]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blame - ssl/t1_lib.c
Fix mac-then-encrypt test with enable-tls1_3
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
846e33c7
RS
1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
f1fd4544 3 *
846e33c7
RS
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
f1fd4544 8 */
58964a49
RE
9
10#include <stdio.h>
aa474d1f 11#include <stdlib.h>
ec577822 12#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH
13#include <openssl/evp.h>
14#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 15#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
5951e840
MC
16#include <openssl/conf.h>
17#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
3c27208f
RS
18#include <openssl/dh.h>
19#include <openssl/bn.h>
58964a49 20#include "ssl_locl.h"
3c27208f 21#include <openssl/ct.h>
58964a49 22
d736bc1a 23static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
ec60ccc1 24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
0f113f3e 25 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 26static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
aa474d1f 27static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
6434abbf 28
0f113f3e
MC
29SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
30 tls1_enc,
31 tls1_mac,
32 tls1_setup_key_block,
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 tls1_alert_code,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
40 0,
a29fa98c 41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 42 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC
43 ssl3_handshake_write
44};
45
46SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
47 tls1_enc,
48 tls1_mac,
49 tls1_setup_key_block,
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_alert_code,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
a29fa98c 58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 59 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC
60 ssl3_handshake_write
61};
62
63SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_enc,
65 tls1_mac,
66 tls1_setup_key_block,
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
0f113f3e
MC
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
72 tls1_alert_code,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
a29fa98c 76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
2c7b4dbc 77 tls_close_construct_packet,
0f113f3e
MC
78 ssl3_handshake_write
79};
58964a49 80
582a17d6
MC
81SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls1_enc,
83 tls1_mac,
92760c21
MC
84 tls13_setup_key_block,
85 tls13_generate_master_secret,
86 tls13_change_cipher_state,
87 tls13_final_finish_mac,
582a17d6
MC
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
90 tls1_alert_code,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
582a17d6
MC
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 ssl3_handshake_write
97};
98
f3b656b2 99long tls1_default_timeout(void)
0f113f3e
MC
100{
101 /*
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
104 */
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
106}
58964a49 107
6b691a5c 108int tls1_new(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
109{
110 if (!ssl3_new(s))
111 return (0);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 return (1);
114}
58964a49 115
6b691a5c 116void tls1_free(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 117{
b548a1f1 118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
0f113f3e
MC
119 ssl3_free(s);
120}
58964a49 121
6b691a5c 122void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
123{
124 ssl3_clear(s);
4fa52141
VD
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
127 else
128 s->version = s->method->version;
0f113f3e 129}
58964a49 130
525de5d3 131#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 132
0f113f3e
MC
133typedef struct {
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137} tls_curve_info;
138
2dc1aeed
DSH
139/*
140 * Table of curve information.
ddb4c047 141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
2dc1aeed
DSH
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 */
0f113f3e
MC
144static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
ec24630a 173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
0f113f3e
MC
174};
175
176static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
180};
181
fe6ef247
KR
182/* The default curves */
183static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
1db3107a 184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
de57d237 185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
0f113f3e 186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
0f113f3e 187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
de57d237
EK
188};
189
190static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
1db3107a 191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
de57d237 192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
de57d237 193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
de57d237 194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
0f113f3e 195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
ddb4c047
RS
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
198
199 /*
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
202 */
0f113f3e 203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
de57d237
EK
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
de57d237
EK
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
0f113f3e
MC
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
0f113f3e
MC
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
0f113f3e
MC
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
0f113f3e
MC
225};
226
227static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
230};
2ea80354 231
ec24630a 232int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
0f113f3e 233{
ec24630a 234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
0f113f3e 235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
b6eb9827 236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
0f113f3e 237 return 0;
ec24630a
DSH
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
239 if (pflags)
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 return cinfo->nid;
0f113f3e 242}
525de5d3
DSH
243
244int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
0f113f3e 245{
2fa2d15a
DSH
246 size_t i;
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
348240c6 249 return (int)(i + 1);
0f113f3e 250 }
2fa2d15a 251 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
252}
253
740580c2
EK
254/*
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
256 * preferred list.
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 265 */
740580c2 266static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
a230b26e 267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
0f113f3e
MC
268{
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
270 if (sess) {
de4d764e
MC
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
0f113f3e
MC
273 } else {
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
279 break;
280
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 pcurveslen = 2;
284 break;
285
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 pcurveslen = 2;
289 break;
290 default:
de4d764e
MC
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
0f113f3e
MC
293 }
294 if (!*pcurves) {
fe6ef247
KR
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
0f113f3e
MC
297 }
298 }
299
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = 0;
304 return 0;
305 } else {
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
307 return 1;
308 }
309}
b362ccab
DSH
310
311/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
0f113f3e
MC
313{
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
315 if (curve[0])
316 return 1;
b6eb9827 317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
0f113f3e
MC
318 return 0;
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
322 return 0;
323# endif
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
325}
b362ccab 326
d18b716d
DSH
327/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
0f113f3e
MC
329{
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
334 return 0;
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
336 if (suiteb_flags) {
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (p[1])
339 return 0;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
342 return 0;
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
345 return 0;
346 } else /* Should never happen */
347 return 0;
348 }
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
350 return 0;
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
354 }
355 return 0;
356}
d0595f17 357
1d97c843 358/*-
de4d764e 359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
6977e8ee
KR
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
de4d764e 362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
376e2ca3 363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 364 */
de4d764e 365int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
0f113f3e
MC
366{
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
369 int k;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (s->server == 0)
372 return -1;
373 if (nmatch == -2) {
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
375 /*
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
378 */
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
385 return NID_undef;
386 }
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 nmatch = 0;
389 }
390 /*
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
393 */
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
396 &num_supp))
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
a230b26e 400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
0f113f3e 401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
3c06513f
KR
402
403 /*
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
405 * are allowed.
406 */
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
408 supp = eccurves_all;
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
a230b26e 411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
3c06513f
KR
412 pref = eccurves_all;
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 }
415
0f113f3e
MC
416 k = 0;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
422 continue;
423 if (nmatch == k) {
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
ec24630a 425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
0f113f3e
MC
426 }
427 k++;
428 }
429 }
430 }
431 if (nmatch == -1)
432 return k;
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 return NID_undef;
435}
d0595f17 436
de4d764e
MC
437int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
0f113f3e 439{
de4d764e 440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
0f113f3e
MC
441 size_t i;
442 /*
de4d764e 443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
0f113f3e
MC
444 * ids < 32
445 */
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
de4d764e
MC
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
448 if (glist == NULL)
0f113f3e 449 return 0;
de4d764e 450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
0f113f3e
MC
451 unsigned long idmask;
452 int id;
de4d764e
MC
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
0f113f3e
MC
455 idmask = 1L << id;
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
de4d764e 457 OPENSSL_free(glist);
0f113f3e
MC
458 return 0;
459 }
460 dup_list |= idmask;
461 s2n(id, p);
462 }
b548a1f1 463 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
de4d764e
MC
464 *pext = glist;
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
0f113f3e
MC
466 return 1;
467}
468
469# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470
471typedef struct {
472 size_t nidcnt;
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
474} nid_cb_st;
d0595f17
DSH
475
476static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC
477{
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
479 size_t i;
480 int nid;
481 char etmp[20];
2747d73c
KR
482 if (elem == NULL)
483 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 return 0;
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 return 0;
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 etmp[len] = 0;
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 return 0;
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 return 0;
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 return 1;
502}
503
de4d764e
MC
504/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
0f113f3e
MC
506{
507 nid_cb_st ncb;
508 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return 0;
511 if (pext == NULL)
512 return 1;
de4d764e 513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
0f113f3e
MC
514}
515
fd2b65ce
DSH
516/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
0f113f3e
MC
518 EC_KEY *ec)
519{
2235b7f2 520 int id;
0f113f3e 521 const EC_GROUP *grp;
0f113f3e
MC
522 if (!ec)
523 return 0;
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
526 if (!grp)
527 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
2235b7f2
DSH
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 if (id == 0)
533 return 0;
534 curve_id[0] = 0;
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
0f113f3e
MC
536 if (comp_id) {
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 return 0;
2235b7f2
DSH
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 } else {
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
0f113f3e
MC
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 else
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2235b7f2 546 }
0f113f3e
MC
547 }
548 return 1;
549}
550
fd2b65ce
DSH
551/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554{
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
557 int j;
558 /*
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 */
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
567 break;
568 }
569 if (i == num_formats)
570 return 0;
571 }
572 if (!curve_id)
573 return 1;
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 return 0;
b79d2410
MC
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 /*
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 */
586 break;
587 }
0f113f3e
MC
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
590 break;
591 }
592 if (i == num_curves)
593 return 0;
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
595 if (!s->server)
596 break;
597 }
598 return 1;
599}
d61ff83b 600
5087afa1 601static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
0f113f3e
MC
602 size_t *num_formats)
603{
604 /*
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 */
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 } else {
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 else
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
617 }
618}
619
620/*
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
d61ff83b 623 */
2ea80354 624static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC
625{
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
627 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
628 int rv;
8382fd3a 629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
0f113f3e
MC
630 if (!pkey)
631 return 0;
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
3aeb9348 633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
0f113f3e 634 return 1;
3aeb9348 635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
0f113f3e
MC
636 if (!rv)
637 return 0;
638 /*
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
640 * curves extension.
641 */
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 if (!rv)
644 return 0;
645 /*
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 */
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
650 int check_md;
651 size_t i;
652 CERT *c = s->cert;
653 if (curve_id[0])
654 return 0;
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 else
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 break;
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 return 0;
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
d376e57d 669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
0f113f3e 670 else
d376e57d 671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
0f113f3e
MC
672 }
673 }
674 return rv;
675}
676
10bf4fc2 677# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
6977e8ee 678/*
8483a003 679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
6977e8ee
KR
680 * @s: SSL connection
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 *
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 *
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 */
2ea80354 688int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
0f113f3e 689{
0f113f3e
MC
690 /*
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
692 * curves permitted.
693 */
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
6977e8ee 695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
0f113f3e
MC
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 else
702 return 0;
703 curve_id[0] = 0;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 return 0;
fe6ef247 707 return 1;
0f113f3e 708 }
fe6ef247 709 /* Need a shared curve */
de4d764e 710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
fe6ef247 711 return 1;
6977e8ee 712 return 0;
0f113f3e 713}
10bf4fc2 714# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d0595f17 715
14536c8c
DSH
716#else
717
718static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC
719{
720 return 1;
721}
14536c8c 722
0f113f3e 723#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 724
0f113f3e
MC
725/*
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
fc101f88
DSH
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
728 */
729
e481f9b9 730#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
a230b26e 731# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
e481f9b9
MC
732#else
733# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
734#endif
0f113f3e 735
e481f9b9 736#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
a230b26e 737# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
e481f9b9
MC
738#else
739# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
740#endif
0f113f3e 741
e481f9b9 742#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
a230b26e 743# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
e481f9b9
MC
744#else
745# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
746#endif
0f113f3e 747
e481f9b9 748#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
0f113f3e
MC
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
fc101f88 752
d97ed219 753static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
0f113f3e
MC
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
0f113f3e 758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
e44380a9
DB
759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
a230b26e
EK
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
e44380a9 763#endif
fc101f88 764};
0f113f3e 765
e481f9b9 766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d97ed219 767static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
2ea80354 770};
e481f9b9 771#endif
b7bfe69b 772size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
0f113f3e
MC
773{
774 /*
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
776 * preferences.
777 */
e481f9b9 778#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
786 return 2;
787
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
790 return 2;
791 }
e481f9b9 792#endif
0f113f3e
MC
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 } else {
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
803 }
804}
805
806/*
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
ec4a50b3
DSH
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 */
810int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812{
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
817 if (sigalg == -1)
818 return -1;
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
822 return 0;
823 }
e481f9b9 824#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3aeb9348 825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
0f113f3e
MC
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
3aeb9348 828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
0f113f3e
MC
829 return 0;
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
832 return 0;
833 }
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
836 if (curve_id[0])
837 return 0;
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
842 return 0;
843 }
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
848 return 0;
849 }
850 } else
851 return 0;
852 }
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
854 return 0;
e481f9b9 855#endif
0f113f3e
MC
856
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
861 break;
862 }
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
868 return 0;
869 }
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 if (*pmd == NULL) {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
873 return 0;
874 }
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
a230b26e 877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
0f113f3e
MC
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
879 return 0;
880 }
881 /*
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 */
d376e57d 884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
0f113f3e
MC
885 return 1;
886}
2ea80354 887
0f113f3e 888/*
3eb2aff4
KR
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 *
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
894 * by the client.
895 *
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
b7bfe69b
DSH
897 */
898void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 899{
4d69f9e6
DSH
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
4d69f9e6 902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
3eb2aff4 903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
a230b26e 904#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e
MC
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
4d69f9e6 907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
fe5eef3a 908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
0f113f3e 909 }
a230b26e 910#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
e481f9b9 911#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e 912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
4d69f9e6
DSH
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
0f113f3e 915 }
e481f9b9 916#endif
0f113f3e 917}
fc101f88 918
3eb2aff4
KR
919/*
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 *
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 */
b362ccab 927int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
0f113f3e 928{
3eb2aff4 929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
4d69f9e6 930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
0f113f3e 931 return 1;
3eb2aff4
KR
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 return 1;
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
a230b26e 935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
3eb2aff4
KR
936 return 1;
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
a230b26e 938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
3eb2aff4
KR
939 return 1;
940
0f113f3e
MC
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
942}
b362ccab
DSH
943
944static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 945{
f5ca0b04 946 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
0f113f3e
MC
947 return 0;
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
949}
ed3883d2 950
a230b26e
EK
951static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952{
aa474d1f
EK
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
955 if (u1 < u2)
956 return -1;
957 else if (u1 > u2)
958 return 1;
959 else
960 return 0;
961}
962
963/*
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
969 * occurred.
970 */
a230b26e
EK
971static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972{
aa474d1f
EK
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
976 int ret = 0;
977
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
980 unsigned int type;
981 PACKET extension;
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
984 goto done;
985 }
986 num_extensions++;
987 }
988
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
990 return 1;
991
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
995 goto done;
996 }
997
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 PACKET extension;
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 goto done;
1007 }
1008 }
1009
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 goto done;
1013 }
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1018 goto done;
1019 }
1020 ret = 1;
1021 done:
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1023 return ret;
1024}
1025
ae2f7b37 1026int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1027{
e481f9b9 1028#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d2c27a28
MC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
0f113f3e 1031 int using_ecc = 0;
c805f618 1032 int min_version, max_version, reason;
d2c27a28
MC
1033
1034 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
c805f618 1035 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
d2c27a28 1036 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
0f113f3e
MC
1037 int i;
1038 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1039 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040
1041 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
4a640fb6 1042 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
0f113f3e
MC
1043
1044 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1045 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
ce0c1f2b 1046 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
c805f618
MC
1047 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1048 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
0f113f3e
MC
1049 using_ecc = 1;
1050 break;
1051 }
1052 }
d2c27a28
MC
1053 }
1054#else
94ed2c67 1055 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
d2c27a28
MC
1056 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 return 0;
0f113f3e 1059 }
e481f9b9 1060#endif
ed3883d2 1061
0f113f3e
MC
1062 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1063 if (s->renegotiate) {
08029dfa 1064 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2f97192c
MC
1065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1067 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1070 return 0;
5a3d8eeb 1071 }
0f113f3e
MC
1072 }
1073 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1074 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 goto done;
1076
1077 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1078 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
08029dfa 1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2c7b4dbc 1080 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
de451856 1081 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1082 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
de451856 1083 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
08029dfa 1084 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
b2b3024e
MC
1085 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1086 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
0217dd19
MC
1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 return 0;
1091 }
0f113f3e 1092 }
e481f9b9 1093#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e 1094 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
2c7b4dbc 1095 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
08029dfa 1096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2c7b4dbc 1097 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
de451856
MC
1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1099 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
de451856 1101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
0217dd19 1102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
2c7b4dbc 1103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
0217dd19
MC
1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1107 return 0;
0f113f3e 1108 }
0f113f3e 1109 }
e481f9b9 1110#endif
0f113f3e 1111
e481f9b9 1112#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
1113 if (using_ecc) {
1114 /*
1115 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1116 */
d2c27a28
MC
1117 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1118 size_t num_formats;
0f113f3e 1119 size_t i;
0f113f3e
MC
1120
1121 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1122
08029dfa 1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2c7b4dbc 1124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
de451856 1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
b2b3024e 1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
0217dd19 1127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1129 return 0;
0f113f3e 1130 }
4817504d 1131
0f113f3e 1132 /*
de4d764e 1133 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
0f113f3e 1134 */
de4d764e
MC
1135 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1136 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
2c7b4dbc 1137 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
0f113f3e 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1139 return 0;
0f113f3e 1140 }
d2c27a28 1141 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
ee2ffc27 1142
de4d764e
MC
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1144 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
de451856
MC
1145 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 return 0;
1149 }
0f113f3e 1150 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
d2c27a28 1151 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
0f113f3e 1152 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
d2c27a28
MC
1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1154 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 return 0;
1158 }
0f113f3e
MC
1159 }
1160 }
0217dd19 1161 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return 0;
1164 }
0f113f3e 1165 }
a230b26e 1166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC
1167
1168 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
348240c6 1169 size_t ticklen;
0f113f3e
MC
1170 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1171 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1172 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1174 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1175 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2c7b4dbc
MC
1176 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 return 0;
1179 }
0f113f3e
MC
1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1181 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1182 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1183 } else
1184 ticklen = 0;
1185 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1186 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1187 goto skip_ext;
2c7b4dbc 1188
08029dfa 1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
b2b3024e
MC
1190 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1191 ticklen)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1193 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
1194 }
1195 }
1196 skip_ext:
1197
f7aa3185 1198 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
0f113f3e
MC
1199 size_t salglen;
1200 const unsigned char *salg;
2c7b4dbc 1201
0f113f3e 1202 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
2c7b4dbc 1203
08029dfa 1204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2c7b4dbc 1205 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
de451856 1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1207 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
de451856 1208 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
0217dd19
MC
1209 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1210 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1211 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 return 0;
1214 }
0f113f3e 1215 }
3e41ac35 1216#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
0f113f3e
MC
1217 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1218 int i;
0f113f3e 1219
08029dfa 1220 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2c7b4dbc 1221 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
de451856 1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
08029dfa 1223 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2c7b4dbc 1224 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
de451856 1225 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
0f113f3e 1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1230 unsigned char *idbytes;
1231 int idlen;
1232 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2c7b4dbc 1233
0f113f3e 1234 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
2c7b4dbc
MC
1235 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1236 if (idlen <= 0
1237 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
dd8710dc 1238 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
b2b3024e 1239 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return 0;
1242 }
1243 }
0217dd19 1244 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
de451856 1245 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return 0;
860c3dd1 1248 }
0f113f3e 1249 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1250 unsigned char *extbytes;
1251 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
0f113f3e 1252
2c7b4dbc
MC
1253 if (extlen < 0) {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
0217dd19 1257 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
2c7b4dbc
MC
1258 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1259 != extlen) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return 0;
1262 }
1263 }
0217dd19 1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
0f113f3e 1267 }
0f113f3e 1268 }
3e41ac35 1269#endif
0f113f3e 1270
e481f9b9 1271#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1273 /*
8483a003 1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
0f113f3e
MC
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1276 */
08029dfa
MC
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 return 0;
1281 }
0f113f3e 1282 }
e481f9b9 1283#endif
0f113f3e 1284
817cd0d5
TS
1285 /*
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1289 */
0f113f3e 1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
08029dfa
MC
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2c7b4dbc 1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
de451856 1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
b2b3024e
MC
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
0217dd19 1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 return 0;
1300 }
817cd0d5 1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
0f113f3e 1302 }
e481f9b9 1303#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
7facdbd6 1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
2c7b4dbc
MC
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1307 int i, ct;
2c7b4dbc 1308
08029dfa 1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2c7b4dbc 1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
de451856 1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2c7b4dbc 1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
de451856 1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
69f68237 1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1315 return 0;
69f68237 1316 }
2c7b4dbc
MC
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
08029dfa 1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324 }
7facdbd6
MC
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1326 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1327 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2c7b4dbc 1330 return 0;
0f113f3e 1331 }
0f113f3e 1332 }
e481f9b9 1333#endif
0f113f3e
MC
1334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1335 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
2c7b4dbc
MC
1336 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 return 0;
1339 }
1340
cde6145b
DW
1341 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
08029dfa 1343 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
cde6145b
DW
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
2c7b4dbc
MC
1347 }
1348
ed29e82a
RP
1349#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1350 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
08029dfa
MC
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
ed29e82a 1356 }
e481f9b9 1357#endif
2c7b4dbc 1358
08029dfa
MC
1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
0f113f3e 1364
c805f618
MC
1365 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1366 if (reason != 0) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370
d2c27a28 1371 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
c805f618
MC
1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1373 int currv;
d2c27a28
MC
1374 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1375
1376 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1377 /* supported_versions extension */
b5b253b1
MC
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 return 0;
1383 }
c805f618 1384
f2342b7a
MC
1385 /*
1386 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1387 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1388 * reviewed later.
1389 */
b5b253b1
MC
1390 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1391 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1392 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1393 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402 }
1403 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 return 0;
1406 }
d2c27a28
MC
1407
1408
1409 /* key_share extension */
1410 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1411 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1413 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 return 0;
1417 }
1418
1419 /*
1420 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1421 * now, just send one
1422 */
1423 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
94ed2c67
MC
1424 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1425 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1426 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1427 size_t encodedlen;
1428
1429 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1430 continue;
1431
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 return 0;
1437 }
d2c27a28 1438
94ed2c67
MC
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1444 return 0;
1445 }
d2c27a28 1446
94ed2c67
MC
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1449 &encodedPoint);
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1453 return 0;
1454 }
d2c27a28 1455
94ed2c67
MC
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
d2c27a28 1462 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
94ed2c67 1463 return 0;
d2c27a28 1464 }
94ed2c67
MC
1465
1466 /*
1467 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1468 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1469 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1470 */
1471 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1472 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1473 sharessent++;
1474 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
d2c27a28
MC
1475 }
1476 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return 0;
1479 }
b5b253b1
MC
1480 }
1481
0f113f3e
MC
1482 /*
1483 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1485 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1486 * appear last.
1487 */
1488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1489 unsigned char *padbytes;
1490 size_t hlen;
1491
ae2f7b37 1492 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 return 0;
1495 }
a3680c8f 1496
0f113f3e
MC
1497 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1498 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1499 if (hlen >= 4)
1500 hlen -= 4;
1501 else
1502 hlen = 0;
1503
08029dfa 1504 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
b2b3024e 1505 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
2c7b4dbc
MC
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
0f113f3e
MC
1510 }
1511 }
5a3d8eeb 1512
0f113f3e 1513 done:
2c7b4dbc 1514 return 1;
0f113f3e 1515}
333f926d 1516
94ed2c67
MC
1517/*
1518 * Add the key_share extension.
1519 *
1520 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1521 */
1522static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1523{
1524 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1525 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1526 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1527
1528 if (ckey == NULL) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 return 0;
1538 }
1539
1540 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
884a790e
MC
1541 if (skey == NULL) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1543 return 0;
1544 }
94ed2c67
MC
1545
1546 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1547 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1548 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1550 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1551 return 0;
1552 }
1553
1554 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1555 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1558 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1559 return 0;
1560 }
1561 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1562
1563 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1564 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1565 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 return 0;
1569 }
1570
1571 return 1;
1572}
1573
8157d44b 1574int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1575{
e481f9b9 1576#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 1577 int next_proto_neg_seen;
e481f9b9
MC
1578#endif
1579#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
1580 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1581 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
ce0c1f2b 1582 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
0f113f3e 1583 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
e481f9b9 1584#endif
0f113f3e 1585
8157d44b
MC
1586 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 return 0;
1590 }
333f926d 1591
8157d44b
MC
1592 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1593 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
1596 }
1597
1598 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1599 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1600 goto done;
1601
1602 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
8157d44b
MC
1603 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1604 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 return 0;
1608 }
0f113f3e 1609 }
e481f9b9 1610#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
1611 if (using_ecc) {
1612 const unsigned char *plist;
1613 size_t plistlen;
1614 /*
1615 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1616 */
0f113f3e
MC
1617 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1618
8157d44b
MC
1619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1620 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1621 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1622 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
8157d44b 1624 return 0;
0f113f3e 1625 }
0f113f3e
MC
1626 }
1627 /*
1628 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1629 * extension
1630 */
a230b26e 1631#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC
1632
1633 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
8157d44b
MC
1634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1635 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1637 return 0;
1638 }
5c753de6 1639 } else {
a230b26e
EK
1640 /*
1641 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1642 * later
1643 */
5c753de6 1644 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
1645 }
1646
1647 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
8157d44b
MC
1648 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1649 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 return 0;
1652 }
0f113f3e 1653 }
e481f9b9 1654#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
8157d44b
MC
1656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1659 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1660 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1661 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
0f113f3e 1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
8157d44b 1663 return 0;
0f113f3e 1664 }
0f113f3e 1665 }
e481f9b9 1666#endif
0f113f3e
MC
1667
1668 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1669 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1670 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1671 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1672 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1673 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1674 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1675 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1676 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1677 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1678 };
8157d44b
MC
1679 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1681 return 0;
1682 }
0f113f3e 1683 }
0f113f3e 1684
e481f9b9 1685#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC
1686 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1689 const unsigned char *npa;
1690 unsigned int npalen;
1691 int r;
1692
1693 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1694 s->
1695 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
8157d44b
MC
1697 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1698 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 return 0;
1701 }
0f113f3e
MC
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1703 }
1704 }
e481f9b9 1705#endif
bcec3358 1706
94ed2c67
MC
1707 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1708 return 0;
bcec3358 1709
8157d44b
MC
1710 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1712 return 0;
1713 }
1714
0f113f3e
MC
1715 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1716 /*
1717 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1718 * for other cases too.
1719 */
1720 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
e44380a9
DB
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1722 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1723 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
0f113f3e
MC
1724 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1725 else {
8157d44b
MC
1726 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1727 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 return 0;
1730 }
0f113f3e
MC
1731 }
1732 }
e7f0d921 1733 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
8157d44b
MC
1734 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1735 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 return 0;
1738 }
ddc06b35 1739 }
0f113f3e 1740
817cd0d5 1741 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
8157d44b
MC
1742 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1743 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1744 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1745 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1746 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1747 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1748 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1749 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1751 return 0;
1752 }
0f113f3e
MC
1753 }
1754
1755 done:
8157d44b
MC
1756 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760 return 1;
0f113f3e 1761}
a398f821 1762
0f113f3e 1763/*
817cd0d5 1764 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
06217867
EK
1765 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1767 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
0f113f3e 1768 */
9ceb2426 1769static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 1770{
06217867 1771 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
0f113f3e 1772
06217867 1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
0f113f3e 1774
06217867
EK
1775 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1776 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1777 return 0;
1778 }
0f113f3e 1779
06217867 1780 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
9ceb2426 1781 do {
06217867
EK
1782 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1783 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1784 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1785 return 0;
1786 }
1787 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1788
817cd0d5 1789 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
a230b26e 1790 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
817cd0d5
TS
1791 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1792 return 0;
1793 }
1794
1795 return 1;
1796}
1797
1798/*
1799 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
817cd0d5 1800 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
70c22888 1801 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
817cd0d5 1802 */
70c22888 1803static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
817cd0d5
TS
1804{
1805 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1806 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1807
1808 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1809 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1810 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
348240c6 1811 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
817cd0d5 1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
0f113f3e 1813
817cd0d5
TS
1814 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1817 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
817cd0d5
TS
1819 return 0;
1820 }
1821 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
0351baae
TS
1822#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1823 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1824 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1825#endif
817cd0d5
TS
1826 } else {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
06217867 1828 return 0;
0f113f3e 1829 }
0f113f3e 1830 }
0f113f3e 1831
06217867 1832 return 1;
0f113f3e 1833}
6f017a8f 1834
e481f9b9 1835#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH
1836/*-
1837 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
3d33f3bb 1838 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
dece3209
RS
1839 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * SNI,
1841 * elliptic_curves
1842 * ec_point_formats
1843 *
1844 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1845 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1846 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1847 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1848 */
902aca09 1849static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
0f113f3e 1850{
06217867
EK
1851 unsigned int type;
1852 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1853 size_t ext_len;
9ceb2426 1854
0f113f3e
MC
1855 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1856 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1857 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1859 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1860 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1861 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1862
1863 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1864 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1865 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1866 0x00, /* uncompressed */
06217867 1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0f113f3e
MC
1868 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1869 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1870 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1871 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1873 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1874 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1875 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 };
1877
06217867
EK
1878 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1879 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1880
1ab3836b 1881 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
68a16628
MC
1882
1883 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
06217867
EK
1884 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
0f113f3e 1886 return;
06217867 1887 }
0f113f3e
MC
1888
1889 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 return;
1891
06217867
EK
1892 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1893 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
0f113f3e 1894
06217867
EK
1895 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 ext_len);
dece3209 1897}
a230b26e 1898#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e 1899
ef7daaf9
MC
1900
1901/*
1902 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1903 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1904 *
94ed2c67 1905 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
ef7daaf9
MC
1906 */
1907static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1908{
1909#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1910 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1911 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1912 hello->num_extensions,
1913 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1914
1915 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1916 return 1;
1917
1918 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1919 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1920 &supported_groups_list)
1921 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1922 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1923 return 0;
1924 }
1925
1926 if (!s->hit
1927 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1928 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1929 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1930 return 0;
1931 }
1932#endif
1933 return 1;
1934}
1935
1936/*
1937 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1938 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
94ed2c67
MC
1939 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1940 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
ef7daaf9
MC
1941 */
1942static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1943 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1944 int checkallow)
1945{
1946 size_t i;
1947
1948 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1949 return 0;
1950
1951 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1952 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
94ed2c67 1953
ef7daaf9
MC
1954 if (group_id == share_id
1955 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1956 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1957 break;
1958 }
1959 }
1960
94ed2c67
MC
1961 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1962 return i < num_groups;
1963}
1964
1965/*
1966 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1967 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1968 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1969 */
1970static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1971{
1972 unsigned int group_id;
1973 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
9a519880
MC
1974 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1975 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
94ed2c67
MC
1976 int group_nid, found = 0;
1977 unsigned int curve_flags;
1978
1979 /* Sanity check */
1980 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ef7daaf9
MC
1983 return 0;
1984 }
1985
94ed2c67
MC
1986 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1989 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992
9a519880
MC
1993 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1994 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1998 return 0;
1999 }
2000
2001 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2002 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2003 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008
94ed2c67
MC
2009 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2011 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2012 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2013 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2015 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2016 return 0;
2017 }
2018
2019 /*
2020 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2021 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2022 */
2023 if (found)
2024 continue;
2025
2026 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
9a519880 2027 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
94ed2c67
MC
2028 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2030 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2031 return 0;
2032 }
2033
2034 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
9a519880 2035 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
94ed2c67
MC
2036 /* Share not suitable */
2037 continue;
2038 }
2039
2040 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2041
2042 if (group_nid == 0) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2045 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2046 return 0;
2047 }
2048
2049 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2050 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2051 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2052
2053 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2056 EVP_PKEY_free(key);
2057 return 0;
2058 }
2059 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2060 } else {
2061 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2062 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2063 if (pctx == NULL
2064 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2065 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2066 group_nid) <= 0
2067 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2070 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2074 pctx = NULL;
2075 }
2076 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2077
2078 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2079 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2080 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2083 return 0;
2084 }
2085
2086 found = 1;
2087 }
2088
ef7daaf9
MC
2089 return 1;
2090}
2091
06217867 2092/*
64386324
MC
2093 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2094 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2095 * object as required.
06217867
EK
2096 *
2097 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2098 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2099 * ignored.
2100 *
64386324 2101 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
06217867
EK
2102 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2103 */
1ab3836b 2104static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
0f113f3e 2105{
1ab3836b 2106 size_t loop;
0f113f3e
MC
2107 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2108
06217867 2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
0f113f3e
MC
2110 s->servername_done = 0;
2111 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
e481f9b9 2112#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
e481f9b9 2114#endif
0f113f3e 2115
b548a1f1
RS
2116 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2117 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0351baae
TS
2118 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2120 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2121 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
0f113f3e 2122
e481f9b9 2123#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e 2124 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1ab3836b 2125 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
a230b26e 2126#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC
2127
2128 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
76106e60
DSH
2129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2130 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
0f113f3e 2131 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f113f3e 2132
e481f9b9 2133#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
b548a1f1
RS
2134 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2135 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
e481f9b9 2136#endif
0f113f3e
MC
2137
2138 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2139
ef7daaf9
MC
2140 /*
2141 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2142 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2143 */
2144 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2145 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148
06217867
EK
2149 /*
2150 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2151 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2152 * resumption.
2153 */
1ab3836b 2154 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
b1b4b543
MC
2155 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2156
0f113f3e 2157 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
b1b4b543
MC
2158 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2159 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2160 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
06217867 2161 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
9ceb2426 2162
b1b4b543 2163 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1ab3836b 2164 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
b1b4b543 2165 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e
MC
2166 return 0;
2167 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2168 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2169 }
1d97c843
TH
2170/*-
2171 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2172 *
2173 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2174 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2175 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2176 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2177 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
0f113f3e
MC
2178 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2179 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2180 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1d97c843
TH
2181 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2182 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2183 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2184 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2185 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
0f113f3e 2186 * the value of the Host: field.
1d97c843 2187 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
0f113f3e
MC
2188 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2189 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2190 * extension.
2191 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1d97c843 2192 *
0f113f3e 2193 */
ed3883d2 2194
b1b4b543 2195 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
9ceb2426 2196 unsigned int servname_type;
06217867
EK
2197 PACKET sni, hostname;
2198
b1b4b543 2199 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
06217867
EK
2200 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2201 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2202 return 0;
0f113f3e 2203 }
6f017a8f 2204
06217867
EK
2205 /*
2206 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2207 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
8483a003 2208 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
06217867
EK
2209 * such.
2210 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2211 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2212 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2213 *
2214 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2215 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2216 */
2217 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2218 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2219 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222
2223 if (!s->hit) {
2224 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228
2229 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2231 return 0;
2232 }
2233
2234 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 return 0;
2237 }
2238
2239 s->servername_done = 1;
2240 } else {
2241 /*
2242 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2243 * fall back to a full handshake.
2244 */
2245 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2246 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2247 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2248 }
0f113f3e 2249 }
e481f9b9 2250#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
b1b4b543 2251 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
06217867
EK
2252 PACKET srp_I;
2253
b1b4b543 2254 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
06217867
EK
2255 return 0;
2256
2257 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2258 return 0;
2259
2260 /*
2261 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2262 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2263 */
2264 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2265 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2266 return 0;
2267 }
0f113f3e 2268 }
e481f9b9 2269#endif
0f113f3e 2270
e481f9b9 2271#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
b1b4b543 2272 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
06217867 2273 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
0f113f3e 2274
b1b4b543 2275 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
1ab3836b 2276 &ec_point_format_list)
06217867
EK
2277 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2278 return 0;
2279 }
9ceb2426 2280
0f113f3e 2281 if (!s->hit) {
06217867
EK
2282 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2283 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
a230b26e
EK
2284 &s->
2285 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
0f113f3e
MC
2286 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2287 return 0;
2288 }
0f113f3e 2289 }
0f113f3e 2290 }
a230b26e 2291#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
9362c93e
MC
2292 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2293 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
06217867 2294 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1ab3836b 2295 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
b1b4b543
MC
2296 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2297 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1ab3836b 2298 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
0f113f3e
MC
2299 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 return 0;
2301 }
b1b4b543 2302 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
06217867
EK
2303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2304
b1b4b543 2305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1ab3836b 2306 &supported_sig_algs)
06217867
EK
2307 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2308 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2309 return 0;
2310 }
2311
a230b26e 2312 if (!s->hit) {
06217867
EK
2313 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2314 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2315 return 0;
2316 }
9ceb2426 2317 }
b1b4b543
MC
2318 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2319 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
06217867
EK
2320 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2321 return 0;
2322 }
3e41ac35 2323#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
0f113f3e 2324 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
3e41ac35 2325 const unsigned char *ext_data;
06217867 2326 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
a230b26e 2327 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
b1b4b543 2328 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
06217867
EK
2329 return 0;
2330
e408c09b
MC
2331 /*
2332 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2333 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2334 */
2335 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2336 OCSP_RESPID_free);
2337 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2339 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 return 0;
2342 }
2343 } else {
2344 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2345 }
2346
06217867 2347 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
0f113f3e 2348 OCSP_RESPID *id;
06217867
EK
2349 PACKET responder_id;
2350 const unsigned char *id_data;
9ceb2426 2351
06217867
EK
2352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2353 &responder_id)
2354 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2355 return 0;
9ceb2426 2356 }
06217867 2357
06217867 2358 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
348240c6 2359 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
06217867 2360 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
348240c6 2361 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
06217867
EK
2362 if (id == NULL)
2363 return 0;
2364
2365 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
0f113f3e 2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
0f113f3e
MC
2367 return 0;
2368 }
06217867 2369
0f113f3e
MC
2370 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 return 0;
2374 }
2375 }
4817504d 2376
0f113f3e 2377 /* Read in request_extensions */
1ab3836b 2378 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
b1b4b543 2379 &currext->data, &exts))
06217867
EK
2380 return 0;
2381
2382 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2383 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
222561fe
RS
2384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
0f113f3e 2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
06217867 2387 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
348240c6 2388 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
06217867
EK
2389 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2390 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2391 return 0;
2392 }
0f113f3e 2393 }
3e41ac35
MC
2394 } else
2395#endif
2396 {
2397 /*
2398 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2399 */
0f113f3e 2400 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
06217867 2401 }
0f113f3e 2402 }
e481f9b9 2403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
b1b4b543 2404 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
1ab3836b 2405 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
50e735f9
MC
2406 /*-
2407 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2408 * renegotiation.
2409 *
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
8483a003 2412 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
50e735f9
MC
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2416 *
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2422 */
0f113f3e
MC
2423 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2424 }
e481f9b9 2425#endif
0f113f3e 2426
b1b4b543 2427 else if (currext->type
1ab3836b
MC
2428 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2429 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2430 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
b1b4b543 2431 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e 2432 return 0;
0f113f3e 2433 }
5e3ff62c 2434
0f113f3e 2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
e481f9b9 2436#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 2437 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
b1b4b543 2438 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1ab3836b 2439 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
b1b4b543 2440 &currext->data, al))
0f113f3e
MC
2441 return 0;
2442 }
e481f9b9 2443#endif
b1b4b543 2444 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
b1834ad7 2445 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
0f113f3e 2446 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
b1834ad7 2447 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
94ed2c67
MC
2448 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2449 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2450 return 0;
b1834ad7 2451 }
e7f0d921
DSH
2452 /*
2453 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
1ab3836b 2454 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
e7f0d921
DSH
2455 */
2456
0f113f3e
MC
2457 /*
2458 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2459 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2460 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2461 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2462 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2463 */
2464 else if (!s->hit) {
b1b4b543
MC
2465 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2466 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2467 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
0f113f3e
MC
2468 return 0;
2469 }
0f113f3e 2470 }
6f017a8f 2471
0f113f3e
MC
2472 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2473
2474 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2475 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2476 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2478 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2479 return 0;
2480 }
2481
06217867
EK
2482 /*
2483 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2484 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2485 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2486 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2487 */
0f113f3e
MC
2488 return 1;
2489}
2490
1ab3836b 2491int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
0f113f3e
MC
2492{
2493 int al = -1;
2494 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
1ab3836b 2495 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC
2496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2497 return 0;
2498 }
0f113f3e
MC
2499 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2501 return 0;
2502 }
2503 return 1;
2504}
2505
e481f9b9 2506#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC
2507/*
2508 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2509 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2510 * fill the length of the block.
2511 */
50932c4a 2512static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
0f113f3e 2513{
b04f9479 2514 PACKET tmp_protocol;
0f113f3e 2515
50932c4a 2516 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
b04f9479 2517 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
a230b26e 2518 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
0f113f3e 2519 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2520 }
2521
50932c4a 2522 return 1;
0f113f3e 2523}
e481f9b9 2524#endif
0f113f3e 2525
50932c4a 2526static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
0f113f3e 2527{
50932c4a 2528 unsigned int length, type, size;
0f113f3e
MC
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2531
e481f9b9 2532#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e 2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
e481f9b9 2534#endif
0f113f3e
MC
2535 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2536
b548a1f1
RS
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
0f113f3e 2539
0f113f3e 2540 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f113f3e 2541
e7f0d921
DSH
2542 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2543
50932c4a 2544 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
0f113f3e
MC
2545 goto ri_check;
2546
50932c4a 2547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
0f113f3e
MC
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 return 0;
2550 }
2551
aa474d1f
EK
2552 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2553 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2554 return 0;
2555 }
2556
50932c4a 2557 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
b6981744 2558 const unsigned char *data;
50932c4a 2559 PACKET spkt;
0f113f3e 2560
50932c4a 2561 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
a230b26e 2562 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
0f113f3e
MC
2563 goto ri_check;
2564
2565 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2566 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2567
2568 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
50932c4a 2569 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
0f113f3e
MC
2570 return 0;
2571 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2572 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2573 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2576 return 0;
2577 }
2578 tlsext_servername = 1;
2579 }
e481f9b9 2580#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e 2581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
50932c4a
MC
2582 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2583 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
a230b26e 2584 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
0f113f3e
MC
2585 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 return 0;
2587 }
2588 if (!s->hit) {
2589 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
b548a1f1 2590 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
0f113f3e
MC
2591 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2592 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2594 return 0;
2595 }
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2597 ecpointformatlist_length;
50932c4a
MC
2598 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2599 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2600 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
0f113f3e 2605 }
0f113f3e 2606 }
a230b26e 2607#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC
2608
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2610 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2611 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2612 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2613 {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 return 0;
2616 }
2617 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
a230b26e 2622 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
0f113f3e
MC
2623 /*
2624 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2625 * request message.
2626 */
2627 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2628 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2629 return 0;
2630 }
2631 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2632 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2633 }
ed29e82a
RP
2634#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2635 /*
2636 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2637 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2638 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2639 */
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2641 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2642 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2643 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2645 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2646 }
2647 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2648 if (size > 0) {
2649 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2650 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 return 0;
2653 }
2654 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2655 }
2656 }
2657#endif
e481f9b9 2658#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC
2659 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2660 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2661 unsigned char *selected;
2662 unsigned char selected_len;
0f113f3e
MC
2663 /* We must have requested it. */
2664 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 return 0;
2667 }
2668 /* The data must be valid */
50932c4a 2669 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
0f113f3e
MC
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
a230b26e
EK
2673 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2674 size,
2675 s->
2676 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
0f113f3e
MC
2677 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 return 0;
2680 }
c31dbed7
MC
2681 /*
2682 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2683 * a single Serverhello
2684 */
2685 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
0f113f3e 2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
a71edf3b 2687 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
0f113f3e
MC
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 return 0;
2690 }
2691 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2692 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2694 }
e481f9b9 2695#endif
0f113f3e
MC
2696
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2698 unsigned len;
0f113f3e 2699 /* We must have requested it. */
817cd0d5 2700 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
0f113f3e
MC
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2702 return 0;
2703 }
50e735f9
MC
2704 /*-
2705 * The extension data consists of:
2706 * uint16 list_length
2707 * uint8 proto_length;
2708 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2709 */
50932c4a 2710 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
a230b26e
EK
2711 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2712 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
0f113f3e
MC
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 return 0;
2715 }
b548a1f1 2716 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
0f113f3e 2717 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
a71edf3b 2718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
0f113f3e
MC
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 return 0;
2721 }
50932c4a
MC
2722 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 return 0;
2725 }
0f113f3e
MC
2726 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2727 }
e481f9b9 2728#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
0f113f3e 2729 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
50932c4a 2730 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
0f113f3e
MC
2731 return 0;
2732 }
e481f9b9 2733#endif
0f113f3e
MC
2734 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2735 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
cde6145b
DW
2736 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2737 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
0f113f3e
MC
2738 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2739 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
0f1e51ea 2740 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
94ed2c67 2741 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
e7f0d921 2742 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
ddc06b35
DSH
2743 if (!s->hit)
2744 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
d7c42d71 2745 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
94ed2c67 2746 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
d7c42d71
MC
2747 unsigned int group_id;
2748 PACKET encoded_pt;
2749 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2750
2751 /* Sanity check */
2752 if (ckey == NULL) {
2753 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757
2758 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2759 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764
2765 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2766 /*
2767 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2768 * key_share!
2769 */
2770 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2772 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2773 return 0;
2774 }
2775
323f212a
MC
2776 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2777 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
d7c42d71
MC
2778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 return 0;
2782 }
2783
94ed2c67 2784 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
884a790e
MC
2785 if (skey == NULL) {
2786 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788 return 0;
2789 }
d7c42d71
MC
2790 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2791 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796
0f1e51ea
MC
2797 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2801 return 0;
2802 }
d7c42d71 2803 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
0f113f3e
MC
2804 /*
2805 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2806 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2807 */
d7c42d71 2808 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
0f113f3e 2809 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2810 }
2811
50932c4a 2812 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
0f113f3e
MC
2813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816
2817 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2818 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2819 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
a230b26e
EK
2820 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2821 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
0f113f3e
MC
2822 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2823 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2824 return 0;
2825 }
2826 } else {
2827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 return 0;
2829 }
2830 }
2831 }
2832
0f113f3e
MC
2833 ri_check:
2834
2835 /*
2836 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2837 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2838 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2839 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
e7653f3b 2840 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
0f113f3e
MC
2841 */
2842 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2843 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2847 return 0;
2848 }
2849
e7f0d921
DSH
2850 if (s->hit) {
2851 /*
2852 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2853 * original session.
2854 */
2855 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2856 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2857 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2859 return 0;
a230b26e 2860 }
e7f0d921
DSH
2861 }
2862
0f113f3e
MC
2863 return 1;
2864}
b2172f4f 2865
36ca4ba6 2866int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 2867{
817cd0d5 2868 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2869 return 1;
2870}
36ca4ba6
BM
2871
2872int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
2873{
2874 return 1;
2875}
36ca4ba6 2876
2daceb03 2877static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
2878{
2879 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2880 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2881
e481f9b9 2882#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
2883 /*
2884 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2885 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2886 */
2887 /*
2888 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2889 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2890 */
e481f9b9 2891#endif
0f113f3e
MC
2892
2893 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2894 ret =
2895 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2896 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2898 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2899 ret =
2900 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2901 s->
2902 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2903
0f113f3e
MC
2904 switch (ret) {
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2907 return -1;
2908
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2911 return 1;
2912
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done = 0;
2915 default:
2916 return 1;
2917 }
2918}
a230b26e 2919
d376e57d 2920/* Initialise digests to default values */
a0f63828 2921void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
d376e57d
DSH
2922{
2923 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2924#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
152fbc28 2925 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d376e57d
DSH
2926#endif
2927#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d18d31a1 2928 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
152fbc28 2929 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d18d31a1 2930 else
152fbc28 2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
d18d31a1 2932 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
d376e57d
DSH
2933#endif
2934#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
152fbc28 2935 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
d376e57d 2936#endif
e44380a9 2937#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
152fbc28
DSH
2938 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2939 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2940 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
e44380a9 2941#endif
d376e57d 2942}
f1fd4544 2943
e469af8d 2944int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
2945{
2946 int al;
2947 size_t i;
8483a003
F
2948
2949 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
b548a1f1
RS
2950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2951 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2952 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2953 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2954 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
d376e57d 2955 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
6383d316 2956 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2957 }
2958
2959 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
76106e60 2960 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
0f113f3e
MC
2961 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2964 goto err;
2965 }
2966 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2967 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
f430ba31 2969 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
0f113f3e
MC
2970 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2971 goto err;
2972 }
d376e57d
DSH
2973 } else {
2974 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2975 }
0f113f3e
MC
2976 return 1;
2977 err:
2978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2979 return 0;
2980}
e469af8d 2981
70c22888
EK
2982/*
2983 * Upon success, returns 1.
2984 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2985 */
2986int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
0f113f3e 2987{
70c22888 2988 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
2989
2990 /*
2991 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2992 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2993 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2994 * influence which certificate is sent
2995 */
2996 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
70c22888 2997 int ret;
0f113f3e
MC
2998 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2999 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3000 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
70c22888
EK
3001 if (certpkey != NULL) {
3002 /*
3003 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3004 * et al can pick it up.
3005 */
3006 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3007 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3008 switch (ret) {
3009 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3010 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
0f113f3e 3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
70c22888
EK
3012 break;
3013 /* status request response should be sent */
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3015 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3016 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3017 break;
3018 /* something bad happened */
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3020 default:
3021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3022 return 0;
3023 }
0f113f3e 3024 }
817cd0d5
TS
3025 }
3026
70c22888
EK
3027 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3028 return 0;
0f113f3e 3029 }
70c22888
EK
3030
3031 return 1;
0f113f3e 3032}
2daceb03 3033
36ca4ba6 3034int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
3035{
3036 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3037 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3038
e481f9b9 3039#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
3040 /*
3041 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3042 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3043 * must contain uncompressed.
3044 */
3045 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3046 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3047 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3048 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3049 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3050 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
ce0c1f2b 3051 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
0f113f3e
MC
3052 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3053 size_t i;
3054 unsigned char *list;
3055 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3056 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3057 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3058 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3059 found_uncompressed = 1;
3060 break;
3061 }
3062 }
3063 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3065 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3066 return -1;
3067 }
3068 }
3069 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
a230b26e 3070#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC
3071
3072 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3073 ret =
3074 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3075 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3076 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3077 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3078 ret =
3079 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3080 s->
3081 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3082
b1931d43
MC
3083 /*
3084 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3085 * that we don't receive a status message
3086 */
bb1aaab4
MC
3087 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3088 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
8b0e934a 3089 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
3090
3091 switch (ret) {
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3094 return -1;
3095
3096 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3097 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3098 return 1;
3099
3100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3101 s->servername_done = 0;
3102 default:
3103 return 1;
3104 }
3105}
761772d7 3106
50932c4a 3107int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
0f113f3e
MC
3108{
3109 int al = -1;
3110 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3111 return 1;
50932c4a 3112 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3114 return 0;
3115 }
3116
3117 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3119 return 0;
3120 }
3121 return 1;
09e4e4b9
DSH
3122}
3123
64386324
MC
3124/*
3125 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3126 * type and return it.
3127 *
3128 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3129 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3130 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3131 *
3132 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3133 */
cd998837
MC
3134RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3135 unsigned int type)
1ab3836b
MC
3136{
3137 size_t loop;
3138
3139 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3140 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3141 return &exts[loop];
3142 }
3143
3144 return NULL;
3145}
3146
1d97c843 3147/*-
1ab3836b 3148 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
e7f0d921 3149 *
1ab3836b 3150 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
c519e89f
BM
3151 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3152 * point to the resulting session.
3153 *
3154 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3155 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3156 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3157 *
3158 * Returns:
3159 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3160 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3161 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3162 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3163 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3164 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3165 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3166 *
3167 * Side effects:
3168 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3169 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3170 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3171 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3172 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3173 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3174 */
1ab3836b
MC
3175int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3176 SSL_SESSION **ret)
0f113f3e 3177{
1ab3836b
MC
3178 int retv;
3179 const unsigned char *etick;
3180 size_t size;
3181 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
e7f0d921 3182
0f113f3e
MC
3183 *ret = NULL;
3184 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3185
3186 /*
9362c93e
MC
3187 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3188 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
0f113f3e
MC
3189 * resumption.
3190 */
1ab3836b 3191 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
0f113f3e 3192 return 0;
9ceb2426 3193
cd998837
MC
3194 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3195 hello->num_extensions,
3196 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
1ab3836b
MC
3197 if (ticketext == NULL)
3198 return 0;
3199
3200 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3201 if (size == 0) {
3202 /*
3203 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3204 * one.
3205 */
3206 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3207 return 1;
9ceb2426 3208 }
1ab3836b
MC
3209 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3210 /*
3211 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3212 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3213 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3214 * calculate the master secret later.
3215 */
3216 return 2;
3217 }
3218 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3219 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3220 return -1;
3221 }
3222 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3223 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3224 switch (retv) {
3225 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3226 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3227 return 2;
9ceb2426 3228
1ab3836b
MC
3229 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3230 return 3;
9ceb2426 3231
1ab3836b
MC
3232 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3233 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3234 return 3;
e7f0d921 3235
1ab3836b
MC
3236 default: /* fatal error */
3237 return -1;
0f113f3e 3238 }
1ab3836b
MC
3239}
3240
3241/*
de7d61d5 3242 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
0f1e51ea 3243 * ClientHello and we can support it
de7d61d5
MC
3244 * Returns:
3245 * 1 on success
3246 * 0 on error
1ab3836b 3247 */
902aca09 3248int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1ab3836b
MC
3249{
3250 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3251
3252 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3253
0f1e51ea
MC
3254 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3255 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
1ab3836b
MC
3256 return 1;
3257
cd998837
MC
3258 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3259 hello->num_extensions,
3260 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
1ab3836b
MC
3261
3262 /*
3263 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3264 * client doesn't support EMS.
3265 */
3266 if (emsext == NULL)
3267 return 1;
3268
3269 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3270 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3271 return 0;
3272
3273 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3274
3275 return 1;
0f113f3e 3276}
6434abbf 3277
1d97c843
TH
3278/*-
3279 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM
3280 *
3281 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
8483a003 3282 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
c519e89f
BM
3283 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3284 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3285 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3286 * point to the resulting session.
3287 *
3288 * Returns:
bf7c6817 3289 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
c519e89f
BM
3290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3291 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3293 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3294 */
0f113f3e 3295static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
d736bc1a 3296 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
ec60ccc1 3297 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
0f113f3e
MC
3298{
3299 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3300 unsigned char *sdec;
3301 const unsigned char *p;
348240c6
MC
3302 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3303 size_t mlen;
0f113f3e 3304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
bf7c6817 3305 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
846ec07d 3306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
0f113f3e 3307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
e97763c9 3308
0f113f3e 3309 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
bf7c6817
RL
3310 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3311 if (hctx == NULL)
3312 return -2;
846ec07d 3313 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
35b1a433
MC
3314 if (ctx == NULL) {
3315 ret = -2;
3316 goto err;
3317 }
0f113f3e
MC
3318 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3319 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3320 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
846ec07d 3321 ctx, hctx, 0);
0f113f3e 3322 if (rv < 0)
35b1a433
MC
3323 goto err;
3324 if (rv == 0) {
3325 ret = 2;
3326 goto err;
3327 }
0f113f3e
MC
3328 if (rv == 2)
3329 renew_ticket = 1;
3330 } else {
3331 /* Check key name matches */
4e2e1ec9
TS
3332 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3333 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
35b1a433
MC
3334 ret = 2;
3335 goto err;
3336 }
4e2e1ec9
TS
3337 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3338 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
5f3d93e4 3339 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
a230b26e
EK
3340 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3341 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3342 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3343 0) {
5f3d93e4 3344 goto err;
a230b26e 3345 }
0f113f3e
MC
3346 }
3347 /*
3348 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3349 * checks on ticket.
3350 */
bf7c6817 3351 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
348240c6 3352 if (mlen == 0) {
5f3d93e4 3353 goto err;
0f113f3e 3354 }
e97763c9
DSH
3355 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3356 if (eticklen <=
348240c6 3357 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
e97763c9
DSH
3358 ret = 2;
3359 goto err;
3360 }
0f113f3e
MC
3361 eticklen -= mlen;
3362 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
bf7c6817 3363 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
a230b26e 3364 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
5f3d93e4
MC
3365 goto err;
3366 }
bf7c6817 3367 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
0f113f3e 3368 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
846ec07d 3369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
0f113f3e
MC
3370 return 2;
3371 }
3372 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3373 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
846ec07d
RL
3374 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3375 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
0f113f3e 3376 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
348240c6
MC
3377 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3378 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
846ec07d 3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
d1247df2 3380 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
0f113f3e
MC
3381 return -1;
3382 }
348240c6 3383 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
846ec07d 3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
0f113f3e
MC
3385 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3386 return 2;
3387 }
348240c6 3388 slen += declen;
846ec07d
RL
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3390 ctx = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC
3391 p = sdec;
3392
3393 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3394 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3395 if (sess) {
3396 /*
3397 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3398 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3399 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3400 * standard.
3401 */
3402 if (sesslen)
3403 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3404 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3405 *psess = sess;
3406 if (renew_ticket)
3407 return 4;
3408 else
3409 return 3;
3410 }
3411 ERR_clear_error();
3412 /*
3413 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3414 */
3415 return 2;
a230b26e 3416 err:
846ec07d 3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
bf7c6817 3418 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
35b1a433 3419 return ret;
0f113f3e 3420}
6434abbf 3421
6b7be581
DSH
3422/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3423
0f113f3e
MC
3424typedef struct {
3425 int nid;
3426 int id;
3427} tls12_lookup;
6b7be581 3428
d97ed219 3429static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
0f113f3e
MC
3430 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3431 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3432 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3433 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3434 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
e44380a9
DB
3435 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
6b7be581
DSH
3439};
3440
d97ed219 3441static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
0f113f3e
MC
3442 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3443 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
e44380a9
DB
3444 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3445 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3446 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3447 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
6b7be581
DSH
3448};
3449
d97ed219 3450static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC
3451{
3452 size_t i;
3453 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3454 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3455 return table[i].id;
3456 }
3457 return -1;
3458}
e7f8ff43 3459
d97ed219 3460static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC
3461{
3462 size_t i;
3463 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3464 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3465 return table[i].nid;
3466 }
3467 return NID_undef;
3468}
3469
6400f338
MC
3470int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3471{
3472 int sig_id, md_id;
418a18a2
MC
3473
3474 if (md == NULL)
6400f338
MC
3475 return 0;
3476 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3477 if (md_id == -1)
3478 return 0;
3479 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3480 if (sig_id == -1)
3481 return 0;
08029dfa 3482 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
6400f338
MC
3483 return 0;
3484
3485 return 1;
3486}
3487
a2f9200f 3488int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
0f113f3e 3489{
3aeb9348 3490 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC
3491}
3492
3493typedef struct {
3494 int nid;
3495 int secbits;
7afd2312 3496 int md_idx;
e44380a9 3497 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
0f113f3e 3498} tls12_hash_info;
b362ccab
DSH
3499
3500static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
7afd2312
DSH
3501 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3502 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3503 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3504 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3505 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3506 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
a230b26e
EK
3507 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3508 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3509 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3510 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3511 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
b362ccab 3512};
a2f9200f 3513
b362ccab 3514static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e 3515{
e44380a9 3516 unsigned int i;
0f113f3e
MC
3517 if (hash_alg == 0)
3518 return NULL;
e44380a9 3519
a230b26e 3520 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
e44380a9
DB
3521 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3522 return tls12_md_info + i;
3523 }
3524
3525 return NULL;
0f113f3e 3526}
a2f9200f 3527
b362ccab 3528const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC
3529{
3530 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3531 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3532 return NULL;
3533 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
7afd2312 3534 if (!inf)
0f113f3e 3535 return NULL;
7afd2312 3536 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
0f113f3e 3537}
a2f9200f 3538
4453cd8c 3539static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
0f113f3e
MC
3540{
3541 switch (sig_alg) {
e481f9b9 3542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC
3543 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3544 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
e481f9b9
MC
3545#endif
3546#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
0f113f3e
MC
3547 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3548 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
e481f9b9
MC
3549#endif
3550#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
3551 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3552 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
e481f9b9 3553#endif
a230b26e 3554#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
e44380a9
DB
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3557
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3560
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
a230b26e 3563#endif
0f113f3e
MC
3564 }
3565 return -1;
3566}
4453cd8c
DSH
3567
3568/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3569static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
0f113f3e
MC
3570 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3571{
330dcb09 3572 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
0f113f3e
MC
3573 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3574 return;
3575 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
b6eb9827 3576 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
0f113f3e
MC
3577 if (phash_nid)
3578 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3579 }
3580 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
b6eb9827 3581 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC
3582 if (psign_nid)
3583 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3584 }
3585 if (psignhash_nid) {
330dcb09 3586 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
a230b26e 3587 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
0f113f3e
MC
3588 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3589 }
3590}
3591
b362ccab
DSH
3592/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3593static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
0f113f3e
MC
3594{
3595 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3596 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
7afd2312 3597 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
0f113f3e
MC
3598 return 0;
3599 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3600 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3601 return 0;
3602 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3603 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3604}
3605
3606/*
3607 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3608 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3609 * disabled.
b362ccab
DSH
3610 */
3611
90d9e49a 3612void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
0f113f3e
MC
3613{
3614 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3615 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3616 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3617 /*
3618 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3619 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3620 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3621 */
3622 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3623 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3624 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
e481f9b9 3625#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC
3626 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3627 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3628 have_rsa = 1;
3629 break;
e481f9b9
MC
3630#endif
3631#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
0f113f3e
MC
3632 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3633 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3634 have_dsa = 1;
3635 break;
e481f9b9
MC
3636#endif
3637#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC
3638 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3639 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3640 have_ecdsa = 1;
3641 break;
e481f9b9 3642#endif
0f113f3e
MC
3643 }
3644 }
3645 if (!have_rsa)
3646 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3647 if (!have_dsa)
3648 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3649 if (!have_ecdsa)
3650 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3651}
b362ccab 3652
ae2f7b37 3653int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2c7b4dbc
MC
3654 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3655{
3656 size_t i;
c0f9e23c 3657
2c7b4dbc
MC
3658 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3659 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
08029dfa
MC
3660 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3661 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
2c7b4dbc
MC
3662 return 0;
3663 }
3664 }
3665 return 1;
3666}
3667
4453cd8c 3668/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
348240c6
MC
3669static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3670 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3671 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
0f113f3e
MC
3672{
3673 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3674 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3675 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3676 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3677 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3678 continue;
3679 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3680 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3681 nmatch++;
3682 if (shsig) {
3683 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3684 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3685 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3686 &shsig->sign_nid,
3687 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3688 shsig++;
3689 }
3690 break;
3691 }
3692 }
3693 }
3694 return nmatch;
3695}
4453cd8c
DSH
3696
3697/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3698static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
3699{
3700 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3701 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3702 size_t nmatch;
3703 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3704 CERT *c = s->cert;
3705 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
b548a1f1
RS
3706
3707 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3708 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3709 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
0f113f3e
MC
3710 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3711 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3712 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3713 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3714 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3715 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3716 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3717 } else
3718 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3719 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3720 pref = conf;
3721 preflen = conflen;
76106e60
DSH
3722 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3723 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC
3724 } else {
3725 allow = conf;
3726 allowlen = conflen;
76106e60
DSH
3727 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3728 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC
3729 }
3730 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
34e3edbf
DSH
3731 if (nmatch) {
3732 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
a71edf3b 3733 if (salgs == NULL)
34e3edbf
DSH
3734 return 0;
3735 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3736 } else {
3737 salgs = NULL;
3738 }
0f113f3e
MC
3739 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3740 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3741 return 1;
3742}
4453cd8c 3743
6b7be581
DSH
3744/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3745
d736bc1a 3746int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
0f113f3e
MC
3747{
3748 CERT *c = s->cert;
3749 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3750 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3751 return 1;
3752 /* Should never happen */
3753 if (!c)
3754 return 0;
3755
76106e60
DSH
3756 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3757 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3758 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
0f113f3e 3759 return 0;
76106e60
DSH
3760 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3761 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
0f113f3e
MC
3762 return 1;
3763}
6b7be581 3764
c800c27a 3765int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
3766{
3767 int idx;
3768 size_t i;
3769 const EVP_MD *md;
d376e57d 3770 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
f7d53487 3771 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
0f113f3e
MC
3772 CERT *c = s->cert;
3773 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3774 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3775 return 0;
3776
0f113f3e
MC
3777 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3778 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3779 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
d376e57d 3780 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
0f113f3e 3781 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
d376e57d 3782 pmd[idx] = md;
6383d316 3783 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
0f113f3e 3784 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
6383d316 3785 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
d376e57d 3786 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
0f113f3e
MC
3787 }
3788 }
6b7be581 3789
0f113f3e
MC
3790 }
3791 /*
3792 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3793 * the certificate for signing.
3794 */
3795 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3796 /*
3797 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3798 * supported it stays as NULL.
3799 */
e481f9b9 3800#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d376e57d
DSH
3801 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3802 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
e481f9b9
MC
3803#endif
3804#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d376e57d
DSH
3805 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3806 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3807 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
0f113f3e 3808 }
e481f9b9
MC
3809#endif
3810#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d376e57d
DSH
3811 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3812 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
e481f9b9 3813#endif
a230b26e 3814#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
e44380a9
DB
3815 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3816 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3817 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
a230b26e
EK
3818 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3819 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
e44380a9 3820 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
a230b26e
EK
3821 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3822 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3823#endif
0f113f3e
MC
3824 }
3825 return 1;
3826}
4817504d 3827
e7f8ff43 3828int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC
3829 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3830 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3831{
76106e60 3832 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
348240c6
MC
3833 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3834 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
0f113f3e
MC
3835 return 0;
3836 if (idx >= 0) {
3837 idx <<= 1;
76106e60 3838 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
0f113f3e
MC
3839 return 0;
3840 psig += idx;
3841 if (rhash)
3842 *rhash = psig[0];
3843 if (rsig)
3844 *rsig = psig[1];
3845 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3846 }
348240c6 3847 return (int)numsigalgs;
0f113f3e 3848}
4453cd8c
DSH
3849
3850int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC
3851 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3852 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3853{
3854 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
348240c6
MC
3855 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3856 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
0f113f3e
MC
3857 return 0;
3858 shsigalgs += idx;
3859 if (phash)
3860 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3861 if (psign)
3862 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3863 if (psignhash)
3864 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3865 if (rsig)
3866 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3867 if (rhash)
3868 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
348240c6 3869 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
0f113f3e
MC
3870}
3871
e481f9b9 3872#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce 3873
0f113f3e
MC
3874typedef struct {
3875 size_t sigalgcnt;
3876 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3877} sig_cb_st;
0f229cce 3878
431f458d
DSH
3879static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3880{
3881 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3882 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3883 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3884 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3885 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3886 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3887 } else {
3888 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3889 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3890 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3891 }
3892}
3893
0f229cce 3894static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC
3895{
3896 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3897 size_t i;
3898 char etmp[20], *p;
431f458d 3899 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2747d73c
KR
3900 if (elem == NULL)
3901 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
3902 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3903 return 0;
3904 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3905 return 0;
3906 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3907 etmp[len] = 0;
3908 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3909 if (!p)
3910 return 0;
3911 *p = 0;
3912 p++;
3913 if (!*p)
3914 return 0;
3915
431f458d
DSH
3916 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3917 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
0f113f3e 3918
431f458d 3919 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
0f113f3e
MC
3920 return 0;
3921
3922 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3923 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3924 return 0;
3925 }
3926 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3927 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3928 return 1;
3929}
3930
3931/*
9d22666e 3932 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
0f113f3e
MC
3933 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3934 */
3dbc46df 3935int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f113f3e
MC
3936{
3937 sig_cb_st sig;
3938 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3939 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3940 return 0;
3941 if (c == NULL)
3942 return 1;
3943 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3944}
3945
a230b26e 3946int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f113f3e
MC
3947{
3948 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3949 int rhash, rsign;
3950 size_t i;
3951 if (salglen & 1)
3952 return 0;
3953 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3954 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3955 return 0;
3956 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
b6eb9827
DSH
3957 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3958 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
0f113f3e
MC
3959
3960 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3961 goto err;
3962 *sptr++ = rhash;
3963 *sptr++ = rsign;
3964 }
3965
3966 if (client) {
b548a1f1 3967 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC
3968 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3969 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3970 } else {
b548a1f1 3971 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
0f113f3e
MC
3972 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3973 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3974 }
3975
3976 return 1;
3977
3978 err:
3979 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3980 return 0;
3981}
4453cd8c 3982
d61ff83b 3983static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
0f113f3e
MC
3984{
3985 int sig_nid;
3986 size_t i;
3987 if (default_nid == -1)
3988 return 1;
3989 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3990 if (default_nid)
3991 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3992 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3993 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3994 return 1;
3995 return 0;
3996}
3997
6dbb6219
DSH
3998/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3999static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC
4000{
4001 X509_NAME *nm;
4002 int i;
4003 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4004 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4005 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4006 return 1;
4007 }
4008 return 0;
4009}
4010
4011/*
4012 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4013 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4014 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4015 * attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4016 */
6dbb6219
DSH
4017
4018/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4019
e481f9b9 4020#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
0f113f3e 4021 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
6dbb6219 4022/* Strict mode flags */
e481f9b9 4023#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
0f113f3e
MC
4024 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4025 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
6dbb6219 4026
d61ff83b 4027int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
0f113f3e
MC
4028 int idx)
4029{
4030 int i;
4031 int rv = 0;
4032 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4033 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4034 CERT *c = s->cert;
f7d53487 4035 uint32_t *pvalid;
0f113f3e
MC
4036 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4037 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4038 if (idx != -1) {
4039 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4040 if (idx == -2) {
4041 cpk = c->key;
348240c6 4042 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
0f113f3e
MC
4043 } else
4044 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
6383d316 4045 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
0f113f3e
MC
4046 x = cpk->x509;
4047 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4048 chain = cpk->chain;
4049 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4050 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4051 if (!x || !pk)
4052 goto end;
0f113f3e
MC
4053 } else {
4054 if (!x || !pk)
d813f9eb 4055 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC
4056 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4057 if (idx == -1)
d813f9eb 4058 return 0;
6383d316
DSH
4059 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4060
0f113f3e
MC
4061 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4062 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4063 else
4064 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4065 strict_mode = 1;
4066 }
4067
4068 if (suiteb_flags) {
4069 int ok;
4070 if (check_flags)
4071 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4072 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4073 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4075 else if (!check_flags)
4076 goto end;
4077 }
4078
4079 /*
4080 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4081 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4082 */
4083 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4084 int default_nid;
4085 unsigned char rsign = 0;
76106e60 4086 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
0f113f3e
MC
4087 default_nid = 0;
4088 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4089 else {
4090 switch (idx) {
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4092 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
0f113f3e
MC
4093 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4094 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4095 break;
4096
4097 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
0f113f3e
MC
4098 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4099 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4100 break;
4101
4102 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4103 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4104 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4105 break;
4106
e44380a9
DB
4107 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4108 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4109 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4110 break;
4111
4112 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4113 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4114 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4115 break;
4116
4117 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4118 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4119 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4120 break;
4121
0f113f3e
MC
4122 default:
4123 default_nid = -1;
4124 break;
4125 }
4126 }
4127 /*
4128 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4129 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4130 */
4131 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4132 size_t j;
4133 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4134 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4135 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4136 break;
4137 }
4138 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4139 if (check_flags)
4140 goto skip_sigs;
4141 else
4142 goto end;
4143 }
4144 }
4145 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4146 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4147 if (!check_flags)
4148 goto end;
4149 } else
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4152 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4153 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4154 if (check_flags) {
4155 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4156 break;
4157 } else
4158 goto end;
4159 }
4160 }
4161 }
4162 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4163 else if (check_flags)
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4165 skip_sigs:
4166 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4167 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4169 else if (!check_flags)
4170 goto end;
4171 if (!s->server)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4173 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4174 else if (strict_mode) {
4175 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4177 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4178 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4179 if (check_flags) {
4180 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4181 break;
4182 } else
4183 goto end;
4184 }
4185 }
4186 }
4187 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4188 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4189 int check_type = 0;
3aeb9348 4190 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
0f113f3e
MC
4191 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4192 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4193 break;
4194 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4195 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4196 break;
4197 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4198 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4199 break;
0f113f3e
MC
4200 }
4201 if (check_type) {
4202 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4203 int ctypelen;
4204 if (c->ctypes) {
4205 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4206 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4207 } else {
4208 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4209 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4210 }
4211 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4212 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4214 break;
4215 }
4216 }
4217 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4218 goto end;
4219 } else
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4221
4222 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4223
4224 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4225 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4226
4227 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4228 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4229 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4230 }
4231 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4232 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4233 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4234 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4235 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4236 break;
4237 }
4238 }
4239 }
4240 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4241 goto end;
4242 } else
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4244
4245 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4246 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4247
4248 end:
4249
4250 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
6383d316 4251 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
0f113f3e 4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
d376e57d 4253 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
0f113f3e
MC
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4255 } else
4256 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4257
4258 /*
4259 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4260 * chain is invalid.
4261 */
4262 if (!check_flags) {
4263 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
6383d316 4264 *pvalid = rv;
0f113f3e
MC
4265 else {
4266 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
6383d316 4267 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
0f113f3e
MC
4268 return 0;
4269 }
4270 }
4271 return rv;
4272}
d61ff83b
DSH
4273
4274/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4275void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 4276{
17dd65e6
MC
4277 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4278 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4279 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
17dd65e6 4280 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
e44380a9
DB
4281 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4282 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4283 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
0f113f3e
MC
4284}
4285
18d71588
DSH
4286/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4287int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC
4288{
4289 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4290}
d61ff83b 4291
09599b52
DSH
4292#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4293DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC
4294{
4295 int dh_secbits = 80;
4296 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4297 return DH_get_1024_160();
adc5506a 4298 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
0f113f3e
MC
4299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4300 dh_secbits = 128;
4301 else
4302 dh_secbits = 80;
4303 } else {
4304 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4305 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4306 }
4307
4308 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4309 DH *dhp = DH_new();
0aeddcfa 4310 BIGNUM *p, *g;
a71edf3b 4311 if (dhp == NULL)
0f113f3e 4312 return NULL;
0aeddcfa
MC
4313 g = BN_new();
4314 if (g != NULL)
4315 BN_set_word(g, 2);
0f113f3e 4316 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
9021a5df 4317 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
0f113f3e 4318 else
9021a5df 4319 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
0aeddcfa 4320 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
0f113f3e 4321 DH_free(dhp);
0aeddcfa
MC
4322 BN_free(p);
4323 BN_free(g);
0f113f3e
MC
4324 return NULL;
4325 }
4326 return dhp;
4327 }
4328 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4329 return DH_get_2048_224();
4330 return DH_get_1024_160();
4331}
09599b52 4332#endif
b362ccab
DSH
4333
4334static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e 4335{
72245f34 4336 int secbits = -1;
8382fd3a 4337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
0f113f3e 4338 if (pkey) {
72245f34
DSH
4339 /*
4340 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4341 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4342 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4343 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4344 */
0f113f3e 4345 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
72245f34 4346 }
0f113f3e
MC
4347 if (s)
4348 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4349 else
4350 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4351}
b362ccab
DSH
4352
4353static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC
4354{
4355 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4356 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
221c7b55
DSH
4357 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4358 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4359 return 1;
0f113f3e
MC
4360 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4361 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4362 const EVP_MD *md;
4363 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4364 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4365 }
4366 if (s)
4367 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4368 else
4369 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4370}
b362ccab
DSH
4371
4372int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
0f113f3e
MC
4373{
4374 if (vfy)
4375 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4376 if (is_ee) {
4377 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4378 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4379 } else {
4380 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4381 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4382 }
4383 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4384 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4385 return 1;
4386}
4387
4388/*
4389 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4390 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4391 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
b362ccab
DSH
4392 */
4393
4394int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
0f113f3e
MC
4395{
4396 int rv, start_idx, i;
4397 if (x == NULL) {
4398 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4399 start_idx = 1;
4400 } else
4401 start_idx = 0;
4402
4403 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4404 if (rv != 1)
4405 return rv;
4406
4407 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4408 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4409 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4410 if (rv != 1)
4411 return rv;
4412 }
4413 return 1;
4414}