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New Russian TLS 1.2 implementation
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
28
29 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
30 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
32
33 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
34
35 typedef struct {
36 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
37 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
38 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
39
40 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
41
42 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
43 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
44 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
45 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
46
47 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
48
49 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
50
51 /*
52 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
53 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
54 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
55 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
56 *
57 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
58 * (transition not allowed)
59 */
60 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
61 {
62 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
63
64 /*
65 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
66 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
67 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
68 */
69 switch (st->hand_state) {
70 default:
71 break;
72
73 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
74 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
77 return 1;
78 }
79 break;
80 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
81 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
82 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
83 return 1;
84 }
85 break;
86 }
87 /* Fall through */
88
89 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
90 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
91 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
92 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
93 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
94 return 1;
95 }
96 } else {
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
99 return 1;
100 }
101 }
102 break;
103
104 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
105 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
106 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
107 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
108 return 1;
109 }
110 } else {
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
113 return 1;
114 }
115 }
116 break;
117
118 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 break;
124
125 case TLS_ST_OK:
126 /*
127 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
128 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
129 */
130 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
131 break;
132
133 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
134 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
136 return 1;
137 }
138
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
141 return 1;
142 }
143 break;
144 }
145
146 /* No valid transition found */
147 return 0;
148 }
149
150 /*
151 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
152 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
153 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
154 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
155 *
156 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
157 * (transition not allowed)
158 */
159 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
160 {
161 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
162
163 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
164 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
165 goto err;
166 return 1;
167 }
168
169 switch (st->hand_state) {
170 default:
171 break;
172
173 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
174 case TLS_ST_OK:
175 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
176 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
178 return 1;
179 }
180 break;
181
182 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
183 /*
184 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
185 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
186 * OR
187 * 2) If we did request one then
188 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
189 * AND
190 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
191 * list if we requested a certificate)
192 */
193 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
194 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
195 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
196 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
197 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
198 /*
199 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
200 * not going to accept it because we require a client
201 * cert.
202 */
203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
204 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
205 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
206 return 0;
207 }
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
209 return 1;
210 }
211 } else {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
213 return 1;
214 }
215 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
216 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
218 return 1;
219 }
220 }
221 break;
222
223 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
224 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 return 1;
227 }
228 break;
229
230 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
231 /*
232 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
233 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
234 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
235 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
236 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
237 * set.
238 */
239 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 /*
242 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
243 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
244 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
245 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
246 */
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
248 return 1;
249 }
250 } else {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
253 return 1;
254 }
255 }
256 break;
257
258 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
261 return 1;
262 }
263 break;
264
265 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
267 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
270 return 1;
271 }
272 } else {
273 #endif
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
276 return 1;
277 }
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 }
280 #endif
281 break;
282
283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
284 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
287 return 1;
288 }
289 break;
290 #endif
291
292 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
293 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
294 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
295 return 1;
296 }
297 break;
298 }
299
300 err:
301 /* No valid transition found */
302 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
303 BIO *rbio;
304
305 /*
306 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
307 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
308 */
309 s->init_num = 0;
310 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
311 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
312 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
313 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
314 return 0;
315 }
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
317 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
318 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 return 0;
320 }
321
322 /*
323 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
324 *
325 * Valid return values are:
326 * 1: Yes
327 * 0: No
328 */
329 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
330 {
331 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
332
333 /*
334 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
335 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
336 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
337 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
338 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
339 * key exchange.
340 */
341 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
342 /*
343 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
344 * provided
345 */
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
347 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
348 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
349 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
350 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
351 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
352 #endif
353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
354 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
355 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
356 #endif
357 ) {
358 return 1;
359 }
360
361 return 0;
362 }
363
364 /*
365 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
366 *
367 * Valid return values are:
368 * 1: Yes
369 * 0: No
370 */
371 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
372 {
373 if (
374 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
375 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
376 /*
377 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
378 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
379 */
380 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
381 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
382 /*
383 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
384 * a second time:
385 */
386 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
387 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
388 /*
389 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
390 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
391 * RFC 2246):
392 */
393 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
394 /*
395 * ... except when the application insists on
396 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
397 * this for SSL 3)
398 */
399 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
400 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
401 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
402 /*
403 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
404 * are omitted
405 */
406 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
407 return 1;
408 }
409
410 return 0;
411 }
412
413 /*
414 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
415 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
416 * client.
417 */
418 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
419 {
420 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
421
422 /*
423 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
424 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
425 */
426
427 switch (st->hand_state) {
428 default:
429 /* Shouldn't happen */
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
431 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
434
435 case TLS_ST_OK:
436 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 }
440 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 }
444 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 }
448 /* Try to read from the client instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
450
451 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454
455 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
456 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
457 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
459 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 else
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464
465 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
466 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 else
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471
472 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
473 if (s->hit)
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
475 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
477 else
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
479
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481
482 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
483 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
484 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
486 } else {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
488 }
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490
491 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494
495 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498
499 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
501 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
502
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
505
506 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
507 /*
508 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
509 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
510 * immediately.
511 */
512 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
513 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
514 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
515 /*
516 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
517 * handshake at this point.
518 */
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
520 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 }
522 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
524 else
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527
528 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
529 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
530 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532
533 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
534 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
535 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
536 * been configured for.
537 */
538 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
541 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
543 }
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 }
546 }
547
548 /*
549 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
550 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
551 */
552 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
553 {
554 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
555
556 /*
557 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
558 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
559 */
560
561 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
562 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
563
564 switch (st->hand_state) {
565 default:
566 /* Shouldn't happen */
567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
568 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
569 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
570 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
571
572 case TLS_ST_OK:
573 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
574 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
576 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
577 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 }
579 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
580 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
581 /* SSLfatal() already called */
582 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
583 }
584 /* Fall through */
585
586 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
587 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
589
590 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593
594 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
596 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
597 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
598 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
599 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 } else {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
604 }
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606
607 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
608 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
609
610 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
611 if (s->hit) {
612 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
614 else
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 } else {
617 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
618 /* normal PSK or SRP */
619 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
620 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
622 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
624 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
626 } else {
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
628 }
629 }
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631
632 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
633 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 }
637 /* Fall through */
638
639 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
640 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
641 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
642 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 }
644 /* Fall through */
645
646 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
647 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
648 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 }
651 /* Fall through */
652
653 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
655 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656
657 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
658 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
659
660 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
661 if (s->hit) {
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
664 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
666 } else {
667 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
668 }
669 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
670
671 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
674
675 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
676 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
677 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
678
679 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
680 if (s->hit) {
681 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
682 }
683 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
685 }
686 }
687
688 /*
689 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
690 * the server to the client.
691 */
692 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
693 {
694 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
695
696 switch (st->hand_state) {
697 default:
698 /* No pre work to be done */
699 break;
700
701 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
702 s->shutdown = 0;
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
704 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
705 break;
706
707 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
708 s->shutdown = 0;
709 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
710 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
711 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
712 st->use_timer = 0;
713 }
714 break;
715
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
718 /*
719 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
720 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
721 */
722 st->use_timer = 1;
723 }
724 break;
725
726 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
728 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
729 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
730 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
731 }
732 #endif
733 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
734
735 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
737 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
738 /*
739 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
740 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
741 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
742 *
743 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
744 */
745 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
746 }
747 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
748 /*
749 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
750 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
751 */
752 st->use_timer = 0;
753 }
754 break;
755
756 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
757 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
758 break;
759 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
760 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
761 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
762 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
764 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 return WORK_ERROR;
767 }
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
769 /* SSLfatal() already called */
770 return WORK_ERROR;
771 }
772 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
773 /*
774 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
775 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
776 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
777 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
778 */
779 st->use_timer = 0;
780 }
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
782
783 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
784 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
785 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
786 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
787 /* Fall through */
788
789 case TLS_ST_OK:
790 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
791 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
792 }
793
794 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
795 }
796
797 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
798 {
799 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
800 #if defined(EPIPE)
801 case EPIPE:
802 return 1;
803 #endif
804 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
805 case ECONNRESET:
806 return 1;
807 #endif
808 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
809 case WSAECONNRESET:
810 return 1;
811 #endif
812 default:
813 return 0;
814 }
815 }
816
817 /*
818 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
819 * server to the client.
820 */
821 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
822 {
823 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
824
825 s->init_num = 0;
826
827 switch (st->hand_state) {
828 default:
829 /* No post work to be done */
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
834 return WORK_MORE_A;
835 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 return WORK_ERROR;
838 }
839 break;
840
841 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
842 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
843 return WORK_MORE_A;
844 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
845 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
847 return WORK_ERROR;
848 }
849 /*
850 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
851 * treat like it was the first packet
852 */
853 s->first_packet = 1;
854 break;
855
856 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
857 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
858 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
859 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
860 return WORK_MORE_A;
861 break;
862 }
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
864 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
865 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
866 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
867 size_t labellen;
868
869 /*
870 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
871 * SCTP used.
872 */
873 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
874 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
875
876 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
877 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
878 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
879 labellen += 1;
880
881 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
882 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
883 labellen, NULL, 0,
884 0) <= 0) {
885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
886 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 return WORK_ERROR;
889 }
890
891 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
892 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
893 }
894 #endif
895 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
896 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
897 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
898 break;
899 /* Fall through */
900
901 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
902 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
903 if (!statem_flush(s))
904 return WORK_MORE_A;
905 break;
906 }
907
908 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
909 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
910 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
911 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
912 /* SSLfatal() already called */
913 return WORK_ERROR;
914 }
915
916 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
917 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
918 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
920 return WORK_ERROR;
921 }
922 /*
923 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
924 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
925 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
926 */
927 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
928 break;
929 }
930
931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
932 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
933 /*
934 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
935 * no SCTP used.
936 */
937 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
938 0, NULL);
939 }
940 #endif
941 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
942 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
943 {
944 /* SSLfatal() already called */
945 return WORK_ERROR;
946 }
947
948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
949 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
950 break;
951
952 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
953 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
954 return WORK_MORE_A;
955 break;
956
957 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
958 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
959 return WORK_MORE_A;
960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
961 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
962 /*
963 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
964 * no SCTP used.
965 */
966 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
967 0, NULL);
968 }
969 #endif
970 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
971 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
972 size_t dummy;
973 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
974 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
975 &dummy)
976 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
977 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 return WORK_ERROR;
980 }
981 break;
982
983 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
984 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
985 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
986 return WORK_MORE_A;
987 }
988 break;
989
990 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
991 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
992 return WORK_MORE_A;
993 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
994 /* SSLfatal() already called */
995 return WORK_ERROR;
996 }
997 break;
998
999 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1000 clear_sys_error();
1001 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
1002 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
1003 && conn_is_closed()) {
1004 /*
1005 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1006 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1007 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1008 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1009 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1010 */
1011 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1012 break;
1013 }
1014
1015 return WORK_MORE_A;
1016 }
1017 break;
1018 }
1019
1020 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1021 }
1022
1023 /*
1024 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1025 * server
1026 *
1027 * Valid return values are:
1028 * 1: Success
1029 * 0: Error
1030 */
1031 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1032 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1033 {
1034 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1035
1036 switch (st->hand_state) {
1037 default:
1038 /* Shouldn't happen */
1039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1040 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1041 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1042 return 0;
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1045 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1046 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1047 else
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1053 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1054 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1058 /* No construction function needed */
1059 *confunc = NULL;
1060 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1061 break;
1062
1063 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1064 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1065 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1066 break;
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1069 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1070 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1071 break;
1072
1073 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1074 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1075 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1076 break;
1077
1078
1079 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1080 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1081 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1082 break;
1083
1084 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1085 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1086 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1087 break;
1088
1089 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1090 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1091 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1092 break;
1093
1094 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1095 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1096 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1097 break;
1098
1099 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1100 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1101 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1102 break;
1103
1104 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1105 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1106 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1107 break;
1108
1109 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1110 *confunc = NULL;
1111 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1112 break;
1113
1114 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1115 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1116 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1117 break;
1118
1119 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1120 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1121 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1122 break;
1123 }
1124
1125 return 1;
1126 }
1127
1128 /*
1129 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1130 * calculated as follows:
1131 *
1132 * 2 + # client_version
1133 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1134 * 1 + # length of session_id
1135 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1136 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1137 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1138 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1139 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1140 * 2 + # length of extensions
1141 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1142 */
1143 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1144
1145 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1146 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1147
1148 /*
1149 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1150 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1151 */
1152 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1153 {
1154 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1155
1156 switch (st->hand_state) {
1157 default:
1158 /* Shouldn't happen */
1159 return 0;
1160
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1162 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1163
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1165 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1166
1167 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1168 return s->max_cert_list;
1169
1170 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1171 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1172
1173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1174 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1175
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1177 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1178 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1179 #endif
1180
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1182 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1183
1184 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1185 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1186
1187 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1188 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1189 }
1190 }
1191
1192 /*
1193 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1194 */
1195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1196 {
1197 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1198
1199 switch (st->hand_state) {
1200 default:
1201 /* Shouldn't happen */
1202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1203 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1206
1207 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1208 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1209
1210 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1211 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1212
1213 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1214 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1215
1216 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1217 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1218
1219 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1220 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1221
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1223 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1224 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1225 #endif
1226
1227 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1228 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1229
1230 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1231 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1232
1233 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1234 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1235
1236 }
1237 }
1238
1239 /*
1240 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1241 * from the client
1242 */
1243 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1244 {
1245 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1246
1247 switch (st->hand_state) {
1248 default:
1249 /* Shouldn't happen */
1250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1251 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 return WORK_ERROR;
1254
1255 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1256 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1257
1258 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1259 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1260 }
1261 }
1262
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1264 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1265 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1266 {
1267 int ret;
1268 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1269
1270 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1271 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1272 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1273 /*
1274 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1275 * login name
1276 */
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1278 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1279 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1280 return -1;
1281 } else {
1282 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1283 if (ret < 0)
1284 return 0;
1285 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1286 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1287 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1288 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1289 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1290 return -1;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 }
1294 return 1;
1295 }
1296 #endif
1297
1298 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1299 size_t cookie_len)
1300 {
1301 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1303 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1304 return 0;
1305
1306 return 1;
1307 }
1308
1309 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1310 {
1311 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1312 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1313 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1314 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1315 cookie_leni > 255) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1317 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1318 return 0;
1319 }
1320 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1321
1322 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1323 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 return 0;
1327 }
1328
1329 return 1;
1330 }
1331
1332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1333 /*-
1334 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1335 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1336 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1337 * SNI,
1338 * elliptic_curves
1339 * ec_point_formats
1340 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1341 *
1342 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1343 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1344 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1345 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1346 */
1347 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1348 {
1349 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1350 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1351 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1352 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1353 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1354 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1355 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1356
1357 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1358 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1359 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1360 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1361 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1362 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1363 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1364 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1365 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1366 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1367 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1368 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1369 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1370 };
1371 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1372 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1373 unsigned int type;
1374 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1375 size_t ext_len;
1376
1377 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1378
1379 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1380 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1381 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1382 return;
1383 }
1384
1385 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1386 return;
1387
1388 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1389 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1390
1391 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1392 ext_len);
1393 }
1394 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1395
1396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1397 {
1398 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1399 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1400 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1401 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1402
1403 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1404 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1405 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1408 goto err;
1409 }
1410 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1411 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1412 && (s->options
1413 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1414 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1415 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1416 }
1417 s->renegotiate = 1;
1418 s->new_session = 1;
1419 }
1420
1421 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1422 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1424 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1425 goto err;
1426 }
1427
1428 /*
1429 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1430 */
1431 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1432 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1433
1434 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1435 unsigned int mt;
1436
1437 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1438 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1441 goto err;
1442 }
1443
1444 /*-
1445 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1446 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1447 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1448 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1449 * Byte Content
1450 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1451 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1452 * 3-4 version
1453 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1454 * 7-8 session_id_length
1455 * 9-10 challenge_length
1456 * ... ...
1457 */
1458
1459 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1460 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1461 /*
1462 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1463 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1464 * in the first place
1465 */
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1467 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1468 goto err;
1469 }
1470 }
1471
1472 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1474 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1475 goto err;
1476 }
1477
1478 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1479 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1480 /*
1481 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1482 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1483 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1484 */
1485 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1486 PACKET challenge;
1487
1488 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1489 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1490 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1492 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1493 goto err;
1494 }
1495
1496 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1498 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1499 goto err;
1500 }
1501
1502 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1503 ciphersuite_len)
1504 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1505 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1506 /* No extensions. */
1507 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1509 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1513
1514 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1515 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1516 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1517 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1518 */
1519 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1520 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1521 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1522 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1523 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1524 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1525 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1526 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1528 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 goto err;
1530 }
1531
1532 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1533 } else {
1534 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1535 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1536 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1537 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1538 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1539 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1542 goto err;
1543 }
1544
1545 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1546 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1548 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1549 goto err;
1550 }
1551 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1552 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1553 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1555 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 goto err;
1557 }
1558 /*
1559 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1560 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1561 * So check cookie length...
1562 */
1563 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1564 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1565 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1566 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1567 }
1568 }
1569 }
1570
1571 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1573 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1574 goto err;
1575 }
1576
1577 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1579 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1580 goto err;
1581 }
1582
1583 /* Could be empty. */
1584 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1585 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1586 } else {
1587 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1588 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1590 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1591 goto err;
1592 }
1593 }
1594 }
1595
1596 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1597 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1598 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1600 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1601 goto err;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1605 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1606 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1607 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1608 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1609 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1610 goto err;
1611 }
1612 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1613
1614 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1615
1616 err:
1617 if (clienthello != NULL)
1618 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1619 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1620
1621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1622 }
1623
1624 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1625 {
1626 unsigned int j;
1627 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1628 int protverr;
1629 size_t loop;
1630 unsigned long id;
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1632 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1633 #endif
1634 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1635 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1636 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1637 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1638 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1639
1640 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1641 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1642 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1643 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1644 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1645 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1646 break;
1647 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1648 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1649 return -1;
1650 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1651 default:
1652 SSLfatal(s, al,
1653 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1654 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1655 goto err;
1656 }
1657 }
1658
1659 /* Set up the client_random */
1660 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1661
1662 /* Choose the version */
1663
1664 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1665 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1666 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1667 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1668 /*
1669 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1670 * support it.
1671 */
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1673 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1674 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1675 goto err;
1676 }
1677 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1678 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1679 }
1680 /*
1681 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1682 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1683 */
1684 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1685 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1686 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1687 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1688 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1689 } else {
1690 protverr = 0;
1691 }
1692
1693 if (protverr) {
1694 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1695 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1696 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1697 }
1698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1699 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1700 goto err;
1701 }
1702
1703 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1704 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1706 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1707 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1708 goto err;
1709 }
1710
1711 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1712 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1713 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1714 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1715 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1716 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1718 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1719 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1720 goto err;
1721 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1722 }
1723 /* default verification */
1724 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1725 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1726 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1728 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1729 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1733 }
1734 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1735 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1736 if (protverr != 0) {
1737 s->version = s->client_version;
1738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1739 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1740 goto err;
1741 }
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 s->hit = 0;
1746
1747 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1748 clienthello->isv2) ||
1749 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1750 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1751 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1752 goto err;
1753 }
1754
1755 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1756 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1757 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1758 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1759 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1760 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1761 if (s->renegotiate) {
1762 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1764 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1765 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1766 goto err;
1767 }
1768 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1769 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1770 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1771 /*
1772 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1773 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1774 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1775 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1776 * an insecure downgrade.
1777 */
1778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1779 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1780 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1781 goto err;
1782 }
1783 }
1784 }
1785
1786 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1788 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1789 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1790
1791 if (cipher == NULL) {
1792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1793 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1794 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1795 goto err;
1796 }
1797 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1798 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1799 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1800 /*
1801 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1802 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1803 */
1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1805 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1806 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1807 goto err;
1808 }
1809 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1810 }
1811
1812 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1813 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1814 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1815 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1817 goto err;
1818 }
1819
1820 /*
1821 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1822 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1823 *
1824 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1825 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1826 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1827 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1828 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1829 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1830 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1831 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1832 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1833 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1834 * ignored.
1835 */
1836 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1837 (s->new_session &&
1838 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1839 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1841 goto err;
1842 }
1843 } else {
1844 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1845 if (i == 1) {
1846 /* previous session */
1847 s->hit = 1;
1848 } else if (i == -1) {
1849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1850 goto err;
1851 } else {
1852 /* i == 0 */
1853 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857 }
1858 }
1859
1860 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1861 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1862 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1863 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1864 }
1865
1866 /*
1867 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1868 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1869 */
1870 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1871 j = 0;
1872 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1873
1874 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1875 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1876 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1877 }
1878 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1879 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1880 if (trc_out != NULL)
1881 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1882 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1883 if (c->id == id) {
1884 j = 1;
1885 break;
1886 }
1887 }
1888 if (j == 0) {
1889 /*
1890 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1891 * to reuse it
1892 */
1893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1894 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1895 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1896 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1897 goto err;
1898 }
1899 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1900 }
1901
1902 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1903 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1904 break;
1905 }
1906
1907 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1908 /* no compress */
1909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1910 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1911 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1912 goto err;
1913 }
1914
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1916 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1917 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1918 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1919
1920 /* TLS extensions */
1921 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1922 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926
1927 /*
1928 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1929 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1930 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1931 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1932 */
1933 {
1934 unsigned char *pos;
1935 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1936 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942 }
1943
1944 if (!s->hit
1945 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1946 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1947 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1948 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1949 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1950 /*
1951 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1952 * backwards compat reasons
1953 */
1954 int master_key_length;
1955
1956 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1957 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1958 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1959 &pref_cipher,
1960 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1961 && master_key_length > 0) {
1962 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1963 s->hit = 1;
1964 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1965 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1966
1967 ciphers = NULL;
1968
1969 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1970 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1971 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1972 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1973 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1975 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1976 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1977 goto err;
1978 }
1979
1980 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1981 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1982 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1983 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1984 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1985 }
1986 }
1987
1988 /*
1989 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1990 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1991 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1992 */
1993 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1994 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1995 /*
1996 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1997 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1998 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1999 */
2000 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
2001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2002 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2003 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2004 goto err;
2005 }
2006 }
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2008 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2009 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2010 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
2011 unsigned int k;
2012 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2013 /* Can't disable compression */
2014 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2016 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2017 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2018 goto err;
2019 }
2020 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2021 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2022 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2023 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2024 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2025 break;
2026 }
2027 }
2028 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2030 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2031 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2032 goto err;
2033 }
2034 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2035 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2036 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2037 break;
2038 }
2039 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2041 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2042 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2043 goto err;
2044 }
2045 } else if (s->hit) {
2046 comp = NULL;
2047 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2048 /* See if we have a match */
2049 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2050 unsigned int o;
2051
2052 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2053 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2054 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2055 v = comp->id;
2056 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2057 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2058 done = 1;
2059 break;
2060 }
2061 }
2062 if (done)
2063 break;
2064 }
2065 if (done)
2066 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2067 else
2068 comp = NULL;
2069 }
2070 #else
2071 /*
2072 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2073 * using compression.
2074 */
2075 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2077 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2078 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2079 goto err;
2080 }
2081 #endif
2082
2083 /*
2084 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2085 */
2086
2087 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2088 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2089 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2090 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2092 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 goto err;
2095 }
2096 ciphers = NULL;
2097 }
2098
2099 if (!s->hit) {
2100 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2101 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2102 #else
2103 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2104 #endif
2105 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2106 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2107 goto err;
2108 }
2109 }
2110
2111 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2112 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2113 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2114 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2115 s->clienthello = NULL;
2116 return 1;
2117 err:
2118 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2119 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2120 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2121 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2122 s->clienthello = NULL;
2123
2124 return 0;
2125 }
2126
2127 /*
2128 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2129 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2130 */
2131 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2132 {
2133 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2134
2135 /*
2136 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2137 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2138 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2139 * influence which certificate is sent
2140 */
2141 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2142 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2143 int ret;
2144
2145 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2146 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2147 /*
2148 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2149 * et al can pick it up.
2150 */
2151 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2152 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2153 switch (ret) {
2154 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2155 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2156 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2157 break;
2158 /* status request response should be sent */
2159 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2160 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2161 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2162 break;
2163 /* something bad happened */
2164 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2165 default:
2166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2167 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2168 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2169 return 0;
2170 }
2171 }
2172 }
2173
2174 return 1;
2175 }
2176
2177 /*
2178 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2179 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2180 */
2181 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2182 {
2183 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2184 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2185
2186 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2187 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2188 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2189 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2190 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2191
2192 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2194 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2195 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2198 return 0;
2199 }
2200 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2202 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2203 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2204 #endif
2205
2206 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2207 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2208 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2209 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2210 selected_len) != 0) {
2211 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2212 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2213
2214 if (!s->hit) {
2215 /*
2216 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2217 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2218 * selected ALPN.
2219 */
2220 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2222 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2223 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2227 selected_len);
2228 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2230 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2235 }
2236 }
2237
2238 return 1;
2239 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2241 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2242 return 0;
2243 }
2244 /*
2245 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2246 * present.
2247 */
2248 }
2249
2250 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2251 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2252 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2253 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2254 }
2255
2256 return 1;
2257 }
2258
2259 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2260 {
2261 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2262
2263 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2264 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2265 if (rv == 0) {
2266 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2267 goto err;
2268 }
2269 if (rv < 0)
2270 return WORK_MORE_A;
2271 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2272 }
2273 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2274 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2275 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2276 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2277 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2278 if (rv == 0) {
2279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2280 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2281 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2282 goto err;
2283 }
2284 if (rv < 0) {
2285 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2286 return WORK_MORE_B;
2287 }
2288 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2289 }
2290
2291 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2292 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2293 cipher =
2294 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2295
2296 if (cipher == NULL) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2298 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2299 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2300 goto err;
2301 }
2302 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2303 }
2304 if (!s->hit) {
2305 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2306 /* SSLfatal already called */
2307 goto err;
2308 }
2309 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2310 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2311 s->session->not_resumable =
2312 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2313 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2314 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2315 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2316 /* do not send a session ticket */
2317 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2318 }
2319 } else {
2320 /* Session-id reuse */
2321 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2322 }
2323
2324 /*-
2325 * we now have the following setup.
2326 * client_random
2327 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2328 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2329 * compression - basically ignored right now
2330 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2331 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2332 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2333 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2334 */
2335
2336 /*
2337 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2338 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2339 */
2340 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2341 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2342 goto err;
2343 }
2344 /*
2345 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2346 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2347 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2348 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2349 */
2350 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2351 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2352 goto err;
2353 }
2354
2355 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2356 }
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2358 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2359 int ret;
2360 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2361 /*
2362 * callback indicates further work to be done
2363 */
2364 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2365 return WORK_MORE_C;
2366 }
2367 if (ret < 0) {
2368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2369 goto err;
2370 }
2371 }
2372 #endif
2373
2374 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2375 err:
2376 return WORK_ERROR;
2377 }
2378
2379 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2380 {
2381 int compm;
2382 size_t sl, len;
2383 int version;
2384 unsigned char *session_id;
2385 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2386
2387 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2388 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2389 /*
2390 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2391 * tls_process_client_hello()
2392 */
2393 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2394 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2395 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2396 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2398 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 return 0;
2400 }
2401
2402 /*-
2403 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2404 * back in the server hello:
2405 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2406 * we send back the old session ID.
2407 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2408 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2409 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2410 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2411 * session ID.
2412 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2413 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2414 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2415 * regardless
2416 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2417 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2418 * to send back.
2419 */
2420 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2421 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2422 && !s->hit))
2423 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2424
2425 if (usetls13) {
2426 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2427 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2428 } else {
2429 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2430 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2431 }
2432
2433 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2436 return 0;
2437 }
2438
2439 /* set up the compression method */
2440 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2441 compm = 0;
2442 #else
2443 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2444 compm = 0;
2445 else
2446 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2447 #endif
2448
2449 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2450 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2451 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 return 0;
2455 }
2456
2457 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2458 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2459 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2460 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2461 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2462 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2463 NULL, 0)) {
2464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2465 return 0;
2466 }
2467
2468 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2469 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2470 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2471 s->session = NULL;
2472 s->hit = 0;
2473
2474 /*
2475 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2476 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2477 */
2478 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2480 return 0;
2481 }
2482 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2483 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2484 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2485 return 0;
2486 }
2487
2488 return 1;
2489 }
2490
2491 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2492 {
2493 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2494 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2495 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2496 return 0;
2497 }
2498 }
2499 return 1;
2500 }
2501
2502 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2503 {
2504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2505 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2506 #endif
2507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2508 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2509 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2510 int curve_id = 0;
2511 #endif
2512 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2513 int i;
2514 unsigned long type;
2515 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2516 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2517 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2518 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2519
2520 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2522 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525
2526 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2529 goto err;
2530 }
2531
2532 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2533
2534 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2536 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2537 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2538 } else
2539 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2541 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2542 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2543
2544 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2545 DH *dh;
2546
2547 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2548 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2549 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2550 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2551 DH_free(dhp);
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 goto err;
2556 }
2557 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2558 pkdhp = pkdh;
2559 } else {
2560 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2561 }
2562 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2563 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2564 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2565 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2569 goto err;
2570 }
2571 pkdhp = pkdh;
2572 }
2573 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2575 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2577 goto err;
2578 }
2579 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2580 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2584 goto err;
2585 }
2586 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2588 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592
2593 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2594 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2596 goto err;
2597 }
2598
2599 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2600 if (dh == NULL) {
2601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2602 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2604 goto err;
2605 }
2606
2607 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2608 pkdh = NULL;
2609
2610 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2611 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2612 } else
2613 #endif
2614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2615 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2616
2617 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2619 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2621 goto err;
2622 }
2623
2624 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2625 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2626 if (curve_id == 0) {
2627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2628 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2630 goto err;
2631 }
2632 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2633 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2634 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2636 goto err;
2637 }
2638
2639 /*
2640 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
2641 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
2642 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
2643 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
2644 *
2645 * THIS IS TEMPORARY
2646 */
2647 EVP_PKEY_get0(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2648 if (EVP_PKEY_id(s->s3.tmp.pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2650 goto err;
2651 }
2652
2653 /* Encode the public key. */
2654 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2655 &encodedPoint);
2656 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2658 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2659 goto err;
2660 }
2661
2662 /*
2663 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2664 * can set these to NULLs
2665 */
2666 r[0] = NULL;
2667 r[1] = NULL;
2668 r[2] = NULL;
2669 r[3] = NULL;
2670 } else
2671 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2673 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2674 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2675 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2676 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2678 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2680 goto err;
2681 }
2682 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2683 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2684 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2685 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2686 } else
2687 #endif
2688 {
2689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2690 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2692 goto err;
2693 }
2694
2695 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2696 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2697 lu = NULL;
2698 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 goto err;
2702 }
2703
2704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2705 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2706 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2707 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2708
2709 /*
2710 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2711 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2712 */
2713 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2714 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2715 len)) {
2716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2717 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2719 goto err;
2720 }
2721 }
2722 #endif
2723
2724 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2725 unsigned char *binval;
2726 int res;
2727
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2729 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2730 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2731 } else
2732 #endif
2733 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2734
2735 if (!res) {
2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2737 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2739 goto err;
2740 }
2741
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2743 /*-
2744 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2745 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2746 * as the prime
2747 */
2748 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2749 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2750
2751 if (len > 0) {
2752 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2754 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 goto err;
2757 }
2758 memset(binval, 0, len);
2759 }
2760 }
2761 #endif
2762 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2763 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2765 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2766 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2767 goto err;
2768 }
2769
2770 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2771 }
2772
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2774 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2775 /*
2776 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2777 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2778 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2779 * point itself
2780 */
2781 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2782 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2783 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2784 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2786 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 goto err;
2789 }
2790 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2791 encodedPoint = NULL;
2792 }
2793 #endif
2794
2795 /* not anonymous */
2796 if (lu != NULL) {
2797 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2798 const EVP_MD *md;
2799 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2800 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2801
2802 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2803 /* Should never happen */
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2805 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 goto err;
2808 }
2809 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2810 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2812 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 goto err;
2815 }
2816 /* send signature algorithm */
2817 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2819 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2821 goto err;
2822 }
2823
2824 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2825 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2826 s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) {
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2828 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2830 goto err;
2831 }
2832 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2833 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2834 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2836 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2838 goto err;
2839 }
2840 }
2841 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2842 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2843 paramlen);
2844 if (tbslen == 0) {
2845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2846 goto err;
2847 }
2848
2849 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2850 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2851 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2852 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2853 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2854 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2856 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 goto err;
2859 }
2860 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2861 }
2862
2863 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2864 return 1;
2865 err:
2866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2867 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2868 #endif
2869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2870 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2871 #endif
2872 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2873 return 0;
2874 }
2875
2876 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2877 {
2878 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2879 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2880 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2881 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2882 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2883 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2884 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2885 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2886 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2888 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2889 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2890 return 0;
2891 }
2892 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2893 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2894 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2895 return 0;
2896 }
2897 } else {
2898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2900 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2901 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 return 0;
2903 }
2904 }
2905
2906 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2907 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2908 0)) {
2909 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2910 return 0;
2911 }
2912 goto done;
2913 }
2914
2915 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2916 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2917 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2919 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2920 return 0;
2921 }
2922
2923 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2924 const uint16_t *psigs;
2925 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2926
2927 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2928 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2929 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2930 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2932 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2934 return 0;
2935 }
2936 }
2937
2938 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2939 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2940 return 0;
2941 }
2942
2943 done:
2944 s->certreqs_sent++;
2945 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2946 return 1;
2947 }
2948
2949 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2950 {
2951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2952 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2953 size_t psklen;
2954 PACKET psk_identity;
2955
2956 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2958 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2959 return 0;
2960 }
2961 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2963 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2964 return 0;
2965 }
2966 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2968 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2969 return 0;
2970 }
2971
2972 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 return 0;
2976 }
2977
2978 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2979 psk, sizeof(psk));
2980
2981 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2984 return 0;
2985 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2986 /*
2987 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2988 */
2989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2990 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2991 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2992 return 0;
2993 }
2994
2995 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2996 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2997 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2998
2999 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
3000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3001 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3002 return 0;
3003 }
3004
3005 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
3006
3007 return 1;
3008 #else
3009 /* Should never happen */
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 return 0;
3013 #endif
3014 }
3015
3016 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3017 {
3018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3019 size_t outlen;
3020 PACKET enc_premaster;
3021 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
3022 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
3023 int ret = 0;
3024 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3025 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3026
3027 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
3028 if (rsa == NULL) {
3029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3030 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
3031 return 0;
3032 }
3033
3034 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
3035 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
3036 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3037 } else {
3038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3039 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3041 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3042 return 0;
3043 }
3044 }
3045
3046 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3047 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3048 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3050 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3051 return 0;
3052 }
3053
3054 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
3055 if (ctx == NULL) {
3056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3057 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3058 goto err;
3059 }
3060
3061 /*
3062 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3063 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3064 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3065 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3066 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3067 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3068 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3069 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3070 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3071 */
3072 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3073 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3075 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3076 goto err;
3077 }
3078
3079 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3080 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3081 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3082 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3083 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3084 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3085 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3086
3087 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3088 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3089 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3090 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3092 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3093 goto err;
3094 }
3095
3096 /*
3097 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3098 * we double check anyway.
3099 */
3100 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3101 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3103 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3104 goto err;
3105 }
3106
3107 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3108 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
3109 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
3110 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3111 goto err;
3112 }
3113
3114 ret = 1;
3115 err:
3116 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3117 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3118 return ret;
3119 #else
3120 /* Should never happen */
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 return 0;
3124 #endif
3125 }
3126
3127 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3128 {
3129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3130 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3131 DH *cdh;
3132 unsigned int i;
3133 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3134 const unsigned char *data;
3135 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3136 int ret = 0;
3137
3138 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3140 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3141 goto err;
3142 }
3143 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3144 if (skey == NULL) {
3145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3146 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3147 goto err;
3148 }
3149
3150 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3152 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3153 goto err;
3154 }
3155 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3156 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 goto err;
3160 }
3161 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3162 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3164 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3165 goto err;
3166 }
3167
3168 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3169 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3170 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3172 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 BN_free(pub_key);
3174 goto err;
3175 }
3176
3177 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3179 goto err;
3180 }
3181
3182 ret = 1;
3183 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3184 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3185 err:
3186 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3187 return ret;
3188 #else
3189 /* Should never happen */
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3192 return 0;
3193 #endif
3194 }
3195
3196 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3197 {
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3199 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3200 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3201 int ret = 0;
3202
3203 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3204 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3206 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3207 goto err;
3208 } else {
3209 unsigned int i;
3210 const unsigned char *data;
3211
3212 /*
3213 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3214 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3215 */
3216
3217 /* Get encoded point length */
3218 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3219 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3221 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3222 goto err;
3223 }
3224 if (skey == NULL) {
3225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3226 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3227 goto err;
3228 }
3229
3230 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3231 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3233 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3234 goto err;
3235 }
3236
3237 /*
3238 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
3239 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
3240 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
3241 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
3242 *
3243 * THIS IS TEMPORARY
3244 */
3245 EVP_PKEY_get0(ckey);
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_id(ckey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3249 goto err;
3250 }
3251
3252 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3254 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3255 goto err;
3256 }
3257 }
3258
3259 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3260 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3261 goto err;
3262 }
3263
3264 ret = 1;
3265 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3266 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3267 err:
3268 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3269
3270 return ret;
3271 #else
3272 /* Should never happen */
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3274 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3275 return 0;
3276 #endif
3277 }
3278
3279 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3280 {
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3282 unsigned int i;
3283 const unsigned char *data;
3284
3285 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3286 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3288 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3289 return 0;
3290 }
3291 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3293 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3294 return 0;
3295 }
3296 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3298 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3299 return 0;
3300 }
3301 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3302 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3303 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3305 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 return 0;
3307 }
3308
3309 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3311 return 0;
3312 }
3313
3314 return 1;
3315 #else
3316 /* Should never happen */
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3319 return 0;
3320 #endif
3321 }
3322
3323 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3324 {
3325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3326 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3327 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3328 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3329 const unsigned char *start;
3330 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3331 unsigned long alg_a;
3332 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3333 const unsigned char *ptr;
3334 int ret = 0;
3335
3336 /* Get our certificate private key */
3337 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3338 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3339 /*
3340 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3341 */
3342 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3343 if (pk == NULL) {
3344 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3345 }
3346 if (pk == NULL) {
3347 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3348 }
3349 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3350 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3351 }
3352
3353 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3354 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3356 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3357 return 0;
3358 }
3359 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3362 return 0;
3363 }
3364 /*
3365 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3366 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3367 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3368 * client certificate for authorization only.
3369 */
3370 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3371 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3372 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3373 ERR_clear_error();
3374 }
3375
3376 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3377 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3378 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3379 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3380 if (pKX == NULL
3381 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3382 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3384 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3385 goto err;
3386 }
3387
3388 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3390 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3391 goto err;
3392 }
3393
3394 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3396 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3397 goto err;
3398 }
3399
3400 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3401 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3402
3403 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3404 inlen) <= 0) {
3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3406 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3407 goto err;
3408 }
3409 /* Generate master secret */
3410 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3411 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3413 goto err;
3414 }
3415 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3416 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3417 NULL) > 0)
3418 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3419
3420 ret = 1;
3421 err:
3422 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3423 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3424 return ret;
3425 #else
3426 /* Should never happen */
3427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3429 return 0;
3430 #endif
3431 }
3432
3433 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3434 {
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3436 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3437 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3438 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3439 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3440 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3441 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
3442 int ret = 0;
3443 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3444
3445 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3448 return 0;
3449 }
3450
3451 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3454 goto err;
3455 }
3456
3457 /* Get our certificate private key */
3458 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3459 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3460 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3461 if (pk == NULL) {
3462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3463 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3464 goto err;
3465 }
3466
3467 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3468 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3470 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3471 goto err;
3472 }
3473 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3476 goto err;
3477 }
3478
3479 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3480 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3481 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3483 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3484 goto err;
3485 }
3486
3487 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3488 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3490 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3491 goto err;
3492 }
3493 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3494 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3495
3496 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3498 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3499 goto err;
3500 }
3501 /* Generate master secret */
3502 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3503 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3505 goto err;
3506 }
3507 ret = 1;
3508
3509 err:
3510 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3511 return ret;
3512 #else
3513 /* Should never happen */
3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3516 return 0;
3517 #endif
3518 }
3519
3520 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3521 {
3522 unsigned long alg_k;
3523
3524 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3525
3526 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3527 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3529 goto err;
3530 }
3531
3532 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3533 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3534 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3538 goto err;
3539 }
3540 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3541 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3543 goto err;
3544 }
3545 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3546 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3548 goto err;
3549 }
3550 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3551 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3552 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3553 goto err;
3554 }
3555 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3556 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3558 goto err;
3559 }
3560 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3561 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3563 goto err;
3564 }
3565 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3566 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3567 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3568 goto err;
3569 }
3570 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3571 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3572 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3573 goto err;
3574 }
3575 } else {
3576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3577 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3578 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3579 goto err;
3580 }
3581
3582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3583 err:
3584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3585 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3586 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3587 #endif
3588 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3589 }
3590
3591 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3592 {
3593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3594 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3596 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3597 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3598 size_t labellen;
3599 /*
3600 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3601 * used.
3602 */
3603 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3604 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3605
3606 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3607 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3608 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3609 labellen += 1;
3610
3611 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3612 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3613 labellen, NULL, 0,
3614 0) <= 0) {
3615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3616 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3618 return WORK_ERROR;
3619 }
3620
3621 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3622 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3623 }
3624 }
3625 #endif
3626
3627 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3628 /*
3629 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3630 * the handshake_buffer
3631 */
3632 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3633 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3634 return WORK_ERROR;
3635 }
3636 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3637 } else {
3638 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3640 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3641 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3642 return WORK_ERROR;
3643 }
3644 /*
3645 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3646 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3647 */
3648 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3650 return WORK_ERROR;
3651 }
3652 }
3653
3654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3655 }
3656
3657 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3658 {
3659 int i;
3660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3661 X509 *x = NULL;
3662 unsigned long l;
3663 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3664 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3665 PACKET spkt, context;
3666 size_t chainidx;
3667 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3668
3669 /*
3670 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3671 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3672 * TLSv1.3
3673 */
3674 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3675
3676 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3678 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3679 goto err;
3680 }
3681
3682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3683 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3684 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3685 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3687 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3688 goto err;
3689 }
3690
3691 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3692 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3694 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3695 goto err;
3696 }
3697
3698 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3699 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3700 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3702 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3703 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3704 goto err;
3705 }
3706
3707 certstart = certbytes;
3708 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3709 if (x == NULL) {
3710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3711 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3712 goto err;
3713 }
3714 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3717 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3718 goto err;
3719 }
3720
3721 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3722 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3723 PACKET extensions;
3724
3725 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3727 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3728 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3729 goto err;
3730 }
3731 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3732 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3733 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3734 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3735 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3736 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3737 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3738 goto err;
3739 }
3740 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3741 }
3742
3743 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3745 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3746 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3747 goto err;
3748 }
3749 x = NULL;
3750 }
3751
3752 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3753 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3754 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3756 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3757 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3758 goto err;
3759 }
3760 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3761 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3762 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3764 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3765 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3766 goto err;
3767 }
3768 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3769 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3770 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3771 goto err;
3772 }
3773 } else {
3774 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3775 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3776 if (i <= 0) {
3777 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3778 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3779 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3780 goto err;
3781 }
3782 if (i > 1) {
3783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3784 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3785 goto err;
3786 }
3787 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3788 if (pkey == NULL) {
3789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3790 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3791 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3792 goto err;
3793 }
3794 }
3795
3796 /*
3797 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3798 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3799 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3800 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3801 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3802 */
3803
3804 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3805 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3807 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3808 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3809 goto err;
3810 }
3811
3812 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3813 s->session = new_sess;
3814 }
3815
3816 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3817 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3818 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3819
3820 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3821 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3822
3823 /*
3824 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3825 * message
3826 */
3827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3828 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3829 goto err;
3830 }
3831
3832 /*
3833 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3834 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3835 */
3836 sk = NULL;
3837
3838 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3839 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3840 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3841 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3842 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3844 goto err;
3845 }
3846
3847 /* Resend session tickets */
3848 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3849 }
3850
3851 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3852
3853 err:
3854 X509_free(x);
3855 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3856 return ret;
3857 }
3858
3859 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3860 {
3861 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3862
3863 if (cpk == NULL) {
3864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3865 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3866 return 0;
3867 }
3868
3869 /*
3870 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3871 * for the server Certificate message
3872 */
3873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3875 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3876 return 0;
3877 }
3878 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3880 return 0;
3881 }
3882
3883 return 1;
3884 }
3885
3886 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3887 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3888 {
3889 /*
3890 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3891 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3892 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3893 * timeout.
3894 */
3895 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3896 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3897 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3900 return 0;
3901 }
3902
3903 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3905 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3908 return 0;
3909 }
3910 }
3911
3912 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3913 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3916 return 0;
3917 }
3918
3919 return 1;
3920 }
3921
3922 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3923 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3924 {
3925 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3926 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3927 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3928 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3929 const unsigned char *const_p;
3930 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3931 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3932 size_t hlen;
3933 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3934 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3935 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3936 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3937 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3938
3939 /* get session encoding length */
3940 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3941 /*
3942 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3943 * long
3944 */
3945 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3948 goto err;
3949 }
3950 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3951 if (senc == NULL) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3953 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3954 goto err;
3955 }
3956
3957 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3958 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3959 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3961 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3962 goto err;
3963 }
3964
3965 p = senc;
3966 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3969 goto err;
3970 }
3971
3972 /*
3973 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3974 */
3975 const_p = senc;
3976 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3977 if (sess == NULL) {
3978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3980 goto err;
3981 }
3982
3983 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3984 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3985 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3988 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3989 goto err;
3990 }
3991 p = senc;
3992 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3996 goto err;
3997 }
3998 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3999
4000 /*
4001 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
4002 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
4003 */
4004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4005 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4006 #else
4007 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4008 #endif
4009 {
4010 int ret = 0;
4011
4012 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4013 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
4014 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
4015 1);
4016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4017 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4018 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
4019 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
4020 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
4021 #endif
4022
4023 if (ret == 0) {
4024
4025 /* Put timeout and length */
4026 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
4027 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
4028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4029 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4031 goto err;
4032 }
4033 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4034 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4035 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4036 return 1;
4037 }
4038 if (ret < 0) {
4039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4040 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
4041 goto err;
4042 }
4043 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
4044 } else {
4045 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
4046 s->ctx->propq);
4047
4048 if (cipher == NULL) {
4049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4050 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
4051 goto err;
4052 }
4053
4054 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
4055 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
4056 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
4057 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
4058 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
4059 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
4060 "SHA256")) {
4061 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4063 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4064 goto err;
4065 }
4066 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4067 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
4068 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
4069 }
4070
4071 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4072 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4073 goto err;
4074 }
4075
4076 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
4077 /* Output key name */
4078 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
4079 /* output IV */
4080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4081 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4082 &encdata1)
4083 /* Encrypt session data */
4084 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4085 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4086 || encdata1 != encdata2
4087 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4088 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4089 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4090 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4091 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4092 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
4093 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4094 macendoffset - macoffset)
4095 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4096 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
4097 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4098 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4099 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4101 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4102 goto err;
4103 }
4104
4105 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4106 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4108 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4109 goto err;
4110 }
4111
4112 ok = 1;
4113 err:
4114 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4116 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4117 return ok;
4118 }
4119
4120 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4121 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4122 {
4123 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4124 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4125 return 0;
4126 }
4127
4128 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4129 s->session->session_id_length)
4130 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4133 return 0;
4134 }
4135
4136 return 1;
4137 }
4138
4139 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4140 {
4141 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4142 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4143 union {
4144 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4145 uint32_t age_add;
4146 } age_add_u;
4147
4148 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4149
4150 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4151 size_t i, hashlen;
4152 uint64_t nonce;
4153 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4154 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4155 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4156
4157 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4158 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4160 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4162 goto err;
4163 }
4164 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4165
4166 /*
4167 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4168 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4169 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4170 */
4171 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4172 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4173
4174 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4175 /* SSLfatal already called */
4176 goto err;
4177 }
4178
4179 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4180 s->session = new_sess;
4181 }
4182
4183 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4185 goto err;
4186 }
4187 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
4188 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4190 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4192 goto err;
4193 }
4194 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4195
4196 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4197 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4198 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4199 nonce >>= 8;
4200 }
4201
4202 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4203 nonce_label,
4204 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4205 tick_nonce,
4206 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4207 s->session->master_key,
4208 hashlen, 1)) {
4209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4210 goto err;
4211 }
4212 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4213
4214 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4215 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4216 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4217 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4218 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4219 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4221 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4222 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4223 goto err;
4224 }
4225 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4226 }
4227 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4228 }
4229
4230 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4231 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4232 goto err;
4233
4234 /*
4235 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4236 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4237 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4238 */
4239 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4240 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4241 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4242 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4243 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4245 goto err;
4246 }
4247 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4248 tick_nonce)) {
4249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4250 goto err;
4251 }
4252
4253 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4254 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4255 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4256 NULL, 0)) {
4257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4258 goto err;
4259 }
4260 /*
4261 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4262 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4263 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4264 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4265 */
4266 s->sent_tickets++;
4267 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4268 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4269 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4270 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4271 }
4272
4273 return 1;
4274 err:
4275 return 0;
4276 }
4277
4278 /*
4279 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4280 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4281 */
4282 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4283 {
4284 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4285 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4286 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4289 return 0;
4290 }
4291
4292 return 1;
4293 }
4294
4295 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4296 {
4297 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4299 return 0;
4300 }
4301
4302 return 1;
4303 }
4304
4305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4306 /*
4307 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4308 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4309 */
4310 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4311 {
4312 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4313 size_t next_proto_len;
4314
4315 /*-
4316 * The payload looks like:
4317 * uint8 proto_len;
4318 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4319 * uint8 padding_len;
4320 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4321 */
4322 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4323 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4324 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4326 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4327 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4328 }
4329
4330 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4331 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4334 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4335 }
4336
4337 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4338
4339 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4340 }
4341 #endif
4342
4343 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4344 {
4345 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4346 NULL, 0)) {
4347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4348 return 0;
4349 }
4350
4351 return 1;
4352 }
4353
4354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4355 {
4356 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4358 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4359 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4360 }
4361
4362 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4363 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4366 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4367 }
4368
4369 /*
4370 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4371 * a record boundary.
4372 */
4373 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4375 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4376 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4377 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4378 }
4379
4380 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4381 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4382 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4384 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4385 }
4386
4387 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4388 }
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