2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
60 #include <openssl/objects.h>
61 #include <openssl/evp.h>
62 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
63 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
66 const char tls1_version_str
[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
68 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
69 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, int ticklen
,
70 const unsigned char *sess_id
, int sesslen
,
74 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data
= {
78 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
79 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
80 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
81 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
88 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
91 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
92 * http, the cache would over fill
97 IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(tlsv1_base_method
,
98 ssl_undefined_function
,
99 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl_bad_method
)
105 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
109 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
117 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
121 long tls1_ctrl(SSL
*s
, int cmd
, long larg
, char *parg
)
126 long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL
*s
, int cmd
, void *(*fp
) ())
132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
133 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *p
,
134 unsigned char *limit
)
137 unsigned char *ret
= p
;
139 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
140 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
)
146 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
148 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
150 unsigned long size_str
;
154 * check for enough space.
155 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
156 * 2 for servernamelist length
157 * 1 for the hostname type
158 * 2 for hostname length
162 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 9) < 0
164 strlen(s
->tlsext_hostname
)) > (unsigned long)lenmax
)
167 /* extension type and length */
168 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
169 s2n(size_str
+ 5, ret
);
171 /* length of servername list */
172 s2n(size_str
+ 3, ret
);
174 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
175 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
;
177 memcpy(ret
, s
->tlsext_hostname
, size_str
);
182 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
183 if (s
->new_session
) {
186 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
191 if ((limit
- p
- 4 - el
) < 0)
194 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
197 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
205 if (!(SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)) {
207 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
208 ticklen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
;
212 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
215 if (limit
- ret
- 4 - ticklen
< 0)
217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
220 memcpy(ret
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
);
225 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
&&
226 s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
) {
228 long extlen
, idlen
, itmp
;
232 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
233 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
234 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
240 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
) {
241 extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, NULL
);
247 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 7 - extlen
- idlen
) < 0)
249 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
250 if (extlen
+ idlen
> 0xFFF0)
252 s2n(extlen
+ idlen
+ 5, ret
);
253 *(ret
++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
;
255 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
256 /* save position of id len */
257 unsigned char *q
= ret
;
258 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
259 /* skip over id len */
261 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &ret
);
267 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, &ret
);
270 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- p
- 2) == 0)
277 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *p
,
278 unsigned char *limit
)
281 unsigned char *ret
= p
;
284 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
286 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
)
291 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
293 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->servername_done
== 1
294 && s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
295 if (limit
- ret
- 4 < 0)
298 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
302 if (s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
) {
305 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
310 if ((limit
- p
- 4 - el
) < 0)
313 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
316 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
324 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
&& !(SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)) {
325 if (limit
- ret
- 4 < 0)
327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
331 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
332 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
338 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- p
- 2) == 0)
345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
347 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
348 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
349 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
354 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
355 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
356 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
357 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
359 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *data
,
360 const unsigned char *d
, int n
)
362 unsigned short type
, size
;
363 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
364 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
365 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
366 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
367 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
368 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
369 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
371 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
372 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
373 0x01, /* 1 point format */
374 0x00, /* uncompressed */
377 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
378 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
[] = {
379 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
380 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
381 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
382 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
383 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
384 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
385 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
386 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
389 if (data
>= (d
+ n
- 2))
393 if (data
> (d
+ n
- 4))
398 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
401 if (data
+ size
> d
+ n
)
405 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
406 const size_t len1
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
407 const size_t len2
= sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
);
409 if (data
+ len1
+ len2
!= d
+ n
)
411 if (memcmp(data
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len1
) != 0)
413 if (memcmp(data
+ len1
, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
, len2
) != 0)
416 const size_t len
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
418 if (data
+ len
!= d
+ n
)
420 if (memcmp(data
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len
) != 0)
424 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= 1;
426 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
428 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, unsigned char *d
,
434 unsigned char *data
= *p
;
435 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
437 s
->servername_done
= 0;
438 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
440 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
441 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
442 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, data
, d
, n
);
443 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
445 if (data
>= (d
+ n
- 2))
450 if (data
> (d
+ n
- len
))
453 while (data
<= (d
+ n
- 4)) {
457 if (data
+ size
> (d
+ n
))
460 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
461 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
463 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
465 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
466 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
467 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
468 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
469 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
470 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
471 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
472 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
473 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
474 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
475 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
476 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
477 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
478 * the value of the Host: field.
479 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
480 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
481 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
483 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
487 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
488 unsigned char *sdata
;
493 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
499 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
505 servname_type
= *(sdata
++);
510 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
513 if (s
->servername_done
== 0)
514 switch (servname_type
) {
515 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
:
517 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) {
518 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
521 if (len
> TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
) {
522 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
525 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
=
526 OPENSSL_malloc(len
+ 1)) == NULL
) {
527 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
530 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
, sdata
, len
);
531 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
[len
] = '\0';
532 if (strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) != len
) {
533 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
);
534 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= NULL
;
535 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
538 s
->servername_done
= 1;
541 s
->servername_done
= s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
542 && strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) == len
543 && strncmp(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
,
544 (char *)sdata
, len
) == 0;
555 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
559 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
560 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, data
, size
, al
))
562 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
563 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
&&
564 s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
567 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
571 s
->tlsext_status_type
= *data
++;
573 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
574 const unsigned char *sdata
;
576 /* Read in responder_id_list */
580 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
587 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
594 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
599 id
= d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL
, &sdata
, idsize
);
601 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
605 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
606 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
609 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
610 && !(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
=
611 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
612 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
613 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
616 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, id
)) {
617 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
618 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
623 /* Read in request_extensions */
625 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
631 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
636 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
) {
637 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
,
638 X509_EXTENSION_free
);
641 s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
=
642 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL
, &sdata
, dsize
);
643 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|| (data
+ dsize
!= sdata
)) {
644 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
650 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
653 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
656 /* session ticket processed earlier */
664 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
666 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& s
->new_session
&&
667 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
668 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
,
670 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
677 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, unsigned char *d
,
680 unsigned short length
;
683 unsigned char *data
= *p
;
684 int tlsext_servername
= 0;
685 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
687 if (data
>= (d
+ n
- 2))
691 if (data
+ length
!= d
+ n
) {
692 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
696 while (data
<= (d
+ n
- 4)) {
700 if (data
+ size
> (d
+ n
))
703 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
704 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
706 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
707 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
|| size
> 0) {
708 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
711 tlsext_servername
= 1;
712 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
713 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)
715 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
718 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
719 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
&&
720 s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
) {
722 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
725 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
== -1) || (size
> 0)) {
726 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
729 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
730 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
731 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
732 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, data
, size
, al
))
734 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
740 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
744 if (!s
->hit
&& tlsext_servername
== 1) {
745 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
) {
746 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
) {
747 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= BUF_strdup(s
->tlsext_hostname
);
748 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) {
749 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
753 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
764 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
765 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
766 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
767 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
768 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
769 * initial connect only.
771 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
)
772 && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
773 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
775 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
782 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
)
784 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
785 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
787 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
789 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
790 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
791 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
792 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
794 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
796 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
799 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
800 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
803 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
804 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
808 s
->servername_done
= 0;
815 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL
*s
)
817 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
821 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
822 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has
823 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because
824 * this may influence which certificate is sent
826 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
829 certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
830 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
831 if (certpkey
== NULL
) {
832 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
836 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
837 * et al can pick it up.
839 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
840 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
842 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
843 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
844 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
846 /* status request response should be sent */
847 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
848 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
849 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
851 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
853 /* something bad happened */
854 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
855 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
856 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
860 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
865 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
869 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
877 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
879 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
880 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
882 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
884 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
885 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
886 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
887 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
889 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
891 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
894 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
897 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && !(s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
898 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
901 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
904 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
905 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
906 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= NULL
;
908 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= -1;
909 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
911 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
912 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
915 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
916 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
921 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
922 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
925 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
926 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
929 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
930 s
->servername_done
= 0;
937 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
938 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
939 * session ticket extension at the same time.
942 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *session_id
, int len
,
943 const unsigned char *limit
, SSL_SESSION
**ret
)
945 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
946 const unsigned char *p
= session_id
+ len
;
950 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
953 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)
956 if ((s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
) || !limit
)
960 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
961 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
967 /* Skip past cipher list */
972 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
977 /* Now at start of extensions */
978 if ((p
+ 2) >= limit
)
981 while ((p
+ 4) <= limit
) {
982 unsigned short type
, size
;
985 if (p
+ size
> limit
)
987 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
989 * If zero length note client will accept a ticket and indicate
990 * cache miss to trigger full handshake
993 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
994 return 0; /* Cache miss */
996 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, p
, size
, session_id
, len
, ret
);
1003 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1004 int eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1005 int sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1008 unsigned char *sdec
;
1009 const unsigned char *p
;
1010 int slen
, mlen
, renew_ticket
= 0;
1011 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1014 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
1015 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1018 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1019 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
1020 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
1021 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
1022 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1023 int rv
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1032 /* Check key name matches */
1033 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16))
1035 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
1036 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
1037 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
1038 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, etick
+ 16);
1041 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1044 mlen
= HMAC_size(&hctx
);
1046 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1047 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, etick
, eticklen
);
1048 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
);
1049 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
1050 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
1054 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1055 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1056 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
1057 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
1058 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1060 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
1063 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
, eticklen
);
1064 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &mlen
) <= 0) {
1065 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
1070 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
1073 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1077 * The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to detect that
1078 * the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1079 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1083 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1084 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1086 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= renew_ticket
;
1090 * If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to send
1094 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;