2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #include <openssl/comp.h>
31 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
35 ASN1_TYPE
*opaqueBlob
;
38 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
40 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
) = {
41 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, kxBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
42 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, opaqueBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
43 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
45 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
47 static CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
50 static ossl_inline
int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
52 return sc
->session
->peer_rpk
!= NULL
|| sc
->session
->peer
!= NULL
;
56 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
57 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
58 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
59 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
61 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
62 * (transition not allowed)
64 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
66 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
69 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
70 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
71 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
73 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
77 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
78 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
79 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
80 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
84 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
85 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
86 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
93 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
94 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
95 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
96 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
97 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
101 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
102 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT
;
108 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
109 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
115 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT
:
117 if (!received_client_cert(s
)) {
118 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
119 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
123 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
124 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
130 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
131 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
132 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
139 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
140 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
142 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
145 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
146 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
147 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
151 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
152 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
153 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
173 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
183 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
184 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
189 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
195 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
196 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
197 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
202 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
204 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
205 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
207 * 2) If we did request one then
208 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
210 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
211 * list if we requested a certificate)
213 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
214 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
215 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
216 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
217 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
219 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
220 * not going to accept it because we require a client
223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
224 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
227 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
231 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
234 } else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
235 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
236 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
243 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
251 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
252 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
253 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
254 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
255 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
258 if (!received_client_cert(s
) || st
->no_cert_verify
) {
259 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
261 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
262 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
263 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
264 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
270 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
277 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
278 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
284 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
286 if (s
->s3
.npn_seen
) {
287 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
288 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
293 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
294 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
303 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
304 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
311 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
312 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
313 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
320 /* No valid transition found */
321 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
325 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
326 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
329 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
330 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
331 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
332 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
340 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
342 * Valid return values are:
346 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
348 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
351 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
352 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
353 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
354 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
355 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
358 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
360 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
364 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
365 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
366 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
367 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
368 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
372 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
382 * Used to determine if we shoud send a CompressedCertificate message
384 * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
386 static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
389 int *alg
= sc
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
;
391 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
392 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
394 for (; *alg
!= TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
; alg
++) {
395 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->comp_cert
[*alg
] != NULL
)
399 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
403 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
405 * Valid return values are:
409 int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
412 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
413 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
415 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
416 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
418 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
419 || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
420 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
422 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
425 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
426 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
428 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
429 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
432 && (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
434 * ... except when the application insists on
435 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
438 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
439 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
440 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
442 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
445 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
452 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
454 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
455 return sc
->ext
.server_cert_type
== TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
456 && get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc
) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
460 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
461 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
464 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
466 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
469 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
470 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
473 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
475 /* Shouldn't happen */
476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
477 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
480 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
481 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
492 /* Try to read from the client instead */
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
495 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
496 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
499 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
500 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
501 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
503 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
504 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
506 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
509 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
510 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
511 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
513 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
516 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
518 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
519 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
520 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
521 else if (do_compressed_cert(s
))
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT
;
524 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
529 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
530 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
531 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
532 } else if (do_compressed_cert(s
)) {
533 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT
;
535 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
539 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT
:
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
548 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
549 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
552 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
555 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
557 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
558 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
561 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
562 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
563 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
565 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
566 * handshake at this point.
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
571 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
577 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
578 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
579 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
583 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
584 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
585 * been configured for.
587 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
589 } else if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
590 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
591 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
598 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
599 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
601 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
603 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
606 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
607 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
610 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
611 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
613 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
615 /* Shouldn't happen */
616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
617 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
620 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
621 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
623 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
626 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
627 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
629 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
634 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
635 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
638 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
641 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
642 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
643 && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
644 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
645 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
646 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
647 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
650 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
654 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
655 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
657 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
659 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
660 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
662 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
664 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
665 /* normal PSK or SRP */
666 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
667 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
668 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
669 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
670 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
671 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
672 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
674 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
677 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
680 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
681 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
682 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
686 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
687 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
688 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
689 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
693 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
694 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
695 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
696 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
700 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
701 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
702 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
704 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
705 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
707 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
709 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
710 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
711 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
712 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
714 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
716 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
718 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
719 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
720 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
722 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
723 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
724 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
726 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
728 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
730 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
731 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
736 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
737 * the server to the client.
739 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
741 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
742 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
744 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
746 /* No pre work to be done */
749 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
751 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
752 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
755 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
757 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
758 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
759 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
764 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
765 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
767 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
768 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
774 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
776 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
))) {
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
783 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
784 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0
785 && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
== 0) {
787 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
788 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
789 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
791 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
793 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
795 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
797 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
798 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
804 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
805 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
807 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
808 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
809 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
810 } else if (s
->session
->cipher
!= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
) {
811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
814 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
818 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
820 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
821 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
822 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
823 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
827 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
829 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
830 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
831 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
832 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
836 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
837 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
840 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
843 static ossl_inline
int conn_is_closed(void)
845 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
850 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
854 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
864 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
865 * server to the client.
867 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
869 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
870 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
874 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
876 /* No post work to be done */
879 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
880 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
882 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
888 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
889 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
891 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
892 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
893 /* SSLfatal() already called */
897 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
898 * treat like it was the first packet
903 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
904 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
905 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
906 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
907 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
912 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
913 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
914 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
918 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
921 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
922 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
924 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
925 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
926 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
929 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
930 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
933 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
937 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
938 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
941 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
942 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
943 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
947 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
948 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
949 if (!statem_flush(s
))
954 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
955 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
956 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
957 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
958 /* SSLfatal() already called */
962 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
963 && !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
964 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
969 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
970 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
971 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
973 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts
!= NULL
)
974 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 1);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
979 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
981 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
984 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
988 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
989 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
995 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
998 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
999 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
1003 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1004 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1007 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1009 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1012 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
1016 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1017 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
1019 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1020 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
1022 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1023 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
1024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1029 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1030 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
1031 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
1034 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1035 || (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
) != 0)
1036 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1041 if (!s
->hit
&& !send_certificate_request(s
)) {
1042 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1043 || (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
) != 0)
1044 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
1048 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1049 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
1051 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
1052 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1059 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1) {
1060 if (SSL_get_error(ssl
, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
1061 && conn_is_closed()) {
1063 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1064 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1065 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1066 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1067 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1069 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1078 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1082 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1085 * Valid return values are:
1089 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1090 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
1092 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1094 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1096 /* Shouldn't happen */
1097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
1100 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
1101 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1102 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1104 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1105 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1108 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1109 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
1110 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
1113 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
1114 /* No construction function needed */
1116 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
1119 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
1120 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
1121 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1124 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT
:
1125 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
1126 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1130 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT
:
1131 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate
;
1132 *mt
= SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
;
1136 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1137 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1138 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1142 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1143 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1144 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1147 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1148 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1149 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1152 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1153 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1154 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1157 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1158 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1159 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1162 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1163 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1164 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1167 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1168 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1169 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1172 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1174 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1177 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1178 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1179 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1182 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1183 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1184 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1192 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1193 * calculated as follows:
1195 * 2 + # client_version
1196 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1197 * 1 + # length of session_id
1198 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1199 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1200 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1201 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1202 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1203 * 2 + # length of extensions
1204 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1206 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1208 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1209 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1212 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1213 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1215 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1217 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1219 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1221 /* Shouldn't happen */
1224 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1225 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1227 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1228 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1230 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT
:
1231 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1232 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1235 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1237 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1238 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH
;
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1241 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1242 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1246 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1248 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1249 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1251 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1252 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1257 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1262 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1264 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1266 /* Shouldn't happen */
1267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1268 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1270 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1271 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1273 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1274 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1276 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1277 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1280 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT
:
1281 return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1284 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1285 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1287 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1288 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1291 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1292 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1295 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1296 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1298 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1299 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1301 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1302 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1308 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1311 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1314 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1316 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1318 /* Shouldn't happen */
1319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1322 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1323 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1325 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1326 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1331 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1332 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1335 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1337 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1338 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1339 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1341 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1345 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1348 ret
= ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s
, &al
);
1351 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1353 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1354 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1355 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1364 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1367 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1369 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1375 CON_FUNC_RETURN
dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1378 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1379 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1381 if (sctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
1382 || sctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), s
->d1
->cookie
,
1384 || cookie_leni
> DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
) {
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1386 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1388 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1390 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1391 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1393 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1396 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
1400 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1401 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1402 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1406 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1408 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1409 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1410 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1411 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1413 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1414 const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1416 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1417 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1418 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1419 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1420 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1421 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1422 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1424 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1425 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1426 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1427 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1428 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1429 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1430 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1431 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1432 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1433 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1434 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1435 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1436 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1438 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1439 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1444 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1446 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1448 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1452 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1455 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(
1456 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1457 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1459 s
->s3
.is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1463 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1464 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1465 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1467 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1469 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1470 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1471 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1472 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1474 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1475 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1476 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1480 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s
->options
)
1481 || (!s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
1483 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1484 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1485 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1491 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1492 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1493 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1498 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1500 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1501 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1503 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1506 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1507 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1513 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1514 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1515 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1516 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1518 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1519 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1521 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1522 * 7-8 session_id_length
1523 * 9-10 challenge_length
1527 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1528 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1530 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1531 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1532 * in the first place
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1539 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1544 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1545 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1547 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1548 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1549 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1551 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1554 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1555 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1556 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1561 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1566 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1568 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1569 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1570 /* No extensions. */
1571 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1572 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1575 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1577 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1578 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1579 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1580 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1582 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1583 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1584 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1585 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1586 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1587 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1588 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1589 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1590 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1594 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1596 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1597 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1598 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1599 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1600 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1601 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1602 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1606 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1607 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1611 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1612 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1613 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1618 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1619 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1620 * So check cookie length...
1622 if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1623 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0) {
1624 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1625 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1630 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1635 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1640 /* Could be empty. */
1641 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1642 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1644 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1645 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1646 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1652 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1653 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1654 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1659 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1660 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1661 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1662 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1663 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1664 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1667 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1669 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1672 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1673 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1674 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1679 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1682 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1687 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1689 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1690 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1691 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1692 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1693 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1694 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1695 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1697 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1698 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1699 if (sctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1700 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1701 switch (sctx
->client_hello_cb(ssl
, &al
, sctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1702 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1704 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1705 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1707 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1709 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1714 /* Set up the client_random */
1715 memcpy(s
->s3
.client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1717 /* Choose the version */
1719 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1720 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1721 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1722 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1724 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1727 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1731 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1734 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1735 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1737 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1738 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1739 } else if (ssl
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1740 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1741 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1747 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1748 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1749 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1751 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1755 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1756 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1757 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1758 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1762 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1763 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1764 if (SSL_get_options(ssl
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1765 if (sctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1766 if (sctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1767 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1768 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1769 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1771 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1773 /* default verification */
1774 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1775 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1776 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1780 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1782 if (ssl
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1783 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1784 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1785 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1786 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1794 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1795 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1796 !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
,
1797 &scsvs
, clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 0;
1803 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1804 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1805 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1806 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1807 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1808 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1809 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1810 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1811 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1814 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1815 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1816 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1818 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1819 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1820 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1821 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1822 * an insecure downgrade.
1824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1825 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1831 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1832 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1833 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1834 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl
));
1836 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1837 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1840 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1841 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1842 || s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1844 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1845 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1847 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER
);
1850 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1853 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1854 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1855 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1856 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1862 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1863 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1865 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1866 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1867 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1868 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1869 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1870 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1871 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1872 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1873 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1874 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1877 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1879 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1880 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1881 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1885 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1887 /* previous session */
1889 } else if (i
== -1) {
1890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1894 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1895 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1901 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1902 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1903 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1904 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1908 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1909 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1911 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1913 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1915 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER
) {
1916 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1917 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1919 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1920 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1921 if (trc_out
!= NULL
)
1922 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i
,
1923 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1931 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1935 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1936 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER
);
1939 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER
);
1942 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1943 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1947 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1953 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1954 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1956 /* TLS extensions */
1957 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1958 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1964 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1965 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1966 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1967 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1971 pos
= s
->s3
.server_random
;
1972 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1979 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1980 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1981 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1982 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
) {
1983 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1985 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1986 * backwards compat reasons
1988 int master_key_length
;
1990 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1991 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(ssl
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1992 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1994 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1995 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1996 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1998 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
1999 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
2003 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
2004 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
2005 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
,
2006 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl
));
2007 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
2008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2012 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
2013 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
2014 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2015 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
2016 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2021 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
2022 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
2023 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
2025 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
2026 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2028 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
2029 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
2030 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
2032 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
2033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2034 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2039 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2040 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2041 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
2043 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2044 /* Can't disable compression */
2045 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
2046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2047 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2050 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2051 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
2052 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
2053 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
2054 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2058 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
2059 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2060 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2063 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2064 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
2065 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
2068 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
2069 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2070 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
2073 } else if (s
->hit
) {
2075 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && sctx
->comp_methods
) {
2076 /* See if we have a match */
2077 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
2080 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
);
2081 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
2082 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
2084 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
2085 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
2094 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2100 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2101 * using compression.
2103 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2104 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2110 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2113 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2114 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2115 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
2116 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2117 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2124 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2125 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2127 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2129 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2135 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2136 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2137 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2138 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2139 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2142 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2143 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2144 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2145 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2146 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2152 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2153 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2155 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2157 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2159 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2162 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2163 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2164 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2165 * influence which certificate is sent
2167 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& sctx
!= NULL
2168 && sctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2171 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2172 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2174 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2175 * et al can pick it up.
2177 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2178 ret
= sctx
->ext
.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2179 sctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2181 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2183 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2185 /* status request response should be sent */
2186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2187 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2188 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2190 /* something bad happened */
2191 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2193 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2203 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2204 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2206 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2208 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2209 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2210 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2212 if (sctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2213 int r
= sctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2214 &selected
, &selected_len
,
2215 s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
,
2216 (unsigned int)s
->s3
.alpn_proposed_len
,
2217 sctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2219 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2220 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
2221 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2222 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2223 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= 0;
2224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2227 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2229 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2233 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2234 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2235 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2236 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2237 selected_len
) != 0) {
2238 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2239 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2243 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2244 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2247 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2252 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2254 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2259 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2264 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
,
2266 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2270 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2275 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2276 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2277 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2278 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2284 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2286 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2287 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
2289 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2290 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2292 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2299 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2300 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2301 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2302 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2303 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(ssl
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2309 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2312 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2315 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2316 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2318 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
,
2319 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl
));
2321 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2323 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2326 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2329 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2330 /* SSLfatal already called */
2333 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2334 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2335 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2336 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl
,
2337 ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2338 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2339 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2340 /* do not send a session ticket */
2341 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2344 /* Session-id reuse */
2345 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2349 * we now have the following setup.
2351 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2352 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2353 * compression - basically ignored right now
2354 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2355 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2356 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2357 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2361 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2362 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2364 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2369 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2370 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2371 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2372 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2374 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2375 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2382 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2384 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2386 * callback indicates further work to be done
2388 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2398 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2403 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2408 unsigned char *session_id
;
2409 int usetls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2410 || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2412 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2413 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2415 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2416 * tls_process_client_hello()
2418 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2419 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2420 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
.server_random
,
2421 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2423 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2427 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2428 * back in the server hello:
2429 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2430 * we send back the old session ID.
2431 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2432 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2433 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2434 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2436 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2437 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2438 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2440 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2441 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2444 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2445 (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2447 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2450 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2451 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2453 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2454 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2457 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2458 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2459 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2462 /* set up the compression method */
2463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2466 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2469 compm
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2472 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2473 || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
,
2475 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)) {
2476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2477 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2480 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2481 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2482 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2483 : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2484 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2485 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2488 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2491 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2492 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2493 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2498 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2499 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2501 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2502 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2503 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2505 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2506 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2507 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2508 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2511 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
2514 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2516 if (!s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
2517 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2519 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2522 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
2525 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2528 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2529 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2530 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2532 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
2536 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2537 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2538 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2540 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret
= CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2541 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2543 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2548 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2553 type
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2555 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2557 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2558 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2560 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2561 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2562 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2563 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2565 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2566 pkdh
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2568 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2573 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2575 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2576 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2577 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2586 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2587 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2590 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2591 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2595 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2600 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, pkdhp
);
2601 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2602 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2606 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2609 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2611 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
,
2613 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
,
2615 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2616 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
, &r
[2])) {
2617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2620 } else if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2622 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2627 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2628 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2629 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2630 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2631 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2634 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2635 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2636 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2637 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2638 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2639 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2643 /* Encode the public key. */
2644 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2646 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2652 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2653 * can set these to NULLs
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2661 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2662 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2663 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2664 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2668 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2669 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2670 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2671 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2675 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2679 if (((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2680 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2682 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2688 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2689 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2690 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2693 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2694 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2696 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2697 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2705 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2706 unsigned char *binval
;
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2710 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2711 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2714 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2717 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2722 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2723 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2726 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2727 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2730 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2734 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2738 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2739 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2740 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2744 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2747 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2749 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2750 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2751 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2755 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2756 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2757 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2758 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2761 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2762 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2767 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2769 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2770 size_t siglen
= 0, tbslen
;
2772 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
2773 /* Should never happen */
2774 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2777 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2778 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2782 /* send signature algorithm */
2783 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2788 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2789 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2790 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2795 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2796 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2797 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2802 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2803 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2810 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <=0
2811 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2812 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <= 0
2813 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2814 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2816 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2822 ret
= CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
2824 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2825 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2836 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2840 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2841 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2842 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2843 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2844 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
) {
2845 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2846 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2847 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2849 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->libctx
,
2850 s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
, 0) <= 0
2851 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
,
2852 s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2854 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2856 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2857 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2859 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2862 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2864 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2868 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2869 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2872 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2877 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2878 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2879 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2880 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2881 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2884 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2885 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2886 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2888 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2889 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2890 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2891 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2893 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2897 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, get_ca_names(s
), pkt
)) {
2898 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2899 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
2904 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2905 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
2908 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2911 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2913 PACKET psk_identity
;
2915 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2919 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2920 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2923 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2928 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2929 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2933 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2934 s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2937 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2940 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2942 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2944 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2948 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2949 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2950 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2952 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2953 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
2954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2958 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2962 /* Should never happen */
2963 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2968 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2971 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2972 EVP_PKEY
*rsa
= NULL
;
2973 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2975 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2976 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
2977 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2979 rsa
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
;
2981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2985 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2986 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2987 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2989 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2990 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2996 outlen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2997 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(outlen
);
2998 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3003 ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, rsa
, sctx
->propq
);
3005 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3010 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3011 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3012 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3013 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
3014 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3015 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3016 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3017 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3018 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3020 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx
) <= 0
3021 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx
, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING
) <= 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3026 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION
,
3027 (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
);
3028 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) != 0)
3029 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3030 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION
,
3031 (unsigned int *)&s
->version
);
3032 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3034 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx
, params
)
3035 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx
, rsa_decrypt
, &outlen
,
3036 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
3037 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
)) <= 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3043 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3044 * we double check anyway.
3046 if (outlen
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
3047 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
3048 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3052 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3053 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
3054 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
, 0)) {
3055 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3061 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
3062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx
);
3066 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3068 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
3070 const unsigned char *data
;
3071 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
3075 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
3078 skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3084 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3088 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3089 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3093 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3094 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
3095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
3099 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, data
, i
)) {
3100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3104 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3105 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3110 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3111 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3113 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3117 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3119 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3120 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3123 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3124 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3129 const unsigned char *data
;
3132 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3133 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3136 /* Get encoded point length */
3137 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3138 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3147 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3148 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3149 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
3153 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, data
, i
) <= 0) {
3154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3159 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3160 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3165 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3166 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3168 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3173 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3177 const unsigned char *data
;
3179 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3180 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3184 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3185 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
3188 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3189 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3192 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3193 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3194 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3199 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3206 /* Should never happen */
3207 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3212 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3215 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3216 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3217 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3218 const unsigned char *start
;
3219 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3220 unsigned long alg_a
;
3221 GOST_KX_MESSAGE
*pKX
= NULL
;
3222 const unsigned char *ptr
;
3224 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3226 /* Get our certificate private key */
3227 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3228 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3230 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3232 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3234 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3237 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3239 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3240 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3243 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pk
, sctx
->propq
);
3244 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3248 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3249 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3253 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3254 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3255 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3256 * client certificate for authorization only.
3258 client_pub_pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
3259 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3260 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3264 ptr
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3265 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3266 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3267 pKX
= d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL
, &ptr
, PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
3269 || pKX
->kxBlob
== NULL
3270 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX
->kxBlob
) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
) {
3271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3275 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, ptr
- PACKET_data(pkt
))) {
3276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3280 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3285 inlen
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->length
;
3286 start
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->data
;
3288 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3293 /* Generate master secret */
3294 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3295 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3296 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3299 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3300 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3302 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3306 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3307 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX
);
3310 /* Should never happen */
3311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3316 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3319 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3320 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3321 EVP_PKEY
*pk
= NULL
;
3322 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3323 const unsigned char *start
= NULL
;
3324 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
= 0;
3326 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3327 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3329 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3334 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3339 /* Get our certificate private key */
3340 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
!= NULL
?
3341 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
:
3342 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
3348 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pk
, sctx
->propq
);
3349 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3353 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3358 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3359 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3360 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3365 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3366 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3370 inlen
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3371 start
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3373 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
3374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3377 /* Generate master secret */
3378 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3379 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3386 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3389 /* Should never happen */
3390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3395 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3398 unsigned long alg_k
;
3400 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3402 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3403 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3408 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3409 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3410 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3414 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3415 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3419 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3420 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3424 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3425 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3429 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3430 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3431 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3434 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3435 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3439 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3440 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3444 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3445 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
)) {
3446 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3457 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3458 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3459 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3461 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3464 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3468 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3469 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3470 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3471 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3474 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3477 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3478 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3480 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3481 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3482 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3485 if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
3487 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3494 BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3495 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3500 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !received_client_cert(s
)) {
3502 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3503 * the handshake_buffer
3505 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3506 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3509 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3511 if (!s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
) {
3512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3516 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3517 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3519 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3520 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3528 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3530 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3531 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3532 EVP_PKEY
*peer_rpk
= NULL
;
3534 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc
, pkt
, &peer_rpk
)) {
3535 /* SSLfatal already called */
3539 if (peer_rpk
== NULL
) {
3540 if ((sc
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)
3541 && (sc
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
3542 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3543 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3547 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc
, peer_rpk
) <= 0) {
3548 SSLfatal(sc
, ssl_x509err2alert(sc
->verify_result
),
3549 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3555 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3556 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3557 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3558 * a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
3559 * as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
3562 if (sc
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3563 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(sc
->session
, 0)) == NULL
) {
3564 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3568 SSL_SESSION_free(sc
->session
);
3569 sc
->session
= new_sess
;
3572 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
3573 X509_free(sc
->session
->peer
);
3574 sc
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
3575 sk_X509_pop_free(sc
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3576 sc
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
3578 EVP_PKEY_free(sc
->session
->peer_rpk
);
3579 sc
->session
->peer_rpk
= peer_rpk
;
3582 sc
->session
->verify_result
= sc
->verify_result
;
3585 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3588 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
3589 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc
, 1)) {
3590 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3594 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3595 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc
, sc
->cert_verify_hash
,
3596 sizeof(sc
->cert_verify_hash
),
3597 &sc
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3598 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
3602 /* resend session tickets */
3603 sc
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3606 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3609 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk
);
3613 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3617 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3620 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3621 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3622 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3624 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3625 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3628 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3629 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
3631 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts
!= NULL
)
3632 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_plain_alerts(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, 0);
3634 if (s
->ext
.client_cert_type
== TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk
)
3635 return tls_process_client_rpk(s
, pkt
);
3637 if (s
->ext
.client_cert_type
!= TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
) {
3638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
,
3639 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3643 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3644 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3648 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3649 && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3650 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3651 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
3652 && !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
,
3653 s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3658 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3659 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3664 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3665 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3666 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3671 certstart
= certbytes
;
3672 x
= X509_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
3674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
3677 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
) == NULL
) {
3678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3682 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3687 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3688 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3691 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3695 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3696 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3697 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3698 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3699 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3700 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3701 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3704 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3707 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3708 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3714 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3715 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3716 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3717 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3718 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3721 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3722 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3723 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3725 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3728 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3729 if (s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3735 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3737 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3738 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3741 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3743 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3744 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3750 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3751 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3752 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3753 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3754 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3757 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3758 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3763 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3764 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3767 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3768 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3769 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3771 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
3772 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3774 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
3775 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->session
->peer_rpk
);
3776 s
->session
->peer_rpk
= NULL
;
3779 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3782 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3788 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3789 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3792 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3793 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3794 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3795 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3796 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3801 /* Resend session tickets */
3802 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3805 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3809 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk
);
3813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3814 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3816 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3818 BUF_MEM
*buf
= BUF_MEM_new();
3820 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc
, pkt
, &tmppkt
, buf
) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
)
3821 ret
= tls_process_client_certificate(sc
, &tmppkt
);
3828 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3830 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3833 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3834 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3838 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3839 * for the server Certificate message
3841 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3843 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3845 switch (s
->ext
.server_cert_type
) {
3846 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk
:
3847 if (!tls_output_rpk(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3852 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
:
3853 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, 0)) {
3854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3863 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3867 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3869 int alg
= get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc
);
3870 OSSL_COMP_CERT
*cc
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->comp_cert
[alg
];
3872 if (!ossl_assert(cc
!= NULL
)) {
3873 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3877 * Server can't compress on-demand
3878 * Use pre-compressed certificate
3880 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, alg
)
3881 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt
, cc
->orig_len
)
3882 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
3883 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, cc
->data
, cc
->len
)
3884 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
3887 sc
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->cert_comp_used
++;
3892 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
3893 uint32_t age_add
, unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3895 uint32_t timeout
= (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s
->session
->timeout
);
3898 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3899 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3900 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3901 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3902 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3904 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3906 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3907 if (ossl_time_compare(s
->session
->timeout
,
3908 ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC
)) > 0)
3909 timeout
= ONE_WEEK_SEC
;
3913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, timeout
)) {
3914 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3918 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3919 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3920 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3926 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3927 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3928 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3935 static CON_FUNC_RETURN
construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3938 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3940 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3941 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3942 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
3943 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3944 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3945 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3948 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3949 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3950 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3952 CON_FUNC_RETURN ok
= CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3953 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3954 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3955 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3957 /* get session encoding length */
3958 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3960 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3963 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3967 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3969 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3973 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3978 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
3980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3985 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3991 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3994 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
, sctx
->libctx
,
3997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4001 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
4002 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
4003 /* shouldn't ever happen */
4004 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4005 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
4009 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
4010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4011 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
4014 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
4017 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
4018 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
4020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4021 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
4023 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
4028 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
4029 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
4030 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
4032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4033 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
4034 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
4035 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(ssl
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
4036 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 1);
4041 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
4042 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
4045 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4046 ok
= CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND
;
4049 /* Put timeout and length */
4050 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
4051 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
4052 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4056 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
4057 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
4058 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
4061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
4064 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
4066 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4070 EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
4073 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
4074 /* Error is already recorded */
4075 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4079 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher
);
4081 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, iv
, iv_len
, 0) <= 0
4082 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
4083 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
4084 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
4085 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
4087 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
4088 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4091 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
4092 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
4093 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
4096 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4097 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4101 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
4102 /* Output key name */
4103 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
4105 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
4106 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
4108 /* Encrypt session data */
4109 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
4110 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
4111 || encdata1
!= encdata2
4112 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
4113 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
4114 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
4115 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4116 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
4117 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx
,
4118 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
4119 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
4120 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
4121 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)
4122 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4123 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
4124 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
4125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4129 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4130 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
4131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4135 ok
= CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
4138 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
4139 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
4143 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
4145 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
4147 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4148 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4152 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
4153 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
4154 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
4155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4162 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
4165 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4166 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4167 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4168 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4171 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
4172 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0)
4173 s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
--;
4176 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4178 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
4179 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
4181 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4184 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret
= CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
4186 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
4188 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4191 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
4192 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
4193 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
4195 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4196 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
4197 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4200 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
4203 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4204 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4205 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4207 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
4208 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
4210 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
4211 /* SSLfatal already called */
4215 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
4216 s
->session
= new_sess
;
4219 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
4220 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4223 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->libctx
,
4224 age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
), 0) <= 0) {
4225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4228 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
4230 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
4231 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
4232 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
4236 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
4238 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
4241 s
->session
->master_key
,
4243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4246 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
4248 s
->session
->time
= ossl_time_now();
4249 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
4250 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
4251 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
4252 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
4253 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
4254 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
4255 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= 0;
4256 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
4259 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
4261 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
4264 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
4265 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
4266 tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0) {
4267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4271 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4272 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4273 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4275 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
4276 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
4277 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
4278 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
4279 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4284 CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret
;
4286 tmpret
= construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
4288 if (tmpret
!= CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
) {
4289 if (tmpret
== CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND
) {
4290 /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
4291 ret
= CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND
;
4292 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
4293 tls_update_ticket_counts(s
);
4295 /* else SSLfatal() already called */
4300 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4301 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
4302 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4304 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4307 tls_update_ticket_counts(s
);
4308 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
4311 ret
= CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
4317 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4318 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4320 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4322 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4323 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4324 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4325 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4332 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4334 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4335 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4336 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
4339 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
4342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4344 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4345 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4347 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4349 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4350 size_t next_proto_len
;
4353 * The payload looks like:
4355 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4356 * uint8 padding_len;
4357 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4360 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4361 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4366 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4372 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4374 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4378 static CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
4381 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4384 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
4387 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
4390 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4397 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4398 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4400 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4404 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4405 * a record boundary.
4407 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4409 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4412 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4413 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4414 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4415 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4416 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4419 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;