]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blame - ssl/t1_lib.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blame
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (incremental) | history | HEAD
Fix some style issues identified during review
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
846e33c7
RS		 1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
f1fd4544 3 *
846e33c7
RS		 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
f1fd4544 8 */
58964a49
RE		 9
10#include <stdio.h>
aa474d1f 11#include <stdlib.h>
ec577822 12#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 13#include <openssl/evp.h>
14#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 15#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
5951e840
MC		 16#include <openssl/conf.h>
17#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
3c27208f
RS		 18#include <openssl/dh.h>
19#include <openssl/bn.h>
58964a49 20#include "ssl_locl.h"
3c27208f 21#include <openssl/ct.h>
58964a49 22
d736bc1a 23static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
ec60ccc1 24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
0f113f3e 25 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 26static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
aa474d1f 27static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
6434abbf 28
0f113f3e
MC		 29SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
30 tls1_enc,
31 tls1_mac,
32 tls1_setup_key_block,
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC		 36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 tls1_alert_code,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
40 0,
a29fa98c 41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 42 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC		 43 ssl3_handshake_write
44};
45
46SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
47 tls1_enc,
48 tls1_mac,
49 tls1_setup_key_block,
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC		 53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_alert_code,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
a29fa98c 58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 59 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC		 60 ssl3_handshake_write
61};
62
63SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_enc,
65 tls1_mac,
66 tls1_setup_key_block,
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC		 70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
72 tls1_alert_code,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
a29fa98c 76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 77 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC		 78 ssl3_handshake_write
79};
58964a49 80
582a17d6
MC		 81SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls1_enc,
83 tls1_mac,
92760c21
MC		 84 tls13_setup_key_block,
85 tls13_generate_master_secret,
86 tls13_change_cipher_state,
87 tls13_final_finish_mac,
582a17d6
MC		 88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
90 tls1_alert_code,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
582a17d6
MC		 94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 ssl3_handshake_write
97};
98
f3b656b2 99long tls1_default_timeout(void)
0f113f3e
MC		 100{
101 /*
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
104 */
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
106}
58964a49 107
6b691a5c 108int tls1_new(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 109{
110 if (!ssl3_new(s))
111 return (0);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 return (1);
114}
58964a49 115
6b691a5c 116void tls1_free(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 117{
b548a1f1 118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
0f113f3e
MC		 119 ssl3_free(s);
120}
58964a49 121
6b691a5c 122void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 123{
124 ssl3_clear(s);
4fa52141
VD		 125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
127 else
128 s->version = s->method->version;
0f113f3e 129}
58964a49 130
525de5d3 131#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 132
0f113f3e
MC		 133typedef struct {
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137} tls_curve_info;
138
2dc1aeed
DSH		 139/*
140 * Table of curve information.
ddb4c047 141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
2dc1aeed
DSH		 142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 */
0f113f3e
MC		 144static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
ec24630a 173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
0f113f3e
MC		 174};
175
176static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
180};
181
fe6ef247
KR		 182/* The default curves */
183static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
1db3107a 184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
de57d237 185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
0f113f3e 186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
0f113f3e 187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
de57d237
EK		 188};
189
190static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
1db3107a 191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
de57d237 192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
de57d237 193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
de57d237 194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
0f113f3e 195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
ddb4c047
RS		 196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
198
199 /*
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
202 */
0f113f3e 203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
de57d237
EK		 204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
de57d237
EK		 210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
0f113f3e
MC		 217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
0f113f3e
MC		 220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
0f113f3e
MC		 222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
0f113f3e
MC		 225};
226
227static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
230};
2ea80354 231
ec24630a 232int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
0f113f3e 233{
ec24630a 234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
0f113f3e 235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
b6eb9827 236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
0f113f3e 237 return 0;
ec24630a
DSH		 238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
239 if (pflags)
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 return cinfo->nid;
0f113f3e 242}
525de5d3
DSH		 243
244int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
0f113f3e 245{
2fa2d15a
DSH		 246 size_t i;
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
348240c6 249 return (int)(i + 1);
0f113f3e 250 }
2fa2d15a 251 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 252}
253
740580c2
EK		 254/*
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
256 * preferred list.
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 265 */
740580c2 266static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
a230b26e 267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
0f113f3e
MC		 268{
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
270 if (sess) {
de4d764e
MC		 271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
0f113f3e
MC		 273 } else {
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
279 break;
280
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 pcurveslen = 2;
284 break;
285
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 pcurveslen = 2;
289 break;
290 default:
de4d764e
MC		 291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
0f113f3e
MC		 293 }
294 if (!*pcurves) {
fe6ef247
KR		 295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
0f113f3e
MC		 297 }
298 }
299
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = 0;
304 return 0;
305 } else {
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
307 return 1;
308 }
309}
b362ccab
DSH		 310
311/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 313{
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
315 if (curve[0])
316 return 1;
b6eb9827 317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
0f113f3e
MC		 318 return 0;
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
322 return 0;
323# endif
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
325}
b362ccab 326
d18b716d
DSH		 327/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
0f113f3e
MC		 329{
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
334 return 0;
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
336 if (suiteb_flags) {
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (p[1])
339 return 0;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
342 return 0;
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
345 return 0;
346 } else /* Should never happen */
347 return 0;
348 }
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
350 return 0;
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
354 }
355 return 0;
356}
d0595f17 357
1d97c843 358/*-
de4d764e 359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
6977e8ee
KR		 360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
de4d764e 362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
376e2ca3 363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 364 */
de4d764e 365int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
0f113f3e
MC		 366{
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
369 int k;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (s->server == 0)
372 return -1;
373 if (nmatch == -2) {
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
375 /*
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
378 */
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
385 return NID_undef;
386 }
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 nmatch = 0;
389 }
390 /*
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
393 */
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
396 &num_supp))
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
a230b26e 400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
0f113f3e 401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
3c06513f
KR		 402
403 /*
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
405 * are allowed.
406 */
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
408 supp = eccurves_all;
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
a230b26e 411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
3c06513f
KR		 412 pref = eccurves_all;
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 }
415
0f113f3e
MC		 416 k = 0;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
422 continue;
423 if (nmatch == k) {
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
ec24630a 425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
0f113f3e
MC		 426 }
427 k++;
428 }
429 }
430 }
431 if (nmatch == -1)
432 return k;
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 return NID_undef;
435}
d0595f17 436
de4d764e
MC		 437int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
0f113f3e 439{
de4d764e 440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
0f113f3e
MC		 441 size_t i;
442 /*
de4d764e 443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
0f113f3e
MC		 444 * ids < 32
445 */
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
de4d764e
MC		 447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
448 if (glist == NULL)
0f113f3e 449 return 0;
de4d764e 450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
0f113f3e
MC		 451 unsigned long idmask;
452 int id;
de4d764e
MC		 453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
0f113f3e
MC		 455 idmask = 1L << id;
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
de4d764e 457 OPENSSL_free(glist);
0f113f3e
MC		 458 return 0;
459 }
460 dup_list |= idmask;
461 s2n(id, p);
462 }
b548a1f1 463 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
de4d764e
MC		 464 *pext = glist;
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
0f113f3e
MC		 466 return 1;
467}
468
469# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470
471typedef struct {
472 size_t nidcnt;
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
474} nid_cb_st;
d0595f17
DSH		 475
476static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 477{
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
479 size_t i;
480 int nid;
481 char etmp[20];
2747d73c
KR		 482 if (elem == NULL)
483 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 return 0;
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 return 0;
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 etmp[len] = 0;
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 return 0;
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 return 0;
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 return 1;
502}
503
de4d764e
MC		 504/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
0f113f3e
MC		 506{
507 nid_cb_st ncb;
508 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return 0;
511 if (pext == NULL)
512 return 1;
de4d764e 513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
0f113f3e
MC		 514}
515
fd2b65ce
DSH		 516/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
0f113f3e
MC		 518 EC_KEY *ec)
519{
2235b7f2 520 int id;
0f113f3e 521 const EC_GROUP *grp;
0f113f3e
MC		 522 if (!ec)
523 return 0;
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
526 if (!grp)
527 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
2235b7f2
DSH		 531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 if (id == 0)
533 return 0;
534 curve_id[0] = 0;
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
0f113f3e
MC		 536 if (comp_id) {
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 return 0;
2235b7f2
DSH		 539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 } else {
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
0f113f3e
MC		 543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 else
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2235b7f2 546 }
0f113f3e
MC		 547 }
548 return 1;
549}
550
fd2b65ce
DSH		 551/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554{
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
557 int j;
558 /*
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 */
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
567 break;
568 }
569 if (i == num_formats)
570 return 0;
571 }
572 if (!curve_id)
573 return 1;
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 return 0;
b79d2410
MC		 578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 /*
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 */
586 break;
587 }
0f113f3e
MC		 588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
590 break;
591 }
592 if (i == num_curves)
593 return 0;
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
595 if (!s->server)
596 break;
597 }
598 return 1;
599}
d61ff83b 600
5087afa1 601static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
0f113f3e
MC		 602 size_t *num_formats)
603{
604 /*
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 */
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 } else {
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 else
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
617 }
618}
619
620/*
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
d61ff83b 623 */
2ea80354 624static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 625{
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
627 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
628 int rv;
8382fd3a 629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
0f113f3e
MC		 630 if (!pkey)
631 return 0;
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
3aeb9348 633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
0f113f3e 634 return 1;
3aeb9348 635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
0f113f3e
MC		 636 if (!rv)
637 return 0;
638 /*
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
640 * curves extension.
641 */
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 if (!rv)
644 return 0;
645 /*
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 */
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
650 int check_md;
651 size_t i;
652 CERT *c = s->cert;
653 if (curve_id[0])
654 return 0;
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 else
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 break;
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 return 0;
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
d376e57d 669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
0f113f3e 670 else
d376e57d 671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
0f113f3e
MC		 672 }
673 }
674 return rv;
675}
676
10bf4fc2 677# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
6977e8ee 678/*
8483a003 679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
6977e8ee
KR		 680 * @s: SSL connection
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 *
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 *
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 */
2ea80354 688int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
0f113f3e 689{
0f113f3e
MC		 690 /*
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
692 * curves permitted.
693 */
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
6977e8ee 695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
0f113f3e
MC		 696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 else
702 return 0;
703 curve_id[0] = 0;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 return 0;
fe6ef247 707 return 1;
0f113f3e 708 }
fe6ef247 709 /* Need a shared curve */
de4d764e 710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
fe6ef247 711 return 1;
6977e8ee 712 return 0;
0f113f3e 713}
10bf4fc2 714# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d0595f17 715
14536c8c
DSH		 716#else
717
718static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 719{
720 return 1;
721}
14536c8c 722
0f113f3e 723#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 724
0f113f3e
MC		 725/*
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
fc101f88
DSH		 727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
728 */
729
e481f9b9 730#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
a230b26e 731# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
e481f9b9
MC		 732#else
733# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
734#endif
0f113f3e 735
e481f9b9 736#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
a230b26e 737# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
e481f9b9
MC		 738#else
739# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
740#endif
0f113f3e 741
e481f9b9 742#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
a230b26e 743# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
e481f9b9
MC		 744#else
745# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
746#endif
0f113f3e 747
e481f9b9 748#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
0f113f3e
MC		 749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
fc101f88 752
d97ed219 753static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
0f113f3e
MC		 756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
0f113f3e 758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
e44380a9
DB		 759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
a230b26e
EK		 761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
e44380a9 763#endif
fc101f88 764};
0f113f3e 765
e481f9b9 766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d97ed219 767static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
2ea80354 770};
e481f9b9 771#endif
b7bfe69b 772size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
0f113f3e
MC		 773{
774 /*
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
776 * preferences.
777 */
e481f9b9 778#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
786 return 2;
787
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
790 return 2;
791 }
e481f9b9 792#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 } else {
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
803 }
804}
805
806/*
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
ec4a50b3
DSH		 808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 */
810int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812{
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
817 if (sigalg == -1)
818 return -1;
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
822 return 0;
823 }
e481f9b9 824#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3aeb9348 825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
0f113f3e
MC		 826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
3aeb9348 828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
0f113f3e
MC		 829 return 0;
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
832 return 0;
833 }
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
836 if (curve_id[0])
837 return 0;
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
842 return 0;
843 }
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
848 return 0;
849 }
850 } else
851 return 0;
852 }
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
854 return 0;
e481f9b9 855#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 856
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
861 break;
862 }
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
868 return 0;
869 }
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 if (*pmd == NULL) {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
873 return 0;
874 }
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
a230b26e 877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
879 return 0;
880 }
881 /*
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 */
d376e57d 884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
0f113f3e
MC		 885 return 1;
886}
2ea80354 887
0f113f3e 888/*
3eb2aff4
KR		 889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 *
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
894 * by the client.
895 *
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
b7bfe69b
DSH		 897 */
898void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 899{
4d69f9e6
DSH		 900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
4d69f9e6 902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
3eb2aff4 903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
a230b26e 904#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e
MC		 905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
4d69f9e6 907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
fe5eef3a 908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
0f113f3e 909 }
a230b26e 910#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
e481f9b9 911#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e 912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
4d69f9e6
DSH		 913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
0f113f3e 915 }
e481f9b9 916#endif
0f113f3e 917}
fc101f88 918
3eb2aff4
KR		 919/*
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 *
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 */
b362ccab 927int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
0f113f3e 928{
3eb2aff4 929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
4d69f9e6 930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
0f113f3e 931 return 1;
3eb2aff4
KR		 932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 return 1;
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
a230b26e 935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
3eb2aff4
KR		 936 return 1;
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
a230b26e 938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
3eb2aff4
KR		 939 return 1;
940
0f113f3e
MC		 941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
942}
b362ccab
DSH		 943
944static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 945{
f5ca0b04 946 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
0f113f3e
MC		 947 return 0;
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
949}
ed3883d2 950
a230b26e
EK		 951static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952{
aa474d1f
EK		 953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
955 if (u1 < u2)
956 return -1;
957 else if (u1 > u2)
958 return 1;
959 else
960 return 0;
961}
962
963/*
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
969 * occurred.
970 */
a230b26e
EK		 971static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972{
aa474d1f
EK		 973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
976 int ret = 0;
977
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
980 unsigned int type;
981 PACKET extension;
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
984 goto done;
985 }
986 num_extensions++;
987 }
988
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
990 return 1;
991
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
995 goto done;
996 }
997
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 PACKET extension;
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 goto done;
1007 }
1008 }
1009
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 goto done;
1013 }
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1018 goto done;
1019 }
1020 ret = 1;
1021 done:
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1023 return ret;
1024}
1025
ae2f7b37 1026int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1027{
e481f9b9 1028#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d2c27a28
MC		 1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
0f113f3e 1031 int using_ecc = 0;
c805f618 1032 int min_version, max_version, reason;
d2c27a28
MC		 1033
1034 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
c805f618 1035 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
d2c27a28 1036 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1037 int i;
1038 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1039 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040
1041 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
4a640fb6 1042 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
0f113f3e
MC		 1043
1044 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1045 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
ce0c1f2b 1046 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
c805f618
MC		 1047 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1048 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1049 using_ecc = 1;
1050 break;
1051 }
1052 }
d2c27a28
MC		 1053 }
1054#else
94ed2c67 1055 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
d2c27a28
MC		 1056 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 return 0;
0f113f3e 1059 }
e481f9b9 1060#endif
ed3883d2 1061
0f113f3e
MC		 1062 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1063 if (s->renegotiate) {
08029dfa 1064 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2f97192c
MC		 1065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1067 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1070 return 0;
5a3d8eeb 1071 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1072 }
1073 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1074 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 goto done;
1076
1077 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1078 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
08029dfa 1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2c7b4dbc 1080 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
de451856 1081 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1082 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
de451856 1083 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
08029dfa 1084 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
b2b3024e
MC		 1085 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1086 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
0217dd19
MC		 1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 return 0;
1091 }
0f113f3e 1092 }
e481f9b9 1093#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e 1094 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
2c7b4dbc 1095 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
08029dfa 1096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2c7b4dbc 1097 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
de451856
MC		 1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1099 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
de451856 1101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
0217dd19 1102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
2c7b4dbc 1103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
0217dd19
MC		 1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1107 return 0;
0f113f3e 1108 }
0f113f3e 1109 }
e481f9b9 1110#endif
0f113f3e 1111
e481f9b9 1112#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 1113 if (using_ecc) {
1114 /*
1115 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1116 */
d2c27a28
MC		 1117 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1118 size_t num_formats;
0f113f3e 1119 size_t i;
0f113f3e
MC		 1120
1121 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1122
08029dfa 1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2c7b4dbc 1124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
de451856 1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
b2b3024e 1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
0217dd19 1127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1129 return 0;
0f113f3e 1130 }
4817504d 1131
0f113f3e 1132 /*
de4d764e 1133 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
0f113f3e 1134 */
de4d764e
MC		 1135 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1136 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
2c7b4dbc 1137 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
0f113f3e 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1139 return 0;
0f113f3e 1140 }
d2c27a28 1141 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
ee2ffc27 1142
de4d764e
MC		 1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1144 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
de451856
MC		 1145 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 return 0;
1149 }
0f113f3e 1150 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
d2c27a28 1151 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
0f113f3e 1152 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
d2c27a28
MC		 1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1154 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 return 0;
1158 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1159 }
1160 }
0217dd19 1161 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return 0;
1164 }
0f113f3e 1165 }
a230b26e 1166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 1167
1168 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
348240c6 1169 size_t ticklen;
0f113f3e
MC		 1170 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1171 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1172 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1174 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1175 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1176 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 return 0;
1179 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1181 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1182 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1183 } else
1184 ticklen = 0;
1185 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1186 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1187 goto skip_ext;
2c7b4dbc 1188
08029dfa 1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
b2b3024e
MC		 1190 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1191 ticklen)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1193 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1194 }
1195 }
1196 skip_ext:
1197
f7aa3185 1198 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1199 size_t salglen;
1200 const unsigned char *salg;
2c7b4dbc 1201
0f113f3e 1202 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
2c7b4dbc 1203
08029dfa 1204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2c7b4dbc 1205 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
de451856 1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1207 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
de451856 1208 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
0217dd19
MC		 1209 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1210 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1211 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 return 0;
1214 }
0f113f3e 1215 }
3e41ac35 1216#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
0f113f3e
MC		 1217 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1218 int i;
0f113f3e 1219
08029dfa 1220 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2c7b4dbc 1221 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
de451856 1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
08029dfa 1223 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2c7b4dbc 1224 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
de451856 1225 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
0f113f3e 1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1230 unsigned char *idbytes;
1231 int idlen;
1232 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2c7b4dbc 1233
0f113f3e 1234 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1235 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1236 if (idlen <= 0
1237 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
dd8710dc 1238 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
b2b3024e 1239 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return 0;
1242 }
1243 }
0217dd19 1244 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
de451856 1245 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return 0;
860c3dd1 1248 }
0f113f3e 1249 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1250 unsigned char *extbytes;
1251 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
0f113f3e 1252
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1253 if (extlen < 0) {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
0217dd19 1257 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1258 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1259 != extlen) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return 0;
1262 }
1263 }
0217dd19 1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
0f113f3e 1267 }
0f113f3e 1268 }
3e41ac35 1269#endif
0f113f3e 1270
e481f9b9 1271#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC		 1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1273 /*
8483a003 1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
0f113f3e
MC		 1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1276 */
08029dfa
MC		 1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 return 0;
1281 }
0f113f3e 1282 }
e481f9b9 1283#endif
0f113f3e 1284
817cd0d5
TS		 1285 /*
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1289 */
0f113f3e 1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
08029dfa
MC		 1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2c7b4dbc 1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
de451856 1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
b2b3024e
MC		 1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
0217dd19 1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 return 0;
1300 }
817cd0d5 1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
0f113f3e 1302 }
e481f9b9 1303#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
7facdbd6 1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1307 int i, ct;
2c7b4dbc 1308
08029dfa 1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2c7b4dbc 1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
de451856 1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
de451856 1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
69f68237 1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1315 return 0;
69f68237 1316 }
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
08029dfa 1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324 }
7facdbd6
MC		 1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1326 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1327 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1330 return 0;
0f113f3e 1331 }
0f113f3e 1332 }
e481f9b9 1333#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1335 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1336 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 return 0;
1339 }
1340
cde6145b
DW		 1341 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
08029dfa 1343 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
cde6145b
DW		 1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1347 }
1348
ed29e82a
RP		 1349#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1350 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
08029dfa
MC		 1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
ed29e82a 1356 }
e481f9b9 1357#endif
2c7b4dbc 1358
08029dfa
MC		 1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
0f113f3e 1364
c805f618
MC		 1365 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1366 if (reason != 0) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370
d2c27a28 1371 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
c805f618
MC		 1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1373 int currv;
d2c27a28
MC		 1374 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1375
1376 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1377 /* supported_versions extension */
b5b253b1
MC		 1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 return 0;
1383 }
c805f618 1384
f2342b7a
MC		 1385 /*
1386 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1387 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1388 * reviewed later.
1389 */
b5b253b1
MC		 1390 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1391 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1392 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1393 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402 }
1403 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 return 0;
1406 }
d2c27a28
MC		 1407
1408
1409 /* key_share extension */
1410 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1411 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1413 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 return 0;
1417 }
1418
1419 /*
1420 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1421 * now, just send one
1422 */
1423 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
94ed2c67
MC		 1424 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1425 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1426 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1427 size_t encodedlen;
1428
1429 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1430 continue;
1431
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 return 0;
1437 }
d2c27a28 1438
94ed2c67
MC		 1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1444 return 0;
1445 }
d2c27a28 1446
94ed2c67
MC		 1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1449 &encodedPoint);
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1453 return 0;
1454 }
d2c27a28 1455
94ed2c67
MC		 1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
d2c27a28 1462 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
94ed2c67 1463 return 0;
d2c27a28 1464 }
94ed2c67
MC		 1465
1466 /*
1467 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1468 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1469 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1470 */
1471 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1472 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1473 sharessent++;
1474 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
d2c27a28
MC		 1475 }
1476 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return 0;
1479 }
b5b253b1
MC		 1480 }
1481
0f113f3e
MC		 1482 /*
1483 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1485 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1486 * appear last.
1487 */
1488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1489 unsigned char *padbytes;
1490 size_t hlen;
1491
ae2f7b37 1492 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 return 0;
1495 }
a3680c8f 1496
0f113f3e
MC		 1497 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1498 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1499 if (hlen >= 4)
1500 hlen -= 4;
1501 else
1502 hlen = 0;
1503
08029dfa 1504 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
b2b3024e 1505 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC		 1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
0f113f3e
MC		 1510 }
1511 }
5a3d8eeb 1512
0f113f3e 1513 done:
2c7b4dbc 1514 return 1;
0f113f3e 1515}
333f926d 1516
94ed2c67
MC		 1517/*
1518 * Add the key_share extension.
1519 *
1520 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1521 */
1522static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1523{
1524 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1525 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1526 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1527
1528 if (ckey == NULL) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 return 0;
1538 }
1539
1540 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1541
1542 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1543 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1544 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1546 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1547 return 0;
1548 }
1549
1550 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1551 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1554 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1555 return 0;
1556 }
1557 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1558
1559 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1560 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1561 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1562 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 return 0;
1565 }
1566
1567 return 1;
1568}
1569
8157d44b 1570int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1571{
e481f9b9 1572#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 1573 int next_proto_neg_seen;
e481f9b9
MC		 1574#endif
1575#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 1576 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
ce0c1f2b 1578 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
0f113f3e 1579 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
e481f9b9 1580#endif
0f113f3e 1581
8157d44b
MC		 1582 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1583 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 return 0;
1586 }
333f926d 1587
8157d44b
MC		 1588 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1589 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1592 }
1593
1594 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1595 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1596 goto done;
1597
1598 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
8157d44b
MC		 1599 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1600 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1601 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 return 0;
1604 }
0f113f3e 1605 }
e481f9b9 1606#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 1607 if (using_ecc) {
1608 const unsigned char *plist;
1609 size_t plistlen;
1610 /*
1611 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1612 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1613 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1614
8157d44b
MC		 1615 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1616 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1617 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1618 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
8157d44b 1620 return 0;
0f113f3e 1621 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1622 }
1623 /*
1624 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1625 * extension
1626 */
a230b26e 1627#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 1628
1629 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
8157d44b
MC		 1630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1631 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1633 return 0;
1634 }
5c753de6 1635 } else {
a230b26e
EK		 1636 /*
1637 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1638 * later
1639 */
5c753de6 1640 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1641 }
1642
1643 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
8157d44b
MC		 1644 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1645 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 return 0;
1648 }
0f113f3e 1649 }
e481f9b9 1650#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 1651 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
8157d44b
MC		 1652 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1653 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1654 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1655 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1656 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1657 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
8157d44b 1659 return 0;
0f113f3e 1660 }
0f113f3e 1661 }
e481f9b9 1662#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1663
1664 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1665 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1666 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1667 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1668 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1669 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1670 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1671 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1672 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1673 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1674 };
8157d44b
MC		 1675 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 return 0;
1678 }
0f113f3e 1679 }
0f113f3e 1680
e481f9b9 1681#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC		 1682 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1683 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1684 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1685 const unsigned char *npa;
1686 unsigned int npalen;
1687 int r;
1688
1689 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1690 s->
1691 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1692 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
8157d44b
MC		 1693 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1694 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1696 return 0;
1697 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 }
1700 }
e481f9b9 1701#endif
bcec3358 1702
94ed2c67
MC		 1703 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1704 return 0;
bcec3358 1705
8157d44b
MC		 1706 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 return 0;
1709 }
1710
0f113f3e
MC		 1711 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1712 /*
1713 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1714 * for other cases too.
1715 */
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
e44380a9
DB		 1717 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1718 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1719 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
0f113f3e
MC		 1720 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1721 else {
8157d44b
MC		 1722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1725 return 0;
1726 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1727 }
1728 }
e7f0d921 1729 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
8157d44b
MC		 1730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1731 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1733 return 0;
1734 }
ddc06b35 1735 }
0f113f3e 1736
817cd0d5 1737 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
8157d44b
MC		 1738 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1739 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1740 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1741 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1742 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1743 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1744 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1745 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747 return 0;
1748 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1749 }
1750
1751 done:
8157d44b
MC		 1752 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 return 0;
1755 }
1756 return 1;
0f113f3e 1757}
a398f821 1758
0f113f3e 1759/*
817cd0d5 1760 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
06217867
EK		 1761 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1762 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1763 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
0f113f3e 1764 */
9ceb2426 1765static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1766{
06217867 1767 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
0f113f3e 1768
06217867 1769 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
0f113f3e 1770
06217867
EK		 1771 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1773 return 0;
1774 }
0f113f3e 1775
06217867 1776 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
9ceb2426 1777 do {
06217867
EK		 1778 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1779 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1780 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1781 return 0;
1782 }
1783 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1784
817cd0d5 1785 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
a230b26e 1786 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
817cd0d5
TS		 1787 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1788 return 0;
1789 }
1790
1791 return 1;
1792}
1793
1794/*
1795 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
817cd0d5 1796 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
70c22888 1797 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
817cd0d5 1798 */
70c22888 1799static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
817cd0d5
TS		 1800{
1801 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1802 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1803
1804 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1805 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1806 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
348240c6 1807 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
817cd0d5 1808 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
0f113f3e 1809
817cd0d5
TS		 1810 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1812 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1813 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
817cd0d5
TS		 1815 return 0;
1816 }
1817 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
0351baae
TS		 1818#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1819 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1820 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1821#endif
817cd0d5
TS		 1822 } else {
1823 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
06217867 1824 return 0;
0f113f3e 1825 }
0f113f3e 1826 }
0f113f3e 1827
06217867 1828 return 1;
0f113f3e 1829}
6f017a8f 1830
e481f9b9 1831#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH		 1832/*-
1833 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
3d33f3bb 1834 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
dece3209
RS		 1835 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1836 * SNI,
1837 * elliptic_curves
1838 * ec_point_formats
1839 *
1840 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1841 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1842 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1843 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1844 */
902aca09 1845static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
0f113f3e 1846{
06217867
EK		 1847 unsigned int type;
1848 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1849 size_t ext_len;
9ceb2426 1850
0f113f3e
MC		 1851 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1852 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1853 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1854 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1855 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1856 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1857 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1858
1859 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1860 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1861 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1862 0x00, /* uncompressed */
06217867 1863 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1864 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1865 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1866 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1867 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1868 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1869 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1871 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1872 };
1873
06217867
EK		 1874 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1875 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1876
1ab3836b 1877 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
68a16628
MC		 1878
1879 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
06217867
EK		 1880 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1881 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
0f113f3e 1882 return;
06217867 1883 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1884
1885 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1886 return;
1887
06217867
EK		 1888 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1889 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
0f113f3e 1890
06217867
EK		 1891 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1892 ext_len);
dece3209 1893}
a230b26e 1894#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e 1895
ef7daaf9
MC		 1896
1897/*
1898 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1899 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1900 *
94ed2c67 1901 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
ef7daaf9
MC		 1902 */
1903static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1904{
1905#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1906 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1907 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1908 hello->num_extensions,
1909 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1910
1911 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1912 return 1;
1913
1914 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1915 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1916 &supported_groups_list)
1917 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1918 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1919 return 0;
1920 }
1921
1922 if (!s->hit
1923 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1924 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1925 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1926 return 0;
1927 }
1928#endif
1929 return 1;
1930}
1931
1932/*
1933 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1934 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
94ed2c67
MC		 1935 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1936 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
ef7daaf9
MC		 1937 */
1938static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1939 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1940 int checkallow)
1941{
1942 size_t i;
1943
1944 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1945 return 0;
1946
1947 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1948 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
94ed2c67 1949
ef7daaf9
MC		 1950 if (group_id == share_id
1951 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1952 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1953 break;
1954 }
1955 }
1956
94ed2c67
MC		 1957 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1958 return i < num_groups;
1959}
1960
1961/*
1962 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1963 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1964 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1965 */
1966static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1967{
1968 unsigned int group_id;
1969 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
9a519880
MC		 1970 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1971 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
94ed2c67
MC		 1972 int group_nid, found = 0;
1973 unsigned int curve_flags;
1974
1975 /* Sanity check */
1976 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1977 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ef7daaf9
MC		 1979 return 0;
1980 }
1981
94ed2c67
MC		 1982 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1983 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1985 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1986 return 0;
1987 }
1988
9a519880
MC		 1989 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1990 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1991 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1994 return 0;
1995 }
1996
1997 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
1998 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
1999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2002 return 0;
2003 }
2004
94ed2c67
MC		 2005 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2006 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2007 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2008 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2009 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2011 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2012 return 0;
2013 }
2014
2015 /*
2016 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2017 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2018 */
2019 if (found)
2020 continue;
2021
2022 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
9a519880 2023 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
94ed2c67
MC		 2024 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2026 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2027 return 0;
2028 }
2029
2030 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
9a519880 2031 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
94ed2c67
MC		 2032 /* Share not suitable */
2033 continue;
2034 }
2035
2036 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2037
2038 if (group_nid == 0) {
2039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2041 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2042 return 0;
2043 }
2044
2045 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2046 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2047 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2048
2049 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2050 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2052 EVP_PKEY_free(key);
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2056 } else {
2057 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2058 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2059 if (pctx == NULL
2060 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2061 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2062 group_nid) <= 0
2063 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2066 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2067 return 0;
2068 }
2069 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2070 pctx = NULL;
2071 }
2072 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2073
2074 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2075 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2076 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2079 return 0;
2080 }
2081
2082 found = 1;
2083 }
2084
ef7daaf9
MC		 2085 return 1;
2086}
2087
06217867 2088/*
64386324
MC		 2089 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2090 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2091 * object as required.
06217867
EK		 2092 *
2093 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2094 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2095 * ignored.
2096 *
64386324 2097 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
06217867
EK		 2098 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2099 */
1ab3836b 2100static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
0f113f3e 2101{
1ab3836b 2102 size_t loop;
0f113f3e
MC		 2103 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2104
06217867 2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
0f113f3e
MC		 2106 s->servername_done = 0;
2107 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
e481f9b9 2108#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 2109 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
e481f9b9 2110#endif
0f113f3e 2111
b548a1f1
RS		 2112 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2113 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0351baae
TS		 2114 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2116 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2117 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
0f113f3e 2118
e481f9b9 2119#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e 2120 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1ab3836b 2121 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
a230b26e 2122#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 2123
2124 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
76106e60
DSH		 2125 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2126 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
0f113f3e 2127 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f113f3e 2128
e481f9b9 2129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
b548a1f1
RS		 2130 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2131 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
e481f9b9 2132#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2133
2134 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2135
ef7daaf9
MC		 2136 /*
2137 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2138 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2139 */
2140 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2142 return 0;
2143 }
2144
06217867
EK		 2145 /*
2146 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2147 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2148 * resumption.
2149 */
1ab3836b 2150 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
b1b4b543
MC		 2151 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2152
0f113f3e 2153 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
b1b4b543
MC		 2154 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2155 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2156 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
06217867 2157 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
9ceb2426 2158
b1b4b543 2159 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1ab3836b 2160 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
b1b4b543 2161 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e
MC		 2162 return 0;
2163 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2164 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2165 }
1d97c843
TH		 2166/*-
2167 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2168 *
2169 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2170 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2171 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2172 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2173 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
0f113f3e
MC		 2174 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2175 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2176 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1d97c843
TH		 2177 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2178 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2179 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2180 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2181 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
0f113f3e 2182 * the value of the Host: field.
1d97c843 2183 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
0f113f3e
MC		 2184 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2185 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2186 * extension.
2187 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1d97c843 2188 *
0f113f3e 2189 */
ed3883d2 2190
b1b4b543 2191 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
9ceb2426 2192 unsigned int servname_type;
06217867
EK		 2193 PACKET sni, hostname;
2194
b1b4b543 2195 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
06217867
EK		 2196 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2197 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2198 return 0;
0f113f3e 2199 }
6f017a8f 2200
06217867
EK		 2201 /*
2202 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2203 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
8483a003 2204 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
06217867
EK		 2205 * such.
2206 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2207 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2208 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2209 *
2210 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2211 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2212 */
2213 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2214 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2215 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218
2219 if (!s->hit) {
2220 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2221 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224
2225 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2226 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2227 return 0;
2228 }
2229
2230 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234
2235 s->servername_done = 1;
2236 } else {
2237 /*
2238 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2239 * fall back to a full handshake.
2240 */
2241 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2242 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2243 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2244 }
0f113f3e 2245 }
e481f9b9 2246#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
b1b4b543 2247 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
06217867
EK		 2248 PACKET srp_I;
2249
b1b4b543 2250 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
06217867
EK		 2251 return 0;
2252
2253 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2254 return 0;
2255
2256 /*
2257 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2258 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2259 */
2260 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2261 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 return 0;
2263 }
0f113f3e 2264 }
e481f9b9 2265#endif
0f113f3e 2266
e481f9b9 2267#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
b1b4b543 2268 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
06217867 2269 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
0f113f3e 2270
b1b4b543 2271 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
1ab3836b 2272 &ec_point_format_list)
06217867
EK		 2273 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2274 return 0;
2275 }
9ceb2426 2276
0f113f3e 2277 if (!s->hit) {
06217867
EK		 2278 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2279 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
a230b26e
EK		 2280 &s->
2281 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2282 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 return 0;
2284 }
0f113f3e 2285 }
0f113f3e 2286 }
a230b26e 2287#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
9362c93e
MC		 2288 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2289 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
06217867 2290 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1ab3836b 2291 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
b1b4b543
MC		 2292 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2293 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1ab3836b 2294 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2295 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2296 return 0;
2297 }
b1b4b543 2298 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
06217867
EK		 2299 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2300
b1b4b543 2301 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1ab3836b 2302 &supported_sig_algs)
06217867
EK		 2303 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2304 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2305 return 0;
2306 }
2307
a230b26e 2308 if (!s->hit) {
06217867
EK		 2309 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2310 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2311 return 0;
2312 }
9ceb2426 2313 }
b1b4b543
MC		 2314 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2315 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
06217867
EK		 2316 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2317 return 0;
2318 }
3e41ac35 2319#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
0f113f3e 2320 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
3e41ac35 2321 const unsigned char *ext_data;
06217867 2322 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
a230b26e 2323 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
b1b4b543 2324 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
06217867
EK		 2325 return 0;
2326
e408c09b
MC		 2327 /*
2328 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2329 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2330 */
2331 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2332 OCSP_RESPID_free);
2333 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2334 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2335 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2336 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2337 return 0;
2338 }
2339 } else {
2340 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2341 }
2342
06217867 2343 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
0f113f3e 2344 OCSP_RESPID *id;
06217867
EK		 2345 PACKET responder_id;
2346 const unsigned char *id_data;
9ceb2426 2347
06217867
EK		 2348 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2349 &responder_id)
2350 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2351 return 0;
9ceb2426 2352 }
06217867 2353
06217867 2354 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
348240c6 2355 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
06217867 2356 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
348240c6 2357 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
06217867
EK		 2358 if (id == NULL)
2359 return 0;
2360
2361 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
0f113f3e 2362 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
0f113f3e
MC		 2363 return 0;
2364 }
06217867 2365
0f113f3e
MC		 2366 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2367 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2368 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 return 0;
2370 }
2371 }
4817504d 2372
0f113f3e 2373 /* Read in request_extensions */
1ab3836b 2374 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
b1b4b543 2375 &currext->data, &exts))
06217867
EK		 2376 return 0;
2377
2378 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2379 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
222561fe
RS		 2380 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2381 X509_EXTENSION_free);
0f113f3e 2382 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
06217867 2383 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
348240c6 2384 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
06217867
EK		 2385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2386 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2387 return 0;
2388 }
0f113f3e 2389 }
3e41ac35
MC		 2390 } else
2391#endif
2392 {
2393 /*
2394 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2395 */
0f113f3e 2396 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
06217867 2397 }
0f113f3e 2398 }
e481f9b9 2399#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
b1b4b543 2400 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
1ab3836b 2401 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
50e735f9
MC		 2402 /*-
2403 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2404 * renegotiation.
2405 *
2406 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2407 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
8483a003 2408 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
50e735f9
MC		 2409 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2410 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2411 * anything like that, but this might change).
2412 *
2413 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2414 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2415 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2416 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2417 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2418 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2420 }
e481f9b9 2421#endif
0f113f3e 2422
b1b4b543 2423 else if (currext->type
1ab3836b
MC		 2424 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2425 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2426 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
b1b4b543 2427 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e 2428 return 0;
0f113f3e 2429 }
5e3ff62c 2430
0f113f3e 2431 /* session ticket processed earlier */
e481f9b9 2432#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 2433 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
b1b4b543 2434 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1ab3836b 2435 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
b1b4b543 2436 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e
MC		 2437 return 0;
2438 }
e481f9b9 2439#endif
b1b4b543 2440 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
b1834ad7 2441 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
0f113f3e 2442 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
b1834ad7 2443 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
94ed2c67
MC		 2444 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2445 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2446 return 0;
b1834ad7 2447 }
e7f0d921
DSH		 2448 /*
2449 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
1ab3836b 2450 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
e7f0d921
DSH		 2451 */
2452
0f113f3e
MC		 2453 /*
2454 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2455 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2456 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2457 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2458 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2459 */
2460 else if (!s->hit) {
b1b4b543
MC		 2461 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2462 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2463 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
0f113f3e
MC		 2464 return 0;
2465 }
0f113f3e 2466 }
6f017a8f 2467
0f113f3e
MC		 2468 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2469
2470 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2471 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2472 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2474 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2475 return 0;
2476 }
2477
06217867
EK		 2478 /*
2479 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2480 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2481 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2482 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2483 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2484 return 1;
2485}
2486
1ab3836b 2487int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
0f113f3e
MC		 2488{
2489 int al = -1;
2490 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
1ab3836b 2491 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2492 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2493 return 0;
2494 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2495 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2497 return 0;
2498 }
2499 return 1;
2500}
2501
e481f9b9 2502#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC		 2503/*
2504 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2505 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2506 * fill the length of the block.
2507 */
50932c4a 2508static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
0f113f3e 2509{
b04f9479 2510 PACKET tmp_protocol;
0f113f3e 2511
50932c4a 2512 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
b04f9479 2513 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
a230b26e 2514 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
0f113f3e 2515 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2516 }
2517
50932c4a 2518 return 1;
0f113f3e 2519}
e481f9b9 2520#endif
0f113f3e 2521
50932c4a 2522static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 2523{
50932c4a 2524 unsigned int length, type, size;
0f113f3e
MC		 2525 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2526 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2527
e481f9b9 2528#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 2529 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
e481f9b9 2530#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2531 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2532
b548a1f1
RS		 2533 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2534 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0f113f3e 2535
0f113f3e 2536 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f113f3e 2537
e7f0d921
DSH		 2538 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2539
50932c4a 2540 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
0f113f3e
MC		 2541 goto ri_check;
2542
50932c4a 2543 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 return 0;
2546 }
2547
aa474d1f
EK		 2548 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 return 0;
2551 }
2552
50932c4a 2553 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
b6981744 2554 const unsigned char *data;
50932c4a 2555 PACKET spkt;
0f113f3e 2556
50932c4a 2557 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
a230b26e 2558 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
0f113f3e
MC		 2559 goto ri_check;
2560
2561 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2562 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2563
2564 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
50932c4a 2565 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
0f113f3e
MC		 2566 return 0;
2567 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2568 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2569 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2570 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2571 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2572 return 0;
2573 }
2574 tlsext_servername = 1;
2575 }
e481f9b9 2576#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e 2577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
50932c4a
MC		 2578 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2579 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
a230b26e 2580 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2581 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 return 0;
2583 }
2584 if (!s->hit) {
2585 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
b548a1f1 2586 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
0f113f3e
MC		 2587 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2588 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2589 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2590 return 0;
2591 }
2592 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2593 ecpointformatlist_length;
50932c4a
MC		 2594 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2596 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2598 return 0;
2599 }
2600
0f113f3e 2601 }
0f113f3e 2602 }
a230b26e 2603#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 2604
2605 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2606 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2607 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2608 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2609 {
2610 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2611 return 0;
2612 }
2613 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2615 return 0;
2616 }
2617 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
a230b26e 2618 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2619 /*
2620 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2621 * request message.
2622 */
2623 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2624 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2625 return 0;
2626 }
2627 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2628 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2629 }
ed29e82a
RP		 2630#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2631 /*
2632 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2633 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2634 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2635 */
2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2637 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2638 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2639 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2640 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2641 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2642 }
2643 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2644 if (size > 0) {
2645 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2646 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 return 0;
2649 }
2650 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2651 }
2652 }
2653#endif
e481f9b9 2654#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC		 2655 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2656 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2657 unsigned char *selected;
2658 unsigned char selected_len;
0f113f3e
MC		 2659 /* We must have requested it. */
2660 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2661 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 return 0;
2663 }
2664 /* The data must be valid */
50932c4a 2665 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2666 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2667 return 0;
2668 }
a230b26e
EK		 2669 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2670 size,
2671 s->
2672 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
0f113f3e
MC		 2673 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 return 0;
2676 }
c31dbed7
MC		 2677 /*
2678 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2679 * a single Serverhello
2680 */
2681 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
0f113f3e 2682 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
a71edf3b 2683 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 return 0;
2686 }
2687 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2688 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2689 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2690 }
e481f9b9 2691#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2692
2693 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2694 unsigned len;
0f113f3e 2695 /* We must have requested it. */
817cd0d5 2696 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2697 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2698 return 0;
2699 }
50e735f9
MC		 2700 /*-
2701 * The extension data consists of:
2702 * uint16 list_length
2703 * uint8 proto_length;
2704 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2705 */
50932c4a 2706 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
a230b26e
EK		 2707 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2708 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2710 return 0;
2711 }
b548a1f1 2712 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
0f113f3e 2713 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
a71edf3b 2714 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2715 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 return 0;
2717 }
50932c4a
MC		 2718 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2720 return 0;
2721 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2722 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2723 }
e481f9b9 2724#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 2725 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
50932c4a 2726 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
0f113f3e
MC		 2727 return 0;
2728 }
e481f9b9 2729#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2731 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
cde6145b
DW		 2732 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2733 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
0f113f3e
MC		 2734 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2735 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f1e51ea 2736 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
94ed2c67 2737 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
e7f0d921 2738 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
ddc06b35
DSH		 2739 if (!s->hit)
2740 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
d7c42d71 2741 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
94ed2c67 2742 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
d7c42d71
MC		 2743 unsigned int group_id;
2744 PACKET encoded_pt;
2745 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2746
2747 /* Sanity check */
2748 if (ckey == NULL) {
2749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 return 0;
2752 }
2753
2754 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2755 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2757 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 return 0;
2759 }
2760
2761 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2762 /*
2763 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2764 * key_share!
2765 */
2766 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2768 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2769 return 0;
2770 }
2771
323f212a
MC		 2772 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2773 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
d7c42d71
MC		 2774 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2776 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2777 return 0;
2778 }
2779
94ed2c67 2780 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
d7c42d71
MC		 2781 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2782 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2783 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2785 return 0;
2786 }
2787
0f1e51ea
MC		 2788 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2789 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2791 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2792 return 0;
2793 }
d7c42d71 2794 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
0f113f3e
MC		 2795 /*
2796 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2797 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2798 */
d7c42d71 2799 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
0f113f3e 2800 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2801 }
2802
50932c4a 2803 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2805 return 0;
2806 }
2807
2808 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2809 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2810 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
a230b26e
EK		 2811 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2812 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
0f113f3e
MC		 2813 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2814 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2815 return 0;
2816 }
2817 } else {
2818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2819 return 0;
2820 }
2821 }
2822 }
2823
0f113f3e
MC		 2824 ri_check:
2825
2826 /*
2827 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2828 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2829 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2830 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
e7653f3b 2831 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
0f113f3e
MC		 2832 */
2833 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2834 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2835 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2837 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2838 return 0;
2839 }
2840
e7f0d921
DSH		 2841 if (s->hit) {
2842 /*
2843 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2844 * original session.
2845 */
2846 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2847 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2848 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2850 return 0;
a230b26e 2851 }
e7f0d921
DSH		 2852 }
2853
0f113f3e
MC		 2854 return 1;
2855}
b2172f4f 2856
36ca4ba6 2857int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 2858{
817cd0d5 2859 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2860 return 1;
2861}
36ca4ba6
BM		 2862
2863int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2864{
2865 return 1;
2866}
36ca4ba6 2867
2daceb03 2868static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2869{
2870 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2871 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2872
e481f9b9 2873#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 2874 /*
2875 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2876 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2877 */
2878 /*
2879 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2880 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2881 */
e481f9b9 2882#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2883
2884 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2885 ret =
2886 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2887 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2888 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2889 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2890 ret =
2891 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2892 s->
2893 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2894
0f113f3e
MC		 2895 switch (ret) {
2896 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2898 return -1;
2899
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2902 return 1;
2903
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2905 s->servername_done = 0;
2906 default:
2907 return 1;
2908 }
2909}
a230b26e 2910
d376e57d 2911/* Initialise digests to default values */
a0f63828 2912void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
d376e57d
DSH		 2913{
2914 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2915#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
152fbc28 2916 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d376e57d
DSH		 2917#endif
2918#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d18d31a1 2919 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
152fbc28 2920 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d18d31a1 2921 else
152fbc28 2922 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
d18d31a1 2923 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
d376e57d
DSH		 2924#endif
2925#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
152fbc28 2926 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d376e57d 2927#endif
e44380a9 2928#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
152fbc28
DSH		 2929 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2930 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
e44380a9 2932#endif
d376e57d 2933}
f1fd4544 2934
e469af8d 2935int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2936{
2937 int al;
2938 size_t i;
8483a003
F		 2939
2940 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
b548a1f1
RS		 2941 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2942 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2943 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2944 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2945 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
d376e57d 2946 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
6383d316 2947 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2948 }
2949
2950 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
76106e60 2951 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2952 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 goto err;
2956 }
2957 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2958 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
f430ba31 2960 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
0f113f3e
MC		 2961 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2962 goto err;
2963 }
d376e57d
DSH		 2964 } else {
2965 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2966 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2967 return 1;
2968 err:
2969 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2970 return 0;
2971}
e469af8d 2972
70c22888
EK		 2973/*
2974 * Upon success, returns 1.
2975 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2976 */
2977int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
0f113f3e 2978{
70c22888 2979 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2980
2981 /*
2982 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2983 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2984 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2985 * influence which certificate is sent
2986 */
2987 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
70c22888 2988 int ret;
0f113f3e
MC		 2989 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2990 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2991 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
70c22888
EK		 2992 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2993 /*
2994 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2995 * et al can pick it up.
2996 */
2997 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2998 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2999 switch (ret) {
3000 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3001 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
0f113f3e 3002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
70c22888
EK		 3003 break;
3004 /* status request response should be sent */
3005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3006 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3007 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3008 break;
3009 /* something bad happened */
3010 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3011 default:
3012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 return 0;
3014 }
0f113f3e 3015 }
817cd0d5
TS		 3016 }
3017
70c22888
EK		 3018 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3019 return 0;
0f113f3e 3020 }
70c22888
EK		 3021
3022 return 1;
0f113f3e 3023}
2daceb03 3024
36ca4ba6 3025int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3026{
3027 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3028 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3029
e481f9b9 3030#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3031 /*
3032 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3033 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3034 * must contain uncompressed.
3035 */
3036 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3037 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3038 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3039 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3040 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3041 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
ce0c1f2b 3042 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
0f113f3e
MC		 3043 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3044 size_t i;
3045 unsigned char *list;
3046 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3047 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3048 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3049 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3050 found_uncompressed = 1;
3051 break;
3052 }
3053 }
3054 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3056 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3057 return -1;
3058 }
3059 }
3060 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
a230b26e 3061#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 3062
3063 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3064 ret =
3065 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3066 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3067 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3068 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3069 ret =
3070 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3071 s->
3072 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3073
b1931d43
MC		 3074 /*
3075 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3076 * that we don't receive a status message
3077 */
bb1aaab4
MC		 3078 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3079 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
8b0e934a 3080 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3081
3082 switch (ret) {
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3084 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3085 return -1;
3086
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3088 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3089 return 1;
3090
3091 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3092 s->servername_done = 0;
3093 default:
3094 return 1;
3095 }
3096}
761772d7 3097
50932c4a 3098int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
0f113f3e
MC		 3099{
3100 int al = -1;
3101 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3102 return 1;
50932c4a 3103 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 3104 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3105 return 0;
3106 }
3107
3108 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3110 return 0;
3111 }
3112 return 1;
09e4e4b9
DSH		 3113}
3114
64386324
MC		 3115/*
3116 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3117 * type and return it.
3118 *
3119 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3120 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3121 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3122 *
3123 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3124 */
cd998837
MC		 3125RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3126 unsigned int type)
1ab3836b
MC		 3127{
3128 size_t loop;
3129
3130 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3131 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3132 return &exts[loop];
3133 }
3134
3135 return NULL;
3136}
3137
1d97c843 3138/*-
1ab3836b 3139 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
e7f0d921 3140 *
1ab3836b 3141 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
c519e89f
BM		 3142 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3143 * point to the resulting session.
3144 *
3145 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3146 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3147 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3148 *
3149 * Returns:
3150 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3151 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3152 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3153 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3154 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3155 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3156 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3157 *
3158 * Side effects:
3159 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3160 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3161 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3162 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3163 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3164 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3165 */
1ab3836b
MC		 3166int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3167 SSL_SESSION **ret)
0f113f3e 3168{
1ab3836b
MC		 3169 int retv;
3170 const unsigned char *etick;
3171 size_t size;
3172 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
e7f0d921 3173
0f113f3e
MC		 3174 *ret = NULL;
3175 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3176
3177 /*
9362c93e
MC		 3178 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3179 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
0f113f3e
MC		 3180 * resumption.
3181 */
1ab3836b 3182 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
0f113f3e 3183 return 0;
9ceb2426 3184
cd998837
MC		 3185 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3186 hello->num_extensions,
3187 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
1ab3836b
MC		 3188 if (ticketext == NULL)
3189 return 0;
3190
3191 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3192 if (size == 0) {
3193 /*
3194 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3195 * one.
3196 */
3197 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3198 return 1;
9ceb2426 3199 }
1ab3836b
MC		 3200 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3201 /*
3202 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3203 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3204 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3205 * calculate the master secret later.
3206 */
3207 return 2;
3208 }
3209 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3210 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3211 return -1;
3212 }
3213 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3214 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3215 switch (retv) {
3216 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3217 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3218 return 2;
9ceb2426 3219
1ab3836b
MC		 3220 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3221 return 3;
9ceb2426 3222
1ab3836b
MC		 3223 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3224 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3225 return 3;
e7f0d921 3226
1ab3836b
MC		 3227 default: /* fatal error */
3228 return -1;
0f113f3e 3229 }
1ab3836b
MC		 3230}
3231
3232/*
de7d61d5 3233 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
0f1e51ea 3234 * ClientHello and we can support it
de7d61d5
MC		 3235 * Returns:
3236 * 1 on success
3237 * 0 on error
1ab3836b 3238 */
902aca09 3239int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1ab3836b
MC		 3240{
3241 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3242
3243 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3244
0f1e51ea
MC		 3245 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3246 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
1ab3836b
MC		 3247 return 1;
3248
cd998837
MC		 3249 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3250 hello->num_extensions,
3251 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
1ab3836b
MC		 3252
3253 /*
3254 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3255 * client doesn't support EMS.
3256 */
3257 if (emsext == NULL)
3258 return 1;
3259
3260 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3261 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3262 return 0;
3263
3264 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3265
3266 return 1;
0f113f3e 3267}
6434abbf 3268
1d97c843
TH		 3269/*-
3270 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM		 3271 *
3272 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
8483a003 3273 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
c519e89f
BM		 3274 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3275 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3276 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3277 * point to the resulting session.
3278 *
3279 * Returns:
bf7c6817 3280 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
c519e89f
BM		 3281 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3282 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3283 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3284 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3285 */
0f113f3e 3286static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
d736bc1a 3287 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
ec60ccc1 3288 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
0f113f3e
MC		 3289{
3290 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3291 unsigned char *sdec;
3292 const unsigned char *p;
348240c6
MC		 3293 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3294 size_t mlen;
0f113f3e 3295 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
bf7c6817 3296 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
846ec07d 3297 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
0f113f3e 3298 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
e97763c9 3299
0f113f3e 3300 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
bf7c6817
RL		 3301 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3302 if (hctx == NULL)
3303 return -2;
846ec07d 3304 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
35b1a433
MC		 3305 if (ctx == NULL) {
3306 ret = -2;
3307 goto err;
3308 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3309 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3310 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3311 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
846ec07d 3312 ctx, hctx, 0);
0f113f3e 3313 if (rv < 0)
35b1a433
MC		 3314 goto err;
3315 if (rv == 0) {
3316 ret = 2;
3317 goto err;
3318 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3319 if (rv == 2)
3320 renew_ticket = 1;
3321 } else {
3322 /* Check key name matches */
4e2e1ec9
TS		 3323 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3324 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
35b1a433
MC		 3325 ret = 2;
3326 goto err;
3327 }
4e2e1ec9
TS		 3328 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3329 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
5f3d93e4 3330 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
a230b26e
EK		 3331 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3332 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3333 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3334 0) {
5f3d93e4 3335 goto err;
a230b26e 3336 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3337 }
3338 /*
3339 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3340 * checks on ticket.
3341 */
bf7c6817 3342 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
348240c6 3343 if (mlen == 0) {
5f3d93e4 3344 goto err;
0f113f3e 3345 }
e97763c9
DSH		 3346 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3347 if (eticklen <=
348240c6 3348 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
e97763c9
DSH		 3349 ret = 2;
3350 goto err;
3351 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3352 eticklen -= mlen;
3353 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
bf7c6817 3354 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
a230b26e 3355 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
5f3d93e4
MC		 3356 goto err;
3357 }
bf7c6817 3358 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
0f113f3e 3359 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
846ec07d 3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
0f113f3e
MC		 3361 return 2;
3362 }
3363 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3364 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
846ec07d
RL		 3365 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3366 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
0f113f3e 3367 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
348240c6
MC		 3368 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3369 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
846ec07d 3370 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
d1247df2 3371 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
0f113f3e
MC		 3372 return -1;
3373 }
348240c6 3374 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
846ec07d 3375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
0f113f3e
MC		 3376 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3377 return 2;
3378 }
348240c6 3379 slen += declen;
846ec07d
RL		 3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3381 ctx = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 3382 p = sdec;
3383
3384 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3385 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3386 if (sess) {
3387 /*
3388 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3389 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3390 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3391 * standard.
3392 */
3393 if (sesslen)
3394 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3395 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3396 *psess = sess;
3397 if (renew_ticket)
3398 return 4;
3399 else
3400 return 3;
3401 }
3402 ERR_clear_error();
3403 /*
3404 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3405 */
3406 return 2;
a230b26e 3407 err:
846ec07d 3408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
bf7c6817 3409 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
35b1a433 3410 return ret;
0f113f3e 3411}
6434abbf 3412
6b7be581
DSH		 3413/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3414
0f113f3e
MC		 3415typedef struct {
3416 int nid;
3417 int id;
3418} tls12_lookup;
6b7be581 3419
d97ed219 3420static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3421 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3422 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3423 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3424 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3425 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
e44380a9
DB		 3426 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3427 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3428 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3429 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
6b7be581
DSH		 3430};
3431
d97ed219 3432static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3433 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3434 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
e44380a9
DB		 3435 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3439};
3440
d97ed219 3441static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3442{
3443 size_t i;
3444 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3445 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3446 return table[i].id;
3447 }
3448 return -1;
3449}
e7f8ff43 3450
d97ed219 3451static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3452{
3453 size_t i;
3454 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3455 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3456 return table[i].nid;
3457 }
3458 return NID_undef;
3459}
3460
6400f338
MC		 3461int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3462{
3463 int sig_id, md_id;
418a18a2
MC		 3464
3465 if (md == NULL)
6400f338
MC		 3466 return 0;
3467 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3468 if (md_id == -1)
3469 return 0;
3470 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3471 if (sig_id == -1)
3472 return 0;
08029dfa 3473 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
6400f338
MC		 3474 return 0;
3475
3476 return 1;
3477}
3478
a2f9200f 3479int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
0f113f3e 3480{
3aeb9348 3481 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC		 3482}
3483
3484typedef struct {
3485 int nid;
3486 int secbits;
7afd2312 3487 int md_idx;
e44380a9 3488 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
0f113f3e 3489} tls12_hash_info;
b362ccab
DSH		 3490
3491static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
7afd2312
DSH		 3492 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3493 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3494 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3495 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3496 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3497 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
a230b26e
EK		 3498 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3499 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3500 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3501 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3502 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
b362ccab 3503};
a2f9200f 3504
b362ccab 3505static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e 3506{
e44380a9 3507 unsigned int i;
0f113f3e
MC		 3508 if (hash_alg == 0)
3509 return NULL;
e44380a9 3510
a230b26e 3511 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
e44380a9
DB		 3512 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3513 return tls12_md_info + i;
3514 }
3515
3516 return NULL;
0f113f3e 3517}
a2f9200f 3518
b362ccab 3519const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3520{
3521 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3522 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3523 return NULL;
3524 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
7afd2312 3525 if (!inf)
0f113f3e 3526 return NULL;
7afd2312 3527 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
0f113f3e 3528}
a2f9200f 3529
4453cd8c 3530static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3531{
3532 switch (sig_alg) {
e481f9b9 3533#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 3534 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3535 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
e481f9b9
MC		 3536#endif
3537#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
0f113f3e
MC		 3538 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3539 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
e481f9b9
MC		 3540#endif
3541#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3542 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
e481f9b9 3544#endif
a230b26e 3545#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
e44380a9
DB		 3546 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3547 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3548
3549 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3550 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3551
3552 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3553 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
a230b26e 3554#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 3555 }
3556 return -1;
3557}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3558
3559/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3560static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
0f113f3e
MC		 3561 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3562{
330dcb09 3563 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
0f113f3e
MC		 3564 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3565 return;
3566 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
b6eb9827 3567 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
0f113f3e
MC		 3568 if (phash_nid)
3569 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3570 }
3571 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
b6eb9827 3572 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC		 3573 if (psign_nid)
3574 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3575 }
3576 if (psignhash_nid) {
330dcb09 3577 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
a230b26e 3578 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
0f113f3e
MC		 3579 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3580 }
3581}
3582
b362ccab
DSH		 3583/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3584static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
0f113f3e
MC		 3585{
3586 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3587 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
7afd2312 3588 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
0f113f3e
MC		 3589 return 0;
3590 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3591 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3592 return 0;
3593 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3594 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3595}
3596
3597/*
3598 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3599 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3600 * disabled.
b362ccab
DSH		 3601 */
3602
90d9e49a 3603void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 3604{
3605 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3606 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3607 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3608 /*
3609 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3610 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3611 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3612 */
3613 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3614 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3615 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
e481f9b9 3616#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 3617 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3618 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3619 have_rsa = 1;
3620 break;
e481f9b9
MC		 3621#endif
3622#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
0f113f3e
MC		 3623 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3624 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3625 have_dsa = 1;
3626 break;
e481f9b9
MC		 3627#endif
3628#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3629 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3630 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3631 have_ecdsa = 1;
3632 break;
e481f9b9 3633#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 3634 }
3635 }
3636 if (!have_rsa)
3637 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3638 if (!have_dsa)
3639 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3640 if (!have_ecdsa)
3641 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3642}
b362ccab 3643
ae2f7b37 3644int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2c7b4dbc
MC		 3645 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3646{
3647 size_t i;
c0f9e23c 3648
2c7b4dbc
MC		 3649 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3650 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
08029dfa
MC		 3651 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3652 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
2c7b4dbc
MC		 3653 return 0;
3654 }
3655 }
3656 return 1;
3657}
3658
4453cd8c 3659/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
348240c6
MC		 3660static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3661 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3662 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3663{
3664 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3665 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3666 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3667 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3668 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3669 continue;
3670 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3671 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3672 nmatch++;
3673 if (shsig) {
3674 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3675 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3676 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3677 &shsig->sign_nid,
3678 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3679 shsig++;
3680 }
3681 break;
3682 }
3683 }
3684 }
3685 return nmatch;
3686}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3687
3688/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3689static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3690{
3691 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3692 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3693 size_t nmatch;
3694 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3695 CERT *c = s->cert;
3696 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
b548a1f1
RS		 3697
3698 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3699 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3700 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3701 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3702 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3703 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3704 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3705 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3706 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3707 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3708 } else
3709 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3710 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3711 pref = conf;
3712 preflen = conflen;
76106e60
DSH		 3713 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3714 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC		 3715 } else {
3716 allow = conf;
3717 allowlen = conflen;
76106e60
DSH		 3718 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3719 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC		 3720 }
3721 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
34e3edbf
DSH		 3722 if (nmatch) {
3723 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
a71edf3b 3724 if (salgs == NULL)
34e3edbf
DSH		 3725 return 0;
3726 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3727 } else {
3728 salgs = NULL;
3729 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3730 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3731 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3732 return 1;
3733}
4453cd8c 3734
6b7be581
DSH		 3735/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3736
d736bc1a 3737int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
0f113f3e
MC		 3738{
3739 CERT *c = s->cert;
3740 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3741 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3742 return 1;
3743 /* Should never happen */
3744 if (!c)
3745 return 0;
3746
76106e60
DSH		 3747 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3748 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3749 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
0f113f3e 3750 return 0;
76106e60
DSH		 3751 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3752 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
0f113f3e
MC		 3753 return 1;
3754}
6b7be581 3755
c800c27a 3756int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3757{
3758 int idx;
3759 size_t i;
3760 const EVP_MD *md;
d376e57d 3761 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
f7d53487 3762 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
0f113f3e
MC		 3763 CERT *c = s->cert;
3764 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3765 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3766 return 0;
3767
0f113f3e
MC		 3768 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3769 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3770 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
d376e57d 3771 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
0f113f3e 3772 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
d376e57d 3773 pmd[idx] = md;
6383d316 3774 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
0f113f3e 3775 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
6383d316 3776 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
d376e57d 3777 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
0f113f3e
MC		 3778 }
3779 }
6b7be581 3780
0f113f3e
MC		 3781 }
3782 /*
3783 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3784 * the certificate for signing.
3785 */
3786 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3787 /*
3788 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3789 * supported it stays as NULL.
3790 */
e481f9b9 3791#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d376e57d
DSH		 3792 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3793 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
e481f9b9
MC		 3794#endif
3795#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d376e57d
DSH		 3796 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3797 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3798 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
0f113f3e 3799 }
e481f9b9
MC		 3800#endif
3801#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d376e57d
DSH		 3802 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3803 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
e481f9b9 3804#endif
a230b26e 3805#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
e44380a9
DB		 3806 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3807 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3808 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
a230b26e
EK		 3809 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3810 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
e44380a9 3811 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
a230b26e
EK		 3812 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3813 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3814#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 3815 }
3816 return 1;
3817}
4817504d 3818
e7f8ff43 3819int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3820 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3821 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3822{
76106e60 3823 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
348240c6
MC		 3824 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3825 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
0f113f3e
MC		 3826 return 0;
3827 if (idx >= 0) {
3828 idx <<= 1;
76106e60 3829 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3830 return 0;
3831 psig += idx;
3832 if (rhash)
3833 *rhash = psig[0];
3834 if (rsig)
3835 *rsig = psig[1];
3836 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3837 }
348240c6 3838 return (int)numsigalgs;
0f113f3e 3839}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3840
3841int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3842 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3843 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3844{
3845 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
348240c6
MC		 3846 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3847 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
0f113f3e
MC		 3848 return 0;
3849 shsigalgs += idx;
3850 if (phash)
3851 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3852 if (psign)
3853 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3854 if (psignhash)
3855 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3856 if (rsig)
3857 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3858 if (rhash)
3859 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
348240c6 3860 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC		 3861}
3862
e481f9b9 3863#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce 3864
0f113f3e
MC		 3865typedef struct {
3866 size_t sigalgcnt;
3867 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3868} sig_cb_st;
0f229cce 3869
431f458d
DSH		 3870static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3871{
3872 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3873 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3874 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3875 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3876 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3877 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3878 } else {
3879 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3880 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3881 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3882 }
3883}
3884
0f229cce 3885static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3886{
3887 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3888 size_t i;
3889 char etmp[20], *p;
431f458d 3890 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2747d73c
KR		 3891 if (elem == NULL)
3892 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3893 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3894 return 0;
3895 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3896 return 0;
3897 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3898 etmp[len] = 0;
3899 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3900 if (!p)
3901 return 0;
3902 *p = 0;
3903 p++;
3904 if (!*p)
3905 return 0;
3906
431f458d
DSH		 3907 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3908 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
0f113f3e 3909
431f458d 3910 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
0f113f3e
MC		 3911 return 0;
3912
3913 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3914 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3915 return 0;
3916 }
3917 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3918 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3919 return 1;
3920}
3921
3922/*
9d22666e 3923 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
0f113f3e
MC		 3924 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3925 */
3dbc46df 3926int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f113f3e
MC		 3927{
3928 sig_cb_st sig;
3929 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3930 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3931 return 0;
3932 if (c == NULL)
3933 return 1;
3934 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3935}
3936
a230b26e 3937int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f113f3e
MC		 3938{
3939 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3940 int rhash, rsign;
3941 size_t i;
3942 if (salglen & 1)
3943 return 0;
3944 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3945 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3946 return 0;
3947 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
b6eb9827
DSH		 3948 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3949 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC		 3950
3951 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3952 goto err;
3953 *sptr++ = rhash;
3954 *sptr++ = rsign;
3955 }
3956
3957 if (client) {
b548a1f1 3958 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC		 3959 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3960 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3961 } else {
b548a1f1 3962 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC		 3963 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3964 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3965 }
3966
3967 return 1;
3968
3969 err:
3970 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3971 return 0;
3972}
4453cd8c 3973
d61ff83b 3974static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 3975{
3976 int sig_nid;
3977 size_t i;
3978 if (default_nid == -1)
3979 return 1;
3980 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3981 if (default_nid)
3982 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3983 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3984 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3985 return 1;
3986 return 0;
3987}
3988
6dbb6219
DSH		 3989/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3990static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 3991{
3992 X509_NAME *nm;
3993 int i;
3994 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3995 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3996 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3997 return 1;
3998 }
3999 return 0;
4000}
4001
4002/*
4003 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4004 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4005 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4006 * attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4007 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 4008
4009/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4010
e481f9b9 4011#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
0f113f3e 4012 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
6dbb6219 4013/* Strict mode flags */
e481f9b9 4014#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
0f113f3e
MC		 4015 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4016 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
6dbb6219 4017
d61ff83b 4018int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
0f113f3e
MC		 4019 int idx)
4020{
4021 int i;
4022 int rv = 0;
4023 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4024 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4025 CERT *c = s->cert;
f7d53487 4026 uint32_t *pvalid;
0f113f3e
MC		 4027 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4028 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4029 if (idx != -1) {
4030 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4031 if (idx == -2) {
4032 cpk = c->key;
348240c6 4033 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
0f113f3e
MC		 4034 } else
4035 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
6383d316 4036 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
0f113f3e
MC		 4037 x = cpk->x509;
4038 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4039 chain = cpk->chain;
4040 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4041 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4042 if (!x || !pk)
4043 goto end;
0f113f3e
MC		 4044 } else {
4045 if (!x || !pk)
d813f9eb 4046 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 4047 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4048 if (idx == -1)
d813f9eb 4049 return 0;
6383d316
DSH		 4050 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4051
0f113f3e
MC		 4052 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4053 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4054 else
4055 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4056 strict_mode = 1;
4057 }
4058
4059 if (suiteb_flags) {
4060 int ok;
4061 if (check_flags)
4062 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4063 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4064 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4066 else if (!check_flags)
4067 goto end;
4068 }
4069
4070 /*
4071 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4072 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4073 */
4074 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4075 int default_nid;
4076 unsigned char rsign = 0;
76106e60 4077 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
0f113f3e
MC		 4078 default_nid = 0;
4079 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4080 else {
4081 switch (idx) {
4082 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4083 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
0f113f3e
MC		 4084 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4085 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4086 break;
4087
4088 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
0f113f3e
MC		 4089 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4090 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4091 break;
4092
4093 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4094 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4095 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4096 break;
4097
e44380a9
DB		 4098 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4099 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4100 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4101 break;
4102
4103 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4104 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4105 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4106 break;
4107
4108 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4109 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4110 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4111 break;
4112
0f113f3e
MC		 4113 default:
4114 default_nid = -1;
4115 break;
4116 }
4117 }
4118 /*
4119 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4120 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4121 */
4122 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4123 size_t j;
4124 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4125 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4126 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4127 break;
4128 }
4129 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4130 if (check_flags)
4131 goto skip_sigs;
4132 else
4133 goto end;
4134 }
4135 }
4136 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4137 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4138 if (!check_flags)
4139 goto end;
4140 } else
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4143 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4144 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4145 if (check_flags) {
4146 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4147 break;
4148 } else
4149 goto end;
4150 }
4151 }
4152 }
4153 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4154 else if (check_flags)
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4156 skip_sigs:
4157 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4158 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4160 else if (!check_flags)
4161 goto end;
4162 if (!s->server)
4163 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4164 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4165 else if (strict_mode) {
4166 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4167 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4168 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4169 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4170 if (check_flags) {
4171 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4172 break;
4173 } else
4174 goto end;
4175 }
4176 }
4177 }
4178 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4179 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4180 int check_type = 0;
3aeb9348 4181 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 4182 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4183 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4184 break;
4185 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4186 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4187 break;
4188 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4189 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4190 break;
0f113f3e
MC		 4191 }
4192 if (check_type) {
4193 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4194 int ctypelen;
4195 if (c->ctypes) {
4196 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4197 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4198 } else {
4199 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4200 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4201 }
4202 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4203 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4204 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4205 break;
4206 }
4207 }
4208 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4209 goto end;
4210 } else
4211 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4212
4213 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4214
4215 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4216 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4217
4218 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4219 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4221 }
4222 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4223 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4224 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4225 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4226 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4227 break;
4228 }
4229 }
4230 }
4231 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4232 goto end;
4233 } else
4234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4235
4236 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4237 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4238
4239 end:
4240
4241 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
6383d316 4242 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
0f113f3e 4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
d376e57d 4244 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
0f113f3e
MC		 4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4246 } else
4247 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4248
4249 /*
4250 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4251 * chain is invalid.
4252 */
4253 if (!check_flags) {
4254 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
6383d316 4255 *pvalid = rv;
0f113f3e
MC		 4256 else {
4257 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
6383d316 4258 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
0f113f3e
MC		 4259 return 0;
4260 }
4261 }
4262 return rv;
4263}
d61ff83b
DSH		 4264
4265/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4266void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 4267{
17dd65e6
MC		 4268 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4269 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4270 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
17dd65e6 4271 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
e44380a9
DB		 4272 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4273 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4274 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
0f113f3e
MC		 4275}
4276
18d71588
DSH		 4277/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4278int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC		 4279{
4280 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4281}
d61ff83b 4282
09599b52
DSH		 4283#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4284DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4285{
4286 int dh_secbits = 80;
4287 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4288 return DH_get_1024_160();
adc5506a 4289 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 4290 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4291 dh_secbits = 128;
4292 else
4293 dh_secbits = 80;
4294 } else {
4295 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4296 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4297 }
4298
4299 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4300 DH *dhp = DH_new();
0aeddcfa 4301 BIGNUM *p, *g;
a71edf3b 4302 if (dhp == NULL)
0f113f3e 4303 return NULL;
0aeddcfa
MC		 4304 g = BN_new();
4305 if (g != NULL)
4306 BN_set_word(g, 2);
0f113f3e 4307 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
9021a5df 4308 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
0f113f3e 4309 else
9021a5df 4310 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
0aeddcfa 4311 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
0f113f3e 4312 DH_free(dhp);
0aeddcfa
MC		 4313 BN_free(p);
4314 BN_free(g);
0f113f3e
MC		 4315 return NULL;
4316 }
4317 return dhp;
4318 }
4319 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4320 return DH_get_2048_224();
4321 return DH_get_1024_160();
4322}
09599b52 4323#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4324
4325static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e 4326{
72245f34 4327 int secbits = -1;
8382fd3a 4328 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
0f113f3e 4329 if (pkey) {
72245f34
DSH		 4330 /*
4331 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4332 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4333 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4334 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4335 */
0f113f3e 4336 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
72245f34 4337 }
0f113f3e
MC		 4338 if (s)
4339 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4340 else
4341 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4342}
b362ccab
DSH		 4343
4344static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4345{
4346 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4347 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
221c7b55
DSH		 4348 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4349 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4350 return 1;
0f113f3e
MC		 4351 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4352 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4353 const EVP_MD *md;
4354 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4355 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4356 }
4357 if (s)
4358 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4359 else
4360 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4361}
b362ccab
DSH		 4362
4363int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
0f113f3e
MC		 4364{
4365 if (vfy)
4366 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4367 if (is_ee) {
4368 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4369 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4370 } else {
4371 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4372 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4373 }
4374 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4375 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4376 return 1;
4377}
4378
4379/*
4380 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4381 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4382 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
b362ccab
DSH		 4383 */
4384
4385int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
0f113f3e
MC		 4386{
4387 int rv, start_idx, i;
4388 if (x == NULL) {
4389 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4390 start_idx = 1;
4391 } else
4392 start_idx = 0;
4393
4394 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4395 if (rv != 1)
4396 return rv;
4397
4398 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4399 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4400 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4401 if (rv != 1)
4402 return rv;
4403 }
4404 return 1;
4405}
A mirror of the official openssl repository