rngd_rdrand: Support compiling for x32 by adding unative_t

On the x32 ABI for x86-64, sizeof(long) == 4, but we still use the
8-byte randomness instructions and flags.  In order to support
compilation for x32, introduce a new type "unative_t" which is
typedef'd to the appropriate type for the architecture.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

diff --git a/rngd_rdrand.c b/rngd_rdrand.c
index d50993d55112d98b4d5b2923ff6379c74891e0ae..064702f9ba69a4bc782a334c21af6b13c39c3353 100644 (file)
--- a/rngd_rdrand.c
+++ b/rngd_rdrand.c
@@ -60,10 +60,16 @@ extern void x86_aes_mangle(void *data, void *state);
 /* Expand an AES key for future use */
 extern void x86_aes_expand_key(const void *key);
 
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+typedef uint64_t unative_t;    /* x86-64 or x32 */
+#else
+typedef uint32_t unative_t;    /* i386 */
+#endif
+
 /* Checking eflags to confirm cpuid instruction available */
-static inline int x86_has_eflag(unsigned long flag)
+static inline int x86_has_eflag(unative_t flag)
 {
-       unsigned long f0, f1;
+       unative_t f0, f1;
        asm("pushf ; "
            "pushf ; "
            "pop %0 ; "
@@ -160,7 +166,7 @@ int xread_drng(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
 
        while (size) {
                for (i = 0; i < rdrand_round_count; i++) {
-                       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(tmp, CHUNK_SIZE/sizeof(long))) {
+                       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(tmp, CHUNK_SIZE/sizeof(unative_t))) {
                                message(LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "read error\n");
                                return -1;
                        }
@@ -262,7 +268,7 @@ int init_drng_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
        have_aesni = !!(info.ecx & features_ecx1_aesni);
 
        /* Randomize the AES data reduction key the best we can */
-       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(xkey, sizeof xkey/sizeof(long)))
+       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(xkey, sizeof xkey/sizeof(unative_t)))
                return 1;
 
        fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
@@ -275,7 +281,7 @@ int init_drng_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
                key[i] ^= xkey[i];
 
        /* Initialize the IV buffer */
-       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(iv_buf, CHUNK_SIZE/sizeof(long)))
+       if (!x86_rdrand_nlong(iv_buf, CHUNK_SIZE/sizeof(unative_t)))
                return 1;
 
        if (init_aesni(key) && init_gcrypt(key))