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58964a49 RE |
1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
2 | * All rights reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 7 | * |
58964a49 RE |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 14 | * |
58964a49 RE |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 21 | * |
58964a49 RE |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
24 | * are met: | |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
58964a49 RE |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 39 | * |
58964a49 RE |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 51 | * |
58964a49 RE |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
56 | */ | |
f1fd4544 | 57 | /* ==================================================================== |
52b8dad8 | 58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
f1fd4544 BM |
59 | * |
60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
62 | * are met: | |
63 | * | |
64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
0f113f3e | 65 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
f1fd4544 BM |
66 | * |
67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
68 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
69 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
70 | * distribution. | |
71 | * | |
72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
73 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
74 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
75 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
76 | * | |
77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
78 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
79 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
80 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
81 | * | |
82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
83 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
84 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
85 | * | |
86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
87 | * acknowledgment: | |
88 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
89 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
90 | * | |
91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
103 | * ==================================================================== | |
104 | * | |
105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
108 | * | |
109 | */ | |
58964a49 RE |
110 | |
111 | #include <stdio.h> | |
aa474d1f | 112 | #include <stdlib.h> |
ec577822 | 113 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
6434abbf DSH |
114 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
115 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
67c8e7f4 | 116 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
4817504d | 117 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
09599b52 | 118 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
0f113f3e MC |
119 | # include <openssl/dh.h> |
120 | # include <openssl/bn.h> | |
09599b52 | 121 | #endif |
58964a49 RE |
122 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
123 | ||
6434abbf | 124 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
0f113f3e MC |
125 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
126 | SSL_SESSION **psess); | |
2daceb03 | 127 | static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); |
aa474d1f | 128 | static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); |
6434abbf | 129 | |
0f113f3e MC |
130 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { |
131 | tls1_enc, | |
132 | tls1_mac, | |
133 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
134 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
135 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
136 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
137 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | |
0f113f3e MC |
138 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
139 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
140 | tls1_alert_code, | |
141 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
142 | 0, | |
143 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
144 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
145 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
146 | }; | |
147 | ||
148 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { | |
149 | tls1_enc, | |
150 | tls1_mac, | |
151 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
152 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
153 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
154 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
155 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | |
0f113f3e MC |
156 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
157 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
158 | tls1_alert_code, | |
159 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
160 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, | |
161 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
162 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
163 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
164 | }; | |
165 | ||
166 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { | |
167 | tls1_enc, | |
168 | tls1_mac, | |
169 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
170 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
171 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
172 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
173 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | |
0f113f3e MC |
174 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
175 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
176 | tls1_alert_code, | |
177 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | |
179 | | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, | |
180 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
181 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
182 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
183 | }; | |
58964a49 | 184 | |
f3b656b2 | 185 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
0f113f3e MC |
186 | { |
187 | /* | |
188 | * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for | |
189 | * http, the cache would over fill | |
190 | */ | |
191 | return (60 * 60 * 2); | |
192 | } | |
58964a49 | 193 | |
6b691a5c | 194 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
195 | { |
196 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) | |
197 | return (0); | |
198 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); | |
199 | return (1); | |
200 | } | |
58964a49 | 201 | |
6b691a5c | 202 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e | 203 | { |
b548a1f1 | 204 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
0f113f3e MC |
205 | ssl3_free(s); |
206 | } | |
58964a49 | 207 | |
6b691a5c | 208 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
209 | { |
210 | ssl3_clear(s); | |
4fa52141 VD |
211 | if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) |
212 | s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION; | |
213 | else | |
214 | s->version = s->method->version; | |
0f113f3e | 215 | } |
58964a49 | 216 | |
525de5d3 | 217 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
eda3766b | 218 | |
0f113f3e MC |
219 | typedef struct { |
220 | int nid; /* Curve NID */ | |
221 | int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */ | |
222 | unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ | |
223 | } tls_curve_info; | |
224 | ||
1db3107a DSH |
225 | /* Mask for curve type */ |
226 | # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 | |
0f113f3e | 227 | # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 |
1db3107a DSH |
228 | # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 |
229 | # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 | |
0f113f3e | 230 | |
2dc1aeed DSH |
231 | /* |
232 | * Table of curve information. | |
233 | * NB: do not delete entries or reorder this array. It is used as a lookup | |
234 | * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id. | |
235 | */ | |
236 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
237 | static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { |
238 | {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
239 | {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
240 | {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
241 | {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
242 | {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
243 | {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
244 | {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
245 | {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
246 | {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
247 | {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
248 | {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
249 | {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
250 | {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
251 | {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
252 | {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
253 | {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
254 | {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
255 | {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
256 | {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
257 | {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
258 | {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
259 | {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
260 | {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
261 | {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
262 | {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
263 | {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ | |
264 | {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ | |
265 | {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ | |
1db3107a DSH |
266 | /* X25519 (29) */ |
267 | {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, | |
0f113f3e MC |
268 | }; |
269 | ||
270 | static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { | |
271 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, | |
272 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, | |
273 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 | |
274 | }; | |
275 | ||
fe6ef247 KR |
276 | /* The default curves */ |
277 | static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = { | |
1db3107a | 278 | 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ |
de57d237 EK |
279 | /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ |
280 | 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
281 | /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
282 | 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
283 | 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
284 | 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ |
285 | 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
de57d237 EK |
286 | 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ |
287 | 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
288 | /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ | |
289 | 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
290 | 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
291 | 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
292 | 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
293 | 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
294 | 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
de57d237 EK |
295 | }; |
296 | ||
297 | static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { | |
1db3107a | 298 | 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ |
de57d237 EK |
299 | /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ |
300 | 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
301 | /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ | |
302 | 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
303 | 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ | |
304 | 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ | |
305 | 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
306 | 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ |
307 | 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
de57d237 EK |
308 | /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ |
309 | 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
310 | 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
311 | 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
312 | 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
313 | 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
314 | 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
315 | /* | |
316 | * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set | |
317 | * via an explicit callback or parameters. | |
318 | */ | |
319 | 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
320 | 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
321 | 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
322 | 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
323 | 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
324 | 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
325 | 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
326 | 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
327 | 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
328 | 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
329 | 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
330 | 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
331 | 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
332 | 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
333 | 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
334 | }; |
335 | ||
de57d237 | 336 | |
0f113f3e MC |
337 | static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { |
338 | 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, | |
339 | 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 | |
340 | }; | |
2ea80354 | 341 | |
525de5d3 | 342 | int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
0f113f3e MC |
343 | { |
344 | /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ | |
b6eb9827 | 345 | if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) |
0f113f3e MC |
346 | return 0; |
347 | return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid; | |
348 | } | |
525de5d3 DSH |
349 | |
350 | int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) | |
0f113f3e | 351 | { |
2fa2d15a DSH |
352 | size_t i; |
353 | for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { | |
354 | if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) | |
355 | return i + 1; | |
0f113f3e | 356 | } |
2fa2d15a | 357 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
358 | } |
359 | ||
740580c2 EK |
360 | /* |
361 | * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise | |
362 | * preferred list. | |
363 | * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., | |
364 | * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. | |
365 | * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. | |
366 | * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such | |
367 | * lists in the first place. | |
368 | * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly | |
369 | * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility | |
370 | * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) | |
fd2b65ce | 371 | */ |
740580c2 | 372 | static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, |
0f113f3e MC |
373 | const unsigned char **pcurves, |
374 | size_t *num_curves) | |
375 | { | |
376 | size_t pcurveslen = 0; | |
377 | if (sess) { | |
378 | *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | |
379 | pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
380 | } else { | |
381 | /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ | |
382 | switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
383 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: | |
384 | *pcurves = suiteb_curves; | |
385 | pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); | |
386 | break; | |
387 | ||
388 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: | |
389 | *pcurves = suiteb_curves; | |
390 | pcurveslen = 2; | |
391 | break; | |
392 | ||
393 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: | |
394 | *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; | |
395 | pcurveslen = 2; | |
396 | break; | |
397 | default: | |
398 | *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | |
399 | pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
400 | } | |
401 | if (!*pcurves) { | |
fe6ef247 KR |
402 | *pcurves = eccurves_default; |
403 | pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default); | |
0f113f3e MC |
404 | } |
405 | } | |
406 | ||
407 | /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ | |
408 | if (pcurveslen & 1) { | |
409 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
410 | *num_curves = 0; | |
411 | return 0; | |
412 | } else { | |
413 | *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; | |
414 | return 1; | |
415 | } | |
416 | } | |
b362ccab DSH |
417 | |
418 | /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */ | |
419 | static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op) | |
0f113f3e MC |
420 | { |
421 | const tls_curve_info *cinfo; | |
422 | if (curve[0]) | |
423 | return 1; | |
b6eb9827 | 424 | if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) |
0f113f3e MC |
425 | return 0; |
426 | cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1]; | |
427 | # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
428 | if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2) | |
429 | return 0; | |
430 | # endif | |
431 | return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve); | |
432 | } | |
b362ccab | 433 | |
d18b716d DSH |
434 | /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ |
435 | int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) | |
0f113f3e MC |
436 | { |
437 | const unsigned char *curves; | |
438 | size_t num_curves, i; | |
439 | unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); | |
440 | if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) | |
441 | return 0; | |
442 | /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ | |
443 | if (suiteb_flags) { | |
444 | unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; | |
445 | if (p[1]) | |
446 | return 0; | |
447 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { | |
448 | if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) | |
449 | return 0; | |
450 | } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { | |
451 | if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) | |
452 | return 0; | |
453 | } else /* Should never happen */ | |
454 | return 0; | |
455 | } | |
456 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) | |
457 | return 0; | |
458 | for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { | |
459 | if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) | |
460 | return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK); | |
461 | } | |
462 | return 0; | |
463 | } | |
d0595f17 | 464 | |
1d97c843 | 465 | /*- |
6977e8ee KR |
466 | * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef |
467 | * if there is no match. | |
468 | * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches | |
376e2ca3 EK |
469 | * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for |
470 | * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. | |
d0595f17 | 471 | */ |
a4352630 | 472 | int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) |
0f113f3e MC |
473 | { |
474 | const unsigned char *pref, *supp; | |
475 | size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; | |
476 | int k; | |
477 | /* Can't do anything on client side */ | |
478 | if (s->server == 0) | |
479 | return -1; | |
480 | if (nmatch == -2) { | |
481 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
482 | /* | |
483 | * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know | |
484 | * these are acceptable due to previous checks. | |
485 | */ | |
486 | unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; | |
487 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) | |
488 | return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ | |
489 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) | |
490 | return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ | |
491 | /* Should never happen */ | |
492 | return NID_undef; | |
493 | } | |
494 | /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ | |
495 | nmatch = 0; | |
496 | } | |
497 | /* | |
498 | * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int | |
499 | * but s->options is a long... | |
500 | */ | |
501 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist | |
502 | (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, | |
503 | &num_supp)) | |
504 | /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ | |
505 | return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; | |
506 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist | |
507 | (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, | |
508 | &num_pref)) | |
509 | return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; | |
3c06513f KR |
510 | |
511 | /* | |
512 | * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them | |
513 | * are allowed. | |
514 | */ | |
515 | if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { | |
516 | supp = eccurves_all; | |
517 | num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; | |
518 | } else if (num_pref == 0 && | |
519 | (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { | |
520 | pref = eccurves_all; | |
521 | num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; | |
522 | } | |
523 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
524 | k = 0; |
525 | for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { | |
526 | const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; | |
527 | for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { | |
528 | if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { | |
529 | if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED)) | |
530 | continue; | |
531 | if (nmatch == k) { | |
532 | int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; | |
533 | return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); | |
534 | } | |
535 | k++; | |
536 | } | |
537 | } | |
538 | } | |
539 | if (nmatch == -1) | |
540 | return k; | |
541 | /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ | |
542 | return NID_undef; | |
543 | } | |
d0595f17 DSH |
544 | |
545 | int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, | |
0f113f3e MC |
546 | int *curves, size_t ncurves) |
547 | { | |
548 | unsigned char *clist, *p; | |
549 | size_t i; | |
550 | /* | |
551 | * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve | |
552 | * ids < 32 | |
553 | */ | |
554 | unsigned long dup_list = 0; | |
555 | clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); | |
a71edf3b | 556 | if (clist == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
557 | return 0; |
558 | for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { | |
559 | unsigned long idmask; | |
560 | int id; | |
561 | id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); | |
562 | idmask = 1L << id; | |
563 | if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { | |
564 | OPENSSL_free(clist); | |
565 | return 0; | |
566 | } | |
567 | dup_list |= idmask; | |
568 | s2n(id, p); | |
569 | } | |
b548a1f1 | 570 | OPENSSL_free(*pext); |
0f113f3e MC |
571 | *pext = clist; |
572 | *pextlen = ncurves * 2; | |
573 | return 1; | |
574 | } | |
575 | ||
576 | # define MAX_CURVELIST 28 | |
577 | ||
578 | typedef struct { | |
579 | size_t nidcnt; | |
580 | int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; | |
581 | } nid_cb_st; | |
d0595f17 DSH |
582 | |
583 | static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) | |
0f113f3e MC |
584 | { |
585 | nid_cb_st *narg = arg; | |
586 | size_t i; | |
587 | int nid; | |
588 | char etmp[20]; | |
2747d73c KR |
589 | if (elem == NULL) |
590 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
591 | if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) |
592 | return 0; | |
593 | if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) | |
594 | return 0; | |
595 | memcpy(etmp, elem, len); | |
596 | etmp[len] = 0; | |
597 | nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); | |
598 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
599 | nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); | |
600 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
601 | nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); | |
602 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
603 | return 0; | |
604 | for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) | |
605 | if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) | |
606 | return 0; | |
607 | narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; | |
608 | return 1; | |
609 | } | |
610 | ||
d0595f17 | 611 | /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ |
0f113f3e MC |
612 | int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, |
613 | const char *str) | |
614 | { | |
615 | nid_cb_st ncb; | |
616 | ncb.nidcnt = 0; | |
617 | if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) | |
618 | return 0; | |
619 | if (pext == NULL) | |
620 | return 1; | |
621 | return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); | |
622 | } | |
623 | ||
fd2b65ce DSH |
624 | /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ |
625 | static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, | |
0f113f3e MC |
626 | EC_KEY *ec) |
627 | { | |
2235b7f2 | 628 | int id; |
0f113f3e | 629 | const EC_GROUP *grp; |
0f113f3e MC |
630 | if (!ec) |
631 | return 0; | |
632 | /* Determine if it is a prime field */ | |
633 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); | |
634 | if (!grp) | |
635 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
636 | /* Determine curve ID */ |
637 | id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
638 | id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); | |
2235b7f2 DSH |
639 | /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */ |
640 | if (id == 0) | |
641 | return 0; | |
642 | curve_id[0] = 0; | |
643 | curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; | |
0f113f3e MC |
644 | if (comp_id) { |
645 | if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) | |
646 | return 0; | |
2235b7f2 DSH |
647 | if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { |
648 | *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | |
649 | } else { | |
650 | if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME) | |
0f113f3e MC |
651 | *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
652 | else | |
653 | *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | |
2235b7f2 | 654 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
655 | } |
656 | return 1; | |
657 | } | |
658 | ||
fd2b65ce DSH |
659 | /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ |
660 | static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
661 | unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) |
662 | { | |
663 | const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; | |
664 | size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; | |
665 | int j; | |
666 | /* | |
667 | * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is | |
668 | * supported (see RFC4492). | |
669 | */ | |
670 | if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { | |
671 | pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
672 | num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
673 | for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { | |
674 | if (*comp_id == *pformats) | |
675 | break; | |
676 | } | |
677 | if (i == num_formats) | |
678 | return 0; | |
679 | } | |
680 | if (!curve_id) | |
681 | return 1; | |
682 | /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ | |
683 | for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { | |
684 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) | |
685 | return 0; | |
b79d2410 MC |
686 | if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { |
687 | /* | |
688 | * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. | |
689 | * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension | |
690 | * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. | |
691 | * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves | |
692 | * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. | |
693 | */ | |
694 | break; | |
695 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
696 | for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { |
697 | if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) | |
698 | break; | |
699 | } | |
700 | if (i == num_curves) | |
701 | return 0; | |
702 | /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ | |
703 | if (!s->server) | |
704 | break; | |
705 | } | |
706 | return 1; | |
707 | } | |
d61ff83b | 708 | |
5087afa1 | 709 | static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, |
0f113f3e MC |
710 | size_t *num_formats) |
711 | { | |
712 | /* | |
713 | * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default | |
714 | */ | |
715 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { | |
716 | *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
717 | *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
718 | } else { | |
719 | *pformats = ecformats_default; | |
720 | /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ | |
721 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
722 | *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; | |
723 | else | |
724 | *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); | |
725 | } | |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
728 | /* | |
729 | * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC | |
730 | * certificates have compatible curves and compression. | |
d61ff83b | 731 | */ |
2ea80354 | 732 | static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) |
0f113f3e MC |
733 | { |
734 | unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; | |
735 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
736 | int rv; | |
8382fd3a | 737 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
738 | if (!pkey) |
739 | return 0; | |
740 | /* If not EC nothing to do */ | |
3aeb9348 | 741 | if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) |
0f113f3e | 742 | return 1; |
3aeb9348 | 743 | rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); |
0f113f3e MC |
744 | if (!rv) |
745 | return 0; | |
746 | /* | |
747 | * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported | |
748 | * curves extension. | |
749 | */ | |
750 | rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); | |
751 | if (!rv) | |
752 | return 0; | |
753 | /* | |
754 | * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or | |
755 | * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. | |
756 | */ | |
757 | if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
758 | int check_md; | |
759 | size_t i; | |
760 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
761 | if (curve_id[0]) | |
762 | return 0; | |
763 | /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ | |
764 | if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) | |
765 | check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; | |
766 | else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) | |
767 | check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; | |
768 | else | |
769 | return 0; /* Should never happen */ | |
770 | for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) | |
771 | if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) | |
772 | break; | |
773 | if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) | |
774 | return 0; | |
775 | if (set_ee_md == 2) { | |
776 | if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
d376e57d | 777 | s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256(); |
0f113f3e | 778 | else |
d376e57d | 779 | s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384(); |
0f113f3e MC |
780 | } |
781 | } | |
782 | return rv; | |
783 | } | |
784 | ||
10bf4fc2 | 785 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
6977e8ee KR |
786 | /* |
787 | * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity | |
788 | * @s: SSL connection | |
789 | * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using | |
790 | * | |
791 | * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using | |
792 | * is compatible with the client extensions. | |
793 | * | |
794 | * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can. | |
795 | */ | |
2ea80354 | 796 | int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) |
0f113f3e | 797 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
798 | /* |
799 | * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other | |
800 | * curves permitted. | |
801 | */ | |
802 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
6977e8ee | 803 | unsigned char curve_id[2]; |
0f113f3e MC |
804 | /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ |
805 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) | |
806 | curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; | |
807 | else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) | |
808 | curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; | |
809 | else | |
810 | return 0; | |
811 | curve_id[0] = 0; | |
812 | /* Check this curve is acceptable */ | |
813 | if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) | |
814 | return 0; | |
fe6ef247 | 815 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 816 | } |
fe6ef247 KR |
817 | /* Need a shared curve */ |
818 | if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) | |
819 | return 1; | |
6977e8ee | 820 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 821 | } |
10bf4fc2 | 822 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
d0595f17 | 823 | |
14536c8c DSH |
824 | #else |
825 | ||
826 | static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) | |
0f113f3e MC |
827 | { |
828 | return 1; | |
829 | } | |
14536c8c | 830 | |
0f113f3e | 831 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
f1fd4544 | 832 | |
0f113f3e MC |
833 | /* |
834 | * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this | |
fc101f88 DSH |
835 | * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. |
836 | */ | |
837 | ||
e481f9b9 MC |
838 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
839 | # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ | |
840 | #else | |
841 | # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, | |
842 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 843 | |
e481f9b9 MC |
844 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
845 | # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ | |
846 | #else | |
847 | # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, | |
848 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 849 | |
e481f9b9 MC |
850 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
851 | # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ | |
852 | #else | |
853 | # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, | |
854 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 855 | |
e481f9b9 | 856 | #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ |
0f113f3e MC |
857 | tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ |
858 | tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ | |
859 | tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) | |
fc101f88 | 860 | |
d97ed219 | 861 | static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { |
0f113f3e MC |
862 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) |
863 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) | |
0f113f3e MC |
864 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) |
865 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) | |
0f113f3e | 866 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) |
e44380a9 DB |
867 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
868 | TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, | |
869 | TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, | |
870 | TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 | |
871 | #endif | |
fc101f88 | 872 | }; |
0f113f3e | 873 | |
e481f9b9 | 874 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
d97ed219 | 875 | static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { |
0f113f3e MC |
876 | tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) |
877 | tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) | |
2ea80354 | 878 | }; |
e481f9b9 | 879 | #endif |
b7bfe69b | 880 | size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) |
0f113f3e MC |
881 | { |
882 | /* | |
883 | * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other | |
884 | * preferences. | |
885 | */ | |
e481f9b9 | 886 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
887 | switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { |
888 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: | |
889 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; | |
890 | return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); | |
891 | ||
892 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: | |
893 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; | |
894 | return 2; | |
895 | ||
896 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: | |
897 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; | |
898 | return 2; | |
899 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 900 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
901 | /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ |
902 | if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { | |
903 | *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; | |
904 | return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; | |
905 | } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { | |
906 | *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; | |
907 | return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; | |
908 | } else { | |
909 | *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; | |
910 | return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); | |
911 | } | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | /* | |
915 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature | |
ec4a50b3 DSH |
916 | * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. |
917 | */ | |
918 | int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
919 | const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
920 | { | |
921 | const unsigned char *sent_sigs; | |
922 | size_t sent_sigslen, i; | |
923 | int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); | |
924 | /* Should never happen */ | |
925 | if (sigalg == -1) | |
926 | return -1; | |
927 | /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ | |
928 | if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { | |
929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
930 | return 0; | |
931 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 932 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
3aeb9348 | 933 | if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
0f113f3e MC |
934 | unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; |
935 | /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ | |
3aeb9348 | 936 | if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) |
0f113f3e MC |
937 | return 0; |
938 | if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { | |
939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
940 | return 0; | |
941 | } | |
942 | /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ | |
943 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
944 | if (curve_id[0]) | |
945 | return 0; | |
946 | if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { | |
947 | if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { | |
948 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
949 | SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); | |
950 | return 0; | |
951 | } | |
952 | } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { | |
953 | if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { | |
954 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
955 | SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); | |
956 | return 0; | |
957 | } | |
958 | } else | |
959 | return 0; | |
960 | } | |
961 | } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
962 | return 0; | |
e481f9b9 | 963 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
964 | |
965 | /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ | |
966 | sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); | |
967 | for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { | |
968 | if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) | |
969 | break; | |
970 | } | |
971 | /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ | |
972 | if (i == sent_sigslen | |
973 | && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 | |
974 | || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { | |
975 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
976 | return 0; | |
977 | } | |
978 | *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); | |
979 | if (*pmd == NULL) { | |
980 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); | |
981 | return 0; | |
982 | } | |
983 | /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */ | |
984 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, | |
985 | EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), | |
986 | (void *)sig)) { | |
987 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
988 | return 0; | |
989 | } | |
990 | /* | |
991 | * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. | |
992 | */ | |
d376e57d | 993 | s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd; |
0f113f3e MC |
994 | return 1; |
995 | } | |
2ea80354 | 996 | |
0f113f3e MC |
997 | /* |
998 | * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't | |
999 | * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike | |
1000 | * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global | |
1001 | * settings. | |
b7bfe69b DSH |
1002 | */ |
1003 | void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 1004 | { |
4d69f9e6 DSH |
1005 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; |
1006 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1007 | /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ |
1008 | if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) | |
4d69f9e6 | 1009 | s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; |
0f113f3e | 1010 | else |
4d69f9e6 | 1011 | s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; |
2b573382 DSH |
1012 | /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */ |
1013 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) | |
1014 | s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1; | |
4d69f9e6 | 1015 | ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); |
0f113f3e MC |
1016 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1017 | /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ | |
1018 | if (!s->psk_client_callback) { | |
4d69f9e6 | 1019 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; |
fe5eef3a | 1020 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; |
0f113f3e | 1021 | } |
e481f9b9 MC |
1022 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
1023 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
0f113f3e | 1024 | if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { |
4d69f9e6 DSH |
1025 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; |
1026 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; | |
0f113f3e | 1027 | } |
e481f9b9 | 1028 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1029 | } |
fc101f88 | 1030 | |
b362ccab | 1031 | int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) |
0f113f3e | 1032 | { |
4d69f9e6 DSH |
1033 | if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |
1034 | || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k | |
1035 | || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1036 | return 1; |
1037 | return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); | |
1038 | } | |
b362ccab DSH |
1039 | |
1040 | static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1041 | { |
1042 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | |
1043 | return 0; | |
1044 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1045 | } | |
ed3883d2 | 1046 | |
aa474d1f EK |
1047 | static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { |
1048 | unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); | |
1049 | unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); | |
1050 | if (u1 < u2) | |
1051 | return -1; | |
1052 | else if (u1 > u2) | |
1053 | return 1; | |
1054 | else | |
1055 | return 0; | |
1056 | } | |
1057 | ||
1058 | /* | |
1059 | * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be | |
1060 | * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. | |
1061 | * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those | |
1062 | * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions | |
1063 | * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error | |
1064 | * occurred. | |
1065 | */ | |
1066 | static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { | |
1067 | PACKET extensions = *packet; | |
1068 | size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; | |
1069 | unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; | |
1070 | int ret = 0; | |
1071 | ||
1072 | /* First pass: count the extensions. */ | |
1073 | while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { | |
1074 | unsigned int type; | |
1075 | PACKET extension; | |
1076 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || | |
1077 | !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
1078 | goto done; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | num_extensions++; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | if (num_extensions <= 1) | |
1084 | return 1; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions); | |
1087 | if (extension_types == NULL) { | |
1088 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1089 | goto done; | |
1090 | } | |
1091 | ||
1092 | /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ | |
1093 | extensions = *packet; | |
1094 | for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
1095 | PACKET extension; | |
1096 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || | |
1097 | !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
1098 | /* This should not happen. */ | |
1099 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1100 | goto done; | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | } | |
1103 | ||
1104 | if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) { | |
1105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1106 | goto done; | |
1107 | } | |
1108 | /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ | |
1109 | qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint); | |
1110 | for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
1111 | if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) | |
1112 | goto done; | |
1113 | } | |
1114 | ret = 1; | |
1115 | done: | |
1116 | OPENSSL_free(extension_types); | |
1117 | return ret; | |
1118 | } | |
1119 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1120 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
1121 | unsigned char *limit, int *al) | |
1122 | { | |
1123 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
1124 | unsigned char *orig = buf; | |
1125 | unsigned char *ret = buf; | |
e481f9b9 | 1126 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
1127 | /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ |
1128 | int using_ecc = 0; | |
1129 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1130 | int i; | |
1131 | unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; | |
1132 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
1133 | ||
1134 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1135 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
1136 | |
1137 | alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; | |
1138 | alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; | |
ce0c1f2b DSH |
1139 | if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) |
1140 | || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1141 | using_ecc = 1; |
1142 | break; | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1146 | #endif |
ed3883d2 | 1147 | |
0f113f3e | 1148 | ret += 2; |
6434abbf | 1149 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1150 | if (ret >= limit) |
1151 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
5a3d8eeb | 1152 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1153 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
1154 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1155 | int el; | |
5a3d8eeb | 1156 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1157 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { |
1158 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1159 | return NULL; | |
1160 | } | |
5a3d8eeb | 1161 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1162 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
1163 | return NULL; | |
5a3d8eeb | 1164 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1165 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
1166 | s2n(el, ret); | |
5a3d8eeb | 1167 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1168 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
1169 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1170 | return NULL; | |
5a3d8eeb | 1171 | } |
edc032b5 | 1172 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1173 | ret += el; |
1174 | } | |
1175 | /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ | |
1176 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) | |
1177 | goto done; | |
1178 | ||
1179 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
1180 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ | |
1181 | unsigned long size_str; | |
1182 | long lenmax; | |
1183 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
1184 | /*- |
1185 | * check for enough space. | |
1186 | * 4 for the servername type and entension length | |
1187 | * 2 for servernamelist length | |
1188 | * 1 for the hostname type | |
1189 | * 2 for hostname length | |
1190 | * + hostname length | |
1191 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1192 | |
1193 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 | |
1194 | || (size_str = | |
1195 | strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
1196 | return NULL; | |
1197 | ||
1198 | /* extension type and length */ | |
1199 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
1200 | s2n(size_str + 5, ret); | |
1201 | ||
1202 | /* length of servername list */ | |
1203 | s2n(size_str + 3, ret); | |
1204 | ||
1205 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ | |
1206 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
1207 | s2n(size_str, ret); | |
1208 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); | |
1209 | ret += size_str; | |
1210 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1211 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
0f113f3e MC |
1212 | /* Add SRP username if there is one */ |
1213 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the | |
1214 | * Client Hello message */ | |
1215 | ||
1216 | int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
1217 | if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { | |
1218 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1219 | return NULL; | |
1220 | } | |
761772d7 | 1221 | |
50e735f9 MC |
1222 | /*- |
1223 | * check for enough space. | |
1224 | * 4 for the srp type type and entension length | |
1225 | * 1 for the srp user identity | |
1226 | * + srp user identity length | |
1227 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1228 | if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) |
1229 | return NULL; | |
1230 | ||
1231 | /* fill in the extension */ | |
1232 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); | |
1233 | s2n(login_len + 1, ret); | |
1234 | (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; | |
1235 | memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); | |
1236 | ret += login_len; | |
1237 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1238 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1239 | |
e481f9b9 | 1240 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
1241 | if (using_ecc) { |
1242 | /* | |
1243 | * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message | |
1244 | */ | |
1245 | long lenmax; | |
1246 | const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; | |
1247 | size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; | |
1248 | size_t i; | |
1249 | unsigned char *etmp; | |
1250 | ||
1251 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); | |
1252 | ||
1253 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) | |
1254 | return NULL; | |
1255 | if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) | |
1256 | return NULL; | |
1257 | if (num_formats > 255) { | |
1258 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1259 | return NULL; | |
1260 | } | |
4817504d | 1261 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1262 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
1263 | /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ | |
1264 | s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); | |
1265 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; | |
1266 | memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); | |
1267 | ret += num_formats; | |
1268 | ||
1269 | /* | |
1270 | * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message | |
1271 | */ | |
1272 | pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | |
1273 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) | |
1274 | return NULL; | |
1275 | ||
1276 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) | |
1277 | return NULL; | |
1278 | if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) | |
1279 | return NULL; | |
1280 | if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { | |
1281 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1282 | return NULL; | |
1283 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1284 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1285 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); |
1286 | etmp = ret + 4; | |
1287 | /* Copy curve ID if supported */ | |
1288 | for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { | |
1289 | if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { | |
1290 | *etmp++ = pcurves[0]; | |
1291 | *etmp++ = pcurves[1]; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | } | |
01f2f18f | 1294 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1295 | curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4; |
1296 | ||
1297 | s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); | |
1298 | s2n(curves_list_len, ret); | |
1299 | ret += curves_list_len; | |
1300 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1301 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1302 | |
1303 | if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
1304 | int ticklen; | |
1305 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) | |
1306 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; | |
1307 | else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | |
1308 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { | |
1309 | ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; | |
1310 | s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); | |
a71edf3b | 1311 | if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1312 | return NULL; |
1313 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, | |
1314 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); | |
1315 | s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; | |
1316 | } else | |
1317 | ticklen = 0; | |
1318 | if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | |
1319 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) | |
1320 | goto skip_ext; | |
1321 | /* | |
1322 | * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for | |
1323 | * ticket | |
1324 | */ | |
1325 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) | |
1326 | return NULL; | |
1327 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
1328 | s2n(ticklen, ret); | |
1329 | if (ticklen) { | |
1330 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); | |
1331 | ret += ticklen; | |
1332 | } | |
1333 | } | |
1334 | skip_ext: | |
1335 | ||
1336 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
1337 | size_t salglen; | |
1338 | const unsigned char *salg; | |
1339 | unsigned char *etmp; | |
1340 | salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); | |
1341 | if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) | |
1342 | return NULL; | |
1343 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); | |
1344 | etmp = ret; | |
1345 | /* Skip over lengths for now */ | |
1346 | ret += 4; | |
1347 | salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen); | |
1348 | /* Fill in lengths */ | |
1349 | s2n(salglen + 2, etmp); | |
1350 | s2n(salglen, etmp); | |
1351 | ret += salglen; | |
1352 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1353 | |
1354 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { | |
1355 | int i; | |
1356 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; | |
1357 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
1358 | ||
1359 | idlen = 0; | |
1360 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
1361 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
1362 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); | |
1363 | if (itmp <= 0) | |
1364 | return NULL; | |
1365 | idlen += itmp + 2; | |
860c3dd1 DSH |
1366 | } |
1367 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1368 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { |
1369 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); | |
1370 | if (extlen < 0) | |
1371 | return NULL; | |
1372 | } else | |
1373 | extlen = 0; | |
1374 | ||
1375 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) | |
1376 | return NULL; | |
1377 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
1378 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) | |
1379 | return NULL; | |
1380 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); | |
1381 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
1382 | s2n(idlen, ret); | |
1383 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
1384 | /* save position of id len */ | |
1385 | unsigned char *q = ret; | |
1386 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
1387 | /* skip over id len */ | |
1388 | ret += 2; | |
1389 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); | |
1390 | /* write id len */ | |
1391 | s2n(itmp, q); | |
1392 | } | |
1393 | s2n(extlen, ret); | |
1394 | if (extlen > 0) | |
1395 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); | |
1396 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1397 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
22e3dcb7 RS |
1398 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1399 | /* Add Heartbeat extension */ | |
1400 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) | |
1401 | return NULL; | |
1402 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); | |
1403 | s2n(1, ret); | |
1404 | /*- | |
1405 | * Set mode: | |
1406 | * 1: peer may send requests | |
1407 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests | |
1408 | */ | |
1409 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) | |
1410 | *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
1411 | else | |
1412 | *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
1413 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1414 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1415 | |
e481f9b9 | 1416 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1417 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { |
1418 | /* | |
1419 | * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support | |
1420 | * for Next Protocol Negotiation | |
1421 | */ | |
1422 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) | |
1423 | return NULL; | |
1424 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
1425 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1426 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1427 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1428 | |
1429 | if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { | |
1430 | if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) | |
1431 | return NULL; | |
1432 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); | |
1433 | s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); | |
1434 | s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); | |
1435 | memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); | |
1436 | ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; | |
1437 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1438 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
0f113f3e MC |
1439 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { |
1440 | int el; | |
1441 | ||
69f68237 MC |
1442 | /* Returns 0 on success!! */ |
1443 | if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
1444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1445 | return NULL; | |
1446 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1447 | |
1448 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) | |
1449 | return NULL; | |
1450 | ||
1451 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
1452 | s2n(el, ret); | |
1453 | ||
1454 | if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
1455 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1456 | return NULL; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | ret += el; | |
1459 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1460 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1461 | custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); |
1462 | /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ | |
1463 | if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) | |
1464 | return NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 1465 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac |
0f113f3e MC |
1466 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); |
1467 | s2n(0, ret); | |
e481f9b9 | 1468 | #endif |
ddc06b35 DSH |
1469 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); |
1470 | s2n(0, ret); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1471 | |
1472 | /* | |
1473 | * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See | |
1474 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this | |
1475 | * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always | |
1476 | * appear last. | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { | |
1479 | int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
a3680c8f | 1480 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1481 | if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { |
1482 | hlen = 0x200 - hlen; | |
1483 | if (hlen >= 4) | |
1484 | hlen -= 4; | |
1485 | else | |
1486 | hlen = 0; | |
1487 | ||
1488 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); | |
1489 | s2n(hlen, ret); | |
1490 | memset(ret, 0, hlen); | |
1491 | ret += hlen; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | } | |
5a3d8eeb | 1494 | |
0f113f3e | 1495 | done: |
5a3d8eeb | 1496 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1497 | if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) |
1498 | return orig; | |
5a3d8eeb | 1499 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1500 | s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
1501 | return ret; | |
1502 | } | |
333f926d | 1503 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1504 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
1505 | unsigned char *limit, int *al) | |
1506 | { | |
1507 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
1508 | unsigned char *orig = buf; | |
1509 | unsigned char *ret = buf; | |
e481f9b9 | 1510 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e | 1511 | int next_proto_neg_seen; |
e481f9b9 MC |
1512 | #endif |
1513 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
0f113f3e MC |
1514 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
1515 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
ce0c1f2b | 1516 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); |
0f113f3e | 1517 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); |
e481f9b9 | 1518 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1519 | |
1520 | ret += 2; | |
1521 | if (ret >= limit) | |
1522 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
1523 | ||
1524 | if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
1525 | int el; | |
1526 | ||
1527 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
1528 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1529 | return NULL; | |
1530 | } | |
333f926d | 1531 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1532 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
1533 | return NULL; | |
333f926d | 1534 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1535 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
1536 | s2n(el, ret); | |
333f926d | 1537 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1538 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
1539 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1540 | return NULL; | |
1541 | } | |
333f926d | 1542 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1543 | ret += el; |
1544 | } | |
1545 | ||
1546 | /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ | |
1547 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) | |
1548 | goto done; | |
1549 | ||
1550 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 | |
1551 | && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
1552 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
1553 | return NULL; | |
1554 | ||
1555 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
1556 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1557 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1558 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
1559 | if (using_ecc) { |
1560 | const unsigned char *plist; | |
1561 | size_t plistlen; | |
1562 | /* | |
1563 | * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message | |
1564 | */ | |
1565 | long lenmax; | |
1566 | ||
1567 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
1568 | ||
1569 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) | |
1570 | return NULL; | |
1571 | if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) | |
1572 | return NULL; | |
1573 | if (plistlen > 255) { | |
1574 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1575 | return NULL; | |
1576 | } | |
4817504d | 1577 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1578 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
1579 | s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); | |
1580 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; | |
1581 | memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); | |
1582 | ret += plistlen; | |
1583 | ||
1584 | } | |
1585 | /* | |
1586 | * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves | |
1587 | * extension | |
1588 | */ | |
e481f9b9 | 1589 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1590 | |
1591 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
1592 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
1593 | return NULL; | |
1594 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
1595 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | ||
1598 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { | |
1599 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
1600 | return NULL; | |
1601 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
1602 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1603 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1604 | |
e481f9b9 | 1605 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
0f113f3e MC |
1606 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { |
1607 | int el; | |
1608 | ||
69f68237 | 1609 | /* Returns 0 on success!! */ |
61986d32 | 1610 | if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { |
69f68237 MC |
1611 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1612 | return NULL; | |
1613 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1614 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
1615 | return NULL; | |
1616 | ||
1617 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
1618 | s2n(el, ret); | |
1619 | ||
1620 | if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
1621 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1622 | return NULL; | |
1623 | } | |
1624 | ret += el; | |
1625 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1626 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1627 | |
1628 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 | |
1629 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) | |
1630 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { | |
1631 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
1632 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
1633 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
1634 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
1635 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
1636 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
1637 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
1638 | }; | |
1639 | if (limit - ret < 36) | |
1640 | return NULL; | |
1641 | memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); | |
1642 | ret += 36; | |
1643 | ||
1644 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1645 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
0f113f3e | 1646 | /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ |
22e3dcb7 | 1647 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1648 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) |
1649 | return NULL; | |
1650 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); | |
1651 | s2n(1, ret); | |
50e735f9 MC |
1652 | /*- |
1653 | * Set mode: | |
1654 | * 1: peer may send requests | |
1655 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests | |
1656 | */ | |
22e3dcb7 RS |
1657 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
1658 | *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
0f113f3e | 1659 | else |
22e3dcb7 | 1660 | *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
0f113f3e MC |
1661 | |
1662 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1663 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1664 | |
e481f9b9 | 1665 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1666 | next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
1667 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
1668 | if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { | |
1669 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
1670 | unsigned int npalen; | |
1671 | int r; | |
1672 | ||
1673 | r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
1674 | s-> | |
1675 | ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
1676 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
1677 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) | |
1678 | return NULL; | |
1679 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
1680 | s2n(npalen, ret); | |
1681 | memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); | |
1682 | ret += npalen; | |
1683 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
1684 | } | |
1685 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1686 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1687 | if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) |
1688 | return NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 1689 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac |
0f113f3e MC |
1690 | if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { |
1691 | /* | |
1692 | * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable | |
1693 | * for other cases too. | |
1694 | */ | |
1695 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
e44380a9 DB |
1696 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 |
1697 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | |
1698 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1699 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; |
1700 | else { | |
1701 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); | |
1702 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1703 | } | |
1704 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 1705 | #endif |
e7f0d921 | 1706 | if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { |
ddc06b35 DSH |
1707 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); |
1708 | s2n(0, ret); | |
1709 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1710 | |
1711 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { | |
1712 | const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; | |
1713 | unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
1714 | ||
1715 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) | |
1716 | return NULL; | |
1717 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); | |
1718 | s2n(3 + len, ret); | |
1719 | s2n(1 + len, ret); | |
1720 | *ret++ = len; | |
1721 | memcpy(ret, selected, len); | |
1722 | ret += len; | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | ||
1725 | done: | |
1726 | ||
1727 | if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) | |
1728 | return orig; | |
1729 | ||
1730 | s2n(extdatalen, orig); | |
1731 | return ret; | |
1732 | } | |
a398f821 | 1733 | |
0f113f3e | 1734 | /* |
06217867 EK |
1735 | * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. |
1736 | * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. | |
1737 | * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. | |
1738 | * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. | |
0f113f3e | 1739 | */ |
9ceb2426 | 1740 | static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
0f113f3e | 1741 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
1742 | const unsigned char *selected; |
1743 | unsigned char selected_len; | |
1744 | int r; | |
06217867 | 1745 | PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; |
0f113f3e | 1746 | |
06217867 | 1747 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 1748 | |
06217867 EK |
1749 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) |
1750 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { | |
1751 | return 0; | |
1752 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1753 | |
06217867 | 1754 | save_protocol_list = protocol_list; |
9ceb2426 | 1755 | do { |
06217867 EK |
1756 | /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ |
1757 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) | |
1758 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { | |
1759 | return 0; | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); | |
1762 | ||
1763 | if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) | |
1764 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1765 | |
06217867 EK |
1766 | r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, |
1767 | PACKET_data(&save_protocol_list), | |
1768 | PACKET_remaining(&save_protocol_list), | |
0f113f3e MC |
1769 | s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); |
1770 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
b548a1f1 | 1771 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); |
0f113f3e | 1772 | s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
a71edf3b | 1773 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1774 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
06217867 | 1775 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1776 | } |
1777 | memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); | |
1778 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
06217867 EK |
1779 | } else { |
1780 | *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; | |
1781 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1782 | } |
0f113f3e | 1783 | |
06217867 | 1784 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1785 | } |
6f017a8f | 1786 | |
e481f9b9 | 1787 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1d97c843 TH |
1788 | /*- |
1789 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
06217867 | 1790 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. |
dece3209 RS |
1791 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: |
1792 | * SNI, | |
1793 | * elliptic_curves | |
1794 | * ec_point_formats | |
1795 | * | |
1796 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1797 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1798 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1799 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1800 | */ | |
68a16628 | 1801 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1802 | { |
06217867 EK |
1803 | unsigned int type; |
1804 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1805 | size_t ext_len; | |
9ceb2426 | 1806 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1807 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1808 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1809 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1810 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1811 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1812 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1813 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1814 | ||
1815 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1816 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1817 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1818 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
06217867 | 1819 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1820 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ |
1821 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1822 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1823 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1824 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1825 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1826 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1827 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1828 | }; | |
1829 | ||
06217867 EK |
1830 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1831 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1832 | ||
68a16628 MC |
1833 | tmppkt = *pkt; |
1834 | ||
1835 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
06217867 EK |
1836 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) |
1837 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
0f113f3e | 1838 | return; |
06217867 | 1839 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1840 | |
1841 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
1842 | return; | |
1843 | ||
06217867 EK |
1844 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? |
1845 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
0f113f3e | 1846 | |
06217867 EK |
1847 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, |
1848 | ext_len); | |
dece3209 | 1849 | } |
e481f9b9 | 1850 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e | 1851 | |
06217867 EK |
1852 | /* |
1853 | * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of | |
1854 | * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. | |
1855 | * | |
1856 | * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no | |
1857 | * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise | |
1858 | * ignored. | |
1859 | * | |
1860 | * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. | |
1861 | * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. | |
1862 | */ | |
9ceb2426 | 1863 | static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
0f113f3e | 1864 | { |
9ceb2426 | 1865 | unsigned int type; |
0f113f3e | 1866 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
06217867 | 1867 | PACKET extensions; |
0f113f3e | 1868 | |
06217867 | 1869 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
1870 | s->servername_done = 0; |
1871 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
e481f9b9 | 1872 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e | 1873 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
e481f9b9 | 1874 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1875 | |
b548a1f1 RS |
1876 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); |
1877 | s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 1878 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
22e3dcb7 RS |
1879 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
1880 | SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); | |
e481f9b9 | 1881 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1882 | |
e481f9b9 | 1883 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 1884 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) |
9ceb2426 MC |
1885 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); |
1886 | # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1887 | |
1888 | /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ | |
76106e60 DSH |
1889 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); |
1890 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 1891 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac |
0f113f3e | 1892 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; |
e481f9b9 | 1893 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1894 | |
e481f9b9 | 1895 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
b548a1f1 RS |
1896 | OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); |
1897 | s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 1898 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1899 | |
1900 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
1901 | ||
9ceb2426 | 1902 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) |
1ae3fdbe AL |
1903 | goto ri_check; |
1904 | ||
06217867 EK |
1905 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) |
1906 | return 0; | |
aa474d1f | 1907 | |
06217867 EK |
1908 | if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) |
1909 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1910 | |
06217867 EK |
1911 | /* |
1912 | * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, | |
1913 | * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon | |
1914 | * resumption. | |
1915 | */ | |
1916 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { | |
1917 | PACKET extension; | |
1918 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) | |
1919 | return 0; | |
9ceb2426 | 1920 | |
0f113f3e | 1921 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
06217867 EK |
1922 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), |
1923 | PACKET_remaining(&extension), | |
1924 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
9ceb2426 | 1925 | |
0f113f3e | 1926 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { |
06217867 | 1927 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1928 | return 0; |
1929 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
1930 | } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
1931 | } | |
1d97c843 TH |
1932 | /*- |
1933 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
1934 | * | |
1935 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
1936 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
1937 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
1938 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
1939 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
0f113f3e MC |
1940 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
1941 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
1942 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
1d97c843 TH |
1943 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
1944 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
1945 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
1946 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
1947 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
0f113f3e | 1948 | * the value of the Host: field. |
1d97c843 | 1949 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the |
1951 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
1952 | * extension. | |
1953 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
1d97c843 | 1954 | * |
0f113f3e | 1955 | */ |
ed3883d2 | 1956 | |
0f113f3e | 1957 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { |
9ceb2426 | 1958 | unsigned int servname_type; |
06217867 EK |
1959 | PACKET sni, hostname; |
1960 | ||
1961 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) | |
1962 | /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ | |
1963 | || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { | |
1964 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1965 | } |
6f017a8f | 1966 | |
06217867 EK |
1967 | /* |
1968 | * Although the server_name extension was intended to be | |
1969 | * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the | |
1970 | * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as | |
1971 | * such. | |
1972 | * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types | |
1973 | * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other | |
1974 | * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. | |
1975 | * | |
1976 | * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, | |
1977 | * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. | |
1978 | */ | |
1979 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) | |
1980 | || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name | |
1981 | || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { | |
1982 | return 0; | |
1983 | } | |
1984 | ||
1985 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1986 | if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
1987 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1988 | return 0; | |
1989 | } | |
1990 | ||
1991 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { | |
1992 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1993 | return 0; | |
1994 | } | |
1995 | ||
1996 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
1997 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1998 | return 0; | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
2001 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
2002 | } else { | |
2003 | /* | |
2004 | * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST | |
2005 | * fall back to a full handshake. | |
2006 | */ | |
2007 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
2008 | && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
2009 | strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); | |
2010 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2011 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2012 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
0f113f3e | 2013 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { |
06217867 EK |
2014 | PACKET srp_I; |
2015 | ||
2016 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) | |
2017 | return 0; | |
2018 | ||
2019 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) | |
2020 | return 0; | |
2021 | ||
2022 | /* | |
2023 | * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user | |
2024 | * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. | |
2025 | */ | |
2026 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { | |
2027 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2028 | return 0; | |
2029 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2030 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2031 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2032 | |
e481f9b9 | 2033 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2034 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { |
06217867 | 2035 | PACKET ec_point_format_list; |
0f113f3e | 2036 | |
06217867 EK |
2037 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, |
2038 | &ec_point_format_list) | |
2039 | || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { | |
2040 | return 0; | |
2041 | } | |
9ceb2426 | 2042 | |
0f113f3e | 2043 | if (!s->hit) { |
06217867 EK |
2044 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, |
2045 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
2046 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2047 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2048 | return 0; | |
2049 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2050 | } |
0f113f3e | 2051 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { |
06217867 | 2052 | PACKET elliptic_curve_list; |
0f113f3e | 2053 | |
06217867 EK |
2054 | /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ |
2055 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, | |
2056 | &elliptic_curve_list) | |
2057 | || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 | |
2058 | || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { | |
2059 | return 0; | |
2060 | } | |
54e3ad00 | 2061 | |
0f113f3e | 2062 | if (!s->hit) { |
06217867 EK |
2063 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, |
2064 | &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, | |
2065 | &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2066 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2067 | return 0; | |
2068 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2069 | } |
0f113f3e | 2070 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2071 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e | 2072 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { |
06217867 EK |
2073 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
2074 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), | |
2075 | PACKET_remaining(&extension), | |
2076 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2077 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2078 | return 0; | |
2079 | } | |
2080 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { | |
06217867 EK |
2081 | PACKET supported_sig_algs; |
2082 | ||
2083 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) | |
2084 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 | |
2085 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { | |
2086 | return 0; | |
2087 | } | |
2088 | ||
2089 | if (!s->hit) { | |
2090 | if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), | |
2091 | PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { | |
2092 | return 0; | |
2093 | } | |
9ceb2426 | 2094 | } |
0f113f3e | 2095 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { |
06217867 | 2096 | const unsigned char *ext_data; |
0f113f3e | 2097 | |
06217867 EK |
2098 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, |
2099 | (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { | |
2100 | return 0; | |
2101 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2102 | |
0f113f3e | 2103 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
06217867 EK |
2104 | PACKET responder_id_list, exts; |
2105 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) | |
2106 | return 0; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 2109 | OCSP_RESPID *id; |
06217867 EK |
2110 | PACKET responder_id; |
2111 | const unsigned char *id_data; | |
9ceb2426 | 2112 | |
06217867 EK |
2113 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, |
2114 | &responder_id) | |
2115 | || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { | |
2116 | return 0; | |
9ceb2426 | 2117 | } |
06217867 EK |
2118 | |
2119 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL | |
2120 | && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = | |
2121 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
2122 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2123 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2124 | } |
06217867 EK |
2125 | |
2126 | id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); | |
2127 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, | |
2128 | PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); | |
2129 | if (id == NULL) | |
2130 | return 0; | |
2131 | ||
2132 | if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { | |
0f113f3e | 2133 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
0f113f3e MC |
2134 | return 0; |
2135 | } | |
06217867 | 2136 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2137 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { |
2138 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
2139 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2140 | return 0; | |
2141 | } | |
2142 | } | |
4817504d | 2143 | |
0f113f3e | 2144 | /* Read in request_extensions */ |
06217867 EK |
2145 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) |
2146 | return 0; | |
2147 | ||
2148 | if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { | |
2149 | ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); | |
222561fe RS |
2150 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, |
2151 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
0f113f3e | 2152 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = |
06217867 EK |
2153 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, |
2154 | PACKET_remaining(&exts)); | |
2155 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL | |
2156 | || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { | |
2157 | return 0; | |
2158 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2159 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2160 | /* |
2161 | * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. | |
2162 | */ | |
06217867 | 2163 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 2164 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
06217867 | 2165 | } |
0f113f3e | 2166 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2167 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
22e3dcb7 | 2168 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { |
9ceb2426 MC |
2169 | unsigned int hbtype; |
2170 | ||
06217867 EK |
2171 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) |
2172 | || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { | |
9ceb2426 MC |
2173 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2174 | return 0; | |
2175 | } | |
2176 | switch (hbtype) { | |
0f113f3e | 2177 | case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ |
22e3dcb7 | 2178 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
0f113f3e MC |
2179 | break; |
2180 | case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ | |
22e3dcb7 RS |
2181 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
2182 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2183 | break; |
2184 | default: | |
2185 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2186 | return 0; | |
2187 | } | |
2188 | } | |
e481f9b9 MC |
2189 | #endif |
2190 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
0f113f3e MC |
2191 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
2192 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && | |
2193 | s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
50e735f9 MC |
2194 | /*- |
2195 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
2196 | * renegotiation. | |
2197 | * | |
2198 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we | |
2199 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on | |
2200 | * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when | |
2201 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
2202 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing | |
2203 | * anything like that, but this might change). | |
2204 | * | |
2205 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake | |
2206 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > | |
2207 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen | |
2208 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
2209 | * Finished message could have been computed.) | |
2210 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2211 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
2212 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2213 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
2214 | |
2215 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && | |
06217867 EK |
2216 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { |
2217 | if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2218 | return 0; |
e481f9b9 | 2219 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
2220 | /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ |
2221 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
e481f9b9 | 2222 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2223 | } |
5e3ff62c | 2224 | |
0f113f3e | 2225 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ |
e481f9b9 | 2226 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
0f113f3e MC |
2227 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) |
2228 | && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { | |
06217867 | 2229 | if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2230 | return 0; |
2231 | } | |
e481f9b9 MC |
2232 | #endif |
2233 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac | |
0f113f3e MC |
2234 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) |
2235 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
e481f9b9 | 2236 | #endif |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2237 | /* |
2238 | * Note: extended master secret extension handled in | |
2239 | * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() | |
2240 | */ | |
2241 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2242 | /* |
2243 | * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a | |
2244 | * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom | |
2245 | * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the | |
2246 | * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate | |
2247 | * ServerHello may be later returned. | |
2248 | */ | |
2249 | else if (!s->hit) { | |
06217867 EK |
2250 | if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), |
2251 | PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2252 | return 0; |
2253 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2254 | } |
6f017a8f | 2255 | |
06217867 EK |
2256 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
2257 | /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ | |
2258 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2259 | return 0; | |
2260 | } | |
54e3ad00 | 2261 | |
0f113f3e | 2262 | ri_check: |
ed3883d2 | 2263 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2264 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
2265 | ||
2266 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && | |
2267 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
2268 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2269 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
2270 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
2271 | return 0; | |
2272 | } | |
2273 | ||
06217867 EK |
2274 | /* |
2275 | * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. | |
2276 | * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. | |
2277 | * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must | |
2278 | * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. | |
2279 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2280 | return 1; |
2281 | } | |
2282 | ||
9ceb2426 | 2283 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e MC |
2284 | { |
2285 | int al = -1; | |
2286 | custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); | |
9ceb2426 | 2287 | if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2288 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
2289 | return 0; | |
2290 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2291 | if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { |
2292 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
2293 | return 0; | |
2294 | } | |
2295 | return 1; | |
2296 | } | |
2297 | ||
e481f9b9 | 2298 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
2299 | /* |
2300 | * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No | |
2301 | * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly | |
2302 | * fill the length of the block. | |
2303 | */ | |
50932c4a | 2304 | static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2305 | { |
50932c4a | 2306 | unsigned int len; |
0f113f3e | 2307 | |
50932c4a MC |
2308 | while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
2309 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len) | |
2310 | || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len)) | |
0f113f3e | 2311 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2312 | } |
2313 | ||
50932c4a | 2314 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2315 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2316 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2317 | |
50932c4a | 2318 | static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
0f113f3e | 2319 | { |
50932c4a | 2320 | unsigned int length, type, size; |
0f113f3e MC |
2321 | int tlsext_servername = 0; |
2322 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
2323 | ||
e481f9b9 | 2324 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e | 2325 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
e481f9b9 | 2326 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
2327 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
2328 | ||
b548a1f1 RS |
2329 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); |
2330 | s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
e481f9b9 | 2331 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
22e3dcb7 RS |
2332 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
2333 | SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); | |
e481f9b9 | 2334 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2335 | |
e481f9b9 | 2336 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac |
0f113f3e | 2337 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; |
e481f9b9 | 2338 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2339 | |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2340 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; |
2341 | ||
50932c4a | 2342 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2343 | goto ri_check; |
2344 | ||
50932c4a | 2345 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2346 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2347 | return 0; | |
2348 | } | |
2349 | ||
aa474d1f EK |
2350 | if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) { |
2351 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2352 | return 0; | |
2353 | } | |
2354 | ||
50932c4a | 2355 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { |
b6981744 | 2356 | const unsigned char *data; |
50932c4a | 2357 | PACKET spkt; |
0f113f3e | 2358 | |
50932c4a MC |
2359 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) |
2360 | || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2361 | goto ri_check; |
2362 | ||
2363 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | |
2364 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
2365 | ||
2366 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
50932c4a | 2367 | if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2368 | return 0; |
2369 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
2370 | } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
2371 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
2372 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { | |
2373 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
2374 | return 0; | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | tlsext_servername = 1; | |
2377 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2379 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { |
50932c4a MC |
2380 | unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; |
2381 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) | |
2382 | || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2383 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2384 | return 0; | |
2385 | } | |
2386 | if (!s->hit) { | |
2387 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | |
b548a1f1 | 2388 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
0f113f3e MC |
2389 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = |
2390 | OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { | |
2391 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2392 | return 0; | |
2393 | } | |
2394 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = | |
2395 | ecpointformatlist_length; | |
50932c4a MC |
2396 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, |
2397 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
2398 | ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
2399 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2400 | return 0; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | ||
0f113f3e | 2403 | } |
0f113f3e | 2404 | } |
e481f9b9 | 2405 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2406 | |
2407 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
2408 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
2409 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, | |
2410 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) | |
2411 | { | |
2412 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2413 | return 0; | |
2414 | } | |
2415 | if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) { | |
2416 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
2417 | return 0; | |
2418 | } | |
2419 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
2420 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2421 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { |
2422 | /* | |
2423 | * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status | |
2424 | * request message. | |
2425 | */ | |
2426 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { | |
2427 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
2428 | return 0; | |
2429 | } | |
2430 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ | |
2431 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
2432 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2433 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
2434 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
2435 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { | |
2436 | unsigned char *selected; | |
2437 | unsigned char selected_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2438 | /* We must have requested it. */ |
2439 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { | |
2440 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
2441 | return 0; | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | /* The data must be valid */ | |
50932c4a | 2444 | if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2445 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2446 | return 0; | |
2447 | } | |
2448 | if (s-> | |
2449 | ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, | |
2450 | size, | |
2451 | s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != | |
2452 | SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
2453 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2454 | return 0; | |
2455 | } | |
2456 | s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); | |
a71edf3b | 2457 | if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2458 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2459 | return 0; | |
2460 | } | |
2461 | memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); | |
2462 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; | |
2463 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
2464 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2465 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
2466 | |
2467 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { | |
2468 | unsigned len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2469 | /* We must have requested it. */ |
2470 | if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { | |
2471 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
2472 | return 0; | |
2473 | } | |
50e735f9 MC |
2474 | /*- |
2475 | * The extension data consists of: | |
2476 | * uint16 list_length | |
2477 | * uint8 proto_length; | |
2478 | * uint8 proto[proto_length]; | |
2479 | */ | |
50932c4a MC |
2480 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) |
2481 | || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len | |
2482 | || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) | |
2483 | || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2484 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2485 | return 0; | |
2486 | } | |
b548a1f1 | 2487 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); |
0f113f3e | 2488 | s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); |
a71edf3b | 2489 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2490 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2491 | return 0; | |
2492 | } | |
50932c4a MC |
2493 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { |
2494 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2495 | return 0; | |
2496 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2497 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; |
2498 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2499 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
22e3dcb7 | 2500 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { |
50932c4a MC |
2501 | unsigned int hbtype; |
2502 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) { | |
2503 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2504 | return 0; | |
2505 | } | |
2506 | switch (hbtype) { | |
0f113f3e | 2507 | case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ |
22e3dcb7 | 2508 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
0f113f3e MC |
2509 | break; |
2510 | case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ | |
22e3dcb7 RS |
2511 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
2512 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2513 | break; |
2514 | default: | |
2515 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2516 | return 0; | |
2517 | } | |
2518 | } | |
e481f9b9 MC |
2519 | #endif |
2520 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
0f113f3e | 2521 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { |
50932c4a | 2522 | if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2523 | return 0; |
2524 | } | |
e481f9b9 MC |
2525 | #endif |
2526 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac | |
0f113f3e MC |
2527 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { |
2528 | /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ | |
2529 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD | |
2530 | && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) | |
2531 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
2532 | } | |
e481f9b9 | 2533 | #endif |
ddc06b35 | 2534 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { |
e7f0d921 | 2535 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; |
ddc06b35 DSH |
2536 | if (!s->hit) |
2537 | s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; | |
2538 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2539 | /* |
2540 | * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a | |
2541 | * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback | |
2542 | */ | |
2543 | else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) | |
2544 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2545 | } |
2546 | ||
50932c4a | 2547 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2548 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
2549 | return 0; | |
2550 | } | |
2551 | ||
2552 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { | |
2553 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) { | |
2554 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
7644a9ae | 2555 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
0f113f3e MC |
2556 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { |
2557 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
2558 | return 0; | |
2559 | } | |
2560 | } else { | |
2561 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2562 | return 0; | |
2563 | } | |
2564 | } | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2567 | ri_check: |
2568 | ||
2569 | /* | |
2570 | * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid | |
2571 | * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello | |
2572 | * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. | |
2573 | * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which | |
2574 | * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on | |
2575 | * initial connect only. | |
2576 | */ | |
2577 | if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) | |
2578 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
2579 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2580 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
2581 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
2582 | return 0; | |
2583 | } | |
2584 | ||
e7f0d921 DSH |
2585 | if (s->hit) { |
2586 | /* | |
2587 | * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with | |
2588 | * original session. | |
2589 | */ | |
2590 | if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != | |
2591 | !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { | |
2592 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2593 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); | |
2594 | return 0; | |
2595 | } | |
2596 | } | |
2597 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2598 | return 1; |
2599 | } | |
b2172f4f | 2600 | |
36ca4ba6 | 2601 | int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
2602 | { |
2603 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2604 | return 1; |
2605 | } | |
36ca4ba6 BM |
2606 | |
2607 | int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2608 | { |
2609 | return 1; | |
2610 | } | |
36ca4ba6 | 2611 | |
2daceb03 | 2612 | static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
2613 | { |
2614 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
2615 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
2616 | ||
e481f9b9 | 2617 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
2618 | /* |
2619 | * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely | |
2620 | * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | |
2621 | */ | |
2622 | /* | |
2623 | * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely | |
2624 | * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | |
2625 | */ | |
e481f9b9 | 2626 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
2627 | |
2628 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2629 | ret = | |
2630 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2631 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2632 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
2633 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2634 | ret = | |
2635 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2636 | s-> | |
2637 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2638 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2639 | switch (ret) { |
2640 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2641 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2642 | return -1; | |
2643 | ||
2644 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
2645 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
2646 | return 1; | |
2647 | ||
2648 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
2649 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
2650 | default: | |
2651 | return 1; | |
2652 | } | |
2653 | } | |
d376e57d | 2654 | /* Initialise digests to default values */ |
a0f63828 | 2655 | void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) |
d376e57d DSH |
2656 | { |
2657 | const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; | |
2658 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
152fbc28 | 2659 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); |
d376e57d DSH |
2660 | #endif |
2661 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
d18d31a1 | 2662 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
152fbc28 | 2663 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); |
d18d31a1 | 2664 | else |
152fbc28 | 2665 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX); |
d18d31a1 | 2666 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]; |
d376e57d DSH |
2667 | #endif |
2668 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
152fbc28 | 2669 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); |
d376e57d | 2670 | #endif |
e44380a9 | 2671 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
152fbc28 DSH |
2672 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX); |
2673 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX); | |
2674 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX); | |
e44380a9 | 2675 | #endif |
d376e57d | 2676 | } |
f1fd4544 | 2677 | |
e469af8d | 2678 | int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
2679 | { |
2680 | int al; | |
2681 | size_t i; | |
2682 | /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ | |
b548a1f1 RS |
2683 | OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); |
2684 | s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
2685 | s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2686 | /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ |
2687 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
d376e57d | 2688 | s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; |
6383d316 | 2689 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2690 | } |
2691 | ||
2692 | /* If sigalgs received process it. */ | |
76106e60 | 2693 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2694 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { |
2695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2696 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2697 | goto err; | |
2698 | } | |
2699 | /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ | |
2700 | if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { | |
2701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, | |
2702 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); | |
2703 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2704 | goto err; | |
2705 | } | |
d376e57d DSH |
2706 | } else { |
2707 | ssl_set_default_md(s); | |
2708 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2709 | return 1; |
2710 | err: | |
2711 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2712 | return 0; | |
2713 | } | |
e469af8d | 2714 | |
2daceb03 | 2715 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
2716 | { |
2717 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
4c9b0a03 | 2718 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
2719 | |
2720 | /* | |
2721 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
2722 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
2723 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
2724 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
2725 | */ | |
2726 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { | |
2727 | int r; | |
2728 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey; | |
2729 | certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
2730 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ | |
2731 | if (certpkey == NULL) { | |
2732 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
2733 | return 1; | |
2734 | } | |
2735 | /* | |
2736 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
2737 | * et al can pick it up. | |
2738 | */ | |
2739 | s->cert->key = certpkey; | |
2740 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | |
2741 | switch (r) { | |
2742 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
2743 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
2744 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
2745 | break; | |
2746 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
2747 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
2748 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) | |
2749 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
2750 | else | |
2751 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
2752 | break; | |
2753 | /* something bad happened */ | |
2754 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2755 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
2756 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2757 | goto err; | |
2758 | } | |
2759 | } else | |
2760 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
2daceb03 BL |
2761 | |
2762 | err: | |
0f113f3e MC |
2763 | switch (ret) { |
2764 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2765 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2766 | return -1; | |
2767 | ||
2768 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
2769 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
2770 | return 1; | |
2771 | ||
2772 | default: | |
2773 | return 1; | |
2774 | } | |
2775 | } | |
2daceb03 | 2776 | |
36ca4ba6 | 2777 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
2778 | { |
2779 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
2780 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
2781 | ||
e481f9b9 | 2782 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e MC |
2783 | /* |
2784 | * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher | |
2785 | * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it | |
2786 | * must contain uncompressed. | |
2787 | */ | |
2788 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2789 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2790 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
2791 | && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) | |
2792 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
2793 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) | |
ce0c1f2b | 2794 | && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2795 | /* we are using an ECC cipher */ |
2796 | size_t i; | |
2797 | unsigned char *list; | |
2798 | int found_uncompressed = 0; | |
2799 | list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
2800 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { | |
2801 | if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { | |
2802 | found_uncompressed = 1; | |
2803 | break; | |
2804 | } | |
2805 | } | |
2806 | if (!found_uncompressed) { | |
2807 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
2808 | SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); | |
2809 | return -1; | |
2810 | } | |
2811 | } | |
2812 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
e481f9b9 | 2813 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2814 | |
2815 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2816 | ret = | |
2817 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2818 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2819 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
2820 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2821 | ret = | |
2822 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2823 | s-> | |
2824 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2825 | ||
b1931d43 MC |
2826 | /* |
2827 | * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event | |
2828 | * that we don't receive a status message | |
2829 | */ | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2830 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
2831 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; | |
2832 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2833 | |
2834 | switch (ret) { | |
2835 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2836 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2837 | return -1; | |
2838 | ||
2839 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
2840 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
2841 | return 1; | |
2842 | ||
2843 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
2844 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
2845 | default: | |
2846 | return 1; | |
2847 | } | |
2848 | } | |
761772d7 | 2849 | |
50932c4a | 2850 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e MC |
2851 | { |
2852 | int al = -1; | |
2853 | if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) | |
2854 | return 1; | |
50932c4a | 2855 | if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2856 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
2857 | return 0; | |
2858 | } | |
2859 | ||
2860 | if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { | |
2861 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
2862 | return 0; | |
2863 | } | |
2864 | return 1; | |
09e4e4b9 DSH |
2865 | } |
2866 | ||
1d97c843 TH |
2867 | /*- |
2868 | * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the | |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2869 | * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions |
2870 | * need to be handled at the same time. | |
2871 | * | |
2872 | * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master | |
2873 | * secret. | |
c519e89f | 2874 | * |
b3e2272c EK |
2875 | * session_id: ClientHello session ID. |
2876 | * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) | |
c519e89f BM |
2877 | * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
2878 | * point to the resulting session. | |
2879 | * | |
2880 | * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key | |
2881 | * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will | |
2882 | * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. | |
2883 | * | |
2884 | * Returns: | |
2885 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. | |
2886 | * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). | |
2887 | * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports | |
2888 | * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. | |
2889 | * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but | |
2890 | * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. | |
2891 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. | |
2892 | * | |
2893 | * Side effects: | |
2894 | * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue | |
2895 | * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support | |
2896 | * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have | |
2897 | * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if | |
2898 | * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. | |
2899 | * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. | |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2900 | * |
2901 | * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present. | |
2902 | * | |
6434abbf | 2903 | */ |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2904 | int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, |
2905 | const PACKET *session_id, | |
2906 | SSL_SESSION **ret) | |
0f113f3e | 2907 | { |
9ceb2426 | 2908 | unsigned int i; |
b3e2272c | 2909 | PACKET local_ext = *ext; |
9ceb2426 | 2910 | int retv = -1; |
0f113f3e | 2911 | |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2912 | int have_ticket = 0; |
2913 | int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s); | |
2914 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2915 | *ret = NULL; |
2916 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
e7f0d921 | 2917 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; |
0f113f3e MC |
2918 | |
2919 | /* | |
2920 | * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful | |
2921 | * resumption. | |
2922 | */ | |
9ceb2426 | 2923 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)) |
0f113f3e | 2924 | return 0; |
9ceb2426 | 2925 | |
b3e2272c | 2926 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) { |
9ceb2426 MC |
2927 | retv = 0; |
2928 | goto end; | |
2929 | } | |
b3e2272c | 2930 | while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) { |
9ceb2426 MC |
2931 | unsigned int type, size; |
2932 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
2933 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) |
2934 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { | |
9ceb2426 MC |
2935 | /* Shouldn't ever happen */ |
2936 | retv = -1; | |
2937 | goto end; | |
2938 | } | |
b3e2272c | 2939 | if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) { |
9ceb2426 MC |
2940 | retv = 0; |
2941 | goto end; | |
2942 | } | |
e7f0d921 | 2943 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) { |
0f113f3e | 2944 | int r; |
b6981744 | 2945 | const unsigned char *etick; |
9ceb2426 | 2946 | |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2947 | /* Duplicate extension */ |
2948 | if (have_ticket != 0) { | |
2949 | retv = -1; | |
2950 | goto end; | |
2951 | } | |
2952 | have_ticket = 1; | |
2953 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2954 | if (size == 0) { |
2955 | /* | |
2956 | * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have | |
2957 | * one. | |
2958 | */ | |
2959 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
9ceb2426 | 2960 | retv = 1; |
e7f0d921 | 2961 | continue; |
0f113f3e MC |
2962 | } |
2963 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { | |
2964 | /* | |
2965 | * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than | |
2966 | * generating the session from ticket now, trigger | |
2967 | * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to | |
2968 | * calculate the master secret later. | |
2969 | */ | |
9ceb2426 | 2970 | retv = 2; |
e7f0d921 | 2971 | continue; |
9ceb2426 | 2972 | } |
b3e2272c | 2973 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) { |
9ceb2426 MC |
2974 | /* Shouldn't ever happen */ |
2975 | retv = -1; | |
2976 | goto end; | |
0f113f3e | 2977 | } |
b3e2272c EK |
2978 | r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id), |
2979 | PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret); | |
0f113f3e MC |
2980 | switch (r) { |
2981 | case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ | |
2982 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
9ceb2426 MC |
2983 | retv = 2; |
2984 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 2985 | case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
2986 | retv = r; |
2987 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2988 | case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ |
2989 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
9ceb2426 MC |
2990 | retv = 3; |
2991 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 2992 | default: /* fatal error */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
2993 | retv = -1; |
2994 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 2995 | } |
e7f0d921 | 2996 | continue; |
c83eda8c | 2997 | } else { |
e7f0d921 DSH |
2998 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) |
2999 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; | |
b3e2272c | 3000 | if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) { |
c83eda8c MC |
3001 | retv = -1; |
3002 | goto end; | |
3003 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3004 | } |
0f113f3e | 3005 | } |
e7f0d921 DSH |
3006 | if (have_ticket == 0) |
3007 | retv = 0; | |
9ceb2426 | 3008 | end: |
9ceb2426 | 3009 | return retv; |
0f113f3e | 3010 | } |
6434abbf | 3011 | |
1d97c843 TH |
3012 | /*- |
3013 | * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. | |
c519e89f BM |
3014 | * |
3015 | * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. | |
3016 | * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. | |
3017 | * sess_id: points at the session ID. | |
3018 | * sesslen: the length of the session ID. | |
3019 | * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
3020 | * point to the resulting session. | |
3021 | * | |
3022 | * Returns: | |
bf7c6817 | 3023 | * -2: fatal error, malloc failure. |
c519e89f BM |
3024 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
3025 | * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. | |
3026 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. | |
3027 | * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. | |
3028 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
3029 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, |
3030 | int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, | |
3031 | int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) | |
3032 | { | |
3033 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
3034 | unsigned char *sdec; | |
3035 | const unsigned char *p; | |
35b1a433 | 3036 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1; |
0f113f3e | 3037 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
bf7c6817 | 3038 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
846ec07d | 3039 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3040 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
3041 | /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ | |
3042 | if (eticklen < 48) | |
3043 | return 2; | |
3044 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ | |
bf7c6817 RL |
3045 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
3046 | if (hctx == NULL) | |
3047 | return -2; | |
846ec07d | 3048 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
35b1a433 MC |
3049 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
3050 | ret = -2; | |
3051 | goto err; | |
3052 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3053 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { |
3054 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; | |
3055 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, | |
846ec07d | 3056 | ctx, hctx, 0); |
0f113f3e | 3057 | if (rv < 0) |
35b1a433 MC |
3058 | goto err; |
3059 | if (rv == 0) { | |
3060 | ret = 2; | |
3061 | goto err; | |
3062 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3063 | if (rv == 2) |
3064 | renew_ticket = 1; | |
3065 | } else { | |
3066 | /* Check key name matches */ | |
35b1a433 MC |
3067 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { |
3068 | ret = 2; | |
3069 | goto err; | |
3070 | } | |
bf7c6817 | 3071 | if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
5f3d93e4 | 3072 | EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 |
846ec07d | 3073 | || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
5f3d93e4 MC |
3074 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, |
3075 | etick + 16) <= 0) { | |
3076 | goto err; | |
3077 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3078 | } |
3079 | /* | |
3080 | * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity | |
3081 | * checks on ticket. | |
3082 | */ | |
bf7c6817 | 3083 | mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); |
0f113f3e | 3084 | if (mlen < 0) { |
5f3d93e4 | 3085 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3086 | } |
3087 | eticklen -= mlen; | |
3088 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | |
bf7c6817 RL |
3089 | if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 |
3090 | || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
3091 | goto err; |
3092 | } | |
bf7c6817 | 3093 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
0f113f3e | 3094 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { |
846ec07d | 3095 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
3096 | return 2; |
3097 | } | |
3098 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | |
3099 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | |
846ec07d RL |
3100 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
3101 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); | |
0f113f3e | 3102 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); |
5f3d93e4 | 3103 | if (sdec == NULL |
846ec07d RL |
3104 | || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { |
3105 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3106 | return -1; |
3107 | } | |
846ec07d RL |
3108 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { |
3109 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3110 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); |
3111 | return 2; | |
3112 | } | |
3113 | slen += mlen; | |
846ec07d RL |
3114 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3115 | ctx = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3116 | p = sdec; |
3117 | ||
3118 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | |
3119 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
3120 | if (sess) { | |
3121 | /* | |
3122 | * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect | |
3123 | * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session | |
3124 | * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by | |
3125 | * standard. | |
3126 | */ | |
3127 | if (sesslen) | |
3128 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | |
3129 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | |
3130 | *psess = sess; | |
3131 | if (renew_ticket) | |
3132 | return 4; | |
3133 | else | |
3134 | return 3; | |
3135 | } | |
3136 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3137 | /* | |
3138 | * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. | |
3139 | */ | |
3140 | return 2; | |
5f3d93e4 | 3141 | err: |
846ec07d | 3142 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3143 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
35b1a433 | 3144 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3145 | } |
6434abbf | 3146 | |
6b7be581 DSH |
3147 | /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ |
3148 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3149 | typedef struct { |
3150 | int nid; | |
3151 | int id; | |
3152 | } tls12_lookup; | |
6b7be581 | 3153 | |
d97ed219 | 3154 | static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { |
0f113f3e MC |
3155 | {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, |
3156 | {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, | |
3157 | {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, | |
3158 | {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, | |
3159 | {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, | |
e44380a9 DB |
3160 | {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, |
3161 | {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, | |
3162 | {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, | |
3163 | {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, | |
6b7be581 DSH |
3164 | }; |
3165 | ||
d97ed219 | 3166 | static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { |
0f113f3e MC |
3167 | {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, |
3168 | {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, | |
e44380a9 DB |
3169 | {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}, |
3170 | {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001}, | |
3171 | {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256}, | |
3172 | {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512} | |
6b7be581 DSH |
3173 | }; |
3174 | ||
d97ed219 | 3175 | static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
0f113f3e MC |
3176 | { |
3177 | size_t i; | |
3178 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
3179 | if (table[i].nid == nid) | |
3180 | return table[i].id; | |
3181 | } | |
3182 | return -1; | |
3183 | } | |
e7f8ff43 | 3184 | |
d97ed219 | 3185 | static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
0f113f3e MC |
3186 | { |
3187 | size_t i; | |
3188 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
3189 | if ((table[i].id) == id) | |
3190 | return table[i].nid; | |
3191 | } | |
3192 | return NID_undef; | |
3193 | } | |
3194 | ||
3195 | int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, | |
3196 | const EVP_MD *md) | |
3197 | { | |
3198 | int sig_id, md_id; | |
3199 | if (!md) | |
3200 | return 0; | |
b6eb9827 | 3201 | md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3202 | if (md_id == -1) |
3203 | return 0; | |
3204 | sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); | |
3205 | if (sig_id == -1) | |
3206 | return 0; | |
3207 | p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; | |
3208 | p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; | |
3209 | return 1; | |
3210 | } | |
6b7be581 | 3211 | |
a2f9200f | 3212 | int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 3213 | { |
3aeb9348 | 3214 | return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3215 | } |
3216 | ||
3217 | typedef struct { | |
3218 | int nid; | |
3219 | int secbits; | |
7afd2312 | 3220 | int md_idx; |
e44380a9 | 3221 | unsigned char tlsext_hash; |
0f113f3e | 3222 | } tls12_hash_info; |
b362ccab DSH |
3223 | |
3224 | static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { | |
7afd2312 DSH |
3225 | {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, |
3226 | {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, | |
3227 | {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, | |
3228 | {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, | |
3229 | {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, | |
3230 | {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, | |
3231 | {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, | |
3232 | {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, | |
3233 | {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, | |
b362ccab | 3234 | }; |
a2f9200f | 3235 | |
b362ccab | 3236 | static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) |
0f113f3e | 3237 | { |
e44380a9 | 3238 | unsigned int i; |
0f113f3e MC |
3239 | if (hash_alg == 0) |
3240 | return NULL; | |
e44380a9 DB |
3241 | |
3242 | for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) | |
3243 | { | |
3244 | if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) | |
3245 | return tls12_md_info + i; | |
3246 | } | |
3247 | ||
3248 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3249 | } |
a2f9200f | 3250 | |
b362ccab | 3251 | const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) |
0f113f3e MC |
3252 | { |
3253 | const tls12_hash_info *inf; | |
3254 | if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode()) | |
3255 | return NULL; | |
3256 | inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg); | |
7afd2312 | 3257 | if (!inf) |
0f113f3e | 3258 | return NULL; |
7afd2312 | 3259 | return ssl_md(inf->md_idx); |
0f113f3e | 3260 | } |
a2f9200f | 3261 | |
4453cd8c | 3262 | static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) |
0f113f3e MC |
3263 | { |
3264 | switch (sig_alg) { | |
e481f9b9 | 3265 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0f113f3e MC |
3266 | case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
3267 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; | |
e481f9b9 MC |
3268 | #endif |
3269 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
0f113f3e MC |
3270 | case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: |
3271 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
e481f9b9 MC |
3272 | #endif |
3273 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
0f113f3e MC |
3274 | case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
3275 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
e481f9b9 | 3276 | #endif |
e44380a9 DB |
3277 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
3278 | case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: | |
3279 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
3280 | ||
3281 | case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256: | |
3282 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
3283 | ||
3284 | case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: | |
3285 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
3286 | # endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
3287 | } |
3288 | return -1; | |
3289 | } | |
4453cd8c DSH |
3290 | |
3291 | /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ | |
3292 | static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, | |
0f113f3e MC |
3293 | int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) |
3294 | { | |
330dcb09 | 3295 | int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; |
0f113f3e MC |
3296 | if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) |
3297 | return; | |
3298 | if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { | |
b6eb9827 | 3299 | hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3300 | if (phash_nid) |
3301 | *phash_nid = hash_nid; | |
3302 | } | |
3303 | if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { | |
b6eb9827 | 3304 | sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3305 | if (psign_nid) |
3306 | *psign_nid = sign_nid; | |
3307 | } | |
3308 | if (psignhash_nid) { | |
330dcb09 MC |
3309 | if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef |
3310 | || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, | |
3311 | sign_nid) <= 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
3312 | *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; |
3313 | } | |
3314 | } | |
3315 | ||
b362ccab DSH |
3316 | /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */ |
3317 | static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) | |
0f113f3e MC |
3318 | { |
3319 | /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */ | |
3320 | const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]); | |
7afd2312 | 3321 | if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
3322 | return 0; |
3323 | /* See if public key algorithm allowed */ | |
3324 | if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) | |
3325 | return 0; | |
3326 | /* Finally see if security callback allows it */ | |
3327 | return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp); | |
3328 | } | |
3329 | ||
3330 | /* | |
3331 | * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature | |
3332 | * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is | |
3333 | * disabled. | |
b362ccab DSH |
3334 | */ |
3335 | ||
90d9e49a | 3336 | void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) |
0f113f3e MC |
3337 | { |
3338 | const unsigned char *sigalgs; | |
3339 | size_t i, sigalgslen; | |
3340 | int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; | |
3341 | /* | |
3342 | * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for | |
3343 | * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep | |
3344 | * down calls to security callback only check if we have to. | |
3345 | */ | |
3346 | sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); | |
3347 | for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { | |
3348 | switch (sigalgs[1]) { | |
e481f9b9 | 3349 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0f113f3e MC |
3350 | case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
3351 | if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) | |
3352 | have_rsa = 1; | |
3353 | break; | |
e481f9b9 MC |
3354 | #endif |
3355 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
0f113f3e MC |
3356 | case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: |
3357 | if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) | |
3358 | have_dsa = 1; | |
3359 | break; | |
e481f9b9 MC |
3360 | #endif |
3361 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
0f113f3e MC |
3362 | case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
3363 | if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) | |
3364 | have_ecdsa = 1; | |
3365 | break; | |
e481f9b9 | 3366 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
3367 | } |
3368 | } | |
3369 | if (!have_rsa) | |
3370 | *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
3371 | if (!have_dsa) | |
3372 | *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS; | |
3373 | if (!have_ecdsa) | |
3374 | *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
3375 | } | |
b362ccab DSH |
3376 | |
3377 | size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, | |
0f113f3e MC |
3378 | const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen) |
3379 | { | |
3380 | unsigned char *tmpout = out; | |
3381 | size_t i; | |
3382 | for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) { | |
3383 | if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) { | |
3384 | *tmpout++ = psig[0]; | |
3385 | *tmpout++ = psig[1]; | |
3386 | } | |
3387 | } | |
3388 | return tmpout - out; | |
3389 | } | |
b362ccab | 3390 | |
4453cd8c | 3391 | /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ |
b362ccab | 3392 | static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, |
0f113f3e MC |
3393 | const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, |
3394 | const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen) | |
3395 | { | |
3396 | const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; | |
3397 | size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; | |
3398 | for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { | |
3399 | /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ | |
3400 | if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp)) | |
3401 | continue; | |
3402 | for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { | |
3403 | if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { | |
3404 | nmatch++; | |
3405 | if (shsig) { | |
3406 | shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; | |
3407 | shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; | |
3408 | tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, | |
3409 | &shsig->sign_nid, | |
3410 | &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); | |
3411 | shsig++; | |
3412 | } | |
3413 | break; | |
3414 | } | |
3415 | } | |
3416 | } | |
3417 | return nmatch; | |
3418 | } | |
4453cd8c DSH |
3419 | |
3420 | /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ | |
3421 | static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e MC |
3422 | { |
3423 | const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; | |
3424 | size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; | |
3425 | size_t nmatch; | |
3426 | TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; | |
3427 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
3428 | unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); | |
b548a1f1 RS |
3429 | |
3430 | OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); | |
3431 | c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
3432 | c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3433 | /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ |
3434 | if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { | |
3435 | conf = c->client_sigalgs; | |
3436 | conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; | |
3437 | } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { | |
3438 | conf = c->conf_sigalgs; | |
3439 | conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; | |
3440 | } else | |
3441 | conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); | |
3442 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { | |
3443 | pref = conf; | |
3444 | preflen = conflen; | |
76106e60 DSH |
3445 | allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; |
3446 | allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3447 | } else { |
3448 | allow = conf; | |
3449 | allowlen = conflen; | |
76106e60 DSH |
3450 | pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; |
3451 | preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3452 | } |
3453 | nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
34e3edbf DSH |
3454 | if (nmatch) { |
3455 | salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); | |
a71edf3b | 3456 | if (salgs == NULL) |
34e3edbf DSH |
3457 | return 0; |
3458 | nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
3459 | } else { | |
3460 | salgs = NULL; | |
3461 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3462 | c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; |
3463 | c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; | |
3464 | return 1; | |
3465 | } | |
4453cd8c | 3466 | |
6b7be581 DSH |
3467 | /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ |
3468 | ||
c800c27a | 3469 | int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) |
0f113f3e MC |
3470 | { |
3471 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
3472 | /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ | |
3473 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) | |
3474 | return 1; | |
3475 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3476 | if (!c) | |
3477 | return 0; | |
3478 | ||
76106e60 DSH |
3479 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); |
3480 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); | |
3481 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) | |
0f113f3e | 3482 | return 0; |
76106e60 DSH |
3483 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize; |
3484 | memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3485 | return 1; |
3486 | } | |
6b7be581 | 3487 | |
c800c27a | 3488 | int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
3489 | { |
3490 | int idx; | |
3491 | size_t i; | |
3492 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
d376e57d | 3493 | const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; |
f7d53487 | 3494 | uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; |
0f113f3e MC |
3495 | CERT *c = s->cert; |
3496 | TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; | |
3497 | if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) | |
3498 | return 0; | |
3499 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3500 | for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; |
3501 | i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { | |
3502 | idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); | |
d376e57d | 3503 | if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 3504 | md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); |
d376e57d | 3505 | pmd[idx] = md; |
6383d316 | 3506 | pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; |
0f113f3e | 3507 | if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { |
6383d316 | 3508 | pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; |
d376e57d | 3509 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md; |
0f113f3e MC |
3510 | } |
3511 | } | |
6b7be581 | 3512 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3513 | } |
3514 | /* | |
3515 | * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use | |
3516 | * the certificate for signing. | |
3517 | */ | |
3518 | if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { | |
3519 | /* | |
3520 | * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not | |
3521 | * supported it stays as NULL. | |
3522 | */ | |
e481f9b9 | 3523 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
d376e57d DSH |
3524 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL) |
3525 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); | |
e481f9b9 MC |
3526 | #endif |
3527 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
d376e57d DSH |
3528 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) { |
3529 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); | |
3530 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1(); | |
0f113f3e | 3531 | } |
e481f9b9 MC |
3532 | #endif |
3533 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
d376e57d DSH |
3534 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) |
3535 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); | |
e481f9b9 | 3536 | #endif |
e44380a9 DB |
3537 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
3538 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) | |
3539 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); | |
3540 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) | |
3541 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); | |
3542 | if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) | |
3543 | pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); | |
3544 | # endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
3545 | } |
3546 | return 1; | |
3547 | } | |
4817504d | 3548 | |
e7f8ff43 | 3549 | int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, |
0f113f3e MC |
3550 | int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, |
3551 | unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) | |
3552 | { | |
76106e60 | 3553 | const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; |
0f113f3e MC |
3554 | if (psig == NULL) |
3555 | return 0; | |
3556 | if (idx >= 0) { | |
3557 | idx <<= 1; | |
76106e60 | 3558 | if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen) |
0f113f3e MC |
3559 | return 0; |
3560 | psig += idx; | |
3561 | if (rhash) | |
3562 | *rhash = psig[0]; | |
3563 | if (rsig) | |
3564 | *rsig = psig[1]; | |
3565 | tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); | |
3566 | } | |
76106e60 | 3567 | return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2; |
0f113f3e | 3568 | } |
4453cd8c DSH |
3569 | |
3570 | int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
3571 | int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, |
3572 | unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) | |
3573 | { | |
3574 | TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; | |
3575 | if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) | |
3576 | return 0; | |
3577 | shsigalgs += idx; | |
3578 | if (phash) | |
3579 | *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; | |
3580 | if (psign) | |
3581 | *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; | |
3582 | if (psignhash) | |
3583 | *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; | |
3584 | if (rsig) | |
3585 | *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; | |
3586 | if (rhash) | |
3587 | *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; | |
3588 | return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; | |
3589 | } | |
3590 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3591 | #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) |
0f229cce | 3592 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3593 | typedef struct { |
3594 | size_t sigalgcnt; | |
3595 | int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; | |
3596 | } sig_cb_st; | |
0f229cce | 3597 | |
431f458d DSH |
3598 | static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str) |
3599 | { | |
3600 | if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) { | |
3601 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA; | |
3602 | } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) { | |
3603 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA; | |
3604 | } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) { | |
3605 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC; | |
3606 | } else { | |
3607 | *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str); | |
3608 | if (*phash == NID_undef) | |
3609 | *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str); | |
3610 | } | |
3611 | } | |
3612 | ||
0f229cce | 3613 | static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) |
0f113f3e MC |
3614 | { |
3615 | sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; | |
3616 | size_t i; | |
3617 | char etmp[20], *p; | |
431f458d | 3618 | int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef; |
2747d73c KR |
3619 | if (elem == NULL) |
3620 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3621 | if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) |
3622 | return 0; | |
3623 | if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) | |
3624 | return 0; | |
3625 | memcpy(etmp, elem, len); | |
3626 | etmp[len] = 0; | |
3627 | p = strchr(etmp, '+'); | |
3628 | if (!p) | |
3629 | return 0; | |
3630 | *p = 0; | |
3631 | p++; | |
3632 | if (!*p) | |
3633 | return 0; | |
3634 | ||
431f458d DSH |
3635 | get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp); |
3636 | get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p); | |
0f113f3e | 3637 | |
431f458d | 3638 | if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) |
0f113f3e MC |
3639 | return 0; |
3640 | ||
3641 | for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { | |
3642 | if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) | |
3643 | return 0; | |
3644 | } | |
3645 | sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; | |
3646 | sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; | |
3647 | return 1; | |
3648 | } | |
3649 | ||
3650 | /* | |
3651 | * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the | |
3652 | * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 | |
3653 | */ | |
3dbc46df | 3654 | int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) |
0f113f3e MC |
3655 | { |
3656 | sig_cb_st sig; | |
3657 | sig.sigalgcnt = 0; | |
3658 | if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) | |
3659 | return 0; | |
3660 | if (c == NULL) | |
3661 | return 1; | |
3662 | return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); | |
3663 | } | |
3664 | ||
3665 | int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, | |
3666 | int client) | |
3667 | { | |
3668 | unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; | |
3669 | int rhash, rsign; | |
3670 | size_t i; | |
3671 | if (salglen & 1) | |
3672 | return 0; | |
3673 | sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); | |
3674 | if (sigalgs == NULL) | |
3675 | return 0; | |
3676 | for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { | |
b6eb9827 DSH |
3677 | rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); |
3678 | rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3679 | |
3680 | if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) | |
3681 | goto err; | |
3682 | *sptr++ = rhash; | |
3683 | *sptr++ = rsign; | |
3684 | } | |
3685 | ||
3686 | if (client) { | |
b548a1f1 | 3687 | OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); |
0f113f3e MC |
3688 | c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; |
3689 | c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
3690 | } else { | |
b548a1f1 | 3691 | OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); |
0f113f3e MC |
3692 | c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; |
3693 | c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
3694 | } | |
3695 | ||
3696 | return 1; | |
3697 | ||
3698 | err: | |
3699 | OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); | |
3700 | return 0; | |
3701 | } | |
4453cd8c | 3702 | |
d61ff83b | 3703 | static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) |
0f113f3e MC |
3704 | { |
3705 | int sig_nid; | |
3706 | size_t i; | |
3707 | if (default_nid == -1) | |
3708 | return 1; | |
3709 | sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
3710 | if (default_nid) | |
3711 | return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; | |
3712 | for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) | |
3713 | if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) | |
3714 | return 1; | |
3715 | return 0; | |
3716 | } | |
3717 | ||
6dbb6219 DSH |
3718 | /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ |
3719 | static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
3720 | { |
3721 | X509_NAME *nm; | |
3722 | int i; | |
3723 | nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
3724 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { | |
3725 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) | |
3726 | return 1; | |
3727 | } | |
3728 | return 0; | |
3729 | } | |
3730 | ||
3731 | /* | |
3732 | * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by | |
3733 | * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before | |
3734 | * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before | |
3735 | * attempting to use them. | |
d61ff83b | 3736 | */ |
6dbb6219 DSH |
3737 | |
3738 | /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ | |
3739 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3740 | #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ |
0f113f3e | 3741 | (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) |
6dbb6219 | 3742 | /* Strict mode flags */ |
e481f9b9 | 3743 | #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ |
0f113f3e MC |
3744 | (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ |
3745 | | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) | |
6dbb6219 | 3746 | |
d61ff83b | 3747 | int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
3748 | int idx) |
3749 | { | |
3750 | int i; | |
3751 | int rv = 0; | |
3752 | int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; | |
3753 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; | |
3754 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
f7d53487 | 3755 | uint32_t *pvalid; |
0f113f3e MC |
3756 | unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); |
3757 | /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ | |
3758 | if (idx != -1) { | |
3759 | /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ | |
3760 | if (idx == -2) { | |
3761 | cpk = c->key; | |
3762 | idx = cpk - c->pkeys; | |
3763 | } else | |
3764 | cpk = c->pkeys + idx; | |
6383d316 | 3765 | pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3766 | x = cpk->x509; |
3767 | pk = cpk->privatekey; | |
3768 | chain = cpk->chain; | |
3769 | strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; | |
3770 | /* If no cert or key, forget it */ | |
3771 | if (!x || !pk) | |
3772 | goto end; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3773 | } else { |
3774 | if (!x || !pk) | |
d813f9eb | 3775 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
3776 | idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); |
3777 | if (idx == -1) | |
d813f9eb | 3778 | return 0; |
6383d316 DSH |
3779 | pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; |
3780 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3781 | if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) |
3782 | check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; | |
3783 | else | |
3784 | check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; | |
3785 | strict_mode = 1; | |
3786 | } | |
3787 | ||
3788 | if (suiteb_flags) { | |
3789 | int ok; | |
3790 | if (check_flags) | |
3791 | check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; | |
3792 | ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); | |
3793 | if (ok == X509_V_OK) | |
3794 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; | |
3795 | else if (!check_flags) | |
3796 | goto end; | |
3797 | } | |
3798 | ||
3799 | /* | |
3800 | * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature | |
3801 | * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. | |
3802 | */ | |
3803 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { | |
3804 | int default_nid; | |
3805 | unsigned char rsign = 0; | |
76106e60 | 3806 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) |
0f113f3e MC |
3807 | default_nid = 0; |
3808 | /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ | |
3809 | else { | |
3810 | switch (idx) { | |
3811 | case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: | |
3812 | case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: | |
0f113f3e MC |
3813 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; |
3814 | default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; | |
3815 | break; | |
3816 | ||
3817 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
0f113f3e MC |
3818 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; |
3819 | default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; | |
3820 | break; | |
3821 | ||
3822 | case SSL_PKEY_ECC: | |
3823 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; | |
3824 | default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; | |
3825 | break; | |
3826 | ||
e44380a9 DB |
3827 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: |
3828 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001; | |
3829 | default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001; | |
3830 | break; | |
3831 | ||
3832 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
3833 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256; | |
3834 | default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256; | |
3835 | break; | |
3836 | ||
3837 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
3838 | rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512; | |
3839 | default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512; | |
3840 | break; | |
3841 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3842 | default: |
3843 | default_nid = -1; | |
3844 | break; | |
3845 | } | |
3846 | } | |
3847 | /* | |
3848 | * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set | |
3849 | * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. | |
3850 | */ | |
3851 | if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { | |
3852 | size_t j; | |
3853 | const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; | |
3854 | for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { | |
3855 | if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) | |
3856 | break; | |
3857 | } | |
3858 | if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { | |
3859 | if (check_flags) | |
3860 | goto skip_sigs; | |
3861 | else | |
3862 | goto end; | |
3863 | } | |
3864 | } | |
3865 | /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ | |
3866 | if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { | |
3867 | if (!check_flags) | |
3868 | goto end; | |
3869 | } else | |
3870 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; | |
3871 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
3872 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
3873 | if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { | |
3874 | if (check_flags) { | |
3875 | rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
3876 | break; | |
3877 | } else | |
3878 | goto end; | |
3879 | } | |
3880 | } | |
3881 | } | |
3882 | /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ | |
3883 | else if (check_flags) | |
3884 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
3885 | skip_sigs: | |
3886 | /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ | |
3887 | if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) | |
3888 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; | |
3889 | else if (!check_flags) | |
3890 | goto end; | |
3891 | if (!s->server) | |
3892 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
3893 | /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ | |
3894 | else if (strict_mode) { | |
3895 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
3896 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
3897 | X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
3898 | if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { | |
3899 | if (check_flags) { | |
3900 | rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
3901 | break; | |
3902 | } else | |
3903 | goto end; | |
3904 | } | |
3905 | } | |
3906 | } | |
3907 | if (!s->server && strict_mode) { | |
3908 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; | |
3909 | int check_type = 0; | |
3aeb9348 | 3910 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3911 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
3912 | check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; | |
3913 | break; | |
3914 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
3915 | check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; | |
3916 | break; | |
3917 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: | |
3918 | check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; | |
3919 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3920 | } |
3921 | if (check_type) { | |
3922 | const unsigned char *ctypes; | |
3923 | int ctypelen; | |
3924 | if (c->ctypes) { | |
3925 | ctypes = c->ctypes; | |
3926 | ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; | |
3927 | } else { | |
3928 | ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; | |
3929 | ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; | |
3930 | } | |
3931 | for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { | |
3932 | if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { | |
3933 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
3934 | break; | |
3935 | } | |
3936 | } | |
3937 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) | |
3938 | goto end; | |
3939 | } else | |
3940 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
3941 | ||
3942 | ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; | |
3943 | ||
3944 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) | |
3945 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
3946 | ||
3947 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { | |
3948 | if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) | |
3949 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
3950 | } | |
3951 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { | |
3952 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
3953 | X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
3954 | if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { | |
3955 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
3956 | break; | |
3957 | } | |
3958 | } | |
3959 | } | |
3960 | if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
3961 | goto end; | |
3962 | } else | |
3963 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
3964 | ||
3965 | if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) | |
3966 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
3967 | ||
3968 | end: | |
3969 | ||
3970 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
6383d316 | 3971 | if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) |
0f113f3e | 3972 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; |
d376e57d | 3973 | else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
3974 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; |
3975 | } else | |
3976 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; | |
3977 | ||
3978 | /* | |
3979 | * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the | |
3980 | * chain is invalid. | |
3981 | */ | |
3982 | if (!check_flags) { | |
3983 | if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) | |
6383d316 | 3984 | *pvalid = rv; |
0f113f3e MC |
3985 | else { |
3986 | /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ | |
6383d316 | 3987 | *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; |
0f113f3e MC |
3988 | return 0; |
3989 | } | |
3990 | } | |
3991 | return rv; | |
3992 | } | |
d61ff83b DSH |
3993 | |
3994 | /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ | |
3995 | void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 3996 | { |
17dd65e6 MC |
3997 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); |
3998 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); | |
3999 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); | |
17dd65e6 | 4000 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); |
e44380a9 DB |
4001 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01); |
4002 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256); | |
4003 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512); | |
0f113f3e MC |
4004 | } |
4005 | ||
18d71588 DSH |
4006 | /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ |
4007 | int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
4008 | { |
4009 | return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); | |
4010 | } | |
d61ff83b | 4011 | |
09599b52 DSH |
4012 | |
4013 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
4014 | DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e MC |
4015 | { |
4016 | int dh_secbits = 80; | |
4017 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) | |
4018 | return DH_get_1024_160(); | |
adc5506a | 4019 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
4020 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) |
4021 | dh_secbits = 128; | |
4022 | else | |
4023 | dh_secbits = 80; | |
4024 | } else { | |
4025 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
4026 | dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey); | |
4027 | } | |
4028 | ||
4029 | if (dh_secbits >= 128) { | |
4030 | DH *dhp = DH_new(); | |
a71edf3b | 4031 | if (dhp == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
4032 | return NULL; |
4033 | dhp->g = BN_new(); | |
a71edf3b | 4034 | if (dhp->g != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
4035 | BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2); |
4036 | if (dh_secbits >= 192) | |
4037 | dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); | |
4038 | else | |
4039 | dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); | |
a71edf3b | 4040 | if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
4041 | DH_free(dhp); |
4042 | return NULL; | |
4043 | } | |
4044 | return dhp; | |
4045 | } | |
4046 | if (dh_secbits >= 112) | |
4047 | return DH_get_2048_224(); | |
4048 | return DH_get_1024_160(); | |
4049 | } | |
09599b52 | 4050 | #endif |
b362ccab DSH |
4051 | |
4052 | static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) | |
0f113f3e | 4053 | { |
72245f34 | 4054 | int secbits = -1; |
8382fd3a | 4055 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e | 4056 | if (pkey) { |
72245f34 DSH |
4057 | /* |
4058 | * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default | |
4059 | * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will | |
4060 | * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and | |
4061 | * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice. | |
4062 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 4063 | secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey); |
72245f34 | 4064 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
4065 | if (s) |
4066 | return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x); | |
4067 | else | |
4068 | return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x); | |
4069 | } | |
b362ccab DSH |
4070 | |
4071 | static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) | |
0f113f3e MC |
4072 | { |
4073 | /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ | |
4074 | int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid; | |
221c7b55 DSH |
4075 | /* Don't check signature if self signed */ |
4076 | if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) | |
4077 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
4078 | sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); |
4079 | if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) { | |
4080 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
4081 | if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid))) | |
4082 | secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4; | |
4083 | } | |
4084 | if (s) | |
4085 | return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x); | |
4086 | else | |
4087 | return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x); | |
4088 | } | |
b362ccab DSH |
4089 | |
4090 | int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee) | |
0f113f3e MC |
4091 | { |
4092 | if (vfy) | |
4093 | vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER; | |
4094 | if (is_ee) { | |
4095 | if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy)) | |
4096 | return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL; | |
4097 | } else { | |
4098 | if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy)) | |
4099 | return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL; | |
4100 | } | |
4101 | if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy)) | |
4102 | return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK; | |
4103 | return 1; | |
4104 | } | |
4105 | ||
4106 | /* | |
4107 | * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then | |
4108 | * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending | |
4109 | * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use | |
b362ccab DSH |
4110 | */ |
4111 | ||
4112 | int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy) | |
0f113f3e MC |
4113 | { |
4114 | int rv, start_idx, i; | |
4115 | if (x == NULL) { | |
4116 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
4117 | start_idx = 1; | |
4118 | } else | |
4119 | start_idx = 0; | |
4120 | ||
4121 | rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1); | |
4122 | if (rv != 1) | |
4123 | return rv; | |
4124 | ||
4125 | for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
4126 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
4127 | rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0); | |
4128 | if (rv != 1) | |
4129 | return rv; | |
4130 | } | |
4131 | return 1; | |
4132 | } |