 /*
404 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
405 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
406 */
407
408 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 default:
410 /* Shouldn't happen */
411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
412 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
414 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
415
416 case TLS_ST_OK:
417 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 }
421 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 }
425 /* Try to read from the client instead */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427
428 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431
432 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
433 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
434 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
436 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 else
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
443 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 else
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448
449 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 if (s->hit)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
452 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 else
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458
459 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
460 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
461 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 } else {
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 }
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467
468 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471
472 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475
476 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479
480 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
481 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482
483 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 /*
485 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
486 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
487 * immediately.
488 */
489 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
490 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
491 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 /*
493 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
494 * handshake at this point.
495 */
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 }
499 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 else
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504
505 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
506 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509
510 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
511 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
512 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
513 * been configured for.
514 */
515 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
516 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 }
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 }
521 }
522
523 /*
524 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
525 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
526 */
527 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
528 {
529 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
530
531 /*
532 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
533 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
534 */
535
536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
537 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
538
539 switch (st->hand_state) {
540 default:
541 /* Shouldn't happen */
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
546
547 case TLS_ST_OK:
548 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
549 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
551 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 }
554 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
555 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
556 /* SSLfatal() already called */
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
558 }
559 /* Fall through */
560
561 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
562 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
564
565 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568
569 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
570 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
571 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
572 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
573 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
574 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 } else {
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
579 }
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581
582 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
583 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
584
585 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
586 if (s->hit) {
587 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
589 else
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
591 } else {
592 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
593 /* normal PSK or SRP */
594 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
595 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
597 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
599 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
601 } else {
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
603 }
604 }
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606
607 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
608 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 }
612 /* Fall through */
613
614 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
615 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 }
619 /* Fall through */
620
621 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
622 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 }
626 /* Fall through */
627
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631
632 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
633 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634
635 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
636 if (s->hit) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
641 } else {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
643 }
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649
650 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653
654 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
655 if (s->hit) {
656 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
657 }
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 }
661 }
662
663 /*
664 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
665 * the server to the client.
666 */
667 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
668 {
669 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
670
671 switch (st->hand_state) {
672 default:
673 /* No pre work to be done */
674 break;
675
676 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
677 s->shutdown = 0;
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
679 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
680 break;
681
682 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
683 s->shutdown = 0;
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
686 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
687 st->use_timer = 0;
688 }
689 break;
690
691 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 /*
694 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
695 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
696 */
697 st->use_timer = 1;
698 }
699 break;
700
701 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
706 }
707 #endif
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
709
710 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
712 /*
713 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
714 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
715 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
716 *
717 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
718 */
719 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
720 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
721 /*
722 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
723 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
724 */
725 st->use_timer = 0;
726 }
727 break;
728
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
730 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
731 break;
732 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 return WORK_ERROR;
736 }
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 /*
739 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
740 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
741 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
742 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
743 */
744 st->use_timer = 0;
745 }
746 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
747
748 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
749 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
750 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
752 /* Fall through */
753
754 case TLS_ST_OK:
755 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
756 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
757 }
758
759 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 }
761
762 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
763 {
764 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
765 #if defined(EPIPE)
766 case EPIPE:
767 return 1;
768 #endif
769 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
770 case ECONNRESET:
771 return 1;
772 #endif
773 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
774 case WSAECONNRESET:
775 return 1;
776 #endif
777 default:
778 return 0;
779 }
780 }
781
782 /*
783 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
784 * server to the client.
785 */
786 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
787 {
788 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
789
790 s->init_num = 0;
791
792 switch (st->hand_state) {
793 default:
794 /* No post work to be done */
795 break;
796
797 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
798 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
799 return WORK_MORE_A;
800 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
802 return WORK_ERROR;
803 }
804 break;
805
806 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
807 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
808 return WORK_MORE_A;
809 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
810 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
812 return WORK_ERROR;
813 }
814 /*
815 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
816 * treat like it was the first packet
817 */
818 s->first_packet = 1;
819 break;
820
821 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
822 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
823 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
824 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
825 return WORK_MORE_A;
826 break;
827 }
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
829 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
830 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
831 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
832 size_t labellen;
833
834 /*
835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
836 * SCTP used.
837 */
838 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
840
841 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
842 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
843 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
844 labellen += 1;
845
846 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
847 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
848 labellen, NULL, 0,
849 0) <= 0) {
850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
851 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 return WORK_ERROR;
854 }
855
856 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
857 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
858 }
859 #endif
860 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
861 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
862 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
863 break;
864 /* Fall through */
865
866 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
867 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
868 if (!statem_flush(s))
869 return WORK_MORE_A;
870 break;
871 }
872
873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
874 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
875 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
876 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
878 return WORK_ERROR;
879 }
880
881 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
882 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
883 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
885 return WORK_ERROR;
886 }
887 /*
888 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
889 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
890 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
891 */
892 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
893 break;
894 }
895
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
897 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
898 /*
899 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
900 * no SCTP used.
901 */
902 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
903 0, NULL);
904 }
905 #endif
906 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
907 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
908 {
909 /* SSLfatal() already called */
910 return WORK_ERROR;
911 }
912
913 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
914 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
918 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
919 return WORK_MORE_A;
920 break;
921
922 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
923 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
924 return WORK_MORE_A;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
926 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
927 /*
928 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
929 * no SCTP used.
930 */
931 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
932 0, NULL);
933 }
934 #endif
935 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
936 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
937 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
938 &s->session->master_key_length)
939 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
940 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
942 return WORK_ERROR;
943 }
944 break;
945
946 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
947 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
948 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
949 return WORK_MORE_A;
950 }
951 break;
952
953 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
954 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
955 return WORK_MORE_A;
956 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
957 /* SSLfatal() already called */
958 return WORK_ERROR;
959 }
960 break;
961
962 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
963 clear_sys_error();
964 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
965 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
966 && conn_is_closed()) {
967 /*
968 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
969 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
970 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
971 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
972 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
973 */
974 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
975 break;
976 }
977
978 return WORK_MORE_A;
979 }
980 break;
981 }
982
983 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
984 }
985
986 /*
987 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
988 * server
989 *
990 * Valid return values are:
991 * 1: Success
992 * 0: Error
993 */
994 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
995 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
996 {
997 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
998
999 switch (st->hand_state) {
1000 default:
1001 /* Shouldn't happen */
1002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1003 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1004 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1005 return 0;
1006
1007 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1008 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1009 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1010 else
1011 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1012 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1013 break;
1014
1015 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1016 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1017 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1018 break;
1019
1020 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1021 /* No construction function needed */
1022 *confunc = NULL;
1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1024 break;
1025
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1029 break;
1030
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1034 break;
1035
1036 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1037 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1039 break;
1040
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1043 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1045 break;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1060 break;
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1065 break;
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1070 break;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1073 *confunc = NULL;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1075 break;
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1080 break;
1081
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1085 break;
1086 }
1087
1088 return 1;
1089 }
1090
1091 /*
1092 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1093 * calculated as follows:
1094 *
1095 * 2 + # client_version
1096 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1097 * 1 + # length of session_id
1098 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1099 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1100 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1101 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1102 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1103 * 2 + # length of extensions
1104 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1105 */
1106 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1107
1108 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1109 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1110
1111 /*
1112 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1113 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1114 */
1115 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1116 {
1117 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1118
1119 switch (st->hand_state) {
1120 default:
1121 /* Shouldn't happen */
1122 return 0;
1123
1124 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1125 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1126
1127 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1128 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1129
1130 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1131 return s->max_cert_list;
1132
1133 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1134 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1135
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1137 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1138
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1140 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1141 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1142 #endif
1143
1144 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1145 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1146
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1148 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1149
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1151 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1152 }
1153 }
1154
1155 /*
1156 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1157 */
1158 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1159 {
1160 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1161
1162 switch (st->hand_state) {
1163 default:
1164 /* Shouldn't happen */
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1166 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1169
1170 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1171 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1172
1173 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1174 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1175
1176 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1177 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1178
1179 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1180 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1181
1182 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1183 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1184
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1186 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1187 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1188 #endif
1189
1190 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1191 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1192
1193 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1194 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1195
1196 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1197 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1198
1199 }
1200 }
1201
1202 /*
1203 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1204 * from the client
1205 */
1206 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1207 {
1208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1209
1210 switch (st->hand_state) {
1211 default:
1212 /* Shouldn't happen */
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1214 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 return WORK_ERROR;
1217
1218 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1219 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1220
1221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1222 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1223 }
1224 }
1225
1226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1227 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1228 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1229 {
1230 int ret;
1231 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1232
1233 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1234 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1235 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1236 /*
1237 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1238 * login name
1239 */
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1241 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1242 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1243 return -1;
1244 } else {
1245 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1246 if (ret < 0)
1247 return 0;
1248 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1249 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1250 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1251 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1252 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1253 return -1;
1254 }
1255 }
1256 }
1257 return 1;
1258 }
1259 #endif
1260
1261 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1262 size_t cookie_len)
1263 {
1264 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1265 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1266 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1267 return 0;
1268
1269 return 1;
1270 }
1271
1272 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1273 {
1274 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1275 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1276 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1277 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1278 cookie_leni > 255) {
1279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1280 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1281 return 0;
1282 }
1283 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1284
1285 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1286 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 return 0;
1290 }
1291
1292 return 1;
1293 }
1294
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1296 /*-
1297 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1298 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1299 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1300 * SNI,
1301 * elliptic_curves
1302 * ec_point_formats
1303 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1304 *
1305 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1306 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1307 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1308 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1309 */
1310 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1311 {
1312 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1313 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1314 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1315 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1316 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1317 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1318 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1319
1320 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1321 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1322 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1323 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1324 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1325 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1326 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1327 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1328 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1329 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1330 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1331 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1332 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1333 };
1334 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1335 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1336 unsigned int type;
1337 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1338 size_t ext_len;
1339
1340 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1341
1342 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1343 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1344 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1345 return;
1346 }
1347
1348 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1349 return;
1350
1351 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1352 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1353
1354 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1355 ext_len);
1356 }
1357 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1358
1359 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1360 {
1361 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1362 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1363 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1364 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1365
1366 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1367 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1368 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 goto err;
1372 }
1373 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1374 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1375 && (s->options
1376 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1377 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1379 }
1380 s->renegotiate = 1;
1381 s->new_session = 1;
1382 }
1383
1384 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1385 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 goto err;
1389 }
1390
1391 /*
1392 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1393 */
1394 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1395 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1396
1397 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1398 unsigned int mt;
1399
1400 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1401 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1403 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1404 goto err;
1405 }
1406
1407 /*-
1408 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1409 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1410 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1411 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1412 * Byte Content
1413 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1414 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1415 * 3-4 version
1416 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1417 * 7-8 session_id_length
1418 * 9-10 challenge_length
1419 * ... ...
1420 */
1421
1422 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1423 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1424 /*
1425 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1426 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1427 * in the first place
1428 */
1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1430 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 goto err;
1432 }
1433 }
1434
1435 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1438 goto err;
1439 }
1440
1441 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1442 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1443 /*
1444 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1445 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1446 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1447 */
1448 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1449 PACKET challenge;
1450
1451 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1452 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1453 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1456 goto err;
1457 }
1458
1459 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1462 goto err;
1463 }
1464
1465 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1466 ciphersuite_len)
1467 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1468 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1469 /* No extensions. */
1470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1473 goto err;
1474 }
1475 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1476
1477 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1478 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1479 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1480 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1481 */
1482 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1484 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1485 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1486 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1487 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1488 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1489 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1492 goto err;
1493 }
1494
1495 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1496 } else {
1497 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1498 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1499 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1500 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1501 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1502 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1505 goto err;
1506 }
1507
1508 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1509 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1511 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1512 goto err;
1513 }
1514 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1515 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1516 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 goto err;
1520 }
1521 /*
1522 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1523 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1524 * So check cookie length...
1525 */
1526 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1527 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1528 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1529 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1530 }
1531 }
1532 }
1533
1534 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1536 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1537 goto err;
1538 }
1539
1540 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1542 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1543 goto err;
1544 }
1545
1546 /* Could be empty. */
1547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1548 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1549 } else {
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1551 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1554 goto err;
1555 }
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1560 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1561 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1568 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1569 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1570 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1571 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1573 goto err;
1574 }
1575 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1576
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1578
1579 err:
1580 if (clienthello != NULL)
1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1582 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1583
1584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1585 }
1586
1587 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1588 {
1589 unsigned int j;
1590 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 int protverr;
1592 size_t loop;
1593 unsigned long id;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1595 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1596 #endif
1597 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1600 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1601 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1602
1603 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1604 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1605 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1606 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1607 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1609 break;
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1611 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1612 return -1;
1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1614 default:
1615 SSLfatal(s, al,
1616 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1617 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1618 goto err;
1619 }
1620 }
1621
1622 /* Set up the client_random */
1623 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1624
1625 /* Choose the version */
1626
1627 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1628 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1629 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1630 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1631 /*
1632 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1633 * support it.
1634 */
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1636 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1637 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1638 goto err;
1639 }
1640 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1641 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1642 }
1643 /*
1644 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1645 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1646 */
1647 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1648 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1649 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1650 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1651 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1652 } else {
1653 protverr = 0;
1654 }
1655
1656 if (protverr) {
1657 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1658 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1659 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1660 }
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1662 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1663 goto err;
1664 }
1665
1666 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1667 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1669 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673
1674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1675 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1676 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1677 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1678 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1679 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1681 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1682 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1683 goto err;
1684 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1685 }
1686 /* default verification */
1687 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1688 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1689 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1691 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1692 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1693 goto err;
1694 }
1695 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1696 }
1697 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1698 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1699 if (protverr != 0) {
1700 s->version = s->client_version;
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1702 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705 }
1706 }
1707
1708 s->hit = 0;
1709
1710 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1711 clienthello->isv2) ||
1712 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1713 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1714 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1719 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1720 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1721 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1722 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1723 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1724 if (s->renegotiate) {
1725 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1727 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1728 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1729 goto err;
1730 }
1731 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1732 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1733 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1734 /*
1735 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1736 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1737 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1738 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1739 * an insecure downgrade.
1740 */
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1742 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1743 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1744 goto err;
1745 }
1746 }
1747 }
1748
1749 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1750 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1751 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1752 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1753
1754 if (cipher == NULL) {
1755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1756 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1757 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1758 goto err;
1759 }
1760 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1761 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1762 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1763 /*
1764 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1765 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1766 */
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1768 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1769 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1770 goto err;
1771 }
1772 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1773 }
1774
1775 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1776 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1777 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1778 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1780 goto err;
1781 }
1782
1783 /*
1784 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1785 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1786 *
1787 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1788 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1789 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1790 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1791 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1792 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1793 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1794 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1795 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1796 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1797 * ignored.
1798 */
1799 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1800 (s->new_session &&
1801 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1802 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1804 goto err;
1805 }
1806 } else {
1807 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1808 if (i == 1) {
1809 /* previous session */
1810 s->hit = 1;
1811 } else if (i == -1) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1813 goto err;
1814 } else {
1815 /* i == 0 */
1816 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820 }
1821 }
1822
1823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1824 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1825 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1826 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1827 }
1828
1829 /*
1830 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1831 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1832 */
1833 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1834 j = 0;
1835 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1836
1837 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1838 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1839 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1840 }
1841 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1842 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1843 if (trc_out != NULL)
1844 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1845 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1846 if (c->id == id) {
1847 j = 1;
1848 break;
1849 }
1850 }
1851 if (j == 0) {
1852 /*
1853 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1854 * to reuse it
1855 */
1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1858 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1859 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1860 goto err;
1861 }
1862 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1863 }
1864
1865 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1866 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1867 break;
1868 }
1869
1870 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1871 /* no compress */
1872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1874 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1875 goto err;
1876 }
1877
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1880 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1881 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1882
1883 /* TLS extensions */
1884 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1885 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1887 goto err;
1888 }
1889
1890 /*
1891 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1892 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1893 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1894 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1895 */
1896 {
1897 unsigned char *pos;
1898 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1899 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1901 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1903 goto err;
1904 }
1905 }
1906
1907 if (!s->hit
1908 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1909 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1910 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1911 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1912 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1913 /*
1914 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1915 * backwards compat reasons
1916 */
1917 int master_key_length;
1918
1919 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1920 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1921 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1922 &pref_cipher,
1923 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1924 && master_key_length > 0) {
1925 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1926 s->hit = 1;
1927 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1928 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1929
1930 ciphers = NULL;
1931
1932 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1933 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1934 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1935 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1936 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1939 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942
1943 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1944 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1945 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1946 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1947 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1948 }
1949 }
1950
1951 /*
1952 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1953 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1954 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1955 */
1956 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1957 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1958 /*
1959 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1960 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1961 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1962 */
1963 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1965 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1966 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1967 goto err;
1968 }
1969 }
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1971 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1972 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1973 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1974 unsigned int k;
1975 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1976 /* Can't disable compression */
1977 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1979 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1980 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1981 goto err;
1982 }
1983 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1984 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1985 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1986 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1987 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1988 break;
1989 }
1990 }
1991 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1993 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1994 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1995 goto err;
1996 }
1997 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1998 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1999 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2000 break;
2001 }
2002 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2004 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2005 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2006 goto err;
2007 }
2008 } else if (s->hit) {
2009 comp = NULL;
2010 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2011 /* See if we have a match */
2012 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2013 unsigned int o;
2014
2015 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2016 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2017 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2018 v = comp->id;
2019 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2020 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2021 done = 1;
2022 break;
2023 }
2024 }
2025 if (done)
2026 break;
2027 }
2028 if (done)
2029 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2030 else
2031 comp = NULL;
2032 }
2033 #else
2034 /*
2035 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2036 * using compression.
2037 */
2038 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2040 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2041 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2042 goto err;
2043 }
2044 #endif
2045
2046 /*
2047 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2048 */
2049
2050 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2051 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2052 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2053 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2055 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2056 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2057 goto err;
2058 }
2059 ciphers = NULL;
2060 }
2061
2062 if (!s->hit) {
2063 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2064 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2065 #else
2066 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2067 #endif
2068 }
2069
2070 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2072 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2073 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2074 s->clienthello = NULL;
2075 return 1;
2076 err:
2077 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2078 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2079 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2080 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2081 s->clienthello = NULL;
2082
2083 return 0;
2084 }
2085
2086 /*
2087 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2088 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2089 */
2090 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2091 {
2092 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2093
2094 /*
2095 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2096 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2097 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2098 * influence which certificate is sent
2099 */
2100 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2101 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2102 int ret;
2103
2104 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2105 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2106 /*
2107 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2108 * et al can pick it up.
2109 */
2110 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2111 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2112 switch (ret) {
2113 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2114 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2115 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2116 break;
2117 /* status request response should be sent */
2118 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2119 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2120 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2121 break;
2122 /* something bad happened */
2123 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2124 default:
2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2126 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2127 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2128 return 0;
2129 }
2130 }
2131 }
2132
2133 return 1;
2134 }
2135
2136 /*
2137 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2138 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2139 */
2140 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2141 {
2142 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2143 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2144
2145 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2146 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2147 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2148 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2149 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2150
2151 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2152 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2153 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2154 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2157 return 0;
2158 }
2159 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2161 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2162 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2163 #endif
2164
2165 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2166 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2167 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2168 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2169 selected_len) != 0) {
2170 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2171 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2172
2173 if (!s->hit) {
2174 /*
2175 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2176 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2177 * selected ALPN.
2178 */
2179 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2181 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2183 return 0;
2184 }
2185 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2186 selected_len);
2187 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2189 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2191 return 0;
2192 }
2193 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2194 }
2195 }
2196
2197 return 1;
2198 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2200 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2201 return 0;
2202 }
2203 /*
2204 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2205 * present.
2206 */
2207 }
2208
2209 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2210 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2211 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2212 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2213 }
2214
2215 return 1;
2216 }
2217
2218 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2219 {
2220 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2221
2222 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2223 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2224 if (rv == 0) {
2225 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2226 goto err;
2227 }
2228 if (rv < 0)
2229 return WORK_MORE_A;
2230 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2231 }
2232 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2233 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2234 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2235 if (!s->hit) {
2236 if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2237 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2238 if (rv == 0) {
2239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2240 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2241 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2242 goto err;
2243 }
2244 if (rv < 0) {
2245 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2246 return WORK_MORE_B;
2247 }
2248 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2249 }
2250 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2251 /* SSLfatal already called */
2252 goto err;
2253 }
2254 }
2255
2256 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2257 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2258 cipher =
2259 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2260
2261 if (cipher == NULL) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2263 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2264 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2265 goto err;
2266 }
2267 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2268 }
2269 if (!s->hit) {
2270 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2271 /* SSLfatal already called */
2272 goto err;
2273 }
2274 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2275 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2276 s->session->not_resumable =
2277 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2278 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2279 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2280 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2281 /* do not send a session ticket */
2282 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2283 }
2284 } else {
2285 /* Session-id reuse */
2286 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2287 }
2288
2289 /*-
2290 * we now have the following setup.
2291 * client_random
2292 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2293 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2294 * compression - basically ignored right now
2295 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2296 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2297 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2298 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2299 */
2300
2301 /*
2302 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2303 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2304 */
2305 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2307 goto err;
2308 }
2309 /*
2310 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2311 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2312 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2313 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2314 */
2315 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2316 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2317 goto err;
2318 }
2319
2320 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2321 }
2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2323 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2324 int ret;
2325 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2326 /*
2327 * callback indicates further work to be done
2328 */
2329 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2330 return WORK_MORE_C;
2331 }
2332 if (ret < 0) {
2333 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 goto err;
2335 }
2336 }
2337 #endif
2338
2339 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2340 err:
2341 return WORK_ERROR;
2342 }
2343
2344 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2345 {
2346 int compm;
2347 size_t sl, len;
2348 int version;
2349 unsigned char *session_id;
2350 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2351
2352 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2353 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2354 /*
2355 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2356 * tls_process_client_hello()
2357 */
2358 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2359 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2360 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2361 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2364 return 0;
2365 }
2366
2367 /*-
2368 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2369 * back in the server hello:
2370 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2371 * we send back the old session ID.
2372 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2373 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2374 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2375 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2376 * session ID.
2377 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2378 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2379 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2380 * regardless
2381 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2382 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2383 * to send back.
2384 */
2385 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2386 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2387 && !s->hit))
2388 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2389
2390 if (usetls13) {
2391 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2392 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2393 } else {
2394 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2395 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2396 }
2397
2398 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2400 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2401 return 0;
2402 }
2403
2404 /* set up the compression method */
2405 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2406 compm = 0;
2407 #else
2408 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2409 compm = 0;
2410 else
2411 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2412 #endif
2413
2414 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2415 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2416 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 return 0;
2420 }
2421
2422 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2423 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2424 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2425 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2426 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2427 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2428 NULL, 0)) {
2429 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2430 return 0;
2431 }
2432
2433 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2434 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2435 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2436 s->session = NULL;
2437 s->hit = 0;
2438
2439 /*
2440 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2441 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2442 */
2443 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2444 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2445 return 0;
2446 }
2447 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2448 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2449 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2450 return 0;
2451 }
2452
2453 return 1;
2454 }
2455
2456 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2457 {
2458 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2459 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2461 return 0;
2462 }
2463 }
2464 return 1;
2465 }
2466
2467 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2468 {
2469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2470 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2471 #endif
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2473 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2474 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2475 int curve_id = 0;
2476 #endif
2477 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2478 int i;
2479 unsigned long type;
2480 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2481 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2482 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2483 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2484
2485 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2487 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2488 goto err;
2489 }
2490
2491 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2494 goto err;
2495 }
2496
2497 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2498
2499 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2501 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2502 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2503 } else
2504 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2506 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2507 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2508
2509 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2510 DH *dh;
2511
2512 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2513 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2514 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2515 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2516 DH_free(dhp);
2517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2518 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2520 goto err;
2521 }
2522 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2523 pkdhp = pkdh;
2524 } else {
2525 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2526 }
2527 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2528 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2529 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2530 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2532 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2534 goto err;
2535 }
2536 pkdhp = pkdh;
2537 }
2538 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2540 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2542 goto err;
2543 }
2544 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2545 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2549 goto err;
2550 }
2551 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 goto err;
2556 }
2557
2558 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2559 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2560 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2561 goto err;
2562 }
2563
2564 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2565 if (dh == NULL) {
2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2569 goto err;
2570 }
2571
2572 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2573 pkdh = NULL;
2574
2575 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2576 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2577 } else
2578 #endif
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2580 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2581
2582 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 goto err;
2587 }
2588
2589 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2590 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2591 if (curve_id == 0) {
2592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2593 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2595 goto err;
2596 }
2597 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2598 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2599 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2601 goto err;
2602 }
2603
2604 /* Encode the public key. */
2605 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2606 &encodedPoint);
2607 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2609 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612
2613 /*
2614 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2615 * can set these to NULLs
2616 */
2617 r[0] = NULL;
2618 r[1] = NULL;
2619 r[2] = NULL;
2620 r[3] = NULL;
2621 } else
2622 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2624 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2625 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2626 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2627 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2629 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2630 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2631 goto err;
2632 }
2633 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2634 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2635 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2636 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2637 } else
2638 #endif
2639 {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2641 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2642 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2643 goto err;
2644 }
2645
2646 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2647 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2648 lu = NULL;
2649 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2651 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2652 goto err;
2653 }
2654
2655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2656 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2657 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2658 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2659
2660 /*
2661 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2662 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2663 */
2664 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2665 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2666 len)) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 goto err;
2671 }
2672 }
2673 #endif
2674
2675 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2676 unsigned char *binval;
2677 int res;
2678
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2680 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2681 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2682 } else
2683 #endif
2684 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2685
2686 if (!res) {
2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2688 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 goto err;
2691 }
2692
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2694 /*-
2695 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2696 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2697 * as the prime
2698 */
2699 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2700 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2701
2702 if (len > 0) {
2703 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2706 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 goto err;
2708 }
2709 memset(binval, 0, len);
2710 }
2711 }
2712 #endif
2713 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2714 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2716 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 goto err;
2719 }
2720
2721 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2722 }
2723
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2725 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2726 /*
2727 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2728 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2729 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2730 * point itself
2731 */
2732 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2733 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2734 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2735 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2737 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2739 goto err;
2740 }
2741 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2742 encodedPoint = NULL;
2743 }
2744 #endif
2745
2746 /* not anonymous */
2747 if (lu != NULL) {
2748 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2749 const EVP_MD *md;
2750 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2751 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2752 int rv;
2753
2754 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2755 /* Should never happen */
2756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2757 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2759 goto err;
2760 }
2761 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2762 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 goto err;
2767 }
2768 /* send signature algorithm */
2769 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2771 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 goto err;
2774 }
2775 /*
2776 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2777 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2778 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2779 * afterwards.
2780 */
2781 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2782 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2783 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 goto err;
2788 }
2789 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2790 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2791 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2793 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2794 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2795 goto err;
2796 }
2797 }
2798 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2799 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2800 paramlen);
2801 if (tbslen == 0) {
2802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2803 goto err;
2804 }
2805 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2806 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2807 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2808 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2810 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 goto err;
2813 }
2814 }
2815
2816 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2817 return 1;
2818 err:
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2820 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2821 #endif
2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2823 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2824 #endif
2825 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2826 return 0;
2827 }
2828
2829 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2830 {
2831 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2832 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2833 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2834 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2835 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2836 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2837 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2838 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2840 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 return 0;
2843 }
2844 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2845 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2847 return 0;
2848 }
2849 } else {
2850 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2852 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2853 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 return 0;
2855 }
2856 }
2857
2858 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2859 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2860 0)) {
2861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2862 return 0;
2863 }
2864 goto done;
2865 }
2866
2867 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2868 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2869 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2871 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 return 0;
2873 }
2874
2875 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2876 const uint16_t *psigs;
2877 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2878
2879 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2880 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2881 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2882 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2884 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 return 0;
2887 }
2888 }
2889
2890 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2891 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2892 return 0;
2893 }
2894
2895 done:
2896 s->certreqs_sent++;
2897 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2898 return 1;
2899 }
2900
2901 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2902 {
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2904 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2905 size_t psklen;
2906 PACKET psk_identity;
2907
2908 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2910 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2911 return 0;
2912 }
2913 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2915 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2920 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2921 return 0;
2922 }
2923
2924 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 return 0;
2928 }
2929
2930 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2931 psk, sizeof(psk));
2932
2933 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 return 0;
2937 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2938 /*
2939 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2940 */
2941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2942 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2943 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2944 return 0;
2945 }
2946
2947 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2948 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2949 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2950
2951 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2953 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2954 return 0;
2955 }
2956
2957 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2958
2959 return 1;
2960 #else
2961 /* Should never happen */
2962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2964 return 0;
2965 #endif
2966 }
2967
2968 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2969 {
2970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2971 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2972 int decrypt_len;
2973 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2974 size_t j, padding_len;
2975 PACKET enc_premaster;
2976 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2977 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2978 int ret = 0;
2979
2980 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2981 if (rsa == NULL) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2983 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2984 return 0;
2985 }
2986
2987 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2988 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2989 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2990 } else {
2991 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2992 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2994 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2995 return 0;
2996 }
2997 }
2998
2999 /*
3000 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
3001 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
3002 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
3003 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
3004 */
3005 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3007 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
3008 return 0;
3009 }
3010
3011 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3012 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3014 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3015 return 0;
3016 }
3017
3018 /*
3019 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3020 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3021 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3022 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3023 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3024 */
3025
3026 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3027 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3030 goto err;
3031 }
3032
3033 /*
3034 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3035 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3036 */
3037 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3038 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3039 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3040 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3041 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3043 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3044 goto err;
3045 }
3046
3047 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3048
3049 /*
3050 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3051 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3052 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3053 */
3054 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3056 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3057 goto err;
3058 }
3059
3060 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3061 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3062 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3063 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3064 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3065 }
3066 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3067
3068 /*
3069 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3070 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3071 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3072 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3073 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3074 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3075 */
3076 version_good =
3077 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3078 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3079 version_good &=
3080 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3081 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3082
3083 /*
3084 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3085 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3086 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3087 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3088 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3089 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3090 * clients.
3091 */
3092 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3093 unsigned char workaround_good;
3094 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3095 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3096 workaround_good &=
3097 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3098 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3099 version_good |= workaround_good;
3100 }
3101
3102 /*
3103 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3104 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3105 */
3106 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3107
3108 /*
3109 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3110 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3111 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3112 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3113 */
3114 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3115 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3116 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3117 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3118 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3119 }
3120
3121 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3122 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3123 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3124 goto err;
3125 }
3126
3127 ret = 1;
3128 err:
3129 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3130 return ret;
3131 #else
3132 /* Should never happen */
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 return 0;
3136 #endif
3137 }
3138
3139 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3140 {
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3142 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3143 DH *cdh;
3144 unsigned int i;
3145 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3146 const unsigned char *data;
3147 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3148 int ret = 0;
3149
3150 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3152 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3153 goto err;
3154 }
3155 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3156 if (skey == NULL) {
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3158 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3159 goto err;
3160 }
3161
3162 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3164 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3165 goto err;
3166 }
3167 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3168 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 goto err;
3172 }
3173 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3174 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3176 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3177 goto err;
3178 }
3179
3180 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3181 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3182 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3185 BN_free(pub_key);
3186 goto err;
3187 }
3188
3189 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3190 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3191 goto err;
3192 }
3193
3194 ret = 1;
3195 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3196 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3197 err:
3198 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3199 return ret;
3200 #else
3201 /* Should never happen */
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3204 return 0;
3205 #endif
3206 }
3207
3208 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3209 {
3210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3211 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3212 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3213 int ret = 0;
3214
3215 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3216 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3218 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3219 goto err;
3220 } else {
3221 unsigned int i;
3222 const unsigned char *data;
3223
3224 /*
3225 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3226 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3227 */
3228
3229 /* Get encoded point length */
3230 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3231 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3233 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3234 goto err;
3235 }
3236 if (skey == NULL) {
3237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3238 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3239 goto err;
3240 }
3241
3242 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3243 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3245 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3246 goto err;
3247 }
3248 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3250 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3251 goto err;
3252 }
3253 }
3254
3255 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3257 goto err;
3258 }
3259
3260 ret = 1;
3261 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3262 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3263 err:
3264 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3265
3266 return ret;
3267 #else
3268 /* Should never happen */
3269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3270 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3271 return 0;
3272 #endif
3273 }
3274
3275 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3276 {
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3278 unsigned int i;
3279 const unsigned char *data;
3280
3281 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3282 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3284 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3285 return 0;
3286 }
3287 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3289 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3290 return 0;
3291 }
3292 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3294 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3295 return 0;
3296 }
3297 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3298 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3299 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3301 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3302 return 0;
3303 }
3304
3305 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3307 return 0;
3308 }
3309
3310 return 1;
3311 #else
3312 /* Should never happen */
3313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3314 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3315 return 0;
3316 #endif
3317 }
3318
3319 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3320 {
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3322 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3323 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3324 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3325 const unsigned char *start;
3326 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3327 unsigned long alg_a;
3328 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3329 int ret = 0;
3330 PACKET encdata;
3331
3332 /* Get our certificate private key */
3333 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3334 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3335 /*
3336 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3337 */
3338 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3339 if (pk == NULL) {
3340 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3341 }
3342 if (pk == NULL) {
3343 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3344 }
3345 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3346 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3347 }
3348
3349 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3350 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3352 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3353 return 0;
3354 }
3355 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3358 return 0;
3359 }
3360 /*
3361 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3362 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3363 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3364 * client certificate for authorization only.
3365 */
3366 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3367 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3368 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3369 ERR_clear_error();
3370 }
3371 /* Decrypt session key */
3372 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3373 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3374 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3376 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3377 goto err;
3378 }
3379 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3380 /*
3381 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3382 * isn't supported.
3383 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3384 */
3385 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3387 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3388 goto err;
3389 }
3390 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3391 /*
3392 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3393 * support it
3394 */
3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3396 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3397 goto err;
3398 } /* else short form length */
3399
3400 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3402 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3403 goto err;
3404 }
3405 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3406 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3407
3408 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3409 inlen) <= 0) {
3410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3411 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3412 goto err;
3413 }
3414 /* Generate master secret */
3415 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3416 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3417 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3418 goto err;
3419 }
3420 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3421 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3422 NULL) > 0)
3423 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3424
3425 ret = 1;
3426 err:
3427 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3428 return ret;
3429 #else
3430 /* Should never happen */
3431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3433 return 0;
3434 #endif
3435 }
3436
3437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3438 {
3439 unsigned long alg_k;
3440
3441 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3442
3443 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3444 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3445 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3446 goto err;
3447 }
3448
3449 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3450 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3451 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3454 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3455 goto err;
3456 }
3457 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3458 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3459 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3460 goto err;
3461 }
3462 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3463 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3465 goto err;
3466 }
3467 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3468 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 goto err;
3471 }
3472 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3473 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3475 goto err;
3476 }
3477 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3478 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3480 goto err;
3481 }
3482 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3483 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3485 goto err;
3486 }
3487 } else {
3488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3489 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3490 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3491 goto err;
3492 }
3493
3494 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3495 err:
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3497 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3498 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3499 #endif
3500 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3501 }
3502
3503 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3504 {
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3506 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3508 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3509 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3510 size_t labellen;
3511 /*
3512 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3513 * used.
3514 */
3515 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3516 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3517
3518 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3519 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3520 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3521 labellen += 1;
3522
3523 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3524 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3525 labellen, NULL, 0,
3526 0) <= 0) {
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3528 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3530 return WORK_ERROR;
3531 }
3532
3533 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3534 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3535 }
3536 }
3537 #endif
3538
3539 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3540 /*
3541 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3542 * the handshake_buffer
3543 */
3544 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3546 return WORK_ERROR;
3547 }
3548 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3549 } else {
3550 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3552 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3553 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3554 return WORK_ERROR;
3555 }
3556 /*
3557 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3558 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3559 */
3560 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3562 return WORK_ERROR;
3563 }
3564 }
3565
3566 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3567 }
3568
3569 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3570 {
3571 int i;
3572 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3573 X509 *x = NULL;
3574 unsigned long l;
3575 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3576 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3577 PACKET spkt, context;
3578 size_t chainidx;
3579 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3580
3581 /*
3582 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3583 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3584 * TLSv1.3
3585 */
3586 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3587
3588 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3590 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3591 goto err;
3592 }
3593
3594 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3595 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3596 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3597 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3599 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3600 goto err;
3601 }
3602
3603 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3604 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3606 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3607 goto err;
3608 }
3609
3610 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3611 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3612 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3614 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3615 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3616 goto err;
3617 }
3618
3619 certstart = certbytes;
3620 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3621 if (x == NULL) {
3622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3623 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3624 goto err;
3625 }
3626 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3628 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3629 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3630 goto err;
3631 }
3632
3633 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3634 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3635 PACKET extensions;
3636
3637 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3639 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3640 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3641 goto err;
3642 }
3643 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3644 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3645 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3646 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3647 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3648 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3649 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3650 goto err;
3651 }
3652 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3653 }
3654
3655 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3657 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3658 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3659 goto err;
3660 }
3661 x = NULL;
3662 }
3663
3664 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3665 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3666 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3668 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3669 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3670 goto err;
3671 }
3672 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3673 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3674 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3676 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3677 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3678 goto err;
3679 }
3680 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3681 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3683 goto err;
3684 }
3685 } else {
3686 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3687 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3688 if (i <= 0) {
3689 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3690 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3691 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3692 goto err;
3693 }
3694 if (i > 1) {
3695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3696 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3697 goto err;
3698 }
3699 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3700 if (pkey == NULL) {
3701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3702 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3703 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3704 goto err;
3705 }
3706 }
3707
3708 /*
3709 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3710 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3711 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3712 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3713 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3714 */
3715
3716 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3717 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3719 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3720 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3721 goto err;
3722 }
3723
3724 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3725 s->session = new_sess;
3726 }
3727
3728 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3729 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3730 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3731
3732 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3733 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3734
3735 /*
3736 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3737 * message
3738 */
3739 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3741 goto err;
3742 }
3743
3744 /*
3745 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3746 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3747 */
3748 sk = NULL;
3749
3750 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3752 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3753 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3754 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3756 goto err;
3757 }
3758
3759 /* Resend session tickets */
3760 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3761 }
3762
3763 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3764
3765 err:
3766 X509_free(x);
3767 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3768 return ret;
3769 }
3770
3771 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3772 {
3773 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3774
3775 if (cpk == NULL) {
3776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3777 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3778 return 0;
3779 }
3780
3781 /*
3782 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3783 * for the server Certificate message
3784 */
3785 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3787 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3788 return 0;
3789 }
3790 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3792 return 0;
3793 }
3794
3795 return 1;
3796 }
3797
3798 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3799 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3800 {
3801 /*
3802 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3803 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3804 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3805 * timeout.
3806 */
3807 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3808 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3809 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3812 return 0;
3813 }
3814
3815 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3816 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3817 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3820 return 0;
3821 }
3822 }
3823
3824 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3825 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3828 return 0;
3829 }
3830
3831 return 1;
3832 }
3833
3834 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3835 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3836 {
3837 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3838 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3839 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3840 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3841 const unsigned char *const_p;
3842 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3843 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3844 unsigned int hlen;
3845 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3846 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3847 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3848 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3849 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3850
3851 /* get session encoding length */
3852 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3853 /*
3854 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3855 * long
3856 */
3857 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3859 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3860 goto err;
3861 }
3862 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3863 if (senc == NULL) {
3864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3865 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3866 goto err;
3867 }
3868
3869 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3870 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3871 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3873 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3874 goto err;
3875 }
3876
3877 p = senc;
3878 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3881 goto err;
3882 }
3883
3884 /*
3885 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3886 */
3887 const_p = senc;
3888 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3889 if (sess == NULL) {
3890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3891 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3892 goto err;
3893 }
3894
3895 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3896 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3897 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3900 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3901 goto err;
3902 }
3903 p = senc;
3904 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3907 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3908 goto err;
3909 }
3910 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3911
3912 /*
3913 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3914 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3915 */
3916 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3917 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3918 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3919 hctx, 1);
3920
3921 if (ret == 0) {
3922
3923 /* Put timeout and length */
3924 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3925 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3927 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3929 goto err;
3930 }
3931 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3932 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3933 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3934 return 1;
3935 }
3936 if (ret < 0) {
3937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3938 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3939 goto err;
3940 }
3941 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3942 } else {
3943 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3944
3945 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3946 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3947 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3948 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3949 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3950 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3951 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3954 goto err;
3955 }
3956 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3957 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3958 }
3959
3960 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3962 goto err;
3963 }
3964
3965 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3966 /* Output key name */
3967 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3968 /* output IV */
3969 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3970 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3971 &encdata1)
3972 /* Encrypt session data */
3973 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3974 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3975 || encdata1 != encdata2
3976 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3977 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3978 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3979 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3980 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3981 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3982 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3983 macendoffset - macoffset)
3984 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3985 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3986 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3987 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3988 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3990 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3991 goto err;
3992 }
3993
3994 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3995 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3998 goto err;
3999 }
4000
4001 ok = 1;
4002 err:
4003 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4004 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4005 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
4006 return ok;
4007 }
4008
4009 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4010 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4011 {
4012 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4013 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4014 return 0;
4015 }
4016
4017 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4018 s->session->session_id_length)
4019 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4022 return 0;
4023 }
4024
4025 return 1;
4026 }
4027
4028 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4029 {
4030 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4031 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4032 union {
4033 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4034 uint32_t age_add;
4035 } age_add_u;
4036
4037 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4038
4039 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4040 size_t i, hashlen;
4041 uint64_t nonce;
4042 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4043 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4044 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4045
4046 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4047 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4049 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4051 goto err;
4052 }
4053 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4054
4055 /*
4056 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4057 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4058 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4059 */
4060 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4061 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4062
4063 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4064 /* SSLfatal already called */
4065 goto err;
4066 }
4067
4068 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4069 s->session = new_sess;
4070 }
4071
4072 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4074 goto err;
4075 }
4076 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4078 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4080 goto err;
4081 }
4082 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4083
4084 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4085 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4086 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4087 nonce >>= 8;
4088 }
4089
4090 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4091 nonce_label,
4092 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4093 tick_nonce,
4094 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4095 s->session->master_key,
4096 hashlen, 1)) {
4097 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4098 goto err;
4099 }
4100 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4101
4102 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4103 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4104 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4105 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4106 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4107 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4109 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4110 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4111 goto err;
4112 }
4113 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4114 }
4115 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4116 }
4117
4118 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4119 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4120 goto err;
4121
4122 /*
4123 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4124 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4125 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4126 */
4127 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4128 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4129 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4130 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4131 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4132 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4133 goto err;
4134 }
4135 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4136 tick_nonce)) {
4137 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4138 goto err;
4139 }
4140
4141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4142 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4143 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4144 NULL, 0)) {
4145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4146 goto err;
4147 }
4148 /*
4149 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4150 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4151 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4152 */
4153 s->sent_tickets++;
4154 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4155 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4156 }
4157
4158 return 1;
4159 err:
4160 return 0;
4161 }
4162
4163 /*
4164 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4165 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4166 */
4167 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4168 {
4169 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4170 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4171 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4174 return 0;
4175 }
4176
4177 return 1;
4178 }
4179
4180 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4181 {
4182 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4184 return 0;
4185 }
4186
4187 return 1;
4188 }
4189
4190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4191 /*
4192 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4193 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4194 */
4195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4196 {
4197 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4198 size_t next_proto_len;
4199
4200 /*-
4201 * The payload looks like:
4202 * uint8 proto_len;
4203 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4204 * uint8 padding_len;
4205 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4206 */
4207 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4208 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4209 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4211 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4212 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4213 }
4214
4215 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4216 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4219 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4220 }
4221
4222 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4223
4224 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4225 }
4226 #endif
4227
4228 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4229 {
4230 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4231 NULL, 0)) {
4232 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4233 return 0;
4234 }
4235
4236 return 1;
4237 }
4238
4239 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4240 {
4241 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4243 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4244 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4245 }
4246
4247 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4248 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4251 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4252 }
4253
4254 /*
4255 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4256 * a record boundary.
4257 */
4258 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4260 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4261 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4262 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4263 }
4264
4265 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4266 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4267 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4269 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4270 }
4271
4272 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4273 }
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