2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
132 * Table of group information.
134 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
135 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
136 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
137 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
166 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
167 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
168 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
169 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
170 {NID_ffdhe2048
, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
171 {NID_ffdhe3072
, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
172 {NID_ffdhe4096
, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
173 {NID_ffdhe6144
, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
174 {NID_ffdhe8192
, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
180 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
181 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
182 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
183 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
185 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
187 /* The default curves */
188 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
189 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
190 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
191 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
194 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
195 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
198 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
199 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
200 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
201 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
202 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
205 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
214 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
216 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
219 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
220 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
221 if (nid_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
224 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
228 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
229 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
233 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
234 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
235 return nid_list
[i
].group_id
;
239 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
242 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
243 * the number of groups supported.
245 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
248 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
249 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
250 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
251 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
252 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
253 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
254 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
257 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
258 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
262 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
263 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
269 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
270 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
271 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
273 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
274 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
281 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
284 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int version
)
286 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id
);
288 if (version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
289 if ((ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3
) != 0)
295 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
296 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
298 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group
);
299 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
303 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
304 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
)
308 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_FFDHE
)
311 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
312 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
313 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
, ginfo
->nid
, (void *)gtmp
);
316 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
317 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
320 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
327 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
328 * if there is no match.
329 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
330 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
331 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
333 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
335 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
336 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
339 /* Can't do anything on client side */
343 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
345 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
346 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
348 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
350 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
351 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
352 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
353 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
354 /* Should never happen */
357 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
361 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
362 * otherwise peer decides.
364 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
365 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
366 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
368 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
369 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
372 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
373 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
375 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
376 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
384 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
388 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
389 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
391 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
395 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
396 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
398 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
399 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
400 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
406 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
410 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
411 unsigned long idmask
;
413 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
414 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
416 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
417 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
418 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
432 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
435 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
436 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
440 int nid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
443 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
445 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
451 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
453 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
455 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
457 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
458 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
460 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
461 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
462 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
463 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
464 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
466 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
467 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
469 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
472 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
474 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
475 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
477 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
480 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
484 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
490 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
491 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
493 const uint16_t *groups
;
499 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
501 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
503 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
504 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
506 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
507 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
510 /* Should never happen */
515 if (check_own_groups
) {
516 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
517 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
518 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
522 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
525 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
529 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
530 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
533 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
534 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
535 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
536 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
540 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
544 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
548 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
550 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
551 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
552 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
554 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
555 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
557 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
559 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
563 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
564 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
568 unsigned char comp_id
;
571 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
572 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
574 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
575 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
577 /* Get required compression id */
578 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
579 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
580 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
582 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
587 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
589 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
590 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
591 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
592 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
597 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
598 * supported (see RFC4492).
600 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
603 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
604 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
610 /* Return group id of a key */
611 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
613 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
618 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
619 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
623 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
624 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
626 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
630 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
633 /* If not EC nothing to do */
634 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
636 /* Check compression */
637 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
639 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
641 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
644 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
647 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
650 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
657 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
658 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
659 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
663 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
672 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
674 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
676 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
677 * is compatible with the client extensions.
679 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
681 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
683 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
685 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
687 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
690 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
691 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
692 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
693 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
700 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
705 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
707 /* Default sigalg schemes */
708 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
711 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
712 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
713 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
717 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
718 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
719 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
720 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
721 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
722 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
740 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
743 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
750 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
756 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
759 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
760 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
761 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
762 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
763 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
764 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
765 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
766 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
767 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
768 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
769 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
770 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
771 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
772 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
773 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
774 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
775 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
776 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
777 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
778 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
780 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
781 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
782 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
783 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
784 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
785 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
786 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
787 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
788 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
789 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
790 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
791 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
792 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
793 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
794 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
795 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
796 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
797 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
798 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
799 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
800 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
801 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
802 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
803 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
804 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
805 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
806 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
807 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
808 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
809 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
810 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
811 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
812 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
814 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
815 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
816 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
817 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
818 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
819 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
820 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
821 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
822 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
823 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
824 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
825 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
826 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
827 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
828 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
831 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
832 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
833 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
834 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
835 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
836 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
837 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
838 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
839 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
840 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
841 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
842 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
845 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
846 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
847 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
848 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
849 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
854 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
855 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
857 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
858 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
859 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
860 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
861 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
862 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
863 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
864 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
865 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
866 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
869 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
870 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
873 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
875 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
877 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
882 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
883 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
888 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
889 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
892 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
902 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
904 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
905 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
906 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
908 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
909 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
915 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
917 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
923 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
924 * is fixed by the certificate type.
926 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
932 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
933 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
934 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
936 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
943 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
945 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
948 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
950 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
957 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
960 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
962 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
963 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
965 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
969 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
971 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
972 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
975 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
977 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
979 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
982 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
986 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
989 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
993 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
994 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
995 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
996 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
998 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
999 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1002 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1003 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1008 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1009 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1010 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1012 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1013 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1014 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1015 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1016 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1017 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1019 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1020 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1026 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1027 * specified EC curve.
1029 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1031 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1034 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1035 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1036 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1038 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1039 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1042 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1043 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs
[i
]);
1047 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1048 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1049 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1058 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1059 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1062 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1064 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1065 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1067 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1068 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1069 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1071 /* Should never happen */
1074 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1075 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1076 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1078 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1081 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1082 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1083 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1085 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
1087 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1088 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1091 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1092 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1093 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1094 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1095 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1098 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1099 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1100 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1101 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1102 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1109 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1110 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1111 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1112 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1113 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1117 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1118 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1119 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
1120 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
1122 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1123 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1124 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1128 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1129 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1130 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1132 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1135 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1136 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1137 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1138 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1140 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1141 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1146 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1148 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1153 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1154 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1155 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1156 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1159 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1160 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1161 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1163 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1166 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1167 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1168 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1173 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1174 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1176 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1177 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1178 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1179 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1180 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1182 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1186 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1187 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1191 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1193 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1195 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1199 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1201 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1203 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1208 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1209 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1210 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1212 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1215 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1217 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1219 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1220 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1221 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1222 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1223 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1226 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1227 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1228 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1229 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1231 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1233 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1234 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1235 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1242 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1243 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1244 * @c: cipher to check
1245 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1246 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1248 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1250 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1252 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1253 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1255 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1257 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1258 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1261 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1262 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1264 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1265 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1266 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1268 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1271 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1272 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1275 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1278 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1280 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1282 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1285 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1289 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1290 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1291 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1292 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1293 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1294 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1295 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1297 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1298 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1300 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1301 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1302 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1303 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1305 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1306 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1311 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1312 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1313 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1314 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1322 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1324 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1327 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1330 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1332 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1337 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1339 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1340 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1341 * point to the resulting session.
1343 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1347 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1350 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1353 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1354 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1357 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1358 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1360 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1361 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1362 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1364 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1366 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1367 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1371 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1373 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1374 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1375 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1376 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1379 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1380 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1381 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1382 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1383 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1384 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1386 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1387 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1388 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1389 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1390 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1391 * point to the resulting session.
1393 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1394 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1395 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1397 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1398 unsigned char *sdec
;
1399 const unsigned char *p
;
1400 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1401 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1403 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1404 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1406 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1408 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1410 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1411 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1413 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1416 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1418 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1419 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1420 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1421 * calculate the master secret later.
1423 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1427 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1428 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1429 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1433 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1434 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1436 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1439 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1441 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1444 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1445 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1446 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1447 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1450 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1454 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1460 /* Check key name matches */
1461 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1462 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1463 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1466 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1467 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1468 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1469 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1470 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1471 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1472 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1475 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1479 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1482 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1484 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1488 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1490 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1491 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1495 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1496 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1497 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1498 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1502 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1503 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1506 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1507 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1508 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1509 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1510 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1511 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1512 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1514 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1517 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1519 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1525 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1529 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1531 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1533 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1537 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1538 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1539 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1543 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1544 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1547 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1549 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1554 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1556 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1559 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1560 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1563 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1564 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1565 * performs any action
1567 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1568 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1569 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1570 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1571 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1572 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1575 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1576 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1577 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1579 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1581 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1582 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1585 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1586 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1587 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1591 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1592 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1593 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1594 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1595 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1599 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1600 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1601 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1602 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
1603 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1604 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
1605 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1607 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1611 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1615 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1617 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1618 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1619 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1620 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1629 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1630 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1632 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1635 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1636 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1638 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1639 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1641 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1642 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1643 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1644 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1645 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1648 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1649 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1652 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1653 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1654 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
1655 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1656 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1659 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1660 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1662 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1665 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1666 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1667 * ciphersuites enabled.
1670 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1673 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1674 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
1675 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
1676 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1678 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1679 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1680 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
1683 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kGOST
) != 0)
1691 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1693 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1694 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1695 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1696 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1697 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1698 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1702 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1703 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1707 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1709 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1710 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1711 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1713 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1716 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1717 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1718 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1719 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1724 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1728 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1729 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1730 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1731 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1733 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1736 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1737 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1742 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1743 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1745 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1747 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1750 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1751 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1753 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1754 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1755 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1756 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1764 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1765 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1766 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1767 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1769 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1770 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1771 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1772 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1774 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1775 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1777 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1778 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1789 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1790 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1792 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1793 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1795 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1797 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1799 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1800 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1801 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1802 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1803 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1804 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1805 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1806 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1807 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1808 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1810 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1811 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1814 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1815 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1819 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1820 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1822 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1824 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1828 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1832 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1833 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1837 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1843 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1845 /* Invalid data length */
1846 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1851 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1855 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1863 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1870 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1872 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1873 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1875 /* Should never happen */
1876 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1880 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1881 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1883 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1884 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1888 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1890 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1893 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
1896 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1899 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1902 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1903 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1904 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1906 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1907 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1909 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1910 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1911 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1916 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1917 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1918 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1920 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1921 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1922 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1925 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1927 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1931 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1933 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1934 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1936 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1938 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1939 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1940 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1942 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1945 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1946 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1947 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1949 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1950 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1952 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1953 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1955 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1957 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1959 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1960 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1961 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1963 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1965 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1966 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1969 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1970 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1974 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1975 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1978 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1980 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1981 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1982 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1983 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1984 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1985 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1986 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1987 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1989 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1990 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1991 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1994 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1995 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1997 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1999 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2001 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2002 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2003 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2006 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2008 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2010 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2012 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2014 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2015 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2016 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2017 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2018 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2019 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2023 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2025 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2026 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2030 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2037 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2038 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2039 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2041 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2043 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2044 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2048 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2052 /* Reject duplicates */
2053 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2054 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2063 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2064 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2066 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2070 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2074 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2077 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2082 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2086 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2089 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2090 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2091 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2093 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2094 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2095 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2101 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2103 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2108 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2112 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2114 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2115 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2116 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2118 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2120 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2121 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2126 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2131 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2132 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2133 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2135 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2136 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2137 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2143 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2147 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2151 if (default_nid
== -1)
2153 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2155 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2156 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
2157 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
2162 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2163 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2167 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2168 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2169 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2176 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2177 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2178 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2179 * attempting to use them.
2182 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2184 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2185 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2186 /* Strict mode flags */
2187 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2188 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2189 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2191 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2196 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2197 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2200 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2201 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2203 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2206 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2208 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2209 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2211 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2213 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2214 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2223 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2226 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2228 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2229 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2231 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2238 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2239 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2240 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2241 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2242 else if (!check_flags
)
2247 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2248 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2250 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2253 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2254 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2256 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2260 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2261 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2264 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2265 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2266 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2270 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2271 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2274 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2275 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2276 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2279 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2280 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2281 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2284 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2285 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2286 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2295 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2296 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2298 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2300 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2301 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2302 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2304 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2307 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2314 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2315 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2319 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2320 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2321 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2322 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2324 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2331 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2332 else if (check_flags
)
2333 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2335 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2336 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2337 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2338 else if (!check_flags
)
2341 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2342 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2343 else if (strict_mode
) {
2344 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2345 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2346 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2347 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2349 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2356 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2357 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2359 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2361 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2364 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2367 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2371 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2374 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2375 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2376 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2380 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2383 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2386 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2388 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2389 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2391 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2392 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2393 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2395 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2396 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2397 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2398 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2399 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2404 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2407 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2409 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2410 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2414 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2415 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2417 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2420 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2424 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2427 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2428 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2435 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2436 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2438 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2439 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2440 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2441 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2442 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2443 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2444 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2445 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2446 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2449 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2450 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2452 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2456 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2458 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2459 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2460 return DH_get_1024_160();
2461 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2462 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2467 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2469 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2472 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2478 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2483 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2484 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2486 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2487 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2495 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2496 return DH_get_2048_224();
2497 return DH_get_1024_160();
2501 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2504 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2507 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2508 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2509 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2510 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2512 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2515 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2517 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2520 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2522 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2523 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2524 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2525 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2527 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2529 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2530 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2533 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2535 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2538 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2541 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2543 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2544 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2546 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2547 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2549 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2550 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2555 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2556 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2557 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2560 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2562 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2564 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2569 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2573 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2574 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2575 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2583 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2584 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2587 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2589 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2590 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2592 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2594 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
2595 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2596 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
2599 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2603 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2604 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2605 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2606 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2607 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2609 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2611 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2612 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
2615 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2618 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2620 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2621 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2622 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2624 || !X509_get_signature_info(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
, &mdnid
,
2627 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2628 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2629 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2630 * signing certificate.
2632 || mdnid
!= lu
->hash
2633 || pknid
!= lu
->sig
)
2637 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
,
2641 else if (supported
< 0)
2643 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2644 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2651 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
,
2655 else if (supported
< 0)
2662 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2663 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2665 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2666 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2668 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2669 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2670 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2672 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2674 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2677 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2678 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2680 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2686 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2687 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2688 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2691 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2692 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2693 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2694 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2695 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2697 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2698 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
) || !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2700 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2703 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2705 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2707 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2712 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2713 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2716 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2717 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2722 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2726 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2730 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2731 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2733 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2736 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2738 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2742 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2743 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2744 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2745 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2752 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2755 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2756 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2759 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2762 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2764 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2765 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2768 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2769 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2771 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2772 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2773 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2775 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2779 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2783 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2786 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2787 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2788 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2793 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2795 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2796 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2798 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2801 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2806 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2807 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2808 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2809 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2810 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2813 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2816 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2817 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2818 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2823 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2826 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2833 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2834 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2835 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2836 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2840 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2842 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2843 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2845 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2849 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2853 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2855 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2856 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2858 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2862 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2866 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
2868 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;