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free null cleanup finale
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
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58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
0f113f3e 8 *
58964a49
RE		 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
0f113f3e 15 *
58964a49
RE		 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
0f113f3e 22 *
58964a49
RE		 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
0f113f3e 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
58964a49
RE		 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
0f113f3e 40 *
58964a49
RE		 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
0f113f3e 52 *
58964a49
RE		 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
0f113f3e 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
f1fd4544
BM		 67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 119# include <openssl/dh.h>
120# include <openssl/bn.h>
09599b52 121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
0f113f3e 124const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
0f113f3e
MC		 128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
0f113f3e
MC		 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151};
152
153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170};
171
172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190};
58964a49 191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
0f113f3e
MC		 193{
194 /*
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
197 */
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
199}
58964a49 200
6b691a5c 201int tls1_new(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 202{
203 if (!ssl3_new(s))
204 return (0);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 return (1);
207}
58964a49 208
6b691a5c 209void tls1_free(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 210{
12bf56c0 211#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
b548a1f1 212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
0f113f3e
MC		 213#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
214 ssl3_free(s);
215}
58964a49 216
6b691a5c 217void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 218{
219 ssl3_clear(s);
220 s->version = s->method->version;
221}
58964a49 222
525de5d3 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 224
0f113f3e
MC		 225typedef struct {
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
229} tls_curve_info;
230
231# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
233
234static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
263};
264
265static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
269};
270
271static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
300};
301
302static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
305};
2ea80354 306
525de5d3 307int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
0f113f3e
MC		 308{
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
311 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
312 return 0;
313 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
314}
525de5d3
DSH		 315
316int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 317{
318 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
319 switch (nid) {
320 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 return 1;
322 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
323 return 2;
324 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 return 3;
326 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
327 return 4;
328 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
329 return 5;
330 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
331 return 6;
332 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
333 return 7;
334 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
335 return 8;
336 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
337 return 9;
338 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
339 return 10;
340 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
341 return 11;
342 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
343 return 12;
344 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
345 return 13;
346 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
347 return 14;
348 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
349 return 15;
350 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
351 return 16;
352 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
353 return 17;
354 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
355 return 18;
356 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
357 return 19;
358 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 return 20;
360 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
361 return 21;
362 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
363 return 22;
364 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
365 return 23;
366 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
367 return 24;
368 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
369 return 25;
370 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
371 return 26;
372 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
373 return 27;
374 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
375 return 28;
376 default:
377 return 0;
378 }
379}
380
740580c2
EK		 381/*
382 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
383 * preferred list.
384 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
385 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
386 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
387 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
388 * lists in the first place.
389 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
390 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
391 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 392 */
740580c2 393static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
0f113f3e
MC		 394 const unsigned char **pcurves,
395 size_t *num_curves)
396{
397 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
398 if (sess) {
399 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
400 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
401 } else {
402 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
403 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
404 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
405 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
406 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
407 break;
408
409 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
410 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
411 pcurveslen = 2;
412 break;
413
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
416 pcurveslen = 2;
417 break;
418 default:
419 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
420 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
421 }
422 if (!*pcurves) {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
427
428 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
429 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
431 *num_curves = 0;
432 return 0;
433 } else {
434 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
435 return 1;
436 }
437}
b362ccab
DSH		 438
439/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
440static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 441{
442 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
443 if (curve[0])
444 return 1;
445 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
446 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
447 return 0;
448 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
449# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
450 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
451 return 0;
452# endif
453 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
454}
b362ccab 455
d18b716d
DSH		 456/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
457int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
0f113f3e
MC		 458{
459 const unsigned char *curves;
460 size_t num_curves, i;
461 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
462 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
463 return 0;
464 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
465 if (suiteb_flags) {
466 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (p[1])
468 return 0;
469 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
470 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
471 return 0;
472 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
473 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
474 return 0;
475 } else /* Should never happen */
476 return 0;
477 }
478 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
479 return 0;
480 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
481 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
482 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
483 }
484 return 0;
485}
d0595f17 486
1d97c843 487/*-
376e2ca3
EK		 488 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
489 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
490 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
491 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 492 */
a4352630 493int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
0f113f3e
MC		 494{
495 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
496 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
497 int k;
498 /* Can't do anything on client side */
499 if (s->server == 0)
500 return -1;
501 if (nmatch == -2) {
502 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
503 /*
504 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
505 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
506 */
507 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
509 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
511 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
512 /* Should never happen */
513 return NID_undef;
514 }
515 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
516 nmatch = 0;
517 }
518 /*
519 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
520 * but s->options is a long...
521 */
522 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
523 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
524 &num_supp))
525 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
526 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
527 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
528 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
529 &num_pref))
530 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
531 k = 0;
532 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
533 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
534 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
535 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
536 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
537 continue;
538 if (nmatch == k) {
539 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
540 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
541 }
542 k++;
543 }
544 }
545 }
546 if (nmatch == -1)
547 return k;
548 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
549 return NID_undef;
550}
d0595f17
DSH		 551
552int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
0f113f3e
MC		 553 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
554{
555 unsigned char *clist, *p;
556 size_t i;
557 /*
558 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
559 * ids < 32
560 */
561 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
562 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
563 if (!clist)
564 return 0;
565 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
566 unsigned long idmask;
567 int id;
568 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
569 idmask = 1L << id;
570 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
571 OPENSSL_free(clist);
572 return 0;
573 }
574 dup_list |= idmask;
575 s2n(id, p);
576 }
b548a1f1 577 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
0f113f3e
MC		 578 *pext = clist;
579 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
580 return 1;
581}
582
583# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
584
585typedef struct {
586 size_t nidcnt;
587 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
588} nid_cb_st;
d0595f17
DSH		 589
590static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 591{
592 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
593 size_t i;
594 int nid;
595 char etmp[20];
2747d73c
KR		 596 if (elem == NULL)
597 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 598 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
599 return 0;
600 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
601 return 0;
602 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
603 etmp[len] = 0;
604 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
608 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
609 if (nid == NID_undef)
610 return 0;
611 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
612 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
613 return 0;
614 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
615 return 1;
616}
617
d0595f17 618/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
0f113f3e
MC		 619int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
620 const char *str)
621{
622 nid_cb_st ncb;
623 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
624 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
625 return 0;
626 if (pext == NULL)
627 return 1;
628 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
629}
630
fd2b65ce
DSH		 631/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
632static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
0f113f3e
MC		 633 EC_KEY *ec)
634{
635 int is_prime, id;
636 const EC_GROUP *grp;
637 const EC_METHOD *meth;
638 if (!ec)
639 return 0;
640 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
641 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
642 if (!grp)
643 return 0;
644 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
645 if (!meth)
646 return 0;
647 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
648 is_prime = 1;
649 else
650 is_prime = 0;
651 /* Determine curve ID */
652 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
653 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
654 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
655 if (id) {
656 curve_id[0] = 0;
657 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
658 } else {
659 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
660 if (is_prime)
661 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
662 else
663 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
664 }
665 if (comp_id) {
666 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
667 return 0;
668 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
669 if (is_prime)
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
671 else
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
673 } else
674 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
675 }
676 return 1;
677}
678
fd2b65ce
DSH		 679/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
680static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 681 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
682{
683 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
684 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
685 int j;
686 /*
687 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
688 * supported (see RFC4492).
689 */
690 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
691 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
692 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
693 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
694 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
695 break;
696 }
697 if (i == num_formats)
698 return 0;
699 }
700 if (!curve_id)
701 return 1;
702 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
703 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
704 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
705 return 0;
b79d2410
MC		 706 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
707 /*
708 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
709 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
710 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
711 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
712 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
713 */
714 break;
715 }
0f113f3e
MC		 716 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
717 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
718 break;
719 }
720 if (i == num_curves)
721 return 0;
722 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
723 if (!s->server)
724 break;
725 }
726 return 1;
727}
d61ff83b 728
5087afa1 729static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
0f113f3e
MC		 730 size_t *num_formats)
731{
732 /*
733 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
734 */
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
736 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
737 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
738 } else {
739 *pformats = ecformats_default;
740 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
741 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
743 else
744 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
745 }
746}
747
748/*
749 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
750 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
d61ff83b 751 */
2ea80354 752static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 753{
754 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
755 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
756 int rv;
757 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
758 if (!pkey)
759 return 0;
760 /* If not EC nothing to do */
761 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
762 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
763 return 1;
764 }
765 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
766 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
767 if (!rv)
768 return 0;
769 /*
770 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
771 * curves extension.
772 */
773 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
774 if (!rv)
775 return 0;
776 /*
777 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
778 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
779 */
780 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
781 int check_md;
782 size_t i;
783 CERT *c = s->cert;
784 if (curve_id[0])
785 return 0;
786 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
787 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
789 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
790 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
791 else
792 return 0; /* Should never happen */
793 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
794 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
795 break;
796 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
797 return 0;
798 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
799 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
800 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
801 else
802 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
803 }
804 }
805 return rv;
806}
807
10bf4fc2 808# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
fd2b65ce 809/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 810int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
0f113f3e
MC		 811{
812 unsigned char curve_id[2];
813 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
814# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
815 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
816 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
817 return 1;
818# endif
819 /*
820 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
821 * curves permitted.
822 */
823 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
824 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
825 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
827 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
828 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
829 else
830 return 0;
831 curve_id[0] = 0;
832 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
833 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
834 return 0;
835 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
836 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
837 return 1;
838 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
839 else {
840 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
841 if (!ec)
842 return 0;
843 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
844 return 0;
845 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
846 return 1;
847 return 0;
848 }
849
850 }
851 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
852 /* Need a shared curve */
853 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
854 return 1;
855 else
856 return 0;
857 }
858 if (!ec) {
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
860 return 1;
861 else
862 return 0;
863 }
864 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
865 return 0;
d18b716d 866/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
0f113f3e
MC		 867# if 0
868 return 1;
869# else
870 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
871# endif
872}
10bf4fc2 873# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d0595f17 874
14536c8c
DSH		 875#else
876
877static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 878{
879 return 1;
880}
14536c8c 881
0f113f3e 882#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 883
ed3883d2 884#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88 885
0f113f3e
MC		 886/*
887 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
fc101f88
DSH		 888 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
889 */
890
0f113f3e
MC		 891# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
892# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
893# else
894# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
895# endif
896
897# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
898# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
899# else
900# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
901# endif
902
10bf4fc2
RS		 903# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
904# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
0f113f3e
MC		 905# else
906# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
907# endif
908
909# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
911 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
fc101f88 913
d97ed219 914static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
0f113f3e
MC		 917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
0f113f3e 919 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
fc101f88 920};
0f113f3e 921
10bf4fc2 922# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d97ed219 923static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 924 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
2ea80354 926};
0f113f3e 927# endif
b7bfe69b 928size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
0f113f3e
MC		 929{
930 /*
931 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
932 * preferences.
933 */
934# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
936 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
937 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
939
940 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
941 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
942 return 2;
943
944 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
945 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
946 return 2;
947 }
948# endif
949 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
950 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
951 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
952 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
953 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
954 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
955 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
956 } else {
957 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
958 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
959 }
960}
961
962/*
963 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
ec4a50b3
DSH		 964 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
965 */
966int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 967 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
968{
969 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
970 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
971 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
972 /* Should never happen */
973 if (sigalg == -1)
974 return -1;
975 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
976 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 return 0;
979 }
980# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
982 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
983 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
984 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
985 return 0;
986 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
988 return 0;
989 }
990 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
991 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 if (curve_id[0])
993 return 0;
994 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 return 0;
999 }
1000 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1001 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 } else
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1010 return 0;
1011# endif
1012
1013 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1014 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1015 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1016 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1017 break;
1018 }
1019 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1020 if (i == sent_sigslen
1021 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1022 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 return 0;
1025 }
1026 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1027 if (*pmd == NULL) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 return 0;
1030 }
1031 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1032 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1033 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1034 (void *)sig)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1036 return 0;
1037 }
1038 /*
1039 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1040 */
1041 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1042 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1043 return 1;
1044}
2ea80354 1045
0f113f3e
MC		 1046/*
1047 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1048 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1049 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1050 * settings.
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1051 */
1052void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1053{
1054 CERT *c = s->cert;
1055 c->mask_a = 0;
1056 c->mask_k = 0;
1057 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1058 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1059 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1060 else
1061 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1062 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1063 /*
1064 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1065 * algorithms.
1066 */
1067 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1069 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1073# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1074 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1077 }
1078# endif
1079# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1080 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1081 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1084 }
1085# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1086# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1087 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1088 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1089 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1090 }
1091# endif
1092 c->valid = 1;
1093}
fc101f88 1094
b362ccab 1095int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 1096{
1097 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1098 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1099 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1100 return 1;
1101 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1102}
b362ccab
DSH		 1103
1104static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1105{
1106 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1107 return 0;
1108 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1109}
ed3883d2 1110
0f113f3e
MC		 1111unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1112 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1113{
1114 int extdatalen = 0;
1115 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1116 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1117# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1118 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1119 int using_ecc = 0;
1120 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1121 int i;
1122 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1123 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1124
1125 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1126 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1127
1128 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1129 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1130 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1131 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1132 using_ecc = 1;
1133 break;
1134 }
1135 }
1136 }
1137# endif
ed3883d2 1138
0f113f3e 1139 ret += 2;
6434abbf 1140
0f113f3e
MC		 1141 if (ret >= limit)
1142 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
5a3d8eeb 1143
0f113f3e
MC		 1144 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1145 if (s->renegotiate) {
1146 int el;
5a3d8eeb 1147
0f113f3e
MC		 1148 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1150 return NULL;
1151 }
5a3d8eeb 1152
0f113f3e
MC		 1153 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1154 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1155
0f113f3e
MC		 1156 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1157 s2n(el, ret);
5a3d8eeb 1158
0f113f3e
MC		 1159 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1162 }
edc032b5 1163
0f113f3e
MC		 1164 ret += el;
1165 }
1166 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1167 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1168 goto done;
1169
1170 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1171 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1172 unsigned long size_str;
1173 long lenmax;
1174
50e735f9
MC		 1175 /*-
1176 * check for enough space.
1177 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1178 * 2 for servernamelist length
1179 * 1 for the hostname type
1180 * 2 for hostname length
1181 * + hostname length
1182 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1183
1184 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1185 || (size_str =
1186 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1187 return NULL;
1188
1189 /* extension type and length */
1190 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1191 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1192
1193 /* length of servername list */
1194 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1195
1196 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1197 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1198 s2n(size_str, ret);
1199 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1200 ret += size_str;
1201 }
1202# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1203 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1204 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1205 * Client Hello message */
1206
1207 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1208 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 return NULL;
1211 }
761772d7 1212
50e735f9
MC		 1213 /*-
1214 * check for enough space.
1215 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1216 * 1 for the srp user identity
1217 * + srp user identity length
1218 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1219 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1220 return NULL;
1221
1222 /* fill in the extension */
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1224 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1225 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1226 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1227 ret += login_len;
1228 }
1229# endif
1230
1231# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1232 if (using_ecc) {
1233 /*
1234 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1235 */
1236 long lenmax;
1237 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1238 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1239 size_t i;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1241
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1243
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1245 return NULL;
1246 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1247 return NULL;
1248 if (num_formats > 255) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 return NULL;
1251 }
4817504d 1252
0f113f3e
MC		 1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1254 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1255 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1256 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1257 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1258 ret += num_formats;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1262 */
1263 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1264 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1265 return NULL;
1266
1267 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1268 return NULL;
1269 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1270 return NULL;
1271 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 return NULL;
1274 }
ee2ffc27 1275
0f113f3e
MC		 1276 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1277 etmp = ret + 4;
1278 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1279 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1280 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1281 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1282 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1283 }
1284 }
01f2f18f 1285
0f113f3e
MC		 1286 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1287
1288 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1289 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1290 ret += curves_list_len;
1291 }
1292# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1293
1294 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1295 int ticklen;
1296 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1298 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1300 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1301 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1302 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1303 return NULL;
1304 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1306 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1307 } else
1308 ticklen = 0;
1309 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1311 goto skip_ext;
1312 /*
1313 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1314 * ticket
1315 */
1316 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1317 return NULL;
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1319 s2n(ticklen, ret);
1320 if (ticklen) {
1321 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1322 ret += ticklen;
1323 }
1324 }
1325 skip_ext:
1326
1327 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1328 size_t salglen;
1329 const unsigned char *salg;
1330 unsigned char *etmp;
1331 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1332 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1333 return NULL;
1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1335 etmp = ret;
1336 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1337 ret += 4;
1338 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1339 /* Fill in lengths */
1340 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1341 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1342 ret += salglen;
1343 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1344
1345 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1346 int i;
1347 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1348 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1349
1350 idlen = 0;
1351 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1354 if (itmp <= 0)
1355 return NULL;
1356 idlen += itmp + 2;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1357 }
1358
0f113f3e
MC		 1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1360 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1361 if (extlen < 0)
1362 return NULL;
1363 } else
1364 extlen = 0;
1365
1366 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1367 return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1369 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1370 return NULL;
1371 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1372 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1373 s2n(idlen, ret);
1374 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1375 /* save position of id len */
1376 unsigned char *q = ret;
1377 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1378 /* skip over id len */
1379 ret += 2;
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1381 /* write id len */
1382 s2n(itmp, q);
1383 }
1384 s2n(extlen, ret);
1385 if (extlen > 0)
1386 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1387 }
1388# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1389 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1390 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1391 return NULL;
1392 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1393 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1394 /*-
1395 * Set mode:
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1398 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1401 else
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1403# endif
1404
1405# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1407 /*
1408 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1409 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1410 */
1411 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 return NULL;
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1414 s2n(0, ret);
1415 }
1416# endif
1417
1418 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1420 return NULL;
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1425 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1426 }
1427# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1428 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1429 int el;
1430
69f68237
MC		 1431 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 return NULL;
1435 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1436
1437 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1438 return NULL;
1439
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1441 s2n(el, ret);
1442
1443 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 return NULL;
1446 }
1447 ret += el;
1448 }
1449# endif
1450 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1451 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1452 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1453 return NULL;
1454# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1456 s2n(0, ret);
1457# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1458 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1459 s2n(0, ret);
0f113f3e
MC		 1460
1461 /*
1462 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1463 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1464 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1465 * appear last.
1466 */
1467 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1468 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1469 /*
1470 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1471 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1472 * does not.
1473 */
1474 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1475 hlen -= 5;
1476 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1477 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1478 if (hlen >= 4)
1479 hlen -= 4;
1480 else
1481 hlen = 0;
1482
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1484 s2n(hlen, ret);
1485 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1486 ret += hlen;
1487 }
1488 }
5a3d8eeb 1489
0f113f3e 1490 done:
5a3d8eeb 1491
0f113f3e
MC		 1492 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1493 return orig;
5a3d8eeb 1494
0f113f3e
MC		 1495 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1496 return ret;
1497}
333f926d 1498
0f113f3e
MC		 1499unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1500 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1501{
1502 int extdatalen = 0;
1503 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1504 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1505# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1507# endif
1508# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1510 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1511 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1512 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1513 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1514# endif
1515
1516 ret += 2;
1517 if (ret >= limit)
1518 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1519
1520 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1521 int el;
1522
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 return NULL;
1526 }
333f926d 1527
0f113f3e
MC		 1528 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 return NULL;
333f926d 1530
0f113f3e
MC		 1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1532 s2n(el, ret);
333f926d 1533
0f113f3e
MC		 1534 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 return NULL;
1537 }
333f926d 1538
0f113f3e
MC		 1539 ret += el;
1540 }
1541
1542 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1543 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1544 goto done;
1545
1546 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1547 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1548 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1549 return NULL;
1550
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1552 s2n(0, ret);
1553 }
1554# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1555 if (using_ecc) {
1556 const unsigned char *plist;
1557 size_t plistlen;
1558 /*
1559 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1560 */
1561 long lenmax;
1562
1563 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564
1565 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1566 return NULL;
1567 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1568 return NULL;
1569 if (plistlen > 255) {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 return NULL;
1572 }
4817504d 1573
0f113f3e
MC		 1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1575 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1576 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1577 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1578 ret += plistlen;
1579
1580 }
1581 /*
1582 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1583 * extension
1584 */
1585# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1586
1587 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1589 return NULL;
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1591 s2n(0, ret);
1592 }
1593
1594 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1596 return NULL;
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1598 s2n(0, ret);
1599 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1600
1601# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1603 int el;
1604
69f68237 1605 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
61986d32 1606 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
69f68237
MC		 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 return NULL;
1609 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1610 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1611 return NULL;
1612
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1614 s2n(el, ret);
1615
1616 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 return NULL;
1619 }
1620 ret += el;
1621 }
1622# endif
1623
1624 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1625 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1626 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1627 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1628 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1629 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1630 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1631 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1632 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1633 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1634 };
1635 if (limit - ret < 36)
1636 return NULL;
1637 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1638 ret += 36;
1639
1640 }
1641# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1642 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1643 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1644 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1645 return NULL;
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1647 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1648 /*-
1649 * Set mode:
1650 * 1: peer may send requests
1651 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1652 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1653 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1655 else
1656 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1657
1658 }
1659# endif
1660
1661# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1662 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1663 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1664 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1665 const unsigned char *npa;
1666 unsigned int npalen;
1667 int r;
1668
1669 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1670 s->
1671 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1672 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1674 return NULL;
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1676 s2n(npalen, ret);
1677 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1678 ret += npalen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1680 }
1681 }
1682# endif
1683 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1684 return NULL;
1685# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1686 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1687 /*
1688 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1689 * for other cases too.
1690 */
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1693 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1694 else {
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1696 s2n(0, ret);
1697 }
1698 }
1699# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1700 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1702 s2n(0, ret);
1703 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1704
1705 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1706 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1707 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1708
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1710 return NULL;
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1712 s2n(3 + len, ret);
1713 s2n(1 + len, ret);
1714 *ret++ = len;
1715 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1716 ret += len;
1717 }
1718
1719 done:
1720
1721 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1722 return orig;
1723
1724 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1725 return ret;
1726}
a398f821 1727
0f113f3e
MC		 1728/*
1729 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1730 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1731 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1732 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1733 * success.
1734 */
6f017a8f 1735static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0f113f3e
MC		 1736 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1737{
1738 unsigned i;
1739 unsigned proto_len;
1740 const unsigned char *selected;
1741 unsigned char selected_len;
1742 int r;
1743
1744 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1745 return 0;
1746
1747 if (data_len < 2)
1748 goto parse_error;
1749
1750 /*
1751 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1752 * length-prefixed strings.
1753 */
1754 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1755 data_len -= 2;
1756 data += 2;
1757 if (data_len != i)
1758 goto parse_error;
1759
1760 if (data_len < 2)
1761 goto parse_error;
1762
1763 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1764 proto_len = data[i];
1765 i++;
1766
1767 if (proto_len == 0)
1768 goto parse_error;
1769
1770 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1771 goto parse_error;
1772
1773 i += proto_len;
1774 }
1775
1776 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1777 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1778 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
b548a1f1 1779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
0f113f3e
MC		 1780 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1781 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1782 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1783 return -1;
1784 }
1785 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1786 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1787 }
1788 return 0;
1789
1790 parse_error:
1791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1792 return -1;
1793}
6f017a8f 1794
0f113f3e 1795# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH		 1796/*-
1797 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
dece3209
RS		 1798 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1799 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1800 * SNI,
1801 * elliptic_curves
1802 * ec_point_formats
1803 *
1804 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1805 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1806 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1807 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1808 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1809static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1810 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1811{
1812 unsigned short type, size;
1813 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1814 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1815 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1816 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1817 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1818 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1819 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1820
1821 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1822 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1823 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1824 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1825 };
1826
1827 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1828 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1829 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1830 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1831 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1832 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1833 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1834 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1835 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1836 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1837 };
1838
1839 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1840 return;
1841 data += 2;
1842
1843 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1844 return;
1845 n2s(data, type);
1846 n2s(data, size);
1847
1848 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1849 return;
1850
1851 if (data + size > d + n)
1852 return;
1853 data += size;
1854
1855 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1856 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1857 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1858
1859 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1860 return;
1861 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1862 return;
1863 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1864 return;
1865 } else {
1866 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1867
1868 if (data + len != d + n)
1869 return;
1870 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1871 return;
1872 }
1873
1874 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
dece3209 1875}
0f113f3e
MC		 1876# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1877
1878static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1879 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1880{
1881 unsigned short type;
1882 unsigned short size;
1883 unsigned short len;
1884 unsigned char *data = *p;
1885 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1886
1887 s->servername_done = 0;
1888 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1889# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1890 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1891# endif
1892
b548a1f1
RS		 1893 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1894 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 1895# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1896 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1897 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1898# endif
1899
1900# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1901 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1902 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1903# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1904
1905 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
b548a1f1
RS		 1906 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1907 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 1908# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1909 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1910# endif
1911
1912# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
b548a1f1
RS		 1913 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1914 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 1915# endif
1916
1917 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1918
1919 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1920 goto ri_check;
1921 n2s(data, len);
1922
1923 if (data > (d + n - len))
1924 goto ri_check;
1925
1926 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1927 n2s(data, type);
1928 n2s(data, size);
1929
1930 if (data + size > (d + n))
1931 goto ri_check;
0f113f3e
MC		 1932 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1933 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1934 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1935 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1936 return 0;
1937 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1938 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1939 }
1d97c843
TH		 1940/*-
1941 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1942 *
1943 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1944 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1945 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1946 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1947 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
0f113f3e
MC		 1948 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1949 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1950 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1d97c843
TH		 1951 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1952 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1953 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1954 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1955 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
0f113f3e 1956 * the value of the Host: field.
1d97c843 1957 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
0f113f3e
MC		 1958 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1959 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1960 * extension.
1961 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1d97c843 1962 *
0f113f3e 1963 */
ed3883d2 1964
0f113f3e
MC		 1965 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1966 unsigned char *sdata;
1967 int servname_type;
1968 int dsize;
1969
1970 if (size < 2) {
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1972 return 0;
1973 }
1974 n2s(data, dsize);
1975 size -= 2;
1976 if (dsize > size) {
1977 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 return 0;
1979 }
1980
1981 sdata = data;
1982 while (dsize > 3) {
1983 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1984 n2s(sdata, len);
1985 dsize -= 3;
1986
1987 if (len > dsize) {
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1989 return 0;
1990 }
1991 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1992 switch (servname_type) {
1993 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1994 if (!s->hit) {
1995 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1996 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 return 0;
1998 }
1999 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2001 return 0;
2002 }
2003 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2004 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2009 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2010 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2011 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2012 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2013 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2014 return 0;
2015 }
2016 s->servername_done = 1;
761772d7 2017
0f113f3e
MC		 2018 } else
2019 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2020 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2021 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2022 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
b2284ed3 2023
0f113f3e 2024 break;
ee2ffc27 2025
0f113f3e
MC		 2026 default:
2027 break;
2028 }
6f31dd72 2029
0f113f3e
MC		 2030 dsize -= len;
2031 }
2032 if (dsize != 0) {
2033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 return 0;
2035 }
6f017a8f 2036
0f113f3e
MC		 2037 }
2038# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2039 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2040 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 return 0;
2043 }
2044 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 return 0;
2047 }
2048 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2049 return -1;
2050 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2051 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2052
2053 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 return 0;
2056 }
2057 }
2058# endif
2059
2060# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2061 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2062 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2063 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2064
2065 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2066 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2067 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 return 0;
2069 }
2070 if (!s->hit) {
b548a1f1
RS		 2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 2073 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2074 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2075 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2077 return 0;
2078 }
2079 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2080 ecpointformatlist_length;
2081 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2082 ecpointformatlist_length);
2083 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2084 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2085 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2086 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2087 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2088
2089 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2090 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2091 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2092 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 return 0;
2095 }
2096 if (!s->hit) {
2097 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2098 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 return 0;
2100 }
2101 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2102 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2103 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 return 0;
2106 }
2107 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2108 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2109 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2110 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2111 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2112 }
2113# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2115 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2116 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2117 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2118 {
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 return 0;
2121 }
2122 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2123 int dsize;
2124 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 return 0;
2127 }
2128 n2s(data, dsize);
2129 size -= 2;
2130 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2132 return 0;
2133 }
2134 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 return 0;
2137 }
2138 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2139
2140 if (size < 5) {
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 return 0;
2143 }
2144
2145 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2146 size--;
2147 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2148 const unsigned char *sdata;
2149 int dsize;
2150 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2151 n2s(data, dsize);
2152 size -= 2;
2153 if (dsize > size) {
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 return 0;
2156 }
2157 while (dsize > 0) {
2158 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2159 int idsize;
2160 if (dsize < 4) {
2161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 return 0;
2163 }
2164 n2s(data, idsize);
2165 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2166 size -= 2 + idsize;
2167 if (dsize < 0) {
2168 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 return 0;
2170 }
2171 sdata = data;
2172 data += idsize;
2173 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2174 if (!id) {
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 return 0;
2177 }
2178 if (data != sdata) {
2179 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 return 0;
2182 }
2183 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2184 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2185 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2188 return 0;
2189 }
2190 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2191 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2192 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 return 0;
2194 }
2195 }
4817504d 2196
0f113f3e
MC		 2197 /* Read in request_extensions */
2198 if (size < 2) {
2199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 return 0;
2201 }
2202 n2s(data, dsize);
2203 size -= 2;
2204 if (dsize != size) {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 return 0;
2207 }
2208 sdata = data;
2209 if (dsize > 0) {
222561fe
RS		 2210 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2211 X509_EXTENSION_free);
0f113f3e
MC		 2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2213 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2214 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218 }
2219 }
2220 /*
2221 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2222 */
2223 else
2224 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2225 }
2226# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2228 switch (data[0]) {
2229 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2231 break;
2232 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2234 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2235 break;
2236 default:
2237 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240 }
2241# endif
2242# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2244 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2245 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
50e735f9
MC		 2246 /*-
2247 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2248 * renegotiation.
2249 *
2250 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2251 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2252 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2253 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2254 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2255 * anything like that, but this might change).
2256 *
2257 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2258 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2259 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2260 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2261 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2262 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2263 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2264 }
2265# endif
2266
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2268 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2269 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2270 return 0;
2271# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2272 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2273 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2274# endif
2275 }
5e3ff62c 2276
0f113f3e
MC		 2277 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2278# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2279 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2280 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2281 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2282 return 0;
2283 }
2284# endif
2285# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2286 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2287 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2288# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2290 if (!s->hit)
2291 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2292 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2293 /*
2294 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2295 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2296 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2297 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2298 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2299 */
2300 else if (!s->hit) {
2301 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2302 return 0;
2303 }
ed3883d2 2304
0f113f3e
MC		 2305 data += size;
2306 }
6f017a8f 2307
0f113f3e
MC		 2308 *p = data;
2309
2310 ri_check:
ed3883d2 2311
0f113f3e
MC		 2312 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2313
2314 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2316 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2318 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2319 return 0;
2320 }
2321
2322 return 1;
2323}
2324
2325int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2326 int n)
2327{
2328 int al = -1;
2329 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2330 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2332 return 0;
2333 }
2334
2335 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2337 return 0;
2338 }
2339 return 1;
2340}
2341
2342# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2343/*
2344 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2345 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2346 * fill the length of the block.
2347 */
2348static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2349{
2350 unsigned int off = 0;
2351
2352 while (off < len) {
2353 if (d[off] == 0)
2354 return 0;
2355 off += d[off];
2356 off++;
2357 }
2358
2359 return off == len;
2360}
2361# endif
2362
2363static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2364 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2365{
2366 unsigned short length;
2367 unsigned short type;
2368 unsigned short size;
2369 unsigned char *data = *p;
2370 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2371 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2372
2373# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2375# endif
2376 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2377
b548a1f1
RS		 2378 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 2380# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2383# endif
2384
2385# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2387# endif
2388
2389 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2390 goto ri_check;
2391
2392 n2s(data, length);
2393 if (data + length != d + n) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2399 n2s(data, type);
2400 n2s(data, size);
2401
2402 if (data + size > (d + n))
2403 goto ri_check;
2404
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2407
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2410 return 0;
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2416 return 0;
2417 }
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2419 }
2420# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2423 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2424
2425 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 return 0;
2428 }
2429 if (!s->hit) {
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
b548a1f1 2431 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
0f113f3e
MC		 2432 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2433 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2435 return 0;
2436 }
2437 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2438 ecpointformatlist_length;
2439 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2440 ecpointformatlist_length);
2441 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2442 }
2443# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2444
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2446 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2447 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2448 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2449 {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2451 return 0;
2452 }
2453 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2454 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2455 return 0;
2456 }
2457 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2458 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2459 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2460 /*
2461 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2462 * request message.
2463 */
2464 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2466 return 0;
2467 }
2468 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2469 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2470 }
2471# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2473 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2474 unsigned char *selected;
2475 unsigned char selected_len;
2476
2477 /* We must have requested it. */
2478 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2479 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2480 return 0;
2481 }
2482 /* The data must be valid */
2483 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2485 return 0;
2486 }
2487 if (s->
2488 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2489 size,
2490 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2491 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2492 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2493 return 0;
2494 }
2495 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2496 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 return 0;
2499 }
2500 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2501 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2502 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2503 }
2504# endif
2505
2506 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2507 unsigned len;
2508
2509 /* We must have requested it. */
2510 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2511 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2512 return 0;
2513 }
2514 if (size < 4) {
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2516 return 0;
2517 }
50e735f9
MC		 2518 /*-
2519 * The extension data consists of:
2520 * uint16 list_length
2521 * uint8 proto_length;
2522 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2523 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2524 len = data[0];
2525 len <<= 8;
2526 len |= data[1];
2527 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 return 0;
2530 }
2531 len = data[2];
2532 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2533 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 return 0;
2535 }
b548a1f1 2536 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
0f113f3e
MC		 2537 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2538 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2540 return 0;
2541 }
2542 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2543 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2544 }
2545# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2546 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2547 switch (data[0]) {
2548 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2549 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2550 break;
2551 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2553 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2554 break;
2555 default:
2556 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2557 return 0;
2558 }
2559 }
2560# endif
2561# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2562 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2563 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2564 return 0;
2565 }
2566# endif
2567# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2569 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2570 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2571 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2572 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2573 }
2574# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2575 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2576 if (!s->hit)
2577 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2578 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2579 /*
2580 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2581 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2582 */
2583 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2584 return 0;
2585
2586 data += size;
2587 }
2588
2589 if (data != d + n) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 return 0;
2592 }
2593
2594 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2595 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2597 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2598 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2599 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2600 return 0;
2601 }
2602 } else {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 return 0;
2605 }
2606 }
2607 }
2608
2609 *p = data;
2610
2611 ri_check:
2612
2613 /*
2614 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2615 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2616 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2617 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2618 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2619 * initial connect only.
2620 */
2621 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2622 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2625 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2626 return 0;
2627 }
2628
2629 return 1;
2630}
b2172f4f 2631
36ca4ba6 2632int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2633{
2634
0f113f3e
MC		 2635 return 1;
2636}
36ca4ba6
BM		 2637
2638int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2639{
2640 return 1;
2641}
36ca4ba6 2642
2daceb03 2643static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2644{
2645 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2646 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2647
2648# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2649 /*
2650 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2651 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2652 */
2653 /*
2654 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2655 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2656 */
2657# endif
2658
2659 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2660 ret =
2661 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2662 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2664 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2665 ret =
2666 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2667 s->
2668 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2669
0f113f3e
MC		 2670 switch (ret) {
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2672 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2673 return -1;
2674
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2676 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2677 return 1;
2678
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2680 s->servername_done = 0;
2681 default:
2682 return 1;
2683 }
2684}
f1fd4544 2685
e469af8d 2686int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2687{
2688 int al;
2689 size_t i;
2690 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
b548a1f1
RS		 2691 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2692 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2693 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2694 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2695 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2696 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2697 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2698 }
2699
2700 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2701 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2702 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 goto err;
2706 }
2707 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2708 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2710 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2711 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2712 goto err;
2713 }
2714 } else
2715 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2716 return 1;
2717 err:
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2719 return 0;
2720}
e469af8d 2721
2daceb03 2722int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2723{
2724 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2725 int al;
2726
2727 /*
2728 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2729 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2730 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2731 * influence which certificate is sent
2732 */
2733 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2734 int r;
2735 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2736 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2737 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2738 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2739 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2740 return 1;
2741 }
2742 /*
2743 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2744 * et al can pick it up.
2745 */
2746 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2747 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2748 switch (r) {
2749 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2751 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2752 break;
2753 /* status request response should be sent */
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2755 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2756 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2757 else
2758 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2759 break;
2760 /* something bad happened */
2761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2762 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2763 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 goto err;
2765 }
2766 } else
2767 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2daceb03
BL		 2768
2769 err:
0f113f3e
MC		 2770 switch (ret) {
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2773 return -1;
2774
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2777 return 1;
2778
2779 default:
2780 return 1;
2781 }
2782}
2daceb03 2783
36ca4ba6 2784int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2785{
2786 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2787 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2788
2789# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2790 /*
2791 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2792 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2793 * must contain uncompressed.
2794 */
2795 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2796 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2797 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2798 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2799 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2800 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2801 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2802 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2803 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2804 size_t i;
2805 unsigned char *list;
2806 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2807 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2808 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2809 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2810 found_uncompressed = 1;
2811 break;
2812 }
2813 }
2814 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2816 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2817 return -1;
2818 }
2819 }
2820 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2821# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2822
2823 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2824 ret =
2825 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2826 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2827 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2828 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2829 ret =
2830 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2831 s->
2832 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2833
0f113f3e
MC		 2834 /*
2835 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2836 * callback
2837 */
2838 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2839 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2840 int r;
2841 /*
2842 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2843 * response.
2844 */
b548a1f1
RS		 2845 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2846 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 2847 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2848 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2849 if (r == 0) {
2850 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2851 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2852 }
2853 if (r < 0) {
2854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2855 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2856 }
2857 }
2858
2859 switch (ret) {
2860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2862 return -1;
2863
2864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2865 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2866 return 1;
2867
2868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2869 s->servername_done = 0;
2870 default:
2871 return 1;
2872 }
2873}
761772d7 2874
0f113f3e
MC		 2875int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2876 int n)
2877{
2878 int al = -1;
2879 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2880 return 1;
2881 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2883 return 0;
2884 }
2885
2886 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2888 return 0;
2889 }
2890 return 1;
09e4e4b9
DSH		 2891}
2892
1d97c843
TH		 2893/*-
2894 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
c519e89f
BM		 2895 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2896 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2897 *
2898 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2899 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2900 * extension, if any.
2901 * len: the length of the session ID.
2902 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2903 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2904 * point to the resulting session.
2905 *
2906 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2907 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2908 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2909 *
2910 * Returns:
2911 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2912 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2913 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2914 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2915 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2916 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2917 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2918 *
2919 * Side effects:
2920 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2921 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2922 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2923 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2924 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2925 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 2926 */
6434abbf 2927int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
0f113f3e
MC		 2928 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2929{
2930 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2931 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2932 unsigned short i;
2933
2934 *ret = NULL;
2935 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2936
2937 /*
2938 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2939 * resumption.
2940 */
2941 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2942 return 0;
2943 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2944 return 0;
2945 if (p >= limit)
2946 return -1;
2947 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2949 i = *(p++);
2950 p += i;
2951 if (p >= limit)
2952 return -1;
2953 }
2954 /* Skip past cipher list */
2955 n2s(p, i);
2956 p += i;
2957 if (p >= limit)
2958 return -1;
2959 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2960 i = *(p++);
2961 p += i;
2962 if (p > limit)
2963 return -1;
2964 /* Now at start of extensions */
2965 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2966 return 0;
2967 n2s(p, i);
2968 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2969 unsigned short type, size;
2970 n2s(p, type);
2971 n2s(p, size);
2972 if (p + size > limit)
2973 return 0;
2974 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2975 int r;
2976 if (size == 0) {
2977 /*
2978 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2979 * one.
2980 */
2981 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2982 return 1;
2983 }
2984 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2985 /*
2986 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2987 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2988 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2989 * calculate the master secret later.
2990 */
2991 return 2;
2992 }
2993 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2994 switch (r) {
2995 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2996 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2997 return 2;
2998 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2999 return r;
3000 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3001 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3002 return 3;
3003 default: /* fatal error */
3004 return -1;
3005 }
3006 }
3007 p += size;
3008 }
3009 return 0;
3010}
6434abbf 3011
1d97c843
TH		 3012/*-
3013 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM		 3014 *
3015 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3016 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3017 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3018 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3019 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3020 * point to the resulting session.
3021 *
3022 * Returns:
3023 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3024 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3025 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3026 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3027 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3028static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3029 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3030 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3031{
3032 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3033 unsigned char *sdec;
3034 const unsigned char *p;
3035 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3036 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3037 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3038 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3039 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3040 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3041 if (eticklen < 48)
3042 return 2;
3043 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3044 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3046 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3047 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3048 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3049 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3050 if (rv < 0)
3051 return -1;
3052 if (rv == 0)
3053 return 2;
3054 if (rv == 2)
3055 renew_ticket = 1;
3056 } else {
3057 /* Check key name matches */
3058 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3059 return 2;
3060 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
474e469b 3061 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
0f113f3e
MC		 3062 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3063 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3064 }
3065 /*
3066 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3067 * checks on ticket.
3068 */
3069 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3070 if (mlen < 0) {
3071 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3072 return -1;
3073 }
3074 eticklen -= mlen;
3075 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3076 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3077 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3078 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3079 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3081 return 2;
3082 }
3083 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3084 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3085 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3086 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3087 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3088 if (!sdec) {
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3090 return -1;
3091 }
3092 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3093 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3095 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3096 return 2;
3097 }
3098 slen += mlen;
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3100 p = sdec;
3101
3102 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3103 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3104 if (sess) {
3105 /*
3106 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3107 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3108 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3109 * standard.
3110 */
3111 if (sesslen)
3112 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3113 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3114 *psess = sess;
3115 if (renew_ticket)
3116 return 4;
3117 else
3118 return 3;
3119 }
3120 ERR_clear_error();
3121 /*
3122 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3123 */
3124 return 2;
3125}
6434abbf 3126
6b7be581
DSH		 3127/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3128
0f113f3e
MC		 3129typedef struct {
3130 int nid;
3131 int id;
3132} tls12_lookup;
6b7be581 3133
d97ed219 3134static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3135 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3136 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3137 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3138 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3139 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3140 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3141};
3142
d97ed219 3143static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3144 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3145 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3146 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3147};
3148
d97ed219 3149static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3150{
3151 size_t i;
3152 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3153 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3154 return table[i].id;
3155 }
3156 return -1;
3157}
e7f8ff43 3158
d97ed219 3159static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3160{
3161 size_t i;
3162 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3163 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3164 return table[i].nid;
3165 }
3166 return NID_undef;
3167}
3168
3169int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3170 const EVP_MD *md)
3171{
3172 int sig_id, md_id;
3173 if (!md)
3174 return 0;
3175 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3176 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3177 if (md_id == -1)
3178 return 0;
3179 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3180 if (sig_id == -1)
3181 return 0;
3182 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3183 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3184 return 1;
3185}
6b7be581 3186
a2f9200f 3187int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
0f113f3e
MC		 3188{
3189 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3190 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3191}
3192
3193typedef struct {
3194 int nid;
3195 int secbits;
3196 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3197} tls12_hash_info;
b362ccab
DSH		 3198
3199static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3200# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3201 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3202# else
3203 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3204# endif
0f113f3e 3205 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
0f113f3e
MC		 3206 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3207 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
0f113f3e
MC		 3208 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3209 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
b362ccab 3210};
a2f9200f 3211
b362ccab 3212static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3213{
3214 if (hash_alg == 0)
3215 return NULL;
3216 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3217 return NULL;
3218 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3219}
a2f9200f 3220
b362ccab 3221const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3222{
3223 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3224 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3225 return NULL;
3226 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3227 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3228 return NULL;
3229 return inf->mfunc();
3230}
a2f9200f 3231
4453cd8c 3232static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3233{
3234 switch (sig_alg) {
3235# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3236 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3237 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3238# endif
3239# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3240 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3241 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3242# endif
10bf4fc2 3243# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3244 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3245 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3246# endif
3247 }
3248 return -1;
3249}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3250
3251/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3252static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
0f113f3e
MC		 3253 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3254{
3255 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3256 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3257 return;
3258 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3259 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3260 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3261 if (phash_nid)
3262 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3263 }
3264 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3265 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3266 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3267 if (psign_nid)
3268 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3269 }
3270 if (psignhash_nid) {
3271 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3272 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3273 else
3274 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3275 }
3276}
3277
b362ccab
DSH		 3278/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3279static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
0f113f3e
MC		 3280{
3281 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3282 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3283 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3284 return 0;
3285 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3286 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3287 return 0;
3288 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3289 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3290}
3291
3292/*
3293 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3294 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3295 * disabled.
b362ccab
DSH		 3296 */
3297
3298void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 3299{
3300 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3301 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3302 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3303 /*
3304 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3305 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3306 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3307 */
3308 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3309 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3310 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3311# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3313 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3314 have_rsa = 1;
3315 break;
3316# endif
3317# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3319 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3320 have_dsa = 1;
3321 break;
3322# endif
10bf4fc2 3323# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3324 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3325 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3326 have_ecdsa = 1;
3327 break;
3328# endif
3329 }
3330 }
3331 if (!have_rsa)
3332 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3333 if (!have_dsa)
3334 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3335 if (!have_ecdsa)
3336 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3337}
b362ccab
DSH		 3338
3339size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
0f113f3e
MC		 3340 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3341{
3342 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3343 size_t i;
3344 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3345 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3346 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3347 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3348 }
3349 }
3350 return tmpout - out;
3351}
b362ccab 3352
4453cd8c 3353/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3354static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
0f113f3e
MC		 3355 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3356 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3357{
3358 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3359 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3360 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3361 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3362 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3363 continue;
3364 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3365 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3366 nmatch++;
3367 if (shsig) {
3368 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3369 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3370 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3371 &shsig->sign_nid,
3372 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3373 shsig++;
3374 }
3375 break;
3376 }
3377 }
3378 }
3379 return nmatch;
3380}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3381
3382/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3383static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3384{
3385 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3386 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3387 size_t nmatch;
3388 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3389 CERT *c = s->cert;
3390 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
b548a1f1
RS		 3391
3392 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3393 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3394 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3395 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3396 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3397 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3398 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3399 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3400 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3401 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3402 } else
3403 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3404 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3405 pref = conf;
3406 preflen = conflen;
3407 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3408 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3409 } else {
3410 allow = conf;
3411 allowlen = conflen;
3412 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3413 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3414 }
3415 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
34e3edbf
DSH		 3416 if (nmatch) {
3417 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3418 if (!salgs)
3419 return 0;
3420 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3421 } else {
3422 salgs = NULL;
3423 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3424 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3425 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3426 return 1;
3427}
4453cd8c 3428
6b7be581
DSH		 3429/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3430
c800c27a 3431int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
0f113f3e
MC		 3432{
3433 CERT *c = s->cert;
3434 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3435 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3436 return 1;
3437 /* Should never happen */
3438 if (!c)
3439 return 0;
3440
b548a1f1 3441 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC		 3442 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3443 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3444 return 0;
3445 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3446 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3447 return 1;
3448}
6b7be581 3449
c800c27a 3450int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3451{
3452 int idx;
3453 size_t i;
3454 const EVP_MD *md;
3455 CERT *c = s->cert;
3456 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3457 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3458 return 0;
3459
3460# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3461 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3462 /*
3463 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3464 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3465 */
3466 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3467 if (s->server)
3468 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3469 else
3470 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3471 if (sigs) {
3472 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3473 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3474 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3475 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3476 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3477 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3478 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3479 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3480 }
3481 }
3482 }
3483# endif
3484
3485 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3486 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3487 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3488 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3489 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3490 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3491 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3492 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3493 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3494 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3496 }
3497 }
6b7be581 3498
0f113f3e
MC		 3499 }
3500 /*
3501 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3502 * the certificate for signing.
3503 */
3504 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3505 /*
3506 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3507 * supported it stays as NULL.
3508 */
3509# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3510 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3511 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3512# endif
3513# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3514 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3517 }
3518# endif
10bf4fc2 3519# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3520 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3522# endif
3523 }
3524 return 1;
3525}
4817504d 3526
e7f8ff43 3527int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3528 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3529 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3530{
3531 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3532 if (psig == NULL)
3533 return 0;
3534 if (idx >= 0) {
3535 idx <<= 1;
3536 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3537 return 0;
3538 psig += idx;
3539 if (rhash)
3540 *rhash = psig[0];
3541 if (rsig)
3542 *rsig = psig[1];
3543 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3544 }
3545 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3546}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3547
3548int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3549 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3550 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3551{
3552 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3553 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3554 return 0;
3555 shsigalgs += idx;
3556 if (phash)
3557 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3558 if (psign)
3559 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3560 if (psignhash)
3561 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3562 if (rsig)
3563 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3564 if (rhash)
3565 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3566 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3567}
3568
3569# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2c60ed04 3570int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
0f113f3e 3571{
2c60ed04 3572 unsigned char *pl;
0f113f3e
MC		 3573 unsigned short hbtype;
3574 unsigned int payload;
3575 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3576
3577 if (s->msg_callback)
3578 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
258f8721 3579 p, length,
0f113f3e
MC		 3580 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3581
3582 /* Read type and payload length first */
258f8721 3583 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
0f113f3e
MC		 3584 return 0; /* silently discard */
3585 hbtype = *p++;
3586 n2s(p, payload);
258f8721 3587 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
0f113f3e
MC		 3588 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3589 pl = p;
3590
3591 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3592 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3593 int r;
3594
3595 /*
3596 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3597 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3598 */
3599 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3600 if (buffer == NULL) {
3601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3602 return -1;
3603 }
3604 bp = buffer;
3605
3606 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3607 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3608 s2n(payload, bp);
3609 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3610 bp += payload;
3611 /* Random padding */
266483d2
MC		 3612 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3613 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3614 return -1;
3615 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3616
3617 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3618 3 + payload + padding);
3619
3620 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3621 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3622 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3623 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3624
3625 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3626
3627 if (r < 0)
3628 return r;
3629 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3630 unsigned int seq;
3631
3632 /*
3633 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3634 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3635 */
3636 n2s(pl, seq);
3637
3638 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3639 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3640 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3641 }
3642 }
3643
3644 return 0;
3645}
0f229cce 3646
0f113f3e
MC		 3647int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3648{
3649 unsigned char *buf, *p;
266483d2 3650 int ret = -1;
0f113f3e
MC		 3651 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3652 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3653
3654 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3655 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3656 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3658 return -1;
3659 }
3660
3661 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3662 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3664 return -1;
3665 }
3666
3667 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3668 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3670 return -1;
3671 }
3672
3673 /*
3674 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3675 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3676 */
3677 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3678
50e735f9
MC		 3679 /*-
3680 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3681 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3682 * some random stuff.
3683 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3684 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3685 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3686 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3687 * - Padding
3688 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3689 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3690 if (buf == NULL) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3692 return -1;
3693 }
3694 p = buf;
3695 /* Message Type */
3696 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3697 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3698 s2n(payload, p);
3699 /* Sequence number */
3700 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3701 /* 16 random bytes */
266483d2
MC		 3702 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3704 goto err;
3705 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3706 p += 16;
3707 /* Random padding */
266483d2
MC		 3708 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3710 goto err;
3711 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3712
3713 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3714 if (ret >= 0) {
3715 if (s->msg_callback)
3716 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3717 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3718 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3719
3720 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3721 }
3722
266483d2 3723 err:
0f113f3e 3724 OPENSSL_free(buf);
0f113f3e
MC		 3725 return ret;
3726}
3727# endif
3728
3729# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce 3730
0f113f3e
MC		 3731typedef struct {
3732 size_t sigalgcnt;
3733 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3734} sig_cb_st;
0f229cce
DSH		 3735
3736static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3737{
3738 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3739 size_t i;
3740 char etmp[20], *p;
3741 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
2747d73c
KR		 3742 if (elem == NULL)
3743 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3744 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3745 return 0;
3746 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3747 return 0;
3748 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3749 etmp[len] = 0;
3750 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3751 if (!p)
3752 return 0;
3753 *p = 0;
3754 p++;
3755 if (!*p)
3756 return 0;
3757
3758 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3760 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3761 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3762 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3763 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3764 else
3765 return 0;
3766
3767 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3768 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3769 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3770 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3771 return 0;
3772
3773 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3774 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3775 return 0;
3776 }
3777 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3778 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3779 return 1;
3780}
3781
3782/*
3783 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3784 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3785 */
3dbc46df 3786int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f113f3e
MC		 3787{
3788 sig_cb_st sig;
3789 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3790 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3791 return 0;
3792 if (c == NULL)
3793 return 1;
3794 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3795}
3796
3797int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3798 int client)
3799{
3800 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3801 int rhash, rsign;
3802 size_t i;
3803 if (salglen & 1)
3804 return 0;
3805 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3806 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3807 return 0;
3808 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3809 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3810 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3811 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3812 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3813
3814 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3815 goto err;
3816 *sptr++ = rhash;
3817 *sptr++ = rsign;
3818 }
3819
3820 if (client) {
b548a1f1 3821 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC		 3822 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3823 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3824 } else {
b548a1f1 3825 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC		 3826 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3827 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3828 }
3829
3830 return 1;
3831
3832 err:
3833 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3834 return 0;
3835}
4453cd8c 3836
d61ff83b 3837static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 3838{
3839 int sig_nid;
3840 size_t i;
3841 if (default_nid == -1)
3842 return 1;
3843 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3844 if (default_nid)
3845 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3846 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3847 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3848 return 1;
3849 return 0;
3850}
3851
6dbb6219
DSH		 3852/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3853static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 3854{
3855 X509_NAME *nm;
3856 int i;
3857 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3858 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3859 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3860 return 1;
3861 }
3862 return 0;
3863}
3864
3865/*
3866 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3867 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3868 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3869 * attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 3870 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 3871
3872/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3873
0f113f3e
MC		 3874# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3875 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
6dbb6219 3876/* Strict mode flags */
0f113f3e
MC		 3877# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3878 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3879 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
6dbb6219 3880
d61ff83b 3881int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
0f113f3e
MC		 3882 int idx)
3883{
3884 int i;
3885 int rv = 0;
3886 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3887 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3888 CERT *c = s->cert;
3889 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3890 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3891 if (idx != -1) {
3892 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3893 if (idx == -2) {
3894 cpk = c->key;
3895 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3896 } else
3897 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3898 x = cpk->x509;
3899 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3900 chain = cpk->chain;
3901 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3902 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3903 if (!x || !pk)
3904 goto end;
3905# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3906 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3907 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3908 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3909 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3910 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3911 return rv;
3912 }
3913# endif
3914 } else {
3915 if (!x || !pk)
d813f9eb 3916 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3917 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3918 if (idx == -1)
d813f9eb 3919 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3920 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3921 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3923 else
3924 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3925 strict_mode = 1;
3926 }
3927
3928 if (suiteb_flags) {
3929 int ok;
3930 if (check_flags)
3931 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3932 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3933 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3935 else if (!check_flags)
3936 goto end;
3937 }
3938
3939 /*
3940 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3941 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3942 */
3943 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3944 int default_nid;
3945 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3946 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3947 default_nid = 0;
3948 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3949 else {
3950 switch (idx) {
3951 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3952 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3953 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3954 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3955 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3956 break;
3957
3958 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3959 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3960 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3961 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3962 break;
3963
3964 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
3965 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3966 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3967 break;
3968
3969 default:
3970 default_nid = -1;
3971 break;
3972 }
3973 }
3974 /*
3975 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3976 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3977 */
3978 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3979 size_t j;
3980 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3981 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3982 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3983 break;
3984 }
3985 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3986 if (check_flags)
3987 goto skip_sigs;
3988 else
3989 goto end;
3990 }
3991 }
3992 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3993 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3994 if (!check_flags)
3995 goto end;
3996 } else
3997 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3998 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3999 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4000 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4001 if (check_flags) {
4002 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4003 break;
4004 } else
4005 goto end;
4006 }
4007 }
4008 }
4009 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4010 else if (check_flags)
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4012 skip_sigs:
4013 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4014 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4016 else if (!check_flags)
4017 goto end;
4018 if (!s->server)
4019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4021 else if (strict_mode) {
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4023 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4024 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4025 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4026 if (check_flags) {
4027 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4028 break;
4029 } else
4030 goto end;
4031 }
4032 }
4033 }
4034 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4036 int check_type = 0;
4037 switch (pk->type) {
4038 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4040 break;
4041 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4043 break;
4044 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4045 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4046 break;
4047 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4048 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4049 {
4050 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4051 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4052 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4053 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4054 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4055 }
4056 }
4057 if (check_type) {
4058 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4059 int ctypelen;
4060 if (c->ctypes) {
4061 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4062 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4063 } else {
4064 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4065 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4066 }
4067 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4068 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4070 break;
4071 }
4072 }
4073 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4074 goto end;
4075 } else
4076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4077
4078 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4079
4080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4082
4083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4086 }
4087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4089 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4092 break;
4093 }
4094 }
4095 }
4096 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4097 goto end;
4098 } else
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4100
4101 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4103
4104 end:
4105
4106 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4107 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4109 else if (cpk->digest)
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4111 } else
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4113
4114 /*
4115 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4116 * chain is invalid.
4117 */
4118 if (!check_flags) {
4119 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4120 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4121 else {
4122 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4123 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4124 return 0;
4125 }
4126 }
4127 return rv;
4128}
d61ff83b
DSH		 4129
4130/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4131void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 4132{
17dd65e6
MC		 4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4138 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
0f113f3e
MC		 4139}
4140
18d71588
DSH		 4141/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4142int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC		 4143{
4144 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4145}
d61ff83b 4146
4453cd8c 4147#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4148
4149#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4150DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4151{
4152 int dh_secbits = 80;
4153 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4154 return DH_get_1024_160();
4155 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4157 dh_secbits = 128;
4158 else
4159 dh_secbits = 80;
4160 } else {
4161 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4162 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4163 }
4164
4165 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4166 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4167 if (!dhp)
4168 return NULL;
4169 dhp->g = BN_new();
4170 if (dhp->g)
4171 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4172 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4173 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4174 else
4175 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4176 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4177 DH_free(dhp);
4178 return NULL;
4179 }
4180 return dhp;
4181 }
4182 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4183 return DH_get_2048_224();
4184 return DH_get_1024_160();
4185}
09599b52 4186#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4187
4188static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4189{
4190 int secbits;
4191 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4192 if (pkey) {
4193 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4194 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4195 } else
4196 secbits = -1;
4197 if (s)
4198 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4199 else
4200 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4201}
b362ccab
DSH		 4202
4203static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4204{
4205 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4206 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4207 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4208 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4209 const EVP_MD *md;
4210 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4211 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4212 }
4213 if (s)
4214 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4215 else
4216 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4217}
b362ccab
DSH		 4218
4219int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
0f113f3e
MC		 4220{
4221 if (vfy)
4222 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4223 if (is_ee) {
4224 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4225 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4226 } else {
4227 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4228 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4229 }
4230 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4231 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4232 return 1;
4233}
4234
4235/*
4236 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4237 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4238 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
b362ccab
DSH		 4239 */
4240
4241int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
0f113f3e
MC		 4242{
4243 int rv, start_idx, i;
4244 if (x == NULL) {
4245 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4246 start_idx = 1;
4247 } else
4248 start_idx = 0;
4249
4250 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4251 if (rv != 1)
4252 return rv;
4253
4254 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4255 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4256 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4257 if (rv != 1)
4258 return rv;
4259 }
4260 return 1;
4261}
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