2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
34 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
35 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
36 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 tls1_export_keying_material
,
42 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
43 tls_close_construct_packet
,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
49 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
50 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
51 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
52 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
53 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
55 tls1_export_keying_material
,
56 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
57 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
58 tls_close_construct_packet
,
62 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
64 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
65 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
66 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
67 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
70 tls1_export_keying_material
,
71 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
72 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
73 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
74 tls_close_construct_packet
,
78 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 OSSL_TIME
tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
99 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
119 OPENSSL_free(sc
->ext
.session_ticket
);
123 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
125 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
133 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
134 sc
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
136 sc
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
141 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
146 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
147 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
148 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
149 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
150 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
151 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
152 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
153 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
154 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
155 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
156 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
157 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
158 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
159 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
160 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
161 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
162 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
163 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
164 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
165 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
166 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
167 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
169 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
170 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
172 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
173 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
174 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
176 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
},
177 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
},
178 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
},
186 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
187 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
188 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
189 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
190 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
193 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
194 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
199 /* The default curves */
200 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
, /* X25519 (29) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
, /* X448 (30) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
, /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, /* secp384r1 (24) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
, /* GC256A (34) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
, /* GC256B (35) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
, /* GC256C (36) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
, /* GC256D (37) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
, /* GC512A (38) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
, /* GC512B (39) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
, /* GC512C (40) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
220 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
,
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
,
225 struct provider_ctx_data_st
{
227 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
230 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
231 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
232 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
234 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
235 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
236 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
238 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
239 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
241 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
244 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
245 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
247 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
248 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
249 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
251 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
252 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
253 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
254 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
257 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
258 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
260 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
261 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
264 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
266 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
267 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
268 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
271 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
272 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
)
275 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
276 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
280 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
281 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
)
284 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
285 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
286 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
289 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
291 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
292 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
296 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
297 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
)
300 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
301 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
302 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
306 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
307 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
308 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
311 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
313 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
314 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
319 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
320 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
325 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
326 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
327 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
331 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
332 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
337 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
338 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
339 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
344 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
345 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
347 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
348 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
350 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
351 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
352 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
353 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
354 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
355 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
358 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
359 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
360 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
363 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
368 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
371 ginf
->algorithm
= ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
376 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
378 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
381 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
382 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
383 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
386 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
388 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
389 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
391 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
394 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
395 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
396 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
397 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
403 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
406 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
407 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
409 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
)
412 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
414 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
415 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
420 #define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
421 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs
;
422 static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
424 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
425 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
426 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
428 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*sinf
= NULL
;
429 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
431 unsigned int code_point
= 0;
434 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== ctx
->sigalg_list_len
) {
435 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
437 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== 0)
438 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
)
439 * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
441 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->sigalg_list
,
442 (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
443 + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
444 * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
));
447 ctx
->sigalg_list
= tmp
;
448 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
, 0,
449 sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
450 ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
+= TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
453 sinf
= &ctx
->sigalg_list
[ctx
->sigalg_list_len
];
455 /* First, mandatory parameters */
456 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME
);
457 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
458 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
461 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
462 sinf
->sigalg_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
463 if (sinf
->sigalg_name
== NULL
)
466 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME
);
467 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
471 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
472 sinf
->name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
473 if (sinf
->name
== NULL
)
476 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
477 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT
);
479 || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &code_point
)
480 || code_point
> UINT16_MAX
) {
481 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
484 sinf
->code_point
= (uint16_t)code_point
;
486 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
487 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS
);
488 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &sinf
->secbits
)) {
489 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
493 /* Now, optional parameters */
494 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID
);
496 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
497 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
500 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
501 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
502 if (sinf
->sigalg_oid
== NULL
)
506 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME
);
508 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
509 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
512 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
513 sinf
->sig_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
514 if (sinf
->sig_name
== NULL
)
518 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID
);
520 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
521 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
524 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
525 sinf
->sig_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
526 if (sinf
->sig_oid
== NULL
)
530 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME
);
532 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
533 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
536 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
537 sinf
->hash_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
538 if (sinf
->hash_name
== NULL
)
542 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID
);
544 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
545 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
548 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
549 sinf
->hash_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
550 if (sinf
->hash_oid
== NULL
)
554 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE
);
556 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
557 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
560 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
561 sinf
->keytype
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
562 if (sinf
->keytype
== NULL
)
566 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID
);
568 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
569 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
572 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
573 sinf
->keytype_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
574 if (sinf
->keytype_oid
== NULL
)
578 /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
579 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS
);
580 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->mintls
)) {
581 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
584 if ((sinf
->mintls
!= 0) && (sinf
->mintls
!= -1) &&
585 ((sinf
->mintls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
586 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
591 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS
);
592 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->maxtls
)) {
593 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
596 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
597 ((sinf
->maxtls
< sinf
->mintls
))) {
598 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
601 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
602 ((sinf
->maxtls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
603 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
609 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
610 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
611 * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
616 keytype
= (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
618 : (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
620 : sinf
->sigalg_name
));
621 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, keytype
, ctx
->propq
);
622 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
624 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
625 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
627 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
628 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
629 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
630 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
631 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
632 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
635 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
637 * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
638 * Check proper object registration first, though.
639 * Don't care about return value as this may have been
640 * done within providers or previous calls to
641 * add_provider_sigalgs.
643 OBJ_create(sinf
->sigalg_oid
, sinf
->sigalg_name
, NULL
);
644 /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
645 if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
) == NID_undef
) ||
646 (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
)) == NULL
)) {
647 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
650 if (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
)
651 OBJ_create(sinf
->sig_oid
, sinf
->sig_name
, NULL
);
652 if (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
)
653 OBJ_create(sinf
->keytype_oid
, sinf
->keytype
, NULL
);
654 if (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
)
655 OBJ_create(sinf
->hash_oid
, sinf
->hash_name
, NULL
);
656 OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
),
657 (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
658 ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->hash_name
)
660 OBJ_txt2nid(keytype
));
661 ctx
->sigalg_list_len
++;
664 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
669 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
671 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
672 sinf
->sigalg_name
= NULL
;
673 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
674 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
675 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
676 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
677 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
678 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
679 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
680 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
681 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
682 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
683 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
684 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
685 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
686 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
691 static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
693 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
696 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
697 OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-SIGALG",
698 add_provider_sigalgs
, &pgd
);
700 * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
701 * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
706 int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
711 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_sigalgs
, ctx
))
714 /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
715 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_len
> 0) {
716 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu
) * ctx
->sigalg_list_len
);
717 if (ctx
->ssl_cert_info
== NULL
)
719 for(i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
720 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].nid
= OBJ_txt2nid(ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].sigalg_name
);
721 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].amask
= SSL_aANY
;
726 * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
727 * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
733 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
737 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
738 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
739 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
740 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
746 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
750 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
751 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
752 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
758 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
766 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
767 * work for groups we don't know about.
769 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
771 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
772 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
774 if (!include_unknown
)
776 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
779 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
784 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
785 * work for groups we don't know about.
787 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
789 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
790 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
797 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
798 * the number of groups supported.
800 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
803 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
805 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
806 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
807 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
808 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
809 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
812 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
813 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
817 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
818 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
823 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
824 *pgroups
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
825 *pgroupslen
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
827 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
828 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
834 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
835 int minversion
, int maxversion
,
836 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
838 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
842 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
848 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
849 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
851 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
854 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
855 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
856 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
858 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
860 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
863 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
864 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
865 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
866 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
867 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
868 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
871 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
872 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
873 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
878 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
879 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
881 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
883 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
888 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
889 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
890 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
891 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
894 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
895 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
898 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
905 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
906 * if there is no match.
907 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
908 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
909 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
911 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int nmatch
)
913 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
914 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
917 /* Can't do anything on client side */
921 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
923 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
924 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
926 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
928 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
929 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
;
930 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
931 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
;
932 /* Should never happen */
935 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
939 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
940 * otherwise peer decides.
942 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
943 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
944 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
946 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
947 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
950 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
951 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
953 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
954 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
962 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
966 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
967 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
972 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
973 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
975 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
976 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
977 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
980 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
983 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
)
985 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
986 unsigned long idmask
;
988 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
989 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
991 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
992 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
993 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
1003 OPENSSL_free(glist
);
1007 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
1008 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
1016 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1018 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
1021 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
1025 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
1027 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
, garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
);
1030 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1031 garg
->gid_arr
= tmp
;
1033 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1035 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1038 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
1040 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
,
1041 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp
);
1044 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
1045 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
1047 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
1051 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
1052 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
1060 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1061 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
1062 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
1065 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
1073 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
1076 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
1079 OPENSSL_free(*pext
);
1081 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
1084 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
1088 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
1089 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
1090 int check_own_groups
)
1092 const uint16_t *groups
;
1098 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
1099 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
1100 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
1102 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
1103 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1105 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
1106 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1109 /* Should never happen */
1114 if (check_own_groups
) {
1115 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
1116 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1117 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
1121 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
1124 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
1128 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
1129 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1132 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
1133 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
1134 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
1135 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
1137 if (groups_len
== 0)
1139 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
1142 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
1143 size_t *num_formats
)
1146 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
1148 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
1149 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
1150 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
1152 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
1153 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
1155 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
1157 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
1161 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
1162 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1164 unsigned char comp_id
;
1168 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
1169 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1173 /* Get required compression id */
1174 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
1175 if (point_conv
== 0)
1177 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
1178 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
1179 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1181 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
1186 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
1188 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
1189 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
1190 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
1191 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
1196 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
1197 * supported (see RFC4492).
1199 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
1202 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
1203 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
1209 /* Return group id of a key */
1210 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1212 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1214 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
1216 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
1220 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
1221 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
1223 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
1227 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1230 /* If not EC nothing to do */
1231 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1233 /* Check compression */
1234 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
1236 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
1238 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
1241 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
1244 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
1247 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1251 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
1252 if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1253 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
1254 else if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1255 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
1257 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1258 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1259 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1268 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1269 * @s: SSL connection
1270 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1272 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1273 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1275 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1277 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
1279 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1280 if (!tls1_suiteb(s
))
1281 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
1283 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1286 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
1287 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, 1);
1288 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
1289 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, 1);
1294 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1295 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
1296 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1297 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1298 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1299 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1300 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1301 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1302 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1303 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1305 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1306 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1307 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1308 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1309 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1310 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1312 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1313 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1314 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1316 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1317 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1319 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1320 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1322 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1323 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1325 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1326 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1327 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1330 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1331 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1332 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1333 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1334 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1339 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1340 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1341 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1344 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1345 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1346 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1347 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1348 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1349 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1350 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1351 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1352 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1353 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1354 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1355 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1356 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1357 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1358 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1359 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1360 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1361 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1362 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1363 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1364 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1365 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1366 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1367 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1368 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 1},
1369 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1370 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1371 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 1},
1372 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1373 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1374 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 1},
1375 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1376 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1377 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1378 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1379 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1380 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1381 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1382 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1383 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1384 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1385 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1386 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1387 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1388 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1389 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1390 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1391 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1392 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1393 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1394 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1395 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1396 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1397 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1398 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1399 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1400 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1401 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1402 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1403 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1404 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1405 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1406 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1407 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1408 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1409 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1410 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1411 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1412 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1413 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1414 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1415 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1416 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1417 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1418 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1419 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1420 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1421 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1422 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1424 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1425 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1426 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1427 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1428 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1429 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1430 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1431 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1432 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1433 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1434 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1435 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1436 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1437 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1438 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1439 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1440 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1441 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1442 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1443 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1446 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1447 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1448 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1449 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1450 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1451 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1455 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1456 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1458 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1459 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1460 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1461 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1462 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1463 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1464 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1465 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1466 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1467 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1470 int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1472 size_t i
, cache_idx
, sigalgs_len
;
1473 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1474 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
= NULL
;
1475 uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1476 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1482 sigalgs_len
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
) + ctx
->sigalg_list_len
;
1484 cache
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
) * sigalgs_len
);
1485 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1488 tls12_sigalgs_list
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len
);
1489 if (tls12_sigalgs_list
== NULL
)
1493 /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
1494 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1495 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1499 tls12_sigalgs_list
[i
] = tls12_sigalgs
[i
];
1502 * Check hash is available.
1503 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1504 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1505 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1506 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1507 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1509 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1510 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1511 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1515 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1516 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1519 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1520 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1522 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1523 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1526 /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
1527 cache_idx
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1528 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
1529 TLS_SIGALG_INFO si
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
];
1530 cache
[cache_idx
].name
= si
.name
;
1531 cache
[cache_idx
].sigalg
= si
.code_point
;
1532 tls12_sigalgs_list
[cache_idx
] = si
.code_point
;
1533 cache
[cache_idx
].hash
= si
.hash_name
?OBJ_txt2nid(si
.hash_name
):NID_undef
;
1534 cache
[cache_idx
].hash_idx
= ssl_get_md_idx(cache
[cache_idx
].hash
);
1535 cache
[cache_idx
].sig
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1536 cache
[cache_idx
].sig_idx
= i
+ SSL_PKEY_NUM
;
1537 cache
[cache_idx
].sigandhash
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1538 cache
[cache_idx
].curve
= NID_undef
;
1539 /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
1540 cache
[cache_idx
].enabled
= 1;
1544 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1545 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs
= tls12_sigalgs_list
;
1546 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs_len
= sigalgs_len
;
1548 tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1552 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1553 OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list
);
1554 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1558 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1559 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1563 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1565 for (i
= 0, lu
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1566 i
< SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1568 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1576 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1577 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1583 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1584 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1587 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1597 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1599 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1600 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1601 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1603 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1604 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1605 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1611 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1613 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1619 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1620 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1621 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1622 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1623 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1625 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1632 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1633 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
1634 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
1635 = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
1639 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1646 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1648 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1651 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1653 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1660 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1661 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1663 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1666 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1668 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1675 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1678 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1681 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1682 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1686 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, NULL
))
1688 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1692 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1694 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1696 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1697 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1700 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1702 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
1704 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1707 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1711 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1714 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1717 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1718 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1719 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1720 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1722 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1723 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1726 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1727 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1731 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1732 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1733 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1735 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1736 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1737 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1738 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1739 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1740 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1742 *psigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1743 return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1748 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1749 * specified EC curve.
1751 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int curve
)
1753 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1756 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1757 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1758 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1760 sigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1761 siglen
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1764 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1765 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1769 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1770 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1771 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1779 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1782 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1784 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1787 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1791 int md_type
= EVP_MD_get_type(md
);
1793 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1794 secbits
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
) * 4;
1796 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1797 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1798 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1800 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1801 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1802 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1803 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1805 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1807 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1809 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1812 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1813 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1815 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1819 * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
1820 * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
1822 if ((secbits
== 0) && (lu
->sig_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_NUM
)
1823 && ((lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
) < (int)ctx
->sigalg_list_len
)) {
1824 secbits
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
].secbits
;
1830 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1831 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1834 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1836 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1837 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1839 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1841 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1844 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
1846 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1847 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1848 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1852 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1853 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1854 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1856 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1857 /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
1858 if ((pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT
) && (lu
!= NULL
))
1861 /* Should never happen */
1866 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1867 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1870 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1871 && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1872 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1873 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1877 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1878 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
1879 (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) : pkeyid
,
1880 &cidx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
))
1881 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1882 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1886 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1888 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1889 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1891 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1895 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1896 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1897 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1899 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1904 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1905 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1906 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1907 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1910 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1911 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1912 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1913 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1914 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1915 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1920 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1925 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1926 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1927 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1928 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1931 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1932 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1933 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1937 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, &md
)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1942 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1943 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1945 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1946 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1947 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
1949 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1950 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_get_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1951 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1955 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1956 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1960 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1962 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
1967 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1969 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1973 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1975 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
1980 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1982 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1987 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1988 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1989 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1991 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1994 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1996 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1998 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1999 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
2000 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
2001 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
2002 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2005 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
2006 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
2007 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
2008 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
2010 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2012 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2013 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
2014 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
2021 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
2022 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
2023 * @c: cipher to check
2024 * @op: Security check that you want to do
2025 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
2027 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
2029 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
,
2032 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
2033 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
2035 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
2037 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2038 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
2041 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
2042 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
2044 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
2045 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
2046 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
2048 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
2051 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2052 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
2053 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
2056 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
2059 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2061 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
2063 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
2066 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2070 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2071 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2072 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2073 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2075 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2076 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
)
2077 memset(s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
, 0, s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2079 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
= OPENSSL_zalloc(s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2080 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
== NULL
)
2083 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
2084 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
2086 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
2087 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
2088 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2089 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2091 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
2092 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
2097 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
2098 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
2099 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
2100 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2108 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2112 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
2115 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
2116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2117 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2122 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2124 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2125 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2126 * point to the resulting session.
2128 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2129 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
2133 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
2136 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2139 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
2140 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2143 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
2144 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2146 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
2147 if (!ticketext
->present
)
2148 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2150 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
2152 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
2153 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
2157 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2159 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
2160 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
2161 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
2162 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
2165 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2166 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2167 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2168 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2169 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2170 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
2172 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2173 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2174 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2175 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2176 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2177 * point to the resulting session.
2179 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2180 const unsigned char *etick
,
2182 const unsigned char *sess_id
,
2183 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
2185 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
2186 unsigned char *sdec
;
2187 const unsigned char *p
;
2188 int slen
, ivlen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
2189 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2191 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2192 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
2193 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2194 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
2195 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2197 if (eticklen
== 0) {
2199 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2200 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
2202 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
2205 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
2207 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2208 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2209 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2210 * calculate the master secret later.
2212 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2216 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
2217 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
2218 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2222 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2223 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
2225 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2228 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2230 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2234 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2236 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2239 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
2242 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2243 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2244 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2246 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2249 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2250 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2251 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2252 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2253 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
2256 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2260 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2266 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
2268 /* Check key name matches */
2269 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
2270 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
2271 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2275 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
2277 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
2278 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
2279 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
2281 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
2282 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
2283 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
2284 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2285 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2288 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2289 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2293 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2296 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
2298 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2302 ivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
2304 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2308 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2309 if (eticklen
<= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
+ mlen
) {
2310 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2314 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2315 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
2316 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
2317 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2321 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
2322 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2325 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2326 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2327 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2328 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2329 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
2330 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
2331 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
2333 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2336 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
2338 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2344 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL
, &p
, slen
, sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
2348 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2350 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2352 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2356 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2357 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2358 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2362 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
2363 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
2366 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2368 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2373 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2375 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2379 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
2382 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2383 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2384 * performs any action
2386 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
2387 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2388 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2389 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2390 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
2391 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2394 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2395 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2396 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2397 sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2399 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2401 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2402 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2405 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2406 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2407 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2411 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2412 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2413 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2414 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2415 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2419 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2420 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2421 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2422 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2423 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2424 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2425 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2427 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2431 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2435 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2437 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2438 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2439 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2440 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2449 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2450 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
,
2451 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2453 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2456 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2458 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2459 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2462 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2465 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2466 && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2467 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2468 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2469 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2472 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2473 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
->sig_idx
))
2476 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2477 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2478 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2479 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2480 if (s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2483 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2484 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2486 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2489 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2490 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2491 * ciphersuites enabled.
2494 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2497 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
2498 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2499 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2500 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2502 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2503 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2504 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2507 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2515 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2516 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
2517 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2518 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2519 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2523 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2524 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2528 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
)
2530 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2531 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2532 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2534 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2537 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2538 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2539 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2540 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2545 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
,
2546 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
2550 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2551 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2552 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2553 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2555 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2558 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2559 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2564 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2565 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2568 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2570 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2573 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2574 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2576 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2577 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2578 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2579 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2583 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2587 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2588 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2589 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2590 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2591 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2593 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2594 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2595 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2596 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2598 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2600 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2602 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2603 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2614 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2615 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2617 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2618 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2620 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2622 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2624 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2625 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2626 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2627 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2628 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2629 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2630 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2631 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2632 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2633 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2635 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2636 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2639 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2640 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2644 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2645 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2647 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2649 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
)
2651 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2655 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2656 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2660 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2666 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2668 /* Invalid data length */
2669 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2674 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
)
2676 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2684 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2691 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2693 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2694 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2696 /* Should never happen */
2697 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2701 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2702 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2704 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2705 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2709 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2711 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2714 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2716 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2719 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++)
2722 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2723 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2724 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2726 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2727 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2729 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2730 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0
2731 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), idx
))
2732 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2737 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2738 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2739 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2743 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2748 psig
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2749 numsigalgs
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2751 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2754 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2756 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2760 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2762 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2763 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc
, *psig
);
2765 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2767 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2768 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2769 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2771 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2774 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2775 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2776 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2779 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2784 if (sc
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2786 || idx
>= (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
2787 || sc
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2789 shsigalgs
= sc
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2791 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2793 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2794 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2795 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2797 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2799 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2800 return (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2803 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2804 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2808 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2809 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2812 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2814 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2815 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2816 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2817 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2818 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2819 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2820 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2821 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2823 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2824 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2825 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2828 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2829 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2831 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2833 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2835 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2836 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2837 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2840 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2842 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2844 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2846 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2848 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2849 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2850 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2851 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2852 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2853 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2857 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2859 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2860 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2864 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2871 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2872 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2873 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2875 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2877 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2878 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2882 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2886 /* Reject duplicates */
2887 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2888 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2897 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2898 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2900 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2904 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2908 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2911 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2916 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
2918 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2921 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2922 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2923 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2925 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2926 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2927 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2933 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2935 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2940 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
2942 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2944 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2945 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2946 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2948 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2950 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2951 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2956 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2961 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2962 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2963 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2965 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2966 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2967 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2973 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2977 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2979 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2981 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2984 if (default_nid
== -1)
2986 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2988 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2990 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2992 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2993 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2994 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2996 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2999 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3001 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3002 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
3003 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
3004 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3005 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
3011 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3012 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3014 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
3016 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3017 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3018 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3025 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3026 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3027 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3028 * attempting to use them.
3031 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3033 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3034 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3035 /* Strict mode flags */
3036 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3037 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3038 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3040 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
3041 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
, int idx
)
3045 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3046 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3049 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3053 * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
3054 * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
3055 * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
3057 * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
3062 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
3064 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3065 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3067 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3069 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3070 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, idx
)) {
3071 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pk
))
3073 *pvalid
= rv
= CERT_PKEY_RPK
;
3076 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3077 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3082 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3085 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
,
3086 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3089 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3091 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
3092 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
3094 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
3101 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3102 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
3103 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
3104 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3105 else if (!check_flags
)
3110 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3111 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3113 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
3118 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
3119 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3121 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3125 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3126 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
3129 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
3130 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3131 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
3135 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3136 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
3139 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
3140 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
3141 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
3144 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
3145 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
3146 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
3149 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
3150 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
3151 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
3160 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3161 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3163 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
3165 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3166 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
3167 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
3169 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
3172 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
3179 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3180 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3182 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
3183 * so check_flags is always set.
3185 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
3186 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3187 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
3191 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3192 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3193 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3194 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
3196 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3203 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3204 else if (check_flags
)
3205 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3207 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3208 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
3209 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
3210 else if (!check_flags
)
3213 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3214 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3215 else if (strict_mode
) {
3216 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3217 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3218 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3219 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
3221 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3228 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
3229 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
3232 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
3233 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
3234 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
3235 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
3236 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
3237 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
3240 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
3243 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
3244 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
3245 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3249 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
3252 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3255 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
3258 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
) == 0
3259 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
3260 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3262 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3263 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3265 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
3266 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3271 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
3274 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3276 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
3277 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
3281 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3282 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
3284 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3287 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3291 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
3294 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3295 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3302 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3303 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3305 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
3306 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
3307 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
3308 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
3309 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
3310 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
3311 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
3312 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
3313 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
3316 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
3317 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
3319 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
3324 return tls1_check_chain(sc
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
3327 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3329 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
3331 int dh_secbits
= 80, sec_level_bits
;
3332 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3333 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
3334 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
3335 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3337 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
3338 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
3339 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
3344 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
3346 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
3350 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3351 sec_level_bits
= ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
3353 if (dh_secbits
< sec_level_bits
)
3354 dh_secbits
= sec_level_bits
;
3356 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
3357 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
3358 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
3359 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
3360 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
3361 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
3362 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
3363 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
3365 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
3369 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
3371 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
3374 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3376 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
3377 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
3380 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
3382 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
3386 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
3387 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
3388 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3393 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3397 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3401 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3402 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3403 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3404 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3406 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
);
3409 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3411 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3414 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3417 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3418 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
3420 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3421 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
3423 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3425 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3426 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
3429 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3431 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3434 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
,
3438 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3440 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3441 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3443 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3444 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3446 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3447 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3452 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3453 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3454 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3457 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
,
3460 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3463 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3465 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3470 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3474 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3475 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3476 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3484 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3485 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3488 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3489 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3491 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3492 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
,
3493 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
3495 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3497 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3498 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3499 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3502 /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
3503 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, sig_idx
))
3504 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_RPK
? sig_idx
: -1;
3506 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3510 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3511 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3513 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3515 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
,
3516 X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3518 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3519 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3521 const char *mdname
= NULL
;
3522 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3525 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3526 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3528 if (sig
->hash
!= NID_undef
)
3529 mdname
= OBJ_nid2sn(sig
->hash
);
3530 supported
= EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey
, sctx
->libctx
,
3537 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3538 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3540 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3541 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3543 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3544 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3549 * This does not differentiate between the
3550 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3551 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3552 * signing certificate.
3554 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3561 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3562 * a viable public key is permitted.
3568 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3569 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3570 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3571 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3572 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3574 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3576 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3579 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3582 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3583 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3587 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3588 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3590 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3595 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3598 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3599 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3602 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3606 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3607 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3608 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3610 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
,
3613 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3617 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3619 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3620 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3621 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3623 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3624 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3625 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3626 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3627 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3629 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3630 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3632 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3633 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3636 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3637 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3639 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3641 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3642 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3644 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3645 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3646 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3652 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3659 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3660 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3662 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3663 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3665 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3666 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3667 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3669 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3671 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3674 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3675 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3677 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3678 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3682 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3683 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3687 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3688 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3690 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3693 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3695 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3697 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3699 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3701 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3705 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3708 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3709 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3712 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3715 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3717 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3718 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3721 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3722 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3724 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3725 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3726 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3728 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3731 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3736 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3737 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3738 * we have to assume GOST support.
3740 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
3741 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
3742 & (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) != 0) {
3743 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3747 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3751 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3755 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3758 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3759 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3764 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3766 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3767 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3769 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3772 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3773 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3777 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3778 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3779 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3780 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3781 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3784 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3788 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3793 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3796 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3797 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3803 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3804 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3805 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3806 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3810 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3812 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3813 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3814 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3818 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3822 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3824 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl
);
3829 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3830 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3831 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3835 sc
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3839 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3841 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3845 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3847 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3849 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3850 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3855 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3856 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3857 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3862 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3863 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3868 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3874 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3877 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3879 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3885 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3890 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3892 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3894 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3895 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3896 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3897 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3901 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3902 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3907 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3909 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3910 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3912 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3913 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3918 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3921 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3922 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3924 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3925 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3930 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3932 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3933 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3935 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3936 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3941 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3943 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3945 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3946 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);
3951 __owur
int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
3952 const unsigned char *enckey
,
3955 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "DH")) {
3956 int bits
= EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey
);
3958 if (bits
<= 0 || enckeylen
!= (size_t)bits
/ 8)
3959 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3961 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC")) {
3962 if (enckeylen
< 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3963 || enckey
[0] != 0x04)
3967 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey
, enckey
, enckeylen
);